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Abstract		This	thesis	argues	that	affect	is	a	technology	of	rule	deployed	by	the	military	institution	in	Pakistan	to	shape	its	relationship	with	soldiers	and	their	families	and	draw	their	service	and	sacrifice.	This	affective	disciplining	extends	to	the	military’s	relationship	with	the	nation,	in	which	the	bodies	and	families	of	dead	soldiers	serve	as	conduits	for	communication.	The	thesis	explores	service	and	death	in	the	Pakistani	military	ethnographically,	privileging	the	lived	experiences	of	subaltern	soldiers	and	their	families.	The	research	material	is	drawn	from	in-depth	interviews	and	participant	observation	spread	over	a	period	of	13	months	in	rural	Punjab	and	at	the	ceremonies	and	recruitment	centres	of	the	military	itself.		Building	on	Michel	Foucault’s	notion	of	governmentality,	according	to	which	statecraft	is	invested	in	governing	both	the	polity	and	the	affective	selves	of	subjects,	this	thesis	situates	militarism	as	a	set	of	gendered	governing	practices	which	not	only	control	affective	selves	but	also	produce	them	by	reworking	affect	and	attachment	through	the	concerns	of	the	military.	It	records	the	limits	of	the	military's	hegemonic	power	by	documenting	spaces	for	contestation	in	these	complicit	relationships	and	analyses	the	reasons	for	these	moments	of	disaffection	being	folded	back	into	tropes	of	sacrifice	and	service	for	the	nation-state.		To	support	its	claims,	the	thesis	analyses	various	disciplinary	practices	set	in	motion	by	the	Pakistani	military,	such	as	the	manufacture	of	the	soldier,	the	management	of	grief,	the	crafting	of	commemorative	spectacles	and	the	masking	of	regimes	of	compensation	for	military	death.	It	argues	that	affective	disciplining	works	closely	alongside	the	material	gains	that	the	military	offers	its	subjects,	and	that	it	is	these	two	drivers,	not	the	scripts	of	nation	and	religion,	that	bind	soldiers	and	their	families	to	the	military	institution.		
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Introduction As	 I	 watched	 the	 Youm-e-Difah	 (Defence	 Day)2	ceremony	 at	 the	 Army	General	Headquarters	(GHQ)	in	Rawalpindi,	the	colourful	stage	surrounded	by	 larger	 than	 life	 screens	went	 dark.	 The	music	 stopped	 playing	 and	 the	master	of	ceremonies	announced	to	the	hushed	audience	that	next	on	stage	would	 be	 the	mother	 of	 a	 shaheed	 (martyr).	 The	 father	 and	 other	 Next	 of	Kins	 (NoKs)3	of	 the	 dead	 soldier	 had	 already	 appeared	 on	 stage,	 and	 the	finale	in	this	commemorative	ceremony	had	been	reserved	for	the	testimony	of	 the	mother.	 She	walked	 onto	 the	 stage,	 a	woman	 in	 her	mid-fifties,	 and	stood	 confidently	 at	 the	 dais.	 Her	 eyes	 glistened	 with	 tears	 as	 she	 spoke	lovingly	of	her	son.	At	times	she	stopped,	took	a	breath	and	visibly	steadied	herself,	 but	when	 she	 did	 speak	 her	 voice	was	 strong	 and	 she	 spoke	with	pride	and	poise,	her	head	held	high.	Her	grief	hung	in	the	air,	but	what	was	more	 touching	 and	 emotive	 to	watch	was	 her	 resolve,	 her	 ability	 to	 stand	firm	 and	 resolute	 against	 the	 overwhelming	 grief	 that	 this	 death	 had	brought	 to	 her.	 The	 tension	 between	 her	 unbridled	 grief	 and	 her	 stoic	resolve	was	maintained	throughout.	It	was	a	powerful	moment,	the	camera	lingered	 over	 it,	 the	 audience	 watched	 in	 awe,	 and	 some	 cried	 silently,	others	sobbed.			From	the	opening	sequence	of	the	ceremony,	where	a	chosen	group	of	Next-of-Kins	(NoKs)	paraded	onto	the	pavilion	to	be	seated	(while	the	rest	of	the	audience	 stood	 in	 respect),	 to	 their	 testimonies	played	on	giant	 screens	or	relayed	 live	 on	 stage	 or	 in	 video	 songs,	 to	 poems	 dedicated	 to	 them,	 the	families	of	the	dead	were	clearly	central	to	the	imagery	of	these	ceremonies.	The	show’s	 final	sequence	involved	homage	being	paid	by	families	through	flowers	and	prayers	at	the	martyrs’	monument.	Recalling	the	testimony	of	a	widow	of	a	dead	soldier	at	an	earlier	commemorative	ceremony,	one	of	the	military	officers	in	charge	told	me:		 [It	 was]	 a	 brilliant	 moment,	 when	 she	 stood	 there	 with	 her	three	children,	 the	youngest	 in	her	arms,	and	said	she	wanted																																									 																					2	In	2010,	the	Pakistan	Army	declared	30th	April	Youm	-e-Shuhada	(YeS)	–	Martyrs’	Day	–	to	pay	tribute	to	the	soldiers	who	died	in	the	War	in	Waziristan,	a	corollary	of	the	global	war	on	terror.	In	2015,	YeS	was	combined	with	the	Youm-e-Difah	(YeD)	–	Defence	Day	ceremony	instituted	earlier	to	commemorate	the	1965	war	with	India.	3	Term	used	by	the	Pakistani	military	to	refer	to	the	families	of	dead	soldiers.	
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her	son	to	go	into	the	army	like	his	father.	It	touched	a	chord;	it	was	 a	 very	 emotionally	 charged	moment.	 It	 is	 to	 create	 such	moments	that	these	commemorations	are	done.			 	 	 	 	 			(Major	1,	ISPR,	24th	August	2015)		For	part	of	the	ceremony	I	sat	with	Yasmin,	Nawaz’s	mother,	a	young	soldier	who	 died	 in	 the	 Swat	 operations	 in	 2009.	 As	 Yasmin	watched	 the	mother	speaking	on	stage,	I	thought	back	to	the	time	we	discussed	these	testimonies	while	we	sat	 in	 the	courtyard	of	her	house	 in	her	village,	a	house	they	had	built	with	money	they	had	received	as	compensation	for	his	death.	She	had	said	to	me	then:		 The	 army	 leaves	 after	 the	 funeral,	 it	 doesn’t	 look	 back,	 it	throws	 innocents	 into	 battle	 and	 says	 go	 fight.	What	 do	 they	care?	How	would	they	know	what	happens	inside	the	spaces	of	the	home?	 It	 is	not	 so	easy	 to	accept	 this,	women	will	 say	we	will	send	another	son	into	the	army	(…)	I	don’t	know	who	these	women	are.		 	 	 	 	 						(Yasmin,	Palwal,4	24th	November	2014)		When	 the	 mother	 on	 stage	 made	 the	 predictable	 offering	 of	 another	 son,	Yasmin	turned	to	me	with	a	raised	eyebrow	and	a	smile	and	said	‘Look	how	easily	she	says	it’.	The	smile	was	weary	and	rueful	and	I	wondered	if	she	too	remembered	our	conversation	earlier.	To	me	it	sounded	like	she	was	saying	‘as	 if	 it	 were	 that	 easy’.	 Here,	 within	 the	 hush	 of	 the	 NoKs	 enclosure,	 the	rhetoric	of	continued	sacrifice	for	the	nation,	a	section	of	the	show	that	held	the	most	resonance	for	the	rest	of	the	audience,	seemed	to	reverberate	the	least	and	invoked	cynicism.		-Fieldnotes,	GHQ,	6th	September	2015	
v 	The	above	vignette	illustrates	a	compressed	example	of	the	complex	relationship	that	exists	between	the	military	institution	and	the	subjects	of	militarism,	the	soldiers	and	family	members	of	the	dead	who	are	the	subject	of	my	thesis.	Two	questions	can	be	posed	here.	First,	why	does	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces5	orchestrate	these	ceremonies																																									 																					4	Fictitious	name	of	village	5	The	Pakistan	Armed	Forces	(Musalla	Afwaj-e-Pakistan)	comprise	three	main	branches:	the	Army,	Navy	and	Air	Force.	The	Pakistan	Army,	the	land-based	uniformed	force,	is	the	largest	of	the	three	in	terms	of	manpower	and	the	most	powerful	in	terms	of	resources,	political	clout,	geographical	coverage	and	public	visibility.	The	YeS	and	YeD	events	are	coordinated	by	the	Pakistan	Army	and	held	at	the	Army	General	Headquarters	(GHQ)	in	Rawalpindi.	
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that	demand	affirmation	of	militarism	from	those	who	have	suffered	unimaginable	losses?	Or	what	does	the	investment	in	this	theatre	tell	us	about	the	nature	of	modern	militarism?	Second,	what	imperatives	obligate	the	subjects	of	militarism,	men	and	women,	to	respond	to	this	call?	The	first	question	alludes	to	statecraft,	the	utility	and	meaning	of	these	spectacles	in	sustaining	militarism.	The	second	question	brings	into	focus	the	subjects	of	militarism	and	the	uneven,	seemingly	antithetical	practices	that	make	these	subjects	possible.	What	I	will	show	in	my	thesis	is	that	both	queries	are	complementary	aspects	of	the	same	question:	how	is	affect	implicated	in	the	production	of	gendered	militaristic	subjectivities	in	Pakistan?	I	contend	that	it	is	important	to	understand	this	question	if	we	are	to	examine	the	tenacious	appeal	of	the	military	institution	in	Pakistan.	The	question	also	responds	to	broader	theoretical	concerns	around	the	operations	and	limits	of	the	hegemonic	power	relations	that	nurture	militarism	and	form	the	subjectivity	of	soldiers	and	families.		The	affective	as	ruse	or	as	propaganda	to	shape	war	rhetoric	is	one	way	to	deconstruct	the	presence	of	sentiment	within	state	narratives.	Another	is	to	view	affect	as	a	form	of	governance	that	combines	‘restraint	with	affection’	(Yazawa	1985:19)	where	familial	analogies	and	paternalistic	power	define	the	relationships	between	the	rulers	and	ruled	(Hunt	1992;	Verdery	1999;	Banti	2008).	I	hold	that	both	these	explanations	provide	only	partial	answers	to	the	operation	of	affect	within	militarism.	I	turn	instead	to	Ann	L.	Stoler	(2004:5-10)	who,	in	the	context	of	studying	Dutch	colonial	authority,	argues	that	sentiment	has	been	mistakenly	treated	as	‘embellishment	to,	rather	than	the	substance	of,	governing	projects’.	She	goes	on	to	suggest	that	the	centrality	of	affect	within	governing	is	similar	to	Michel	Foucault’s	notion	of	governmentality,	where	statecraft	joins	‘the	care	and	governing	of	polity	to	the	care	and	governing	of	the	affective	self.’			The	primary	argument	I	put	forward	in	this	thesis	is	that	affect	is	a	technology	of	rule	deliberately	deployed	by	the	military	institution	in	Pakistan	to	contour	its	relationship	with	its	immediate	subjects	(soldiers	and	families)	and	with	the	nation	in	general.	The	principle	focus	of	the	thesis	remains	on	the	symbiotic	relationship	between	the	Pakistani	military	as	an	institution	and	the	soldiers	and	their	families.	It	is	a	study	of	what	makes	this	relationship	possible	and	the	purposes	it	serves.	This	thesis	situates	militarism	as	a	sociological	process	(Mann	1987;	Geyer	1989;	Chenoy	1998;	Gusterson	2007;	Lutz	2011),	a	set	of	social	practices	that	imbricate	ideologies	of	religion	and	nation	in	an	instrumental	usage.	I	also	posit	that	these	practices	involve	not	just	an	acceptance	of	and	preparation	for	war,	but	an	acceptance	of	violence	against	oneself	and	one’s	loved	ones.	
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This	acceptance	is	made	possible	through	an	invocation	of	affect	that	is	central	to	the	production	of	militarist	subjectivities.	The	thesis	will	show	that	while	material	gain	is	a	driver	and	cannot	be	refuted	in	the	formation	of	these	subjectivities,	this	is	not	a	complete	explanation	of	how	militarism	functions.	Affect	as	a	technology	of	rule	implies	a	set	of	governing	practices	that	are	gendered,	and	not	only	control	affective	selves	but	also	produce	them	by	reworking	affect	and	attachment	through	the	concerns	of	the	state,	and	in	this	case	the	military.	There	is	recognition	by	the	military	that	certain	kinds	of	affect	can	be	unsettling	and	counterproductive	to	state	interest	and	must	be	managed.	Also	implicated	within	this	technology	of	rule	are	the	production,	and	not	just	the	control,	of	affect	and	affective	selves.	This	production	creates	its	own	truth,	the	meaningfulness	of	service	and	sacrifice	in	the	service	of	the	nation-state.			The	thesis	accentuates	two	aspects	of	this	affective	production.	First,	that	this	production	of	affect	works	through	the	consent	and	participation	of	protagonists,	or	what	I	refer	to	as	collusion	between	the	military	institution	and	its	subjects	(soldiers	and	families).	Rosalind	O’Hanlon	(1988:199-200),	in	reviewing	the	extensive	Subaltern	Studies	literature,	argues	for	the	need	to	re-conceptualize	the	dichotomy	created	between	the	powerful	and	the	subordinated	through	two	propositions.	One	is	theoretical,	or	‘a	point	about	power’,	which	understands	domination	as	a	power	relation	and	not	as	a	collective	voice.	Thus,	in	this	case	the	dichotomy	must	be	emphasized	and	the	word	collusion	may	seem	inaccurate.	The	second	proposition	(more	relevant	to	my	thesis)	is	more	substantive	and	is	about	how	domination	operates.	She	suggests	that	the	categories	that	are	used	to	analyse	domination	here	should	not	be	‘monolithic	blocks’;	instead	these	categories	‘must	be	as	multifarious	and	nuanced	as	the	courses	and	ligaments	through	which	power	itself	runs’.	In	other	words,	the	experience	of	power	is	fluid	and	subjects	themselves	can	participate	in	their	own	domination.	As	such,	where	I	have	retained	the	distinct	categories	of	ruler	and	ruled	in	this	thesis	to	emphasize	the	power	differentials	inherent	within	this	relationship	I	have	also	stressed	their	collusive	and	symbiotic	nature.		
Second,	the	process	of	production	does	not	imply	a	fabrication	even	as	it	does	implicate	a	degree	of	manufacture.	The	nature	of	this	production	relies	on	the	appropriation	or	rechannelling	of	visceral	affect	(such	as	sadness	or	grief)	generated	within	the	interaction	between	the	two	protagonists	and	is	experienced	as	authentic	even	as	it	is	disciplined	and	shaped	by	hegemonic	power.	For	the	subjects	(soldiers	and	families)	this	production	is	based	on	affective	residue,	effluence	from	attachments	severed,	hence	it	is	
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experienced	as	authentic	even	as	the	military’s	appropriation	of	the	affective	terrain	is	recognized	by	those	imbricated	within	it.	This	experience	of	authenticity	bestows	upon	this	affect	a	certain	kind	of	sacredness	and	places	it	beyond	question.			The	thesis	will	interrogate	the	mechanisms	through	which	this	truth	is	created	and	will	present	evidence	for	the	claim	that	subjects	think	through	the	conditions	of	their	formation	and	are	conscious	of	these	appropriations.	Their	complicity	in	the	scripts	of	service	and	sacrifice	is	not	a	result	of	ideological	imperatives,	but	instead	is	driven	by	affective	compulsions	set	in	motion	by	affective	productions.	I	argue	that	affect	has	the	potential	to	be	two	things	at	the	same	time,	harnessed	and	produced	by	disciplinary	frameworks,	yet	able	to	decipher	and	stand	outside	them.	This	duality	of	affect	is	what	makes	for	spaces	that	may	be	populated	by	subject	positions	that	allow	for	disengagement	from	the	project	of	militarism	and	permit	complicity	in	it.	This	is	evident	in	the	vignette	presented	above,	where	the	mother	creates	the	‘brilliant’	authentic	moment	on	the	national	stage,	while	in	other	spaces	distances	herself	from	the	militarism	project.			The	military	controls,	suppresses	or	invokes	grief	within	its	subjects	through	a	process	of	disciplining	narratives	of	pain.	It	attempts	to	assuage	the	grief	of	soldiers	and	families	through	a	host	of	meaning-making	processes	and	material	mechanisms.	I	argue	that	the	military	not	only	seeks	these	affective	bonds	to	ensure	continued	replenishment	of	its	rank	and	file,	but	also	cultivates	these	relationships	with	soldiers	and	their	families	to	serve	as	conduits	for	communication	with	the	nation	in	a	bid	to	garner	support	for	the	institution.	Commemorative	ceremonies	where	families	affirm	their	support	for	the	military	and	mouth	the	rhetoric	of	sacrifice	for	the	nation	utilize	the	affect	of	families	in	order	to	invoke	affective	bonds	with	the	nation.	This	second	set	of	affective	relationships	between	the	military	and	the	nation	(the	first	being	between	the	military	and	the	soldiers	and	families)	are	formed	in	the	crucible	of	the	earlier	relationship	and	rely	on	deliberately	crafted	narratives	of	grief	and	mourning.			In	this	thesis	I	will	also	delineate	how	this	management	of	affect	is	gendered.	I	argue	that	the	success	of	this	technology	of	rule	(the	control	and	production	of	affect)	rests	heavily	on	gendering	its	subjects	in	ways	that	that	involve	two	contradictory	moves.	First,	it	subordinates	women	and	emotions	beneath	the	faculties	of	reason,	a	denigrated	status	where	a	woman’s	affect	is	considered	unreasonable,	excessive	and	beyond	her	control,	and	must	be	restrained	(Ahmed	2004).	Second,	it	clearly	exalts	the	suffering	of	the	female	
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and	relegates	it	to	an	almost	scared	status.	It	also	acknowledges	the	female	dependent	as	a	crucial	next	of	kin	with	whom	it	sets	out	to	create	a	transactional	partnership	that	compensates	for	the	death	of	the	soldier.	I	argue	that	the	masculine	military	institution	is	obsessed	with	the	feminine	subject,	who	remains	an	object	of	both	exaltation	and	disdain.	The	exaltation	belongs	to	the	suffering	mother	and	helpless	wife,	in	need	of	protection	from	the	masculine	military	and	the	soldier,	while	the	disdain	is	for	her	weakness,	depicted	in	her	inability	to	control	destructive	affect	that	has	the	potential	to	destabilize	the	carefully	scripted	(by	the	military	institution)	narrative	of	willing	sacrifice	for	the	nation-state.	The	tension	between	the	stoic	mother	and	the	weeping	mother	that	we	see	within	the	vignette	above,	a	tension	between	the	need	for	affect	and	the	need	for	that	affect	to	be	disciplined,	is	analogous	to	the	military	institution’s	relationship	with	the	feminine	subject.			It	is	important	to	state	here	that	throughout	my	thesis	religion	is	situated	within	the	context	of	statecraft,	and	it	is	sacrifice	and	martyrdom	as	a	state	enterprise	rather	than	as	a	theological	discourse	that	is	foregrounded.	I	do	so	not	to	suggest	that	the	Islamization	of	national	identity	and	the	military	does	not	exist,	but	posit	this	Islamization	as	a	state	driven	project	that	instrumentalizes	religion	for	its	own	ends.	As	such,	my	analysis	foregrounds	the	state	(or	more	specifically	the	Pakistani	military)	and	not	religion	per	se.			The	attention	to	affect	requires	us	to	not	only	traverse	the	terrain	of	militarism	within	the	larger-than-life	landscapes	and	institutions	of	state,	military	and	industrial	systems,6	but	also	to	turn	to	the	intimate	realm	of	everyday	mundane	life	and	living.	This	thesis	privileges	the	lived	experienced	of	the	sipahi7	(junior	and	non-commissioned	male	soldiers	in	the	Pakistani	military)	and	the	families	of	sipahis	(dead	and	alive)	through	an	ethnographic	exploration	of	service	and	death	in	the	military.	The	relationship	between	the	ruler	and	the	ruled	plays	out	on	civilian	and	military	terrain,	and	as	such	the	research	for	the	thesis	takes	place	both	within	the	institutions	of	the	military	and	in	civilian	spaces	where	these	soldiers	and	their	families	reside.	
Scholarly	Debates	I	engage	with	three	sets	of	literature	in	this	thesis.	I	first	locate	my	inquiry	within	the	first	set	of	scholarship,	dealing	with	militarism,	especially	in	the	context	of	Pakistan,	and	I	then	outline	how	I	define	militarism	in	this	thesis.	The	second	set	of	literature	revolves																																									 																					6	See	works	by	Melman	1974;	Kostinen	1980;	Kaldor	1981;	Adams	1981;	Tilly	1985;	Shaw	1988;	Holsti	1997.			7	Refers	to	a	soldier	below	the	rank	of	commissioned	officer.	The	anglicized	version	of	the	term,	sepoy,	is	no	longer	in	common	use.	However,	the	anglicized	plural,	sipahis,	is	still	common.	
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around	theoretical	formulations	around	affect	and	how	it	is	imbricated	within	statecraft.	The	third	set	looks	at	studies	that	pull	together	gender	and	affect	within	the	context	of	militarism.		
Approaching	Militarism		Macro	level	analyses	that	look	for	grand	narratives	and	explanations	of	militarism	in	larger	structural,	historical,	political,	economic	and	technological	shifts	dominate	the	study	of	militarism	as	a	political	and	analytical	category.	Several	studies	have	linked	militarism	to	capitalism’s	inherent	tendency	towards	imperialism	defined	by	hegemonic	militarist	thinking	and	practices	(Melman	1974;	Kostinen	1980;	Kaldor	1981).	Other	theorists,	drawing	on	Max	Weber’s	work,	have	located	militarism	in	the	nature	of	the	state,	where	states	are	inclined	towards	coercion	and	the	consolidation	of	political	power	by	the	expansion	of	state	force	through	investment	in	standing	armies,	weaponry	and	military	infrastructure	and	through	collusion	with	bureaucracy	(Fitzgerald	1972;	Adams	1981;	Tilly	1985;	Shaw	1988;	Holsti	1997).8		
Pakistan	has	been	ruled	directly	by	its	military,	more	specifically	the	Pakistan	Army,	for	roughly	half	of	its	existence.	The	military	has	effectively	been	a	joint	and	indirect	ruler	for	the	remainder	of	this	time,	through	interference	in	defence	and	foreign	policy	and	the	manipulation	of	domestic	politics.	The	emphasis	of	scholarship	on	militarism	in	Pakistan	tends	to	be	top	down,	much	like	the	literature	mentioned	above,	and	mainly	focuses	on	the	institution	of	the	military	and	debates	around	the	civil-military	nexus.9	First,	there	are	accounts	of	the	military	institution,	including	chronicles	of	the	British	Indian	Army	and	the	martial	race	discourse	(Gough	and	Innes	1984;	Heathcote	1995;	Roy	and	Dasgupta	2010),	as	well	as	the	military	in	post-independence	Pakistan	(Cohen	1984;	Cloughley	2000;	Lieven	2011).	Second,	there	is	an	abundance	of	literature	on	the	relationship	between	civil	political	institutions	and	the	military	(Siddiqa	2001;	Rizvi	2003)	including	the	military’s	involvement	in	Pakistan’s	economy	and	the	relationship	between	religious	institutions	and	the	army	(Jalal	1990;	Rizvi	2003;	Siddiqa	2007).	This	latter	set	of	scholarship	interrogates	the	military’s	interference	in	civilian	governments	and	its	forays	into	the	economy	supported	by	invisible	state	subsidies.	As	Pakistani	analysts	have	time	and	time	again	pointed	out,	the	military	stands	as	one	of	the	most	powerful	institutions	in	the	country,	and	it	has	a	de	facto	role	in	politics	(Jalal	1990;																																									 																					8	Shifts	in	patterns	of	war	have	been	theorized.	Examples	are	‘virtual	wars’,	‘new	wars’	and	‘post-modern	wars’,	which	amongst	other	things	implicate	neoliberal	globalization	and	the	lessening	of	the	state’s	monopoly	of	legitimate	violence	(Gray	1997;	Kaldor	1999;	Ignatieff	2000).	9	This	mirrors	the	global	trend	where	a	substantial	set	of	debates	on	militarism	within	the	disciplines	of	sociology	and	political	science	deal	with	civil-military	relations	and	the	military’s	interference	in	politics	and	governance.	(Kolkowicz	1966;	Colton	1979;	Horowitz	1980;	Ben	Meir	1995;	Nordlinger	1997).	
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Abbas	2005;	Nawaz	2008;	Shah	2014).	It	may	be	instructive	at	this	point	to	briefly	examine	the	reasons	for	this	as	purported	by	scholarship.	Ayesha	Siddiqa	(2007)	suggests	that	the	reasons	for	military	dominance	rest	upon	its	burgeoning	economic	empire	based	on	agricultural	and	property	ownership	as	well	as	its	control	of	business	and	industrial	enterprises.	Theorists	such	as	Mazhar	Aziz	(2007)	lean	towards	institutional	theory	and	path	dependence.	Aziz	suggests	that	repeated	coups	in	Pakistan	have	led	to	the	weakening	of	civil	institutions,	resulting	in	the	military	stepping	in	directly	or	interfering	unresisted	during	periods	of	civilian	rule.	There	is	also	the	more	dated	yet	still	relevant	postcolonial	state	hypothesis	proposed	by	Hamza	Alavi	(1972).	Alavi	argues	that	states	that	came	into	being	after	decolonization	were	especially	vulnerable	to	an	imbalance	between	military	and	civil	forces.	This	is	because	militaries	were	derived	from	the	earlier	colonial	machinery,	so	the	inherited	overinflated	military-bureaucratic	oligarchy	developed	more	autonomously	than	other	civil	institutions	did.	Furthermore,	it	has	been	argued	that	these	states	are	shaped	as	client	states	to	foreign	patrons	(countries)	who	invest	through	military	aid	and	organization	(Tilly	1992:208;	Wendt	and	Barnett	1993).	Because	of	Pakistan’s	geo-political	location,	the	Pakistani	military	has	always	attracted	its	fair	share	of	patrons.	Ishtiaq	Ahmed	(2013:9),	while	agreeing	with	Alavi’s	basic	premise,	critiques	Alavi	for	not	putting	sufficient	emphasis	on	the	politics	of	the	Cold	War	and	Pakistan’s	role	as	a	client	state	to	the	US.	He	suggests	instead	that	Harold	Lasswell’s	(1997)	idea	of	garrison	states	can	be	applied	to	Pakistan,	taking	into	account	Pakistan’s	postcolonial	history	as	well	as	its	vital	geostrategic	importance	in	the	Cold	War.	According	to	Lasswell,	modern	industrial	societies,	faced	with	the	constant	threat	of	war	and	continual	crisis,	would	create	conditions	where	‘specialists	on	violence	would	capture	the	leadership,	thus	establishing	the	supremacy	of	the	military	over	the	state	and	society….	[so	the	population	in	these	societies	would	be]	obedient	and	docile	[,]	indoctrinated	to	believe	in	the	inevitability	of	war	and	the	need	to	maintain	that	garrison	state’	(qtd.	in	Ahmed	2013:14).			Much	of	this	scholarship	in	Pakistan	examines	both	the	historical	dynamics	and	the	geostrategic	imperatives	that	have	allowed	the	military	to	take	up	political	space.	The	primary	question	these	studies	grapple	with	is	the	ever-shifting	boundary	between	military	and	civil	political	institutions.	In	his	study	of	post-colonial	Jordan,	Joseph	Massad	(2001:8)	suggests	that	perhaps	the	focus	of	scholarship	on	militarism	should	also	be	on	how	the	military	‘produces	politics	rather	than	how	it	is	related	to	it’	(emphasis	in	original).	Since	the	1980s	there	has	been	an	increased	interest	in	how	the	military	affects	daily	lives,	public	spaces	and	civil	institutions.	I	would	like	to	draw	a	distinction	between	
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global	and	Pakistan-specific	trends.	While	the	former	have	involved	a	turn	towards	sociology	and	anthropological	accounts	of	militarism,	in	Pakistan	this	lens	has	been	restricted	mostly	to	feminist	critique	and	scholarship	on	the	militarization	of	state	and	society.	The	areas	studied	include	educational	curricula	(Saigol	1995;	Nayer	and	Salim	2003)	popular	culture,	songs,	images	and	literary	texts	(Lalarukh	1997;	Saigol	2013)	and	military	symbols	in	various	national	rituals	(Khattak	1997;	Baber	2000).			This	thesis	is	situated	within	this	ambit,	as	I	examine	the	mechanisms	that	allow	the	Pakistani	military	to	access	political	space,	an	access	that	I	argue	depends	in	part	on	its	ability	to	produce	certain	kinds	of	political	and	affective	subjects.	I	am	not	interested	in	deciphering	the	much-studied	and	debated	whys	of	the	military’s	dominance	in	Pakistan,	but	instead	I	aim	to	focus	on	the	hows,		nuancing	the	ways	in	which	the	military	creates	its	image	as	an	institution	that	demands	‘reverence	and	fear’	(Siddiqi	1996:	ii)	and	allows	‘docile	populations’	(Lasswell	qtd.	in	Ahmed,	2013:14)	to	emerge.	For	this	I	have	turned	to	the	realms	of	affect	and	gender.	However,	before	I	engage	with	the	literature	on	these	themes,	it	may	be	important	to	outline	how	I	invoke	the	term	militarism	within	this	thesis.10		Militarism	has	been	defined	as	an	ideology,	as	a	behavioural	phenomenon,	as	a	military	build-up,	as	a	set	of	institutional	relationships	and	as	a	sociological	process	(Stavrianakis	and	Selby	2013:11–16).	My	own	conceptual	understanding	of	militarism	sees	it	as	a	sociological	process	closely	imbricated	with	ideology.	
In	the	History	of	Militarism,	Alfred	Vagts	suggests	that	militarism	
covers	every	system	of	thinking	and	valuing	in	every	complex	of	feelings	which	rank	military	institutions	and	ways	above	the	ways	of	civilian	life,	carrying	military	mentality	and	modes	of	acting	and	decisions	into	the	civilian	sphere	(1959:17).	The	above	definition	sets	up	militarism	primarily	as	not	being	limited	to	the	military:	a	system	that	‘carries…into’	and	almost	infects	civilian	life	around	it.	It	suggests	two	important	aspects	of	militarism.	The	first	is	the	ideological	pervasiveness	that	is	intrinsic	to	militarism:	‘every	system	of	thinking	and	valuing	in	every	complex	of	feelings’.	The																																									 																					10	My	analysis	of	militarism	is	indebted	to	James	Eastwood’s	overview	of	various	theoretical	formulations	of	militarism	in	his	doctoral	dissertation	at	SOAS:	The ethics of Israeli militarism: soldiers’ testimony and the 
formation of the Israeli soldier-subject. 	
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second	aspect	it	highlights	is	the	way	militarism	places	itself	above	civilian	modes	of	thinking	and	feeling.	Vagts	implicates	thinking	and	feeling	within	militarism,	hinting	at	a	tendency	to	immerse	the	subject	at	both	rational	and	visceral	levels.	Vagts’	intense	focus	on	ideology	is	perhaps	problematic,	and	for	a	more	comprehensive	grasp	of	how	militarism	functions	I	turn	to	Michael	Mann,	who	defines	militarism	as	denoting	attitudes	and	social	practices	which	view	war	and	preparation	for	war	as	normal	and	desirable.	(Mann	1987).	Martin	Shaw	takes	this	further	when	he	extends	militarism	beyond	preparation	for	war,	describing	it	instead	as	‘the	relationship	between	war	preparation	and	society’,	which	indicates	‘the	influence	of	military	organization	and	values	on	social	structure’	(1991:11)	including	‘the	penetration	of	social	relations	in	general	by	military	relations’	(2013:20).	In	this	way	Shaw	extends	militarism	beyond	ideology	to	a	range	social	practices	and	processes,	including	modes	of	economic	production,	popular	culture	and	gender	norms	and	relations.	The	gendered	working	of	power,	where	militant	and	violent	solutions	to	conflict	are	inscribed	in	institutions	and	in	the	mind	of	the	civilian	subject	is	important	to	highlight	here	(De	Mel	2007;	Saigol	2013).	There	is	evidence	that	this	attitude,	coupled	with	the	valorization	of	violence,	spills	into	civilian	spheres	and	impacts	gender	relations.	It	becomes	visible	in	neighbourhoods,	households	and	bedrooms,	where	ideas	of	appropriate	dress,	women’s	independence,	education	and	mobility	come	under	scrutiny	in	times	of	rising	militarization	(Khattak	1995;	Reardon	1996;	Enloe,	2000).	Aneela	Baber	(2000)	emphasizes	how	a	confrontational	attitude	towards	the	other	is	valorized,	while	restraint	and	pacifism	are	seen	as	unmanly	and	unbecoming.	This	was	evident	in	both	India	and	Pakistan	when	nuclear	tests	were	being	carried	out,	where	those	who	expressed	an	anti-militarist	viewpoint	were	feminized	and	called	traitors	(Chenoy	1998;	Baber	2000).			Catherine	Lutz	nuances	these	processes	further	when	she	suggests	that	militarism			is	intimately	connected	not	only	to	the	obvious	increase	in	the	size	of	armies	and	resurgence	of	militant	nationalisms	and	fundamentalisms	but	also	to	the	less	visible	deformation	of	human	potentials	into	the	hierarchies	of	race,	class,	gender,	and	sexuality,	and	to	the	shaping	of	national	histories	in	ways	that	glorify	and	legitimate	military	action	(Lutz	2006:292).				She	prefers	the	term	militarization	to	militarism	for	it	allows	a	focus	on	both	the	‘material	and	discursive	nature	of	military	dominance’	(Lutz	2006:294)	and	defines	it	as	‘the	contradictory	and	tense	social	process	in	which	civil	society	organizes	itself	for	the	production	of	violence’	(Geyer	1989:79).		
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While	I	agree	with	Lutz	and	the	other	theorists	mentioned	above	about	the	need	to	focus	on	both	material	and	discursive	aspects	of	this	phenomenon,	I	retain	the	term	militarism	as	it	allows	the	focus	to	remain	on	ideology,	which	I	contend	it	must	as	I	will	explain	shortly.	Let	me	first	expand	the	notions	of	‘war	preparation’	(Shaw	1991:11)	and	‘production	of	violence’	(Lutz,	2006:29)	to	include	the	acceptance	of	violence	against	one’s	own	self	and	one’s	loved	ones.	Here	acceptance	does	not	point	to	a	glorification	or	even	a	desire	for	violence,	but	instead	to	a	submission	to	the	possibility	of	violence	on	one’s	body	and	on	the	bodies	of	those	we	love.	For	any	definition	of	the	concept	of	militarism	to	hold	it	must	take	into	account	this	intimate	aspect	of	war	preparation,	the	ability	to	produce	the	instruments	and	then	subjects	of	violence,	the	soldier	and	his	family,	and	their	complicity	in	the	project.	The	importance	of	this	complicity	is	obvious	for	instrumental	reasons,	for	standing	armies	are	integral	to	the	ability	of	militarism	to	thrive,	or	at	least	will	be	for	some	time	to	come.	This	complicity	is	also	important	for	symbolic	reasons,	as	it	plays	into	truth	claims	about	the	nation-state	and	the	need	to	sacrifice	for	it.	As	such,	I	revert	to	militarism	as	an	ideology	here	and	seek	an	explanation	for	how	this	submission	(of	the	soldier	and	the	family)	to	violence	is	made	possible.	This	submission	is	an	acceptance	of	violence	constructed	as	willing,	meaningful	and	selfless	service	and	sacrifice	for	the	nation	and	of	the	assertion	that	dying	for	the	nation-state	is	noble,	manly	and	necessary.	The	concept	of	ideology	I	invoke	here	is	not	a	set	of	beliefs	that	lead	to	material	consequences	or	practices	in	a	causal	way.	Instead,	militarism	is	a	set	of	social	practices	that	instrumentally	and	actively	employ	other	kinds	of	ideologies	(religious	and	national)	and	this	engagement	keeps	these	practices	securely	in	place.			In	his	psychoanalytic	reconstruction	of	the	concept	of	ideology,	Slavoj	Žižek	(2008:45)11	suggests	that	‘[t]he	function	of	ideology	is	not	to	offer	us	a	point	of	escape	from	our	reality	but	to	offer	us	the	social	reality	itself	as	an	escape	from	some	real	traumatic	kernel.’	In	other	words,	subjects	turn	to	certain	beliefs	and	ideas	to	explain	or	justify	their	continued	participation	in	structures	of	domination.	Through	this	understanding	then,	ideology	is	something	that	is	instrumentally	drawn	in	to	discipline	and	re-purpose	survival,	livelihoods,	death	and	disability.			I	now	turn	to	theoretical	formulations	around	affect	that	I	argue	provide	a	critical	perspective	from	which	to	attempt	to	understand	subject	formation	in	militarism.		
																																								 																					11	I	invoke	Žižek’s	work	on	ideology,	especially	where	he	draws	upon	Lacanian	psychoanalysis,	but	distance	myself	from	him	in	his	more	recent	work	and	views	on	multiculturalism,	integration	and	refugees.	
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Bringing	in	Affect		The	study	of	affect,	labelled	the	affective	turn	in	humanities	and	social	science,	has	emerged	in	the	last	two	decades	as	a	way	to	theorize	the	social	and	political.	The	primary	precursors	of	this	interest	in	affect	were	a	focus	on	the	body,	associated	with	feminist	theory,	and	an	interest	in	emotions,	visible	in	queer	studies	(Butler	1993;	Grosz	1994).	A	number	of	terms	have	been	used	interchangeably	within	this	turn,	including	feelings,	sentiments,	passions,	and	the	two	most	commonly	and	interchangeably	used:	emotion	and	affect.	Traditionally,	affect	is	used	as	the	broader	term,	referring	to	‘states	of	being’,	of	which	emotions	are	seen	as	a	‘manifestation	or	interpretation’	(Hemmings	2005:551).	Affect	has	been	referred	to	psychoanalytically	as	a	‘qualitative	expression	of	our	drives’,	energy	and	variations’	(Giardini,	1999:150).	Moving	away	from	affects	being	reduced	to	drives	alone,	Silvan	Tomkins	(1963)	suggests	that	they	are	autotelic	and	insatiable	and	give	depth	to	our	lives	by	allowing	us	to	narrate	our	lives	to	ourselves	and	others.	In	the	introduction	to	their	book	Politics	and	the	Emotions:	The	Affective	Turn	in	Contemporary	
Political	Studies,	Hogget	and	Thompson	(2012)	present	a	healthy	synthesis	of	these	differences,	theorizing	affect	and	emotions	as	two	forms	of	feelings	that	can	overlap	and	are	not	mutually	exclusive,	and	yet	have	different	connotations.		
Affect	concerns	the	more	embodied,	unformed	and	less	conscious	dimension	of	human	feeling,	whereas	emotion	concerns	the	feelings	which	are	more	conscious	since	they	are	more	anchored	in	language	and	meaning	(2012:2-3).			Anxiety	is	described	here	as	an	affect,	‘experienced	in	a	bodily	way’,	while	jealousy	is	an	emotion,	directed	outwards,	giving	it	‘meaning,	focus	and	intentionality’	(Hogget	and	Thompson	2012:3).	The	object	of	anxiety	may	shift,	making	it	almost	arbitrary.	On	the	other	hand,	emotion	here	is	externally	directed	and	embedded	in	language	and	discourse.	Affect	is	more	abiding,	while	emotions	are	more	fleeting	or	transient.	The	authors	take	this	one	step	further	by	suggesting	that	if	the	role	of	passion	in	political	life	is	to	be	understood,	another	aspect	of	affect	must	be	described:	its	ability	to	be	‘labile’	and	‘fluid’,	capable	of	spreading	through	people.	This	is	what	Sigmund	Freud	called	‘contagion’,	which	Hogget	(qtd.	in	Hogget	and	Thompson	2012:3)	also	refers	to	as	‘affective	networks’.	I	use	both	emotion	and	affect	in	this	thesis,	based	upon	my	understanding	of	their	differentiations	above,	but	the	thesis	remains	locked	into	an	analysis	of	affective	ties	as	a	model	of	subject	formation	for	the	project	of	militarism,	where	affect	stands	as	more	autotelic,	abiding,	labile,	capable	of	contagion	and	less	easily	externally	driven,	directed	or	explained.	
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	I	now	turn	to	how	affective	control	and	production	becomes	a	technique	of	governmentality,	the	latter	described	as	an	exercise	of	power	that	involves	‘the	conduct	of	conduct’	through	which	subjects	are	produced	through	the	management	of	individual	behaviour	(Foucault	2008:87–114,	2002).	
	‘[E]ducating	consent’12(…)	is	made	possible,	not	through	some	abstract	process	of	“internalization”	but	by	shaping	appropriate	and	reasoned	affect,	by	directing	affective	judgments,	by	severing	some	affective	bonds	and	establishing	others,	by	adjudicating	what	constituted	moral	sentiments	–	in	short,	by	educating	the	proper	distribution	of	sentiments	and	desires	(Stoler	2004:9,	emphasis	in	original).		In	the	above	excerpt,	Ann	L.	Stoler	argues,	in	the	context	of	Dutch	colonial	authority,	that	affect	is	central	to	statecraft,	a	critical	medium	though	which	it	operates.	As	Stoler	suggests,	the	Dutch	colonial	state	was	‘troubled	with	distribution	of	sentiment,	by	both	its	excessive	expression	and	the	absence	of	it’	and	sought	to	manage	these	‘affective	states’	through	‘techniques	of	affective	control’	(Stoler,	2004:5,	emphasis	in	original).	Citing	Francis	Bacon,	who	suggests	that	the	governance	of	states	is	similar	to	‘the	government	within’,	where	both	require	knowledge	about	the	‘dangerous	and	combustible	passions	of	ordinary	men’,	she	discusses	statecraft	as	being	not	‘opposed’	to	the	affective	but	more	concerned	with	its	‘mastery’	(2004:5-10).	In	her	study	of	Salvadoran	refugees,	Janis	Jenkins	(1991:139-165)	puts	forward	the	notion	that	states	go	beyond	the	mere	control	of	emotional	discourse,	to	‘culturally	standardize	the	organization	of	feeling’	thereby	
producing	as	well	as	managing	affect.	I	endorse	Stoler’s	emphasis,	placing	affect	as	central	to	governing	projects	and	furthermore	position	this	preoccupation	with	sentiment	not	as	a	controlling	mechanism	alone	but,	as	Jenkins	suggests,	a	productive	one,	where	techniques	of	affective	management	not	only	control	but	also	produce	certain	kinds	of	affective	subjectivities.			I	also	contend	that	the	affective	realm	is	a	critical	lens	for	studying	the	ambivalences	and	disengagements	in	the	operation	of	hegemonic	power.	The	opening	vignette	brought	out	this	disengagement,	where	the	mother	on	the	national	stage	was	complicit	in	the	militarism	project	and	yet	within	the	confines	of	her	home	and	in	the	darkened	NoKs	enclosure	expressed	unease	and	cynicism.	To	explain	these	disengagements,	I	first	
																																								 																					12		Gramsci	qtd.	in	Stoler	2004:9	
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outline	debates	within	the	scholarly	focus	on	affect	around	the	possibility	of	affective	freedoms.		Theorists	such	as	Brian	Massumi	(1996)	and	John	Bruns	(2000)	have	suggested	that	affects	are	beyond	social,	pre	discursive	states,	lying	outside	social	signification.	Some	of	this	work	sets	up	affective	freedoms	and	autonomy	as	a	way	out	of	the	pessimism	inherent	in	social	determinism.	This	is	a	position	fiercely	contested	by	constructivist	models,	which	see	affect	as	externally	determined,	as	a	social	and	cultural	practice	(Lutz	and	Lughod	1990;	Ahmed	2004).	Clara	Hemmings	(2005:550-551)	in	perhaps	rightly	turning	away	from	what	she	regards	as	misplaced	‘theoretical	celebration	of	affect’	as	a	way	to	theorize	challenges	to	social	order,	suggests	instead	that	affect	presents	itself	‘not	as	a	difference,	but	as	a	central	mechanism	of	social	reproduction	in	the	most	glaring	ways’.	Laura	Berlant	(1997)	has	demonstrated	this	in	her	work,	citing	the	tendency	of	affective	responses	to	strengthen	rather	than	challenge	hegemonic	power.	Critical	race	theorists	have	argued	that	affect	plays	a	role	in	consolidating	structures	of	power	and	oppression,	while	also	providing	the	investments	needed	to	challenge	these	relations	(Spivak	1993;	Bhabha	1994).	My	own	position	acknowledges	these	debates	and	veers	towards	Berlant’s	usage	of	affect,	but	it	derives	largely	from	an	understanding	of	affect	as	an	analytical	lens	to	understand	subject	formation,	or	more	specifically	as	a	technology	of	rule	that	can	be	employed	by	the	military	to	create	subjects	both	immediate	(soldiers	and	families)	and	secondary	(nation),	and	contour	its	relationship	with	them.	My	position	on	the	potential	of	affect	to	both	affix	sexed	and	raced	relationships	of	oppression	and	provide	cathexis	to	resist	or	oppose	these	relationships	is	best	described	by	Yael	Navaro-Yashin	in	her	ethnographic	study	of	Northern	Cyprus,	The	Make	Believe	Space,	Affective	
Geographies	in	a	Post	War	Polity	(2012:17-19).	Navaro-Yashin	first	suggests	that	we	re-imagine	relations	between	human	beings	and	space	as	not	being	reducible	to	the	‘interpretations	projected	onto	it	through	human	subjectivities’,	as	well	as	including	a	more	‘object	centred’	perspective	which	allows	us	to	acknowledge	‘that	there	is	something	in	space,	in	material	objects	or	in	the	environment	that	exceeds,	or	goes	further	beyond	the	human	imagination,	but	that	produces	an	affect	that	may	be	experienced	by	human	beings,	all	the	same’.	Taking	this	further,	Navaro-Yashin	(2012:21-24)	challenges	the	traditional	psychoanalytical	association	made	between	affective	realm	and	human	subjectivity,	where	‘affective	possibility	and	potentiality’	lie	only	within	the	inner	world	or	interiority	of	human	beings.	Although	Lacanian	psychoanalysis	moves	away	from	this	more	exclusive	connection	and	acknowledges	that	‘subjectivity	is	a	product	of	relational	construction’,	a	making	of	the	subject	in	relation	to	
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other	subjects,	Navaro-Yashin	finds	it	inadequate,	as	it	still	‘psychologizes’	affect,	and	the	human	self	or	subjectivity	remains	the	primary	site	for	affective	energy.	According	to	Navaro-Yashin,	the	alternative	to	this	is	Nikolas	Rose’s	suggestion	that	the	psyche	is	constructed	and	resides	within	discourse	in	the	Foucauldian	sense,	where	the	inside	is	reduced	to	an	effect	of	the	outside	and	where	subjectivity	is	a	‘product	of	governmentalizing	practices	that	bring	a	subject	into	being’,	‘an	effect	of	truth,	the	reflection	of	governmentality’.	Navaro-Yashin	places	herself	between	the	traditions	of	the	‘agoraphobia	of	humanist	disciplines	(…)	which	would	primarily	look	inward’	and	the	‘claustrophobia’	of	theoretical	frameworks	that	‘open	out’	and	take	into	account	‘exteriorities,	outer	spaces,	environment	and	objects’.	By	doing	so	she	questions	the	distinctions	made	between	‘interiority	and	exteriority,	the	subjective	and	the	objective,	or	the	human	and	the	object’.	She	proposes	a	study	of	affect	and	subjectivity	at	the	same	time.		 The	purpose	is	not	to	privilege	a	new	theory	of	affect	against	previous	constructions	of	subjectivity	but	to	develop	a	perspective	that	could	be	called	the	affect-subjectivity	continuum,	one	that	attends	to	embroilment	of	the	inner	and	outer	worlds,	to	their	co-dependence	and	co-determination	(2012:24).			I	take	this	understanding	forward	in	my	study	of	subject	formation	within	the	terms	of	affect,	positioning	affect	as	not	purely	exterior,	even	as	it	is	not	merely	bounded	within	the	realm	of	subjectivity.	Affect	is	also	about	affective	transmissions	between	human	subjects	and	their	environment,	so	interiority	and	exteriority	become	indistinguishable.	Subjects	that	embody	both	disengagement	from	and	complicity	with	the	project	of	militarism	are	made	possible	by	this	potential	of	affect	to	linger,	to	haunt,	to	be	two	things	at	the	same	time,	to	be	produced	and	harnessed	by	disciplinary	frameworks	and	yet	exist	outside	them,	residing	in	the	interiority	of	the	subjects	and	in	their	relations	with	each	other	and	with	their	physical	environment	and	spaces.			For	the	purposes	of	my	project,	disengagement	from	the	project	of	militarism	includes	thoughts	or	acts	by	soldiers	or	families	that	challenge	or	deny	the	demands	of	the	nation-state	for	sacrifice.	How	this	disengagement	is	to	be	acknowledged	has	already	been	the	focus	of	much	debate.	Are	these	acts	of	protest	that	are	deeply	ambivalent,	that	allow	subversion	to	exist	within	the	military	side	by	side	with	complicity	(Gutmann	and	Lutz	2010),	actions	that	are	limited	by	the	available	discourses	and	wrapped	up	in	power	that	initiates	the	subject	(Butler	1997;	Mitchell	1990),	counter	hegemonic	‘weapons	of	the	
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weak’	(Scott	1985),	mere	‘safety	valves’	or	acts	that	reveal	the	‘diagnostics	of	power’	(Abu	Lughod	1990:42-47)?	For	me,	what	is	relevant	is	how	we	locate	these	disengagements	and	ambivalences	within	our	understanding	of	the	power	dynamics	that	operate	in	subject	formation	and	in	processes	that	allow	militarism	to	grow	and	take	root	within	society.	More	specifically,	how	do	affect	and	affective	realms	provide	a	more	critical	lens	for	studying	the	formation	of	these	militarist	subjectivities	that	allows	the	subject	to	stand	both	outside	and	inside	these	webs	of	disciplinary	power?		I	move	now	to	the	last	set	of	literature,	which	lays	out	the	ways	through	which	the	masculine	and	militarist	state	actively	constructs	and	sustains	specific	kinds	of	gendered	subjectivities	that	are	imbued	with	affect.	
Gendering	Scripts	for	the	Theatre	of	War	The	nation-state	has	what	Katherine	Verdery	(1999:41)	calls	a	‘parasitic’	need	for	gendered	kinship	metaphors	such	as	‘fatherland	and	motherland,	sons	of	the	nation	and	their	brothers,	mothers	of	these	worthy	sons,	and	occasionally	daughters’.	These	kinship	metaphors	allow	the	nation-state	to	invoke	affect	and	inspire	what	Benedict	Anderson	calls	‘profoundly	self-sacrificing	love’.	The	nation	‘is	assimilated	to	skin-color,	gender,	parentage,	birth-era	–	all	those	things	that	one	cannot	help’	and	demands	‘disinterested	love	and	solidarity’	(2006	141-144).	The	link	between	nation,	sacrifice	and	men’s	bodies	can	be	traced	back	to	the	wars	of	the	French	revolution	and	Napoleon	which	mark	the	shift	from	the	career	officer,	the	mercenary	soldier	who	served	a	sovereign	king	in	dynastic	wars,	to	the	citizen-soldier	who	drew	arms	to	defend	and	protect	his	nation-state	(Vagts	1959;	Mosse	1990;	Ehrenreich	1997:187;	Parker	1996).	Women	too	play	a	central	role	within	discourses	of	the	nation	as	repositories	of	national	honour	and	cultural	and	religious	traditions,	and	as	producers	and	nurturers	of	family	(Kandiyoti	1991;	Khattak	1995;	Yuval-	Davis,	1997).		Below	I	nuance	how	male	and	female	subjects	have	been	theorized	within	militarism,	starting	with	colonial	India,	for	the	history	of	militarism	in	Pakistan	is	closely	tied	to	its	colonial	roots.		British	rule	in	India	was	heavily	invested	in	the	binary	categories	of	the	manly	scientific	Englishman	and	the	primitive,	effeminate	native	in	order	to	justify	racial	privilege	(Sinha	1995;	Nandy	2009),	and	this	in	turn	influenced	the	narrative	of	the	nation	that	emerged	in	this	postcolonial	setting,	where	resistance	to	colonial	rule	was	invested	with	the	
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politics	of	masculinity	and	reclaiming	male	honour	(Sinha	1995:7).	This	resistance	also	played	out	along	religious	lines,	with	Hindu	and	Muslim	identities	being	formed	in	the	crucible	of	nationalist	movements	(Jaffrelot	2002).	The	narrative	of	the	new	nation	involved	a	recasting	of	both	Muslim	and	Hindu	womanhood	and	manhood	without	challenging	the	‘terms	of	the	discourse’,	and	remained	patriarchal	in	its	possibilities	(Saigol	2013:48;	Chakravarti	1989).	Allama	Iqbal,	a	Muslim	nationalist	poet,	bemoaned	the	loss	of	Muslim	masculinity	and	honour	under	colonial	rule	and	campaigned	for	the	reclamation	of	this	loss	through	the	hyper	masculine	Muslim,	Mard-e-Momin	(the	Male	Believer)	(Saigol	2013:98-99).	The	woman	in	this	discourse	was	cast	as	the	‘emotionally	laden	signifier	and	symbol	of	nation,	self,	the	inner	spiritual	world	and	the	home’,	to	be	shielded	from	Western	influence,	modern	values	and	secular	education	(Saigol	2013:244).	The	post-partition	Pakistani	nation-state	‘invented’	(Gellner	1964)	Pakistani	nationhood	through	the	forced	homogenization	of	a	culturally	diverse	geographical	area	under	the	banner	of	Islam.	It	constructed	a	Pakistani	selfhood	based	on	the	physical	and	cultural	purging	of	the	other:	the	Hindu	or	the	Hindu	Indian	State	(Jaffrelot	2002;	Racine	2002).	This	required	a	certain	aggressive	posturing,	provided	by	the	strong	Pakistani	Muslim	male	figure	who	would	defend	the	nation	from	the	‘other’,	which	was	often	portrayed	as	effeminate	and	thus	polluting.	Religion	was	reiterated	again	and	again	within	this	identity	as	the	primary	basis	of	difference.	The	primary	tropes	of	the	nation-state,	family	and	religion	were	fused	such	that	any	attack	on	Pakistan	was	an	attack	on	Islam	and	on	the	entirety	of	a	citizen’s	family	and	kinship	structure.			The	formidable	appeal	of	militarism	to	a	large	section	of	men	as	an	attractive	and	idealized	form	of	masculinity	lies	scattered	through	a	range	of	historical	antecedents	and	socio-cultural	settings	and	institutions.	The	supply	of	men	who	comprise	the	rank	and	file	of	the	Pakistan	Army	comes	largely	from	Punjab	and	Khyber	Pakhtunkhwa	(KP),	a	trend	that	can	be	traced	to	the	British	Indian	Army.	The	development	of	militarized	districts	in	Punjab,	the	‘sword	arm’	(Barrier	1967:376)	of	the	British	Raj,	was	largely	achieved	not	through	coercion	but	through	a	nuanced	working	of	power.	Clive	Dewey	(1991:263-266)	has	argued	that	the	soldier	in	Pakistan	is	made	outside	the	military,	where	‘half	of	the	army’s	work	is	done	for	it’.	The	all-volunteer	army	continues	to	draw	with	ease	from	these	districts,	which	have	benefitted	economically	from	the	military’s	patronage	and	where	the	community	have	come	to	understand	themselves	as	members	of	martial	races,	with	men	constructed	as	hardy,	valiant	and	concerned	with	primordial	notions	such	as	ghairat	(honour)	and	izzat	(prestige).		
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I	nuance	these	militaristic	and	masculine	subjectivities	by	referring	to	several	theorists	of	masculinities	who	suggest	that	these	subjectivities	are	insecure	and	open	to	anxiety	as	they	emerge	from	a	conscious	and	deliberate	effort	to	create	a	distance	from	the	other,	in	this	case	the	feminine.	A	sociological	reading	of	this,	especially	in	the	South	Asian	context,	cites	the	separation	of	the	boy	from	a	feminine	world	and	his	removal	to	a	more	masculine	one,	where	‘the	sexed	body	[is]	imagined	and	consciously	crafted	in	opposition	to	the	female	body’	(Chopra,	Osella	&	Osella	2004:25).	In	her	study	of	young	boys	in	the	Indian	Punjab,	Radikha	Chopra	(2004)	talks	about	how	boys	learning	to	plough	the	field	see	the	hardening	of	their	body	as	a	sign	that	they	are	becoming	men.	In	a	study	conducted	by	a	national	rights	group	in	Pakistan	(Rozan	2010:22)	young	men	invariably	expressed	their	sense	of	maleness	through	a	negation	of	the	feminine,	where	the	real	man	was	‘not	a	woman’.	Expanding	these	ideas	to	militarist	subjectivities	in	the	context	of	Hindutva,	Dibyesh	Anand	(2008:163)	states	that	the	‘militarized/masculinized/	nationalized	self,	however,	from	its	originary	moment	is	fearful	of	its	own	fragility	and	seeks	to	expunge	from	within	what	it	perceives	as	non-masculine	and	thus	weak’.	Masculinity	is	therefore	theorized	within	this	thesis	as	fragile,	in	constant	flux,	‘an	ambivalent	complex	of	weakness	and	strength’	(Chopra,	Osella	&	Osella,	2013:8)	and	I	will	return	to	these	ideas	to	explain	how	the	male	and	female	subjects	of	war	are	connected.			I	now	turn	to	the	female	subject	and	how	she	is	drawn	into	the	militarism	project.	Unlike	men,	women	have	often	been	painted	as	more	ambivalent	subjects	of	militarism.	There	has	been	considerable	debate	within	feminist	scholarship	(Ruddick	1980;	Elshtain	1994)	regarding	maternal	inclinations	toward	pacifism	and	peace	movements,	examples	being	the	Plaza	de	Mayo	in	Argentina	and	the	Mother’s	Front	in	Sri	Lanka.	In	the	first	example,	the	refusal	of	women	to	mourn	sustained	the	struggle	for	justice	and	the	affect	or	grief	of	these	mothers	provided	the	fuel	for	protest	(Holst-Warhaft	2000).	Sara	Ruddick	(1980)	has	argued	that	because	of	their	social	(not	biological)	role,	mothers	are	called	upon	to	care	for	and	tend	to	the	young	and	sick	of	society,	and	thus	develop	values	and	capacities	of	feeling	that	affirm	peacekeeping	and	preservation	of	life.	Others	(de	Volo	1998,	Scheper-Hughes	1998)	have	critiqued	this	move,	which	claims	to	establish	a	link	between	peace	and	motherhood,	arguing	that	motherhood	is	a	social	and	fluid	category	and	citing	examples	of	mothers	willingly	giving	their	sons	up	to	the	cause,	for	example	in	1980s	Nicaragua.	Analysing	the	link	between	maternal	thinking	and	the	politics	of	war,	Nancy	Scheper-Hughes	(1998:229-231)	draws	upon	her	earlier	work	in	Brazilian	shantytowns	afflicted	by	poverty	and	high	infant	mortality.	She	proposes	the	notion	of	
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‘inevitable,	acceptable	and	meaningful	death’,	a	maternal	thinking	guided	by	‘letting	go’	as	opposed	to	‘holding	on’,	‘a	peaceful	resignation’	in	the	face	of	death	that	would	be	too	painful	to	accept.	So	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	‘mater	dolorosa,	the	mother	of	sorrows’	suggested	by	Ruddick	(1998:215),	who	grieves	for	her	child	and	is	a	symbol	of	maternal	pacifism,	Scheper-Hughes	puts	forward	the	idea	of	‘maternal	thinking’	that	accepts	death	and	‘resembles	military,	especially	war	time	thinking’,	and	finds	echoes	in	religion	and	its	accompanying	notions	of	sacrifice	–	‘where	angels	(martyrs)	can	be	fashioned	from	the	dead	bodies	of	those	who	die	young’	(1998:230).		
Neither	of	the	two	images	presented	above	–	the	pacifist	mother	who	resists	war	or	the	militarist	mother	who	gives	up	the	child	as	a	sacrificial	offering	–	provide	the	complexity	that	I	argue	exists	within	the	figure	of	the	grieving	female	and	the	state’s	need	to	appropriate	her.	The	military	clearly	seeks	out	the	female	subject,	as	is	evident	both	within	regimes	of	compensation,	where	the	primary	next	of	kin	receives	compensation,	and	within	commemorative	events	such	as	the	one	cited	in	the	opening	section	of	this	introduction.	Reverting	to	the	theorization	of	male	subject	formation	presented	earlier,	it	can	be	argued	that	the	need	for	the	feminine	arises	as	the	masculinized	self	(and	state)	cannot	be	imagined	without	reference	to	it	(Chopra,	Osella	&	Osella	2004).	Women	and	men	are	symbiotically	connected	to	the	project	of	war	for	the	nation	in	ways	that	seem	complementary:	men’s	bodies	protect	the	honour	of	vulnerable	female	bodies	(Kandiyoti	1991;	De	Alwis	1998;	Saigol	2013);	in	turn,	women	produce	these	male	bodies	and	willingly	give	them	up	for	sacrifice	(Stobart	1913;	Haq	2007;	Rajan	2013).	What	I	add	to	this	scholarship	is	an	analysis	of	affect	and	how	it	is	used	to	produce	these	gendered	militarized	subjectivities.	The	woman’s	affect	is	central	(it	was	also	central	in	the	pacifist	mother	image,	presented	above),	and	is	deliberately	invoked	for	two	reasons.	First	her	affect	validates	and	affirms	the	difference	between	the	valiant	soldier,	symbolic	of	the	state/military,	and	the	helpless	and	vulnerable	mother	or	wife,	symbolic	of	the	nation.	Second,	the	female	subject’s	affect	is	appropriated	by	the	state,	which	deems	her	ability	to	express	and	invoke	grief	useful	in	allowing	contagion	to	occur	most	effectively	between	her	and	the	nation	that	watches	her.	The	masculine	identity	nurtured	on	the	idea	of	separation	and	difference	(in	military	training	and	in	mourning	rites)	struggles	with	fear,	expressed	as	a	disdain	for	the	feminine	that	requires	constant	assertion	of	distance	from	its	polluting	effect	on	men	and	yet	is	haunted	by	its	constant	need	to	engage	with	it	for	the	reasons	mentioned	above.	I	therefore	argue	that	the	feminine	must	forever	be	central	within	the	militaristic	imagination,	for	its	validity	lies	within	both	the	espousal	and	the	repudiation	of	the	feminine.	
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Research	Methodology	Before	I	embark	upon	a	description	of	my	methods,	site	and	interlocutors,	it	is	pertinent	to	lay	out	my	own	history	and	politics,	which	have	not	only	shaped	the	subject	matter	of	my	thesis	but	have	also	determined	how	I	approached	its	study.	 
	I	have	always	been	interested	in	violence,	both	the	conditions	that	make	it	possible	and	the	conditions	that	allow	it	to	be	constructed	such	that	it	becomes	socially	sanctioned,	sometimes	ignored	and	invisible	as	in	the	case	of	child	sexual	abuse	and	violence	against	women	and	sometimes	glorified	and	revelled	in	as	in	the	case	of	war.	Attaching	these	conditions	to	the	modern	state,	and	not	just	to	trajectories	of	culture	or	religion	or	even	history,	although	all	those	considerations	remain	relevant,	is	a	political	project	for	me,	and	hence	it	seemed	fitting	to	choose	militarism,	a	social	practice	as	violent	and	modern	as	can	be,	and	in	the	case	of	Pakistan	affixed	neatly	onto	the	state.			Gianpaolo	Biaocchi	and	Brian	Connor	(2008:140)	argue	for	the	relevance	of	the	study	of	the	political	in	spaces	outside	formal	politics.	This	allows	a	shift	away	from	institutional	actors	and	sites	towards	the	periphery	where	the	state	meets	its	subjects	(Chatterjee	2004;	Corbridge	et	al.	2005).	I	believe	that	these	political	ethnographies	allow	a	reversal	of	the	usual	top-down	view	of	power,	representing	instead	a	view	from	below,	or	more	aptly	one	that	brings	into	focus	‘the	myriad	ways	the	state	comes	into	view’	(Corbridge	et	al.	2005:7).	It	was	therefore	a	conscious	choice	to	turn	to	the	story	of	the	subaltern,	a	view	steered	by	my	feminist	politics,	to	document	the	lived	experience	of	the	instruments	and	subjects	of	war	and	violence:	the	soldiers	and	families	of	the	Pakistani	military	as	well	my	somewhat	romanticized	desire	to	find	an	alternative	world	view,	or	at	least	a	hankering	for	one.	The	soldier	in	the	mass	standing	armies	of	modern	militaries	has	often	been	painted	as	an	automaton,	or	simply	as	a	sheep	willing	and	ready	for	slaughter.	I	knew	that	sheep	seldom	act	subversively,	especially	in	the	context	of	the	Pakistani	military	(and	even	if	they	did,	I	did	not	think	my	research	would	be	able	to	uncover	this,	for	the	military	and	its	subalterns	guard	their	secrets	well).	My	interest	lay	in	finding	out	if	the	automaton	or	sheep	could	think,	or	in	other	words	did	the	web	of	the	military’s	disciplinary	power	break	down	at	any	point,	and	how	did	it	reconstitute	itself?			My	study	situates	subject	formation	as	a	mutually	constitutive	process	between	subjects	and	the	powers	that	form	them.	Moving	beyond	the	strictly	post-structuralist	approach,	which	sees	subjects	as	‘epiphenomena	constructed	by	culturally	specific	discursive	regimes’	(Keller	2007:353),	my	study	argues	for	an	approach	to	subjectivity	where		
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subjectivity	is	not	just	the	outcome	of	social	control	or	the	unconscious;	it	also	provides	the	ground	for	subjects	to	think	through	their	circumstances	and	to	feel	through	their	contradictions	(Biehl,	Good	and	Kleinman	2007:14).		It	is	this	meaning	making,	the	facility	to	sense	their	condition,	the	flair	for	knowing,	that	I	privileged	as	important	to	capture.	This	sense	making	can	be	contradictory,	and	my	intent	in	capturing	these	contradictions	over	time	as	I	proceeded	with	my	fieldwork	was	not	to	look	for	the	resistant	subject	or	a	subject	that	is	subversive	but	simply	to	record	the	experience	of	subject	formation	as	incomplete,	flawed,	one	that	leaves	room	for	manoeuvre	through	the	expression	of	affect	that	frees	them	to	articulate	what	must	never	be	said	and	at	the	same	time	binds	them	in	myriad	ways	to	the	truth	that	they	create	through	it.	Subjects	think	through	experiences,	sense	their	way	through	their	contradictions	and	choose	different	subject	positions	in	different	contexts	and	in	different	kinds	of	relationships.			I	believe	that	researchers	influence	the	social	world	they	seek	to	interrogate	and	do	not	exist	in	an	external	frame,	untouched	by	the	lives	and	spaces	they	deconstruct.	Personal	biographies	and	experiences	permeate	into	this	world.	As	such,	in	setting	up	these	representations	of	participants’	stories	I	am	conscious	that	they	reflect	my	interpretation	of	research	participants’	lives	and	my	theorizing	about	these	lives	in	relation	to	broader	contextual	situations	and	issues	(Cole	and	Knowles,	2001).	I	situate	myself	as	both	an	insider	and	an	outsider	within	this	research	frame.	While	I	come	from	a	third	generation	military	family,	I	am	also	an	outsider	to	the	world	I	have	chosen	to	study,	the	world	of	the	subaltern	military	soldiers	who	were	ever	present	in	my	world	yet	were	silenced	and	separated	by	a	huge	chasm	of	class	and	gender.	Thus,	even	as	I	had	considerable	familiarity	with	some	of	the	content	in	which	I	immersed	myself,	the	setting	of	my	study	placed	its	own	challenges.	As	a	woman	and	a	stranger	in	that	setting,	I	acknowledge	that	not	only	did	my	physical	presence	impact	what	was	visible	(to	me)	and	what	remained	veiled,	but	my	particular	worldview	also	affected	what	I	observed	and	how	I	interpreted	it.	Reflexivity	implied	that	I	remained	conscious	of	these	influences.	It	implied	more	than	vigilance:	it	asked	me	to	acknowledge	the	‘intrusive	self’	as	a	resource,	one	that	stops	me	from	generalizing	and	simplifying	other	people’s	lives	(Cohen	1994	qtd.	in	O’Reilly,	2005:223).	Here	the	text	did	not	become	about	me	but	about	confronting	the	relationships	I	formed	with	others,	what	they	brought	up	and,	most	of	all,	conveying	the	context	and	my	place	within	it.	I	locate	the	data	that	my	work	has	yielded	‘within	the	context	of	the	social	processes	that	brought	them	about,	and	recognize	the	limits	of	their	
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representation	of	reality’	(Woolgar	1988	qtd.	in	Brewer		2000:43).	I	see	the	interviewing	process	as	dialogical,	where	I	am	present	and	where	my	life	and	my	views	must	intrude	upon	the	canvass	of	what	is	finally	produced.	It	would	be	dishonest	to	pretend	otherwise,	and	thus	the	interaction	was	an	engagement	with	others,	or	what	Linda	Alcoff	calls	a	‘speaking	to’	as	opposed	to	a	‘speaking	for’	the	subject.	(1992:23)	
Over	time	as	I	proceeded	with	my	fieldwork	and	analysis	of	my	data,	this	consciousness	of	my	imbrication	within	the	research	frame	became	more	pronounced.	This	is	perhaps	an	inevitable	consequence	of	the	subject	of	my	thesis,	affect	as	powerful	as	grief.	I	could	not	situate	myself	outside	the	stories	I	heard	for	two	reasons,	first	simply	because	it	was	an	emotive	experience	to	listen	to	mothers	and	fathers	talk	about	their	loss	and	second	because	even	before	this	research	began	I	was	already	imbricated	as	the	third	vector,	the	nation,	in	my	relationship	with	the	military	through	these	tropes	of	grief	and	sacrifice.	Hence,	tears	would	flow	when	I	heard	the	families	talk	about	their	children,	in	the	silences	between	our	conversations	or	as	we	sat	by	the	graves.	My	own	affective	self,	its	response	to	the	stories,	became	a	site	of	observation,	an	intimacy	with	the	affect	I	sought	to	study,	which	was	both	exhilarating	and	exhausting	at	times.		
Sites,	Methods	and	Interlocutors13		My	study	privileges	the	study	of	the	political	in	more	intimate	space,	an	inquiry	into	militarism	not	just	through	institutions	or	the	generals	and	policy	makers	who	purportedly	shape	the	institution,	but	through	people’s	lives,	a	view	from	below	with	reference	to	location	and	class.	As	such,	the	focus	of	inquiry	was	the	soldier	class	and	their	families,	traditionally	drawn	from	villages	in	Pakistan.	Much	of	my	investigation,	including	the	selection	of	officers	and	soldiers	for	interviews,	examines	the	Pakistan	Army.	As	the	largest	(in	terms	of	man	power)	and	most	influential	(in	terms	of	political	clout)	of	the	three	forces	constituting	the	Pakistani	military	(the	other	two	being	the	Air	Force	and	the	Navy),	I	contend	that	many	of	the	arguments	in	this	thesis	about	militarism	in	Pakistan	are	best	represented	through	this	institution.	I	use	the	words	sipahi	and	soldier	interchangeably	to	refer	to	the	ranks	of	Sipahi,	Lance	Naik,	Naik,	Havildar	(collectively	referred	to	as	non-commissioned	officers	–	NCOs),	Naib	Subedar,	Subedar	Major,	Subedar	and	Honorary	Captain	(referred	to	as	junior	commissioned	officers	–JCOs).14	I	also	invoke	the	term	jawan	(young	man),	a	term	commonly	used	in	the	Pakistani	military	to	refer	to	soldiers,	usually	recruits	and	NCOs.	Officers	stand	distinct																																									 																					13	List	of	interviewees	is	being	withheld	to	ensure	anonymity	and	safety	of	interlocutors.	14	Subedars	(or	junior	commissioned	officers)	who	complete	32	years	of	service	may	be	discharged	with	the	title	of	Honorary	Captain.	This	is	the	highest	rank	accorded	to	the	soldier	class.	
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from	this	class	in	terms	of	the	criteria	and	procedure	for	their	selection	as	well	as	their	army	training	and	service	conditions.	Officers	are	not	the	subjects	of	my	inquiry,	but	are	interlocutors	as	and	when	their	proximity	to	the	sipahis	makes	them	useful.	To	reflect	this,	I	index	my	primary	subjects	with	names	(fictional	to	protect	confidentiality)	and	relationships	(e.g.	Yasmin,	Nawaz’s	mother)	and	refer	to	the	officer	class	through	rank	and	an	arbitrary	number	(e.g.	Colonel	2).	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	usual	depiction	of	soldiers	and	the	officer	class	in	military	narratives,	with	the	soldier	subaltern	represented	anonymously	through	number	and	sometimes	rank,	while	officers	are	more	humanized	through	name	and	rank.		The	data	in	this	thesis	is	drawn	from	two	primary	methods:	in-depth	semi-structured	interviews	and	ethnographic	participant	observation	spread	over	a	period	of	13	months.	For	the	interviews	I	charted	five	broad	domains	that	that	were	useful	for	my	study.	These	included	reflections	on	association	with	the	military,	such	as	experiences	during	recruitment,	training	and	service	including	combat,	enlistment	in	villages	and	dying	in	service,	including	memories	of	funerals	and	local	and	national	commemorative	services	and	compensation	packages	received.	Ethnographic	work	and	participant	observation	was	built	into	my	research	framework	to	provide	context	for	the	narrative	and	verbal	realm	that	the	interview	method	exposed	me	to.	Joe	Soss	(2006:139)	outlines	reasons	for	the	usefulness	of	supplementing	in-depth	interviews	with	ethnographic	work,	and	it	is	important	to	reiterate	these	here.	First,	the	‘social	process	of	meaning	making’	is	embedded	in	context,	and	this	can	be	best	understood	within	a	stream	of	everyday	reality.	Second,	the	interest	of	interpretive	research	in	indexicality	–	the	tendency	of	a	certain	event,	emotional	response,	identity	or	phrase	to	take	on	varied	meanings	in	various	contexts	–	is	best	served	by	this	method.			There	are	two	broad	classifications	of	sites	within	my	study;	civilian	and	military		i. Villages	in	Chakwal,	Punjab	(these	were	once	established	recruiting	grounds	for	the	British	Indian	Army).	ii. Formal	encounters	between	the	state	and	its	subjects	in	military	or	semi	military	institutions	(Commemorative	events	for	war	martyrs	at	the	Army	General	Headquarters	–	GHQ,	an	infantry	regiment	training	centre,	an	Army	Selection	and	Recruitment	Office	and	a	District	Armed	Services	Board).		The	first	site	allowed	me	to	study	the	process	of	militarization	of	informal	civilian	spaces,	while	the	second	allowed	me	to	study	how	civilian	subjects	participate	in	the	
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reproduction	of	the	state,	in	this	case	military	power,	within	formally	controlled	military	spaces	or	what	I	call	the	civilianization	of	military	events	and	spaces.		i.	Parts	of	Punjab,	including	the	Chakwal	District,	have	been	extensively	studied	as	the	‘nursery	of	the	martial	races’	of	the	British	Raj	(Barrier	1967:376),	a	specialization	that	the	Pakistan	Army	actively	encouraged	until	the	national	integration	policy	was	announced	in	2001.	The	primary	sites	for	my	data	collection	were	two	villages	in	Chakwal	District,	situated	in	Chakwal	Tehsil.15	I	have	assigned	fictitious	names	for	them	and	they	are	referred	to	as	Palwal	and	Kandwal	within	the	thesis.		A	small	number	of	interviews	were	also	conducted	outside	these	two	villages,	some	within	adjoining	Tehsils	in	the	district.	The	ethnographic	work	was	limited	to	Palwal,	the	smaller	of	the	two	villages,	where	I	spent	a	considerable	amount	of	time	between	September	2014	and	September	2015.			Palwal	is	small	village	in	the	southwest	of	Chakwal	Tehsil.	It	is	located	in	the	Potohar	belt,	which	is	largely	rain	fed	and	where	agricultural	land	holdings	tend	to	be	small.	The	area	relies	primarily	on	services	as	its	main	source	of	livelihood,	both	the	military	and	police	and	migration	to	the	Gulf	States	as	unskilled	labour.	According	to	current	estimates16	obtained	from	a	local	NGO	with	an	office	in	the	adjoining	village	of	Kandwal,	the	population	stands	at	2393	(last	survey	2013)	and	the	number	of	households	stands	at	somewhere	between	420	and	468	(based	on	records	from	a	local	NGO	and	a	woman	health	worker	in	Palwal	respectively).	Records	obtained	from	the	nearest	post	office	(also	in	Kandwal)	in	September	2014	suggest	that	270	persons	from	Palwal	draw	pensions	from	this	post	office,	of	which	230	are	males	and	40	are	the	wives	or	mothers	of	soldiers.	This	puts	the	ratio	of	households	with	someone	who	has	served	in	the	military	between	58	and	64	percent. This	does	not	include	serving	soldiers,	so	the	number	of	households	with	a	direct	relationship	to	the	military	is	likely	to	be	higher.			The	selection	of	the	two	villages	was	based	on	three	considerations:	the	presence	of	families	of	martyrs,	possible	contacts	that	would	allow	my	entry	into	the	village	space	and	the	presence	of	soldiers	(on	leave	from	service).	Points	of	special	attention	in	these	villages	were	various	institutions	and	sites	such	as	public	and	private	schools,	mosques	and	other	community	spaces	such	as	a	graveyard	and	a	large	shrine	that	attracted	devotees	from	the	rest	of	the	district	and	beyond.	I	also	attended	commemorations	of																																									 																					15	Denotes	an	administrative	unit	within	a	district.		16	According	to	the	Union	Council,	the	population	at	the	time	of	the	last	census	in	1998	stood	at	1891.		
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national	days	in	schools	and	annual	commemorations	of	soldiers’	deaths	planned	by	the	village	community.		My	primary	interlocutors	remained	soldiers	and	family	members	(mothers,	fathers	and	wives)	of	soldiers	(dead,	serving	and	retired)	as	well	as	other	influential	people	from	villages	or	the	city	of	Chakwal	who	I	felt	had	something	to	say	to	me,	either	indicated	by	their	own	interest	or	because	others	had	pointed	out	their	possible	significance	to	me	due	to	their	experience,	age	or	influence	in	village	or	district	affairs.	I	interviewed	eight	serving	soldiers	(seven	of	whom	had	served	in	combat),	eleven	retired	soldiers	and	five	soldiers	who	had	deserted	from	the	army.	I	was	in	regular	contact	with	five	families	of	dead	soldiers	(fathers,	mothers,	wives	and	sisters)	in	Palwal	and	two	in	adjoining	villages,	whom	I	interviewed	over	the	13	months	of	my	fieldwork.	In	addition,	I	also	spent	considerable	time	with	two	disabled	soldiers	and	their	families	in	Palwal	and	Kandwal.	There	were	twenty-seven	interlocutors	in	these	families.	I	interviewed	nineteen	other	individuals,	including	imams	from	mosques	in	Palwal,	schoolteachers,	other	influential	villagers	including	older	residents	and	the	village	headman,	NGO	workers,	a	retired	general	from	the	district,	a	politician,	the	District	Assistant	Commissioner,	a	college	professor,	a	local	writer	and	the	caretaker	of	the	district	community	centre.			I	had	initially	planned	to	conduct	life	history	interviews	in	the	village.	The	inability	of	many	of	my	male	interlocutors	to	spend	more	than	a	limited	amount	of	time	with	me,	as	they	were	only	present	in	the	village	for	short	periods	of	time	and	because	of	the	constraints	of	my	gender,	implying	that	spending	extended	periods	of	time	alone	with	a	male	could	be	considered	inappropriate,	meant	that	I	had	to	reduce	the	scope	of	my	inquiry	somewhat.	As	a	result,	these	exchanges	were	more	structured,	often	with	direct	questions	posed	about	the	domains	I	have	outlined	above.	I	did	attempt	to	maintain	my	interest	in	the	individual’s	life	as	a	whole,	allowing	the	interview	to	be	a	more	fluid	process	in	my	longer	associations	with	families,	and	I	found	this	helpful.	I	also	felt	this	approach	to	be	more	effective,	as	it	allowed	more	rapport-building	and	sometimes	a	needed	shift	of	focus	away	from	intense	grief.			My	initial	visits	caused	little	or	no	surprise	in	the	villages.	These	villages	were	used	to	visitors	from	the	city:	journalists,	filmmakers	and	military	personnel	who	wanted	to	know	the	stories	of	the	shaheeds.	What	aroused	a	certain	amount	of	discomfort	and	trepidation	was	that	I	wouldn’t	go	away.	By	the	second	month	it	was	clear	that	I	was	
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causing	some	bemusement	and	at	times	open	suspicion.	I	attribute	part	of	this	to	the	very	natural	reaction	in	these	areas	to	the	somewhat	nebulous	notion	of	ethnography.	However,	I	believe	this	was	also	partly	due	to	the	subject	of	my	inquiry.	Many	had	questions	and	some	were	posed	directly,	others	conveyed	through	others.	I	was	watched,	people	were	curious,	and	my	motives	were	often	questioned.	Why	did	I	need	to	come	in	
again	and	again,	they	had	already	told	me	all	that	I	wanted	to	know?	Did	the	military	know	
I	was	here?	Who	was	I?	Was	I	perhaps	from	the	military	sent	to	spy	on	people?	Was	my	
purpose	to	find	out	why	people	enlisted	and	think	of	ways	that	they	wouldn’t?		
The	village	of	Palwal	was	loyal	to	the	military	and	felt	uncomfortable	with	this	stranger	who	came	morning	after	morning	and	said	she	wanted	to	listen	to	people’s	stories.	What	was	obvious	was	the	hesitation,	an	awareness	of	what	could	and	could	not	be	said	and	what	might	be	said	if	I	came	again	and	again.	It	was	a	hesitation	born	out	of	increasing	familiarity,	the	beginnings	of	an	intimacy	between	researcher	and	researched	that	was	uncomfortable,	for	it	might	allow	an	exchange	that	went	beyond	the	script	that	is	acceptable,	not	just	to	the	military	but	also	to	the	self.	To	allay	in	part	this	sense	of	suspicion	and	partly	my	own	sense	of	frustration	as	I	felt	people	withdrawing,	I	began	to	teach	English	in	the	village’s	only	public	school	three	times	a	week	for	a	period	of	three	months.	Other	than	the	somewhat	useful	distraction	this	provided	for	my	own	nerves,	which	were	sometimes	overwhelmed	by	the	substance	of	my	talks	with	families,	it	was	also	instrumental	in	developing	a	number	of	strategic	contacts.	Most	of	all,	while	it	did	not	change	my	identity	as	the	girl	from	the	city	doing	her	PhD	on	the	military	it	did	allow	the	village	to	place	me	in	a	role	where	I	became	more	relatable	and	less	alien.		
My	engagement	with	my	interlocutors	was	as	sets	of	families	rather	than	as	individuals	alone.	Thus,	in	Palwal,	my	primary	ethnographic	site,	I	engaged	with	five	sets	of	families,	all	of	whom	had	lost	a	son	in	military	service	in	the	last	16	years,	one	as	recently	as	two	weeks	before	the	time	I	started	to	interact	with	them.	Many	of	these	interviews	were	held	in	the	courtyard	of	the	family	house,	with	my	subjects	walking	in	and	out	of	the	space	as	they	went	about	their	daily	chores.	The	lived	experience	I	wished	to	capture	was	collective,	not	private,	and	was	also	highly	affective.	Jubilation	at	the	coveted	acceptance	of	the	son	into	the	military,	distress	at	his	physical	condition	when	he	returned	home	after	his	initial	training,	pride	in	his	recruitment	parade,	rising	fear	and	anxiety	when	he	was	posted	to	a	combat	area,	dread	when	the	phone	rang,	numbness	when	the	coffin	arrived,	helplessness	when	they	found	it	nailed	shut,	awe	at	the	grandness	of	the	funeral,	the	rawness	of	grief	when	the	military	left,	and	tears,	always	the	tears,	some	hovering	behind	wet	eyes	and	others	that	just	rolled	out	unexpectedly,	never	wiped	away	but	
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leaving	traces	as	they	dried.	I	worried	initially	about	the	lack	of	privacy,	hesitated	when	initiating	conversations	about	what	I	felt	were	sensitive	or	painful	moments,	but	it	seemed	that	the	stories	and	experiences	I	sought	had	been	discussed	and	talked	about	often,	and	it	was	not	so	much	that	that	I	was	(re-)opening	these	painful	moments	for	them	but	simply	that	I	was	being	let	into	conversations	that	were	already	happening.			The	women,	especially	the	mothers,	went	back	to	that	time	with	little	effort	on	my	part,	almost	as	if	these	were	memories	that	they	lived	and	breathed	every	day.	Fathers	too	spoke	to	me,	but	that	took	longer.	Some	were	reluctant	or	hesitant,	and	yet	my	regular	presence	in	Palwal	and	in	their	homes	drew	them	to	speech,	even	though	I	did	not	intend	it	to	have	that	effect.	Others	continued	to	remain	silent	and	suspicious.	With	the	latter	I	maintained	an	uneasy	relationship,	respectful	(of	their	space),	grateful	(that	they	still	allowed	me	into	their	home	where	I	spoke	to	another	family	member)	and	conscious	of	my	location	as	a	researcher	(and	the	desire	to	know).			Is	there	a	particular	moment	when	you	feel	you	are	hearing	the	‘authentic’	from	your	interlocutors,	when	you	feel	they	have	finally	begun	to	trust	you	and	decided	to	open	up?	There	were	such	moments,	like	the	first	time	a	mother	expressed	deep	anger	and	regret	about	sending	her	son	to	the	military,	or	when	another	performed	a	spontaneous	vaen	(a	Punjabi	mourning	ritual)	at	her	son’s	grave,	wishing	her	son	had	died	when	he	was	a	baby,	or	when	a	father	said	to	me	that	he	told	the	colonel	that	he	would	send	his	other	son	to	the	army	because	he	felt	he	had	to,	almost	like	a	platitude.	These	were	hard	worn	testimonies,	for	as	I	started	my	fieldwork	the	cacophony	of	voices	that	reached	me	was	full	of	familiar	narratives	of	willing	sacrifice.	During	my	fieldwork	they	seemed	like	significant	moments,	but	over	time	as	I	analysed	the	stream	of	data,	the	hundreds	of	hours	of	lived	experience	that	my	interlocutors	were	willing	to	share	with	me,	I	realized	that	the	distance	between	such	moments	and	those	I	had	earlier	considered	less	remarkable	was	not	so	significant.	These	moments	stood	out	for	me	perhaps	because	they	made	the	story	more	dramatic	by	their	contrary	(to	the	popular	script	of	sacrifice)	and	almost	sacrilegious	nature.	As	I	analysed	my	data,	I	began	to	be	more	interested	in	how	these	dramatic	and	less	dramatic	pieces	of	narratives	were	joined	together,	how	the	intricate	lacing	together	of	complicit	and	subversive	narratives	allowed	the	ambivalent	subject	to	emerge,	where	contradictions	and	counters	were	not	discordant	notes	but	instead	were	a	mosaic	of	experiences	and	felt	states	that	my	subjects	identified	with,	lived	with	and	accepted	as	their	lives.	
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ii.	The	space	where	the	state	meets	its	subjects	was	the	second	site	for	interrogation.	Commemorative	events	such	as	the	Youm-e-Shuhada	(YeS)	–	Martyrs’	Day	–	and	Youm-e-
Difah	(YeD)	–	Defence	Day	–	ceremonies	are	a	special	focus	of	this	thesis,	which	includes	an	analysis	of	the	recordings	of	five	YeS	shows	held	since	2010	and	the	combined	YeD	and	YeS	show	held	in	2015.	For	the	latter,	I	was	present	during	one	preparatory	meeting	and	attended	the	show	itself,	being	backstage	for	part	of	the	programme.	Other	sites	included	the	Army	Selection	and	Recruitment	Office	in	Chakwal,	where	I	was	present	during	the	April-May	2015	intake,	the	District	Soldiers	Board	in	Chakwal	and	an	infantry	regiment	training	centre	in	Abbottabad.			Within	these	spaces	I	interviewed	military	personnel	who	were	significant	by	way	of	their	association	with	soldiers,	e.g.	officers	in	charge	of	designing	and	coordinating	the	commemorative	events,	officers	in	the	Personnel	and	Administrative	(PA)	Directorate,	including	the	Shuhada	cell,	and	officers	as	well	as	NCOs	and	JCOs	involved	in	the	recruitment	and	training	of	soldiers.	These	included	three	generals,	three	brigadiers,	eight	colonels,	five	majors,	two	captains,	one	serving	Subedar	and	one	Havildar.			A	sense	of	what	can	and	what	cannot	be	said	comes	out	at	different	points	in	my	fieldwork.	It	emerges	in	the	narratives	of	villagers	and	in	interviews	with	military	officers	and	soldiers.	I	have	elaborated	on	this	discomfort	in	the	discussion	of	how	my	fieldwork	progressed	in	the	village,	but	I	mention	it	again	here	to	emphasize	that	it	was	not	limited	to	the	villagers	as	I	found	it	echoed	in	my	interviews	with	officers.	It	was	not	censorship	but	an	openly	avowed/expressed	disclaimer	that	this	is	how	it	is	but	it	cannot	be	said	openly,	open	secrets	that	needed	to	be	guarded	nonetheless	from	outsiders	(researchers)	who	may	not	understand.	I	had	to	go	through	security	clearance	initially,	followed	by	repeated	need	for	verification	by	each	office	I	contacted	as	my	research	progressed,	and	I	was	sometimes	refused	information.	The	caution	expressed	was	that	in	the	interests	of	state	security	it	was	important	to	protect	the	institution	from	those	who	wished	to	malign	it,	and	clearly	the	topic	of	my	research	was	considered	sensitive	enough	to	warrant	this	caution.	The	image	of	the	institution	was	sacrosanct	and	was	to	be	protected	at	all	costs,	even	if	truth	had	to	be	compromised	from	time	to	time.	This	was	the	message	that	was	repeated	time	and	time	again	to	me	by	my	military	interlocutors,	the	message	becoming	louder	as	I	went	up	the	ladder	of	ranks.			I	categorize	my	interactions	with	110	interlocutors	into	three	types,	based	on	the	amount	of	time	I	spent	with	them.	The	first	were	conversations	sometimes	initiated	by	myself	
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and	sometimes	by	persons	I	came	across	as	I	went	about	the	villages	or	the	city	of	Chakwal,	including	district	administrative	offices	and	the	district	community	centre.	These	rarely	lasted	more	than	30-45	minutes.	These	were	men	and	women,	some	linked	to	the	military	and	others	not,	but	I	found	them	helpful	in	providing	context	for	the	dynamics	of	the	relationship	between	the	village/district	and	the	military.	Twelve	of	these	were	aspiring	recruits	going	through	various	testing	requirements	at	the	Selection	Centre.			The	second	type	of	interview	lasted	between	one	and	two	hours.	This	type	of	interview	was	most	feasible	with	the	various	serving	soldiers	who	were	home	on	leave	for	a	limited	time,	military	officers	within	the	military	institutions,	retired	military	officers	from	the	area,	local	politicians	and	other	influential	people,	including	teachers,	professors	and	clerics	with	whom	I	had	between	one	and	three	encounters.			The	third	set	of	interviews	was	with	families	of	soldiers	whose	homes	I	visited.	These	interviews	were	often	spread	out	over	a	number	of	visits	spread	over	a	period	of	13	months.	Some	of	these	were	chance	encounters	at	other	people’s	homes,	others	were	more	formal	interviews	at	their	houses	or	took	place	while	I	walked	with	people	as	they	went	about	their	chores	in	the	village.	These	interviews	typically	entailed	two	to	ten	hours	of	conversation,	some	of	which	were	taped,	while	others	required	note	taking	after	the	encounter.	Wherever	possible	I	attempted	to	record	the	discussion	immediately	after	the	session.			I	obtained	five	types	of	primary	data:	typed	transcriptions	of	taped	interviews	in	the	same	language	they	occurred	(Punjabi,	Urdu	or	English),	handwritten	notes	made	during	and	after	interviews	when	responders	did	not	want	to	be	taped,	detailed	ethnographic	notes	including	my	own	responses	to	the	situation,	photographs	I	took	during	the	course	of	my	field	work	and	artefacts,	such	as	the	diary	of	a	dead	soldier,	newspaper	clippings	of	various	events	or	letters	from	the	GHQ	that	a	family	had	kept.		
Chapter	Outline	The	thesis	begins	with	an	examination	of	the	most	concentrated	expression	of	militarist	ideology:	the	commemorative	ceremonies	held	by	the	Pakistani	military.	Chapter	1	is	based	on	a	review	of	recordings	of	six	shows	held	since	2010,	fieldwork	notes	taken	during	a	preparatory	meeting	for	the	2015	show	and	the	2015	show	itself,	as	well	as	interviews	with	military	officers	and	the	parents	of	dead	soldiers.	The	crafting	of	these	
			 40	
shows	for	the	benefit	of	the	nation	is	under	investigation	here	as	much	as	much	as	the	script	that	is	put	out	at	these	ceremonies.	The	chapter	also	addresses	content	that	is	kept	invisible	on	stage,	including	aspects	of	the	show	that	are	edited	out	and	the	affective	tones	within	the	NoKs	enclosure.	In	this	chapter,	I	argue	that	the	body	of	the	shaheed	and	the	grief	of	the	families	is	symbolic	capital	at	the	disposal	of	the	military	that	it	uses	to	communicate	with	the	nation.		Chapter	2	explores	the	historical,	physical	and	political	terrain	of	Chakwal,	a	famed	
martial	district	in	Punjab.	Sites	explored	in	this	chapter	are	military	institutions	(the	British	Indian	Army	and	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces),	their	policies	and	the	local	district.	I	draw	upon	interviews	with	officers	at	local	military	institutions,	district	residents	including	retired	generals,	writers,	activists	and	politicians	and	ethnographic	notes	from	my	time	spent	within	the	district.	I	argue	that	while	the	post-colonial	trajectory	of	the	district’s	relationship	with	the	military	echoes	the	earlier	paternalism	of	its	bonds	with	the	British	Indian	Army,	over	the	years	this	relationship	has	morphed	into	a	formidable	direct	social	contract	between	the	military	and	the	soldier,	his	family	and	the	district.	The	chapter	also	charts	the	local	population’s	efforts	to	inscribe	service	and	sacrifice	for	the	nation	on	the	landscape	of	the	district.		Chapter	3	focuses	on	a	military	training	school	for	recruits	as	a	direct	window	into	the	dramatic	disciplinary	mechanisms	that	transform	the	soldier-peasant	into	the	soldier-subject.	The	chapter	is	based	on	interviews	with	senior	army	personnel	involved	in	military	training,	training	school	instructors	and	recruits.	I	argue	that	these	disciplines,	formidable	as	they	may	be,	still	leave	spaces	for	consciousness	and	thought	within	the	automaton	that	is	the	soldier-subject.	The	chapter	also	addresses	the	role	of	religion	and	nationalism	within	training	and	argues	that	within	military	training	Islamic	teaching	represents	an	instrumentalization	of	religion	that	to	some	extent	echoes	how	the	Pakistani	state	conceives	of	religion.	However,	this	dosage	(of	religion)	is	carefully	controlled,	watched	and	diluted	within	military	spaces.		
Chapter	4	is	an	ethnographic	account	of	military	death	and	its	reception	in	a	martial	village	in	Punjab	and	describes	the	unfolding	of	mourning	rituals	and	the	negotiated	terrain	of	grieving,	including	the	local	memorialization	of	the	dead	that	stretches	beyond	the	dramatic	death	and	burial	of	the	soldier.	It	is	based	on	interviews	with	family	members	and	an	ethnographic	exploration	of	village	space	and	events	such	as	state	funerals,	local	death	anniversaries	and	the	commemoration	of	national	days	in	local	
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schools	and	graveyards.	I	study	grief	as	it	shifts	between	the	private	and	public	realms	and	follows	familiar	(allowed)	and	unfamiliar	(discouraged)	scripts	and	practices	of	death.	This	chapter	is	about	the	production	and	harnessing	of	affect	and	about	its	afterlife	and	examines	the	ways	in	which	moments	that	are	affect	laden	and	dissonant	are	transformed	into	junctures	that	allow	for	a	reconsolidation	of	military	power.			Chapter	5	charts	the	associated	yet	imperceptible	narrative	of	material	reparation	offered	for	loss	and	damage	endured	for	the	nation	through	interviews	with	families	of	dead	soldiers,	disabled	soldiers	and	officers	in	charge	of	implementing	compensatory	regimes.	The	chapter	brings	to	the	foreground	two	figures,	the	wife	of	the	dead	soldier	and	the	disabled	soldier,	both	direct	recipients	of	compensation	packages.	It	also	highlights	the	subtle	ways	through	which	the	female	subject	is	pulled	into	the	project	of	militarism.	I	suggest	that	these	compensation	economies	function	as	economies	of	loss,	compensation	offered	by	the	military	and	claimed	by	families	against	losses	that	elude	reparation.			Chapter	6	investigates	contestations	around	Pakistan’s	involvement	in	the	war	on	terror	in	local	spaces	such	as	Chakwal.	The	chapter	draws	upon	my	ethnography	of	Palwal	and	fieldwork	in	its	adjoining	villages,	including	interviews	with	retired	and	serving	military	soldiers,	ordinary	men	and	women,	local	politicians	and	activists.	I	argue	that	these	landscapes	are	not	adapted	or	prepared	for	the	new	enemy	system	and	that	there	is	limited	local	buy-in	to	the	military’s	narrative.	The	chapter	argues	that	the	terrain	through	which	these	relationships	may	be	publicly	articulated,	that	of	nationalist	and	religious	ideology,	is	not	the	terrain	where	the	victory	of	these	militarist	narratives	is	assured.	The	reconciliations	that	smooth	over	the	surface	of	these	destabilizations	are	made	possible	on	altogether	different	terrains,	the	affective	and	materialist.			To	sum	up	the	argument	presented	in	the	thesis,	I	examine	the	ways	affect	and	meaning	making	work	alongside	material	compensation	as	means	of	binding	ordinary	soldiers	and	their	families	to	the	military	as	an	institution.	I	interrogate	the	invocation	of	affect	that	I	argue	is	central	to	the	production	of	militarist	subjectivities.	I	argue	that	this	control	and	production	of	affect	also	sustains	another	set	of	relationships,	that	between	the	military	institution	and	the	nation	in	general.	The	deliberately	crafted	narratives	of	grief	and	willing	sacrifice	that	the	military	puts	on	display	set	up	the	military	as	the	selfless	saviour	and	garner	support	for	its	aims	and	policies.	As	such,	my	thesis	relates	the	apparent	enthusiasm	for	war	to	the	forging	of	affective	relationships	between	those	who	stand	to	
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suffer	significant	losses	(soldiers	and	families)	and	those	who	stand	to	gain	(the	military	institution).	This	is	not	to	say	that	these	enthusiasms	drive	militarism,	but	instead	to	emphasize	the	myriad	channels	and	nodes	that	make	militarism	possible	and	that	must	be	deconstructed	if	we	are	to	better	understand	its	multifarious	working.
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Chapter 1: Spectacles of Mourning - Manufacturing the Authentic A	 pleasant	 balmy	 evening,	 row	 upon	 row	 of	 seats	 laid	 out	 in	 meticulous	symmetry	 on	 the	 green	 expanse	 of	 a	 perfectly	 manicured	 lawn	 at	 the	Pakistan	 Army	 General	 Headquarters	 (GHQ),	 familiar	 patriotic	 anthems	blaring	 from	 large	speakers,	 smartly	dressed	men	and	women	 in	uniforms	ushering	guests	in,	three	giant	elevated	screens	arranged	around	a	majestic	stage	lit	with	the	national	colours	and	an	audience	of	a	couple	of	thousand	people.	These	are	all	the	hallmarks	of	a	perfectly	fantastic	start	to	the	Youm-
e-Difah	(YeD)	–Defence	Day	–	ceremony	in	2015.			Seated	 in	 the	 press	 enclosure,	 I	 noticed	 that	 the	 last	 enclosure	 on	my	 left	was	already	full	of	people.	I	knew	before	I	saw	the	sign	reading	‘NoKs’	that	this	 would	 be	 where	 the	 families	 of	 the	 dead	 would	 be	 seated,	 largely	because	 the	 enclosure	 was	 dominated	 by	 people	 from	 villages,	 men	 and	women	in	shalwar	kameez,	(traditional	dress	consisting	of	a	loose	shirt	over	loose	 trousers)	 and	women	with	white	 chaadars	(large	 often	white	 cotton	cloth	worn	in	public	spaces)	on	their	heads	and	bodies.	Seated	here	was	the	group	 from	 the	 village	 of	 Palwal,	 which	 named	 its	 main	 crossroads,	
Shaheeda	 da	 Chowk	 (Martyrs’	 Junction),	 after	 seven	 young	 villagers	 who	died	in	service.	My	friends	from	the	village	saw	me	before	I	saw	them,	maybe	because	 I	 stood	 out	 in	 the	 crowd	 with	 my	 uncovered	 head	 and	 colourful	clothes.	I	went	over	to	say	hello,	and	they	seemed	pleased	to	see	a	familiar	face.		Later,	 I	noticed	the	major	from	the	Inter	Services	Public	Relations	(ISPR)	I	had	interviewed	a	few	days	before	standing	near	the	stage,	so	I	asked	him	if	I	 could	 come	 backstage	 for	 a	 while.	 The	 scene	 behind	 the	 stage	 was	somewhat	chaotic;	some	celebrities	were	getting	their	makeup	done,	while	others	stood	at	the	side	smoking	and	discussing	poetry.	There	was	nervous	laughter	 and	 some	 last	 minute	 instructions	 and	 script	 changes.	 A	 Baluch	man	wearing	a	large	headdress	was	seated	silently	at	the	side,	the	father	of	a	 dead	 soldier	who	was	 to	 give	 his	 testimony	 on	 stage	 that	 day.	 An	 army	officer	asked	him	if	he	wanted	some	juice,	then	told	a	soldier	to	make	sure	he	 was	 looked	 after	 as	 he	 was	 their	 most	 honoured	 guest.	 The	 father	seemed	very	gracious	but	did	not	speak	much.	After	a	while,	he	was	joined	
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by	a	middle	aged	woman,	the	mother	of	a	dead	soldier	who	was	also	to	give	her	 testimony.	 She	 too	 seemed	 aloof	 from	 the	 rest,	who	were	 talking	 and	jesting	amongst	themselves.	Maybe	they	were	tense,	maybe	they	were	sad,	or	maybe	they	were	rehearsing	their	 lines?	I	wondered	if	 I	should	sit	with	them	 or	 continue	 to	 stand	 with	 the	 organizers	 and	 celebrities.	 I	 decided	instead	to	leave	the	now	darkened	back	stage,	as	the	show	had	begun,	and	sit	 with	 the	 families	 from	 Palwal	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 programme,	 for	 our	vantage	points	and	locations	determine	not	just	our	vision	and	the	scope	of	what	we	see	but	the	atmosphere	we	breathe.		-Fieldnotes,	GHQ,	6th	September	2015.		
v 	The	Youm-e-Difah	(YeD)	2015	ceremony	described	above	aims	to	entertain,	to	inspire,	with	scale	and	colour	as	much	as	through	what	is	actually	presented	on	stage.	This	entire	performance	is	built	around	death,	often	a	brutal	and	violent	death,	and	grief	and	loss	are	central	themes,	for	which	reason	I	call	these	events	‘spectacles	of	mourning’.	What	follows	is	a	spectacular	stage	performance	choreographed	down	to	the	last	detail,	a	performance	that	is	planned	for	effect,	a	visual	and	audio	treat,	one	that	tugs	at	the	heartstrings,	makes	you	weep	and	then	makes	your	heart	swell	with	pride,	plunges	you	into	deep	wretched	sadness	as	you	watch	the	mother	of	a	dead	soldier	smile	through	her	tears	and	then	pulls	you	up	within	minutes	on	waves	of	pride	with	visions	of	smiling	young	muscular	men	in	combat	clothes,	sounds	of	machine	gun	fire,	t-les	of	development	and	prosperity,	of	a	nation	that	is	at	peril	but	resilient.	There	are	liberal	splashes	of	the	military	in	every	scene,	a	sovereign	country	that	stands	on	the	blood	of	the	predominantly	khaki-clad	martyr,	visceral	registers	that	play	through	the	bodies	of	the	mothers,	fathers,	wives,	sisters,	brothers	and	children	of	the	dead	and	produce	and	shape	the	responses	of	the	audience,	of	the	nation	that	watches	them.	The	right	dose	of	emotion,	the	production	and	harnessing	of	affect,	a	pulling	of	scabs	to	invoke	a	response	of	awe,	of	gratitude	and	of	empathy	for	the	military.		A	way	to	study	these	ceremonies	is	to	understand	them	as	states	investing	in	the	management	of	grief	through	carefully	crafted	commemorative	rituals	of	mourning	and	memory	making	(Mosse	1990;	Holst-Warhaft	2000;	Acton	2007).	Vigilance	is	required	in	‘constructing	grief	and	mourning	behaviour	in	a	way	that	supports	rather	than	undermines	the	state’s	pursuit	of	war	aims’	(Acton,	2007:2).	According	to	this	
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scholarship,	grief	is	managed	in	order	to	curtail	dissent	that	may	arise	due	to	conditions	of	mass	bereavement.	My	thesis	and	this	chapter	position	affect	and	grief	instead	not	as	inconvenient	facts	of	war	but	as	central	to	militarism	in	Pakistan,	and	examine	these	spectacles	of	mourning	as	sites	where	complicity	in	the	project	of	militarism	is	created.	Here,	I	borrow	from	Katherine	Verdery’s	work	on	the	political	appropriation	of	dead	bodies	in	post-socialist	countries,	or	what	she	calls	the	‘strong	affective	dimension	of	dead-body	politics’	(1999:33).	She	suggests	that	the	dead	bodies	of	soldiers	can	be	used	by	the	state	as	‘symbolic	capital’.	First,	bodies	cannot	speak	but	can	be	spoken	for,	an	ambiguity	which	makes	them	useful.	They	can	be	deployed	to	invoke	nationalist	images	that	ask	for	national	unity	around	a	hero	of	the	nation	or	religious	images	that	emphasize	sacrifice	and	continuous	life.	Second,	bodies	inspire	awe	as	they	bring	to	the	surface	questions	and	fears	about	the	meaning	of	life	and	death.	Third,	they	allow	an	engagement	with	affect	and	emotion	through	identification	with	the	self	and	through	invoked	kinship	relations,	as	brothers	and	sons.	All	of	this	makes	these	bodies	‘good	symbolic	vehicles’,	and	they	are	thus	actively	appropriated	by	the	state	in	a	bid	to	shore	up	and	mobilize	support	for	its	aims	(1999:27-33).	In	this	chapter	I	extend	these	claims	to	include	the	families	of	dead	soldiers,	whose	grief	acts	as	symbolic	capital	and	remains	central	to	how	the	narrative	of	sacrifice	and	service	to	the	nation	is	kept	alive	by	the	Pakistani	military.		There	are	two	reasons	why	I	choose	to	begin	the	thesis	with	these	spectacles	of	mourning,	sites	where	the	military	and	its	subjects	(the	families	of	dead	soldiers	and	the	immediate	audience)	perform	a	heady	mix	of	grief	and	ceremony	for	the	nation.	First,	it	defines	the	master	narrative,	one	that	purports	to	shape	and	discipline	the	nation’s	perception	of	the	military	and	its	role.	These	ceremonies	of	light	and	shadow	showcase	performances	that	valorize	military	service,	speak	for	the	dead	and	their	families,	construct	the	manly	soldier	and	his	mother	(family)	as	willing,	nationalistic	beings	whose	hardship,	pain	and	suffering	is	immense,	yet	they	rally,	stand	firm	and	offer	more.	This	thesis	is	a	journey	that	marks	its	start	at	the	most	logical	point,	the	most	concentrated	expression	of	militarist	(national)	ideology	as	framed	by	the	military	not	as	some	static	contraption	fixed	in	time	and	space,	like	literature,	song,	visual	art	or	a	history	book,	but	as	performance,	altogether	more	fleeting,	more	fluid	with	the	ability	to	respond	and	engage	with	possible	disaffection	or	challenge.			
Second,	these	ceremonies	represent	a	site	for	the	examination	of	relationships	that	lie	at	the	heart	of	militarism,	between	soldiers	and	families	and	the	military	institution.	This	encounter	between	the	military	and	its	subjects	is	perhaps	the	most	dramatic,	for	it	is	
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staged	for	the	benefit	of	the	qaum	(nation),	the	third	vector	in	these	relationships.	My	use	of	the	word	qaum	is	taken	from	the	script	of	the	commemorative	ceremonies,	which	constantly	allude	to	the	qaum	and	its	relationship	with	the	military,	as	well	as	from	my	interviews	with	military	officers	and	soldiers.	In	these	texts,	the	qaum	is	constructed	as	a	monolithic	group,	whose	relationship	with	(and	more	specifically	support	for	and	affiliation	with)	the	military	is	considered	vital.	These	encounters	are	made	possible	through	affective	bonds	between	the	military	and	the	families	of	the	dead	that	act	as	conduits	for	the	military’s	relationship	with	the	qaum.	The	crafting	of	these	spectacles	for	the	benefit	of	the	qaum	is	under	investigation	here	as	much	as	is	the	script	that	is	put	out	at	these	ceremonies.	The	crafting	that	animates	these	spectacles	brings	these	relationships	to	life	through	the	invocation	and	transmission	of	sentiments	between	the	military,	the	families	of	the	dead	and	the	nation.	
	This	chapter	first	builds	a	context	for	these	performances	through	a	brief	examination	of	Pakistan’s	war	in	Waziristan	and	the	resulting	contestations	that	have	arisen	around	martyrdom.	It	then	examines	these	spectacular	performances	(YeS	shows)	and	reviews	both	the	script,	the	‘deep	images’	(Banti	2008:54)	these	shows	draw	on,	or	what	must	be	
said	and	the	craft,	the	technologies	employed	to	convey	these,	or	how	it	is	to	be	said.	The	latter	includes	the	production	aspects	of	the	show,	the	dynamics	in	rehearsals	and	backstage	and	the	preparation	of	families	for	testimonies	on	stage.	The	subsequent	section	pulls	into	view	themes	within	the	show	that	lie	outside	the	ambit	of	mourning	and	commemoration	and	that	I	argue	shift	this	theatre	of	mourning	into	the	theatre	of	war.	The	last	section	deals	what	cannot	be	said	and	must	be	invisible	on	stage.	This	includes	aspects	of	the	show	that	are	edited	out	and	the	affective	tones	within	the	NoKs	enclosure	that	highlight	the	ambivalence	of	these	collusive	relationships	(between	the	military	and	the	families	of	the	dead).		
The	Waziristan	War	and	its	Dead		North	and	South	Waziristan,	which	have	been	the	sites	of	fierce	combat	between	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces	and	the	Taliban,	are	located	in	the	Federally	Administered	Tribal	Areas	(FATA)	in	northwestern	Pakistan,	bordering	the	provinces	of	Baluchistan	and	Khyber	Pakhtunkhwa	(KP).	Under	British	rule,	this	area	was	loosely	governed	and	used	as	a	buffer	zone	between	Afghanistan	and	colonial	India,	a	practice	which	continued	after	partition.	The	subsequent	use	of	these	areas	to	support	the	Afghan	jihad	against	the	Soviet	invasion	of	Afghanistan	in	1979	and	beyond	has	been	documented	(Gul	2010;	Rashid	2012;	Jaffrelot	2015).	The	Pakistani	state	used	FATA	first	as	a	base	for	resistance	
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against	various	Soviet-supported	governments,	then	to	provide	support	to	Mujahideen	groups	fighting	for	Kabul	in	the	1990s	and	later	to	support	the	Taliban	and	other	militia	in	maintaining	strategic	depth	in	Afghanistan	in	case	of	an	attack	from	India	(Gul	2010;	Khattak	2015).	After	the	9/11	attacks	on	US	soil,	Pakistan	was	faced	with	the	dilemma	of	reviewing	its	hitherto	largely	unquestioned	alliance	with	the	jihadi	forces	it	had	nurtured	with	US	support	and	aided	during	and	after	the	Afghan-Soviet	war	(Haqqani	2005,	Jaffrelot,	2015).	Although	some	small-scale	operations	and	troop	deployments	in	South	Waziristan	began	as	early	as	2002-2003,	it	was	not	until	2004	that	more	concerted	operations	were	initiated	by	the	military	in	these	areas.	This	has	escalated	steadily	over	the	years,	with	Operation	Zarb-e-Azab	being	launched	in	North	Waziristan	in	June	2014.		The	Global	War	on	Terror	(GWOT)	and	Pakistan’s	participation	in	it	has	been	a	contentious	subject	nationally,	even	among	the	military	as	some	have	argued	(Rizvi	2003;	Jaffrelot	2015:527),	especially	its	alignment	with	the	US	and	the	fact	that	the	designated	enemy	is	Muslim.	For	the	subject	of	this	thesis	it	is	important	to	sketch	out	a	brief	trajectory	of	how	this	war	has	unfolded	in	the	national	landscape	and	the	strain	it	has	put	on	the	military’s	ability	to	garner	support	for	this	war,	and	especially	how	the	military’s	claim	to	shahadat	(martyrdom)	for	its	dead	soldiers	has	been	challenged	by	right-wing	political	and	religious	groups	on	two	very	distinct	occasions	during	this	period.	I	would	like	to	posit	a	nuanced	difference	between	shahadat	and	martyrdom,	the	former	being	associated	with	Islam	and	the	latter	with	the	nation-state.	Until	now,	because	of	the	heavy	appropriation	of	religion	by	the	Pakistani	state	and	the	military,	this	differentiation	has	been	irrelevant	in	the	context	of	Pakistan.	Hence,	a	solider	in	the	Pakistani	military	is	considered	a	soldier	of	Islam,	and	when	he	dies	in	the	battlefield	he	is	a	shaheed.	This	differentiation	has	come	into	play	during	the	GWOT.		In	2004,	Maulana	Abdul	Aziz,	the	Lal	Masjid	cleric	in	Islamabad,17	issued	a	fatwa	(religious	decree)	declaring	the	South	Waziristan	operation	by	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces	un-Islamic	and	prohibiting	the	burial	of	soldiers	in	Muslim	graveyards.	There	were	media	reports	of	disaffection	among	lower-ranking	troops	and	resignations	by	commissioned	officers	posted	to	South	Waziristan	(Shahzad	2011).	There	were	also	reports	of	villagers	refusing	to	participate	in	military	funerals	held	in	villages.18	In	2007,	there	was	an	armed	confrontation	between	clerics	and	students	of	a	mosque	and	the																																									 																					17	Lal	Masjid	(the	Red	Mosque)	is	one	of	Islamabad’s	oldest	mosques.	During	the	Soviet	War	in	Afghanistan	(1978-1989)	it	played	a	key	role	in	recruiting	and	training	young	men	to	fight	in	Afghanistan	and	enjoyed	the	patronage	of	the	military	regime	of	the	time.	18	Major	2,	ISPR,	16th	September	2015.		
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Pakistan	Army.	The	state	officially	acknowledged	only	the	military	dead	as	shaheed,	while	many	religious	parties	labelled	the	students	of	the	seminary	attached	to	the	mosque	who	died	during	the	army	operation	as	shaheed.	This	marks	a	distinct	phase	where	the	military’s	monopoly	of	martyrdom	for	religion	began	to	be	challenged	in	more	organized	and	visible	ways.19		In	November	2013,	when	a	US	drone	killed	the	leader	of	Tehreek	Taliban	Pakistan	(TTP),	Hekimullah	Mehsud,	Syed	Munawar	Hassan,	the	head	of	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	party,	made	two	declarations:20	first	that	Mehsud	was	a	shaheed	and	second	that	the	Pakistani	soldiers	killed	fighting	Islamic	militants	in	North	Waziristan	were	not	as	they	were	aligned	with	the	US.21		I	will	briefly	outline	the	response	to	this	later	questioning	of	military	deaths,	as	it	is	instructive	to	the	analysis	of	YeS	events	that	follows.	There	was	condemnation	from	the	military,	a	delayed	but	resolute	reaction	from	the	civilian	leadership,	with	Prime	Minister	Nawaz	Sharif	going	to	the	General	Headquarters	to	pay	homage	at	the	Shuhadas’	(Martyrs’)	memorial	monument,	a	retraction	by	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	and	subsequent	debate	in	major	editorials	and	on	popular	talk	shows.22	Debate	revolved	around	three	primary	themes:	the	reassertion	of	state	policy	on	the	right	to	claim	shahadat	for	its	armed	forces,	theological	discussions	on	what	constitutes	true	shahadat,	and	possible	hurt	and	damage	to	the	morale	and	sentiments	of	soldiers	and	their	families.	Where	the	first	two	remained	contentious,	and	were	hotly	debated	in	television	talk	shows	and	newspaper	editorials,	the	need	to	protect	the	feelings	of	soldiers	and	their	families	was	the	theme	that	received	the	most	unequivocal	support	from	both	military	and	non-military	quarters.			What	was	at	stake	in	these	debates	was	the	right	of	the	military	to	claim	shahdaat	in	the	service	of	Islam,	a	claim	that	had	so	far	been	synonymous	with	martyrdom	for	the	state.	I																																									 																					19	Chapter	6	deals	with	the	reverberations	of	this	in	the	local	landscape	where	the	military	recruits	its	troops.	20	The	oldest	Islamist	political	party	in	Pakistan,	which	has	traditionally	enjoyed	a	strong	alliance	with	the	military.	21	Boone,	J.	(2013,	November	12).	Pakistani	army	blasts	Islamist	party	for	calling	Taliban	chief	‘Martyr’.	The	
Guardian.	Retrieved	from	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/12/pakistan-army-taliban-hakimullah-mehsud-martyr		22	Staff	Correspondent	(2013,	November	11th).	Controversial	remarks:	Army	demands	apology	from	Munawar	Hussan.	The	Express	Tribune.	Retrieved	from	http://tribune.com.pk/story/630232/controversial-remarks-army-demands-apology-from-munawar-hassan/	;	Staff	Correspondent	(2013,	November	18).	The	martyrdom	controversy.	Dawn.	Retrieved	from			http://www.dawn.com/news/1056902	Raza,	S.	(2013,	November	15th).	Ideological	Fault.	The	Friday	Times.	Retrieved	from	http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/ideological-fault/		
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will	outline	two	possible	anxieties	on	part	of	the	military	in	response	to	this	challenge	from	right-wing	political	parties	and	religious	groups.	First,	a	practical	fear	of	disaffection	among	troops	and	their	families	who	come	from	areas	where	mosques	and	madrassahs	(religious	seminaries)	are	aplenty	and	ambivalent	state	policies	have	allowed	extremist	and	sectarian	ideologies	to	seep	into	neighbourhoods,	school	curricula	and	media.	The	reported	desertions	from	the	army	after	the	2004	fatwa	suggest	that	this	anxiety	is	founded	in	reality,	yet	all	men	did	not	desert	or	revolt;	in	fact	disaffection	was	dealt	with	swiftly.	While	this	may	have	been	managed	partly	through	court	martials	(Jaffrelot	2015:563),	as	the	1952	Pakistan	Army	Act	details	strict	procedures	for	court	martials	in	cases	of	mutiny,	desertion	and	disobedience,	the	Pakistani	military	did	not	sustain	any	serious	damage	and	was	able	to	continue	recruiting	and	functioning.	Material	incentives,	such	as	the	comprehensive	pension	and	welfare	schemes	offered	by	the	military	to	officers	and	enlisted	personnel,	continue	to	be	some	of	the	most	exhaustive	of	any	public	sector	employer	in	Pakistan	(Siddiqa	2007:206-207).	Thus	the	supply	of	troops	to	the	Armed	Forces	continues	to	outrun	demand.			The	second	anxiety	revolves	around	a	fear	that	the	military	narrative	of	sacrifice	and	service	to	the	state	(and	Islam)	would	be	weakened.	This	narrative	or	moral	card	(operationalized	or	made	visible	through	the	bodies	of	dead	and	living	soldiers	and	their	families)	is	dear	to	the	military,	for	it	is	a	terrain	where	the	military	is	able	to	command	blanket	acceptance	by	both	civilian	populations	and	military	personnel.	In	the	debates	that	followed	the	controversy	generated	by	the	remarks	of	Syed	Munawar	Hassan,	it	was	on	the	grounds	of	appeals	made	on	behalf	of	the	sentiments	of	soldiers	and	families	of	the	dead	that	the	military	was	able	to	win	and	garner	most	support.	The	status	of	the	dead	was	swiftly	and	unequivocally	defended	in	the	national	landscape,	not	just	by	the	military	but	also	in	the	media	and	among	civil	society	activists,	spaces	where	there	has	traditionally	been	more	criticism	of	the	military.	The	registers	through	which	this	debate	unfolded	almost	always	included	a	reference	to	the	sentiment	and	feelings	of	the	families	of	troops	and	the	troops	themselves	as	sacred	and	revered.	I	argue	that	this	sacredness	is	bestowed	not	by	Islam,	as	that	very	association	was	under	attack,	but	by	the	power	of	affect,	sentiments	that	have	been	deliberately	cultivated	within	the	national	imagination	and	have	come	to	be	associated	with	this	sacrifice.	It	is	these	feelings	and	sentiments	that	my	thesis	positions	as	central	to	these	debates,	the	deliberate	production,	harnessing	and	management	of	feelings	to	make	this	militaristic	narrative	of	service	and	sacrifice	for	the	nation	come	alive,	stay	alive	and	stay	relevant.		
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Brand	Martyrdom:	Youm-	e-Shuhada	(YeS)		 You	 can’t	 build	 a	 brand	 overnight.	 You	 have	 to	 sell	 your	narrative.	It	has	to	be	comparable	and	contemporary.	(Colonel	1,	ISPR,	22nd	May	2015)		Over	666323	security	personnel	have	died	in	the	GWOT,	the	large	bulk	of	whom	(over	500024)	were	military	soldiers,	and	more	than	three	times	that	number	have	been	maimed	or	injured.	In	2010,	the	Pakistani	military	declared	30th	April	Youm-e-Shuhada	(YeS)	–	Martyrs’	Day.		YeS	is	managed	by	the	Inter	Services	Public	Relations	(ISPR),	which	was	set	up	in	1949	as	a	unified	public	relations	system	for	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces.	With	one	exception,	the	Director	General	of	the	ISPR	has	always	been	from	the	Pakistan	Army,	and	the	more	recent	appointments	have	been	generals	from	the	army	who	also	act	as	the	official	spokesperson	for	the	military.	A	large	chunk	of	the	technical	production	of	the	YeS	programme	is	outsourced	to	private	production	companies,	but	the	script,	including	song	lyrics	and	poems,	is	often	handled	directly	by	the	ISPR.	These	are	screened	at	each	stage	of	concept,	design,	and	production.	The	Director	General	of	the	ISPR	and	the	Chief	of	Army	Staff	(COAS)	also	approve	the	final	programme	on	the	day	of	the	last	rehearsal.			Prior	to	YeS,	Youm-e-	Difah	(YeD)	–	Defence	Day	–	was	held	on	6th	September	and	was	devoted	to	the	commemoration	of	martyrs	and	the	celebration	of	Pakistan’s	victory	over	India	in	1965.25	Although	YeD	is	linked	to	the	1965	war,	until	that	point	it	had	been	considered	sufficient	tribute	to	the	Pakistani	military’s	subsequent	casualties,	largely	incurred	against	its	traditional	enemy	India,	for	example	in	Siachen	or	in	the	Kargil	War.	A	national	televised	commemorative	ceremony	was	also	held	on	this	day.	In	2010,	the	Pakistan	Army	declared	the	Youm-e-Shuhada	(Martyrs’	Day)	to	pay	tribute	to	the	martyrs	of	the	war	in	Waziristan.	Over	the	following	five	years,	commemorations	were	held	on	this	day	in	all	army	garrisons,	while	a	national	commemorative	ceremony	was	broadcast	across	the	nation	on	state	television	and	private	channels.	The	army	leadership	decided																																									 																									23	South	Asia	Terrorism	Portal	–	SATP		(2017,	January	17).	‘Fatalities	in	Terrorist	Violence	in	Pakistan					2003-2016.	Retrieved	from	http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm				24	Number	announced	by	the	COAS	in	his	address	in	the	YeD	ceremony,	2016.	25	It	is	relevant	to	mention	here	that	the	1965	war	with	India	is	looked	upon	in	Pakistan	as	a	decisive	victory,	an	unprovoked	war	in	which	India	suffered	major	losses	and	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces	won	the	day	for	the	nation	by	defeating	an	enemy	far	greater	in	size	and	superior	in	technology.	The	history	books	do	not	discuss	the	fact	that	India’s	assault	on	Pakistan’s	border	was	in	retaliation	for	Pakistan’s	initiation	of	Operation	Gibraltar	in	Kashmir,	nor	that	there	was	no	decisive	victor,	with	the	war	ending	after	three	weeks	with	the	declaration	of	a	ceasefire.		
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not	to	include	its	tribute	to	the	martyrs	of	the	Waziristan	war	within	the	folds	of	YeD,	a	state	event,	opting	instead	to	commemorate	it	separately.	It	may	be	instructive	at	this	point	to	compare	the	YeS	and	YeD	performances	and	draw	out	the	intended	or	unintended	consequences	of	declaring	an	exclusive	day	for	army	martyrs	in	the	GWOT.		YeD	is	a	national	day,	celebrated	by	the	state,	not	just	the	military,	and	was	also	a	national	holiday	in	Pakistan	for	some	time.	The	general	tone	of	the	YeD	show	in	the	past	has	been	celebratory,	extolling	the	heroism	of	the	soldiers	of	the	Pakistani	military	(not	just	the	army)	with	respect	to	the	1965	war.	Martyrs	are	remembered	through	songs,	but	the	tone	remains	celebratory,	with	sacrifice	glorified	and	revered,	while	the	challenges	and	grief	that	may	accompany	this	are	not	dwelled	on.	The	show	is	smaller	in	scale	than	subsequent	YeS	ceremonies,	with	a	limited	audience,	often	in	a	civilian	location,	and	is	presided	over	by	members	of	the	military	leadership	in	civilian	attire	and	sometimes	civilian	leaders	as	senior	as	the	Prime	Minister.			The	YeS	ceremony	is	on	a	much	larger	scale	in	terms	of	the	size	and	type	of	audience	and	its	resources.	This	is	an	army	affair	held	at	the	GHQ	premises,	presided	over	by	the	Chief	of	Army	Staff	(COAS)	and	the	senior	military	leadership	in	full	uniform.	An	address	by	the	COAS	is	a	traditional	feature	of	this	event,	and	foreign	dignitaries	have	attended	it	from	the	very	beginning.	It	focuses	almost	exclusively	on	martyrdom,	predominantly	with	reference	to	those	who	have	died	on	the	western	border	with	Afghanistan	or	in	counterinsurgencies,	and	it	is	attended	by	a	large	number	of	what	the	military	calls	NoKs,	the	families	of	dead	soldiers.26	The	tone	is	more	sombre,	and	there	is	a	strong	focus	on	emotive	testimonies	or	experience	sharing	from	mothers,	fathers	and	other	family	members	of	dead	soldiers.	The	decision	to	keep	these	two	events	separate	gives	insight	into	how	these	grand	performances	are	deployed	by	the	military	to	convey,	shape	and	discipline	narratives.	YeS	was	an	assertion	by	the	military	to	mark	a	new	phase	of	warfare	for	Pakistan:	a	shift	from	the	more	traditional	enemy	(Hindu	India)	and	type	of	war	to	a	new	enemy	(fellow	Muslims)	and	an	unconventional	war,	an	assertion	that	was	contested	through	the	discourse	on	shahadat.	For	this	reason	perhaps,	it	was	deemed	essential	to	mark	it	separately	and	not	fold	it	within	an	already	existing	day.	This	decision	provided	the	military	with	a	stage	on	which	to	brand	martyrdom	anew	within	military	domains,	while	also	giving	it	the	flexibility	to	shape	the	new	enemy	while	keeping	the	old	one	(India)	intact	(as	annual	YeD	ceremonies	were	also	held	on	the	side).																																											 																					26	Dead	soldiers	from	the	eastern	front,	e.g.	the	2012	Siachen	landslide,	have	also	featured	on	occasion.		
			 52	
The	army	officers	I	interviewed	who	were	in	charge	of	developing	and	producing	the	show	suggested	two	primary	objectives	for	the	YeS	event.	The	first	was	the	need	to	buttress	the	morale	of	troops	and	families	by	providing	a	formal	commemorative	space,	while	the	second	was	more	tactical:	to	reclaim	the	‘strategic	concept	of	the	shaheed’.27	In	other	words,	the	YeS	event	was	the	military	establishment’s	response	to	the	insinuation	that	the	war	in	Waziristan	was	America’s	war	and	that	the	soldiers	dying	in	encounters	with	fellow	Muslims	were	not	shaheed.	Behind	this	lay	an	acknowledgement	of	the	strategic	doctrinal	shift	within	the	military	that	claimed	that	the	nation	had	enemies	within	its	own	borders,	a	tacit	suggestion	by	the	military	that	I	will	show	becomes	bolder	with	each	subsequent	YeS	ceremony.		A	third	theme	central	to	the	claims	of	this	thesis	was	voiced	by	officers	in	charge	of	scripting	the	show.	This	theme	speaks	more	to	the	craft	of	the	show	and	determines	the	affective	tone	of	the	spaces	within	which	the	script	will	be	read	out,	as	well	as	who	 will	 read	 it.	 To	 clarify	 this	 theme	 further	 I	 revert	 to	 interviews	 with	 two	majors.		 [In	the	show]	you	[the	organizers]	are	talking	about	two	things,	purpose	and	feeling.	The	sentiment	towards	the	nation-state	and	those	feelings	at	that	time	towards	those	who	sacrificed	their	loved	ones	[families](…)	you	have	to	give	[family	members]	space	for	expression	of	these	feelings	towards	these	[dead]	relations	and	[space	for]	feelings	that	we	[qaum]	have	for	them	[families].	So	you	convey	that	it	[the	sacrifice]	was	a	purposeful	thing.									(Major	2,	ISPR,	16th	September	2015)		In	the	introductory	chapter’s	opening	vignette,	I	shared	Major	1’s	description	of	the	widow	as	he	explained	to	me	that	the	objective	of	the	YeS	ceremony	was	to	‘create’	‘brilliant	moments’	that	were	‘emotionally	charged.’28		I	draw	attention	to	two	features	of	these	exchanges.	One	is	that	that	the	sentiment	of	the	 family	 member	 towards	 the	 dead	 loved	 one,	 his	 or	 her	 grief,	 is	 central.	 The	bodies	 of	 family	members,	 their	 grief,	 are	 the	 conduit	 through	which	 the	military	‘conveys’	its	message	of	purpose	and	sacrifice	 to	 the	nation.	The	widow	so	clearly	described	 by	Major	 1	 is	 an	 image	 –	 ‘she	 stood	 there	with	 her	 three	 children,	 the	youngest	 in	her	arms’	–	 ‘created’	for	 consumption	by	 the	nation.	The	 third	vector,	the	nation,	is	clearly	acknowledged	here.	Second	the	appeal	to	the	nation	is	made	on	
																																								 																					27	Colonel	1,	ISPR,	22nd	May	2015.	28	Major1,	ISPR,	24th	August	2015.	
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affective	 terrain,	 relying	 on	 the	 deliberate	 ‘creation’	 of	 such	moments	 so	 that	 the	family	member’s	expression	of	loss	‘touches	a	chord’	with	the	audience.	A	response	that	seems	natural,	drawn	as	if	from	the	depth	of	their	being,	speaks	to	the	illusion	
of	authenticity	 that	 is	 created	 in	 these	 ‘brilliant	 moments’.	 I	 call	 them	 illusions	of	
authenticity	because	these	testimonies	of	families	are	made	possible	by	a	calculated	and	 carefully	planned	mixing	of	 the	 felt	 and	 the	 scripted.	What	 follows	now	 is	 an	attempt	to	unpack	the	creation	of	these	illusions	of	authenticity.	
The	Script:	Gendered	Narratives	of	the	Islamic	Nation-state	One	way	to	decipher	the	narrative	of	service	and	sacrifice	to	the	nation	is	to	look	at	the	content	of	these	spectacular	performances.	While	scripts	are	important	in	their	explicit	content,	for	the	rhetoric	that	the	state	wants	its	subjects	to	imbibe,	they	also,	despite	the	wish	to	exert	influence	outwards,	become	a	window	into	the	state	and	its	anxieties.	Reiterated	again	and	again	in	these	scripts	are	the	threads	that	the	military	deems	important	but	also	possibly	fragile,	which	must	be	reinforced	to	keep	these	bonds	and	bondages	intact.			Begona	Aretxaga	(2003:396)	reminds	us	that	it	is	‘difficult	to	think	of	the	state	outside	the	hyphenated	dyad	nation-state’	because	states	actively	promote	national	cultures	and	create	narratives	of	the	nation	through	a	range	of	institutions	involving	the	use	of	memory	and	history	making.	These	narratives	of	the	nation	rest	heavily	on	what	Katherine	Verdery	(1999:41)	calls	the	state’s	‘parasitic’	need	to	draw	on	‘kinship	metaphors’.	In	his	study	of	nationalist	discourse	in	Italy,	Alberto	M.	Banti	(2008)	suggests	that	this	discourse	‘derives	its	huge	emotional	power	by	a	morphology	structured	around	what	we	might	call	“deep	images”.’	These	images	deal	with	‘	“primal”	facts’	such	as	‘birth/death,	love/hate’	and	are	‘elaborated	through	materials	that	come	from	a	pre-existent	discursive	continuum’.	This	makes	them	‘easily	recognizable’	and	‘adaptive	within	new	discursive	contexts’	(2008:54,	emphasis	in	original).	Banti	identifies	these	images	as	kinship,	love/honour/virtue	and	sacrifice.	The	latter	brings	in	‘themes	of	suffering,	mourning	and	death’	and	has	the	potential	to	transform	‘national	belonging	as	a	sacred	experience	(...).	This	sacral	way	of	understanding	the	nation	offers	an	explanatory	and	ennobling	framework	(…)	for	the	death	of		“our”	martyrs’	(Banti	2008:56-57,	emphasis	in	original).	In	other	words,	suffering,	mourning	and	death	are	rendered	meaningful	and	thus	sufferable	by	the	family	that	deals	with	the	loss	and	the	soldier	who	prepares	or	trains	for	this	sacrifice.		
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Within	the	context	of	Pakistan,	these	narratives	of	the	nation	have	been	filtered	through	the	discourse	of	gender,	religion	and	kinship	(Khattak	1995;	Lalarukh	1997;	Baber	2000;	Jaffrelot	2002;	Saigol	2013).	All	three	feature	heavily	in	the	five	YeS	shows	and	the	one	YeD	show	that	are	examined	as	part	of	this	thesis.29			Within	Pakistan,	as	in	other	South	Asian	states,	nationalist	imaginings	are	staunchly	gendered,	with	women	playing	a	central	role	as	repositories	of	national	honour	and	cultural	and	religious	traditions	(Khattak	1995;	Saigol	2013).	The	woman	is	to	be	
protected,	and	if	necessary	defended	violently,	and	she	is	to	be	revered	as	a	producer	of	virile	robust	soldiers	who	protect	the	nation,	sacrificing	them	willingly	for	the	nation	(Baber,	2000;	Saigol,	2013).			The	appropriation	of	religion	is	reflective	of	a	wider	nationalist	ideology,	which	though	contested	has	had	constitutional	backing	since	Pakistan’s	early	years.	The	Pakistani	state	has	borrowed	generously	from	popular	understandings	and	concepts	of	religion,	using	them	as	fertile	ground	for	instilling	particular	forms	of	nationalist	subjectivity.	The	Pakistani	military’s	use	of	religion	and	the	idea	of	shahadat	as	a	motivator	for	training,	fighting	and	dying	for	the	nation	is	well	established	(Rizvi	2003;	Cohen	2004).	The	word	
shaheed	itself	has	a	clear	religious	connotation,	and	religion	comes	up	repeatedly	and	predictably	in	YeS	scripts.	Some	shows	begin	with	a	reference	to	a	verse	from	the	Quran	which	declares	shaheed	to	be	forever	alive.	More	often	than	not	the	nation	is	mentioned	within	the	folds	of	faith:	the	state	is	Islamic	and	the	nation	has	a	religion.	The	COAS’s	speech	almost	always	makes	reference	to	religious	duty,	and	the	claim	that	‘Pakistan	is	an	ideology	not	just	a	geographical	state’	is	often	repeated.	Videos,	songs	and	documentaries	feature	shots	of	mothers	on	prayer	mats	or	soldiers	praying	on	the	battlefield.	Poems	and	imagery	refer	to	Islamic	history	and	terms	with	a	clear	connection	to	Islamic	battle	history	or	Islamic	texts	in	general	are	often	invoked.	
	
Riste	(familial	relations)	or	kinship	is	a	recurring	discourse	to	which	the	script	is	tightly	bound.	I	highlight	this	particularly	because	gender	and	religion	often	come	wrapped	within	the	appeal	to	these	familial	relations.	The	shows	bring	this	‘deep	image’	to	life	through	an	intense	focus	on	the	families	of	the	dead,	which	is	clearly	central	to	the	imagery	of	the	YeS	programme	(Banti	2008:54).	The	shows	open	with	the	entry	of	a																																									 																					29	The	analysis	presented	in	this	section	is	drawn	from	content	analysis	of	video	recordings	of	five	YeS	shows	and	one	YeD	show	between	2010	and	2015.	In	the	case	of	specific	examples	drawn	from	a	particular	show,	the	year	is	provided.	Where	no	year	is	given,	examples	refer	to	generalized	themes	that	appear	in	almost	all	shows.	
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chosen	set	of	NoKs	walking	into	the	pavilion.	They	are	featured	in	songs	and	various	documentaries	and	video	clips	shown	during	the	ceremony,	and	their	testimonies	on	stage	are	an	essential	feature,	while	the	shows	close	with	them	paying	tribute	at	the	martyrs’	monument.	The	2014	show	started	with	a	detailed	relation-by-relation	dedication	of	the	show	to	the	families	of	the	dead	soldiers.	This	language	and	imagery	of	kinship	is	gendered	just	as	families	are	gendered.	The	lost	are	the	fathers	and	sons;	those	who	feel	their	absence	most	are	the	mothers,	wives	and	daughters.	Twice	in	2010	and	again	in	2014	the	chief’s	speech	singled	out	female	relatives	and	acknowledged	their	grief,	while	in	nearly	all	shows	the	tribute	to	the	‘azeem	maan’	(great	mother)	is	underscored	and	draws	the	most	emotive	reaction.	The	mother	remains	central	in	this	commemorative	ceremony,	with	her	testimony	saved	for	the	grand	finale,	and	she	is	singled	out	as	the	affective	relationship	whose	sanction	is	critical	to	making	this	sacrifice	possible.			 A	mother’s	investment	and	attachment	is	more.	The	man	is	physically	composed	and	it	is	easier	to	expect	the	man	to	say	go	my	son	[to	death],	it	is	harder	for	the	mother	to	say	this,	her	sanction	means	more,	her	grief	is	more.		 					(Major	2,	ISPR,	16th	September,	2015)		
	Here	the	passion	of	the	mother’s	grief	is	exalted,	expected	to	be	more	extreme	than	that	of	others,	and	hence	becomes	a	symbolic	resource	just	as	the	soldier’s	dead	body	is	symbolic	capital.	This	grief	needs	to	be	harnessed	in	the	service	of	militarism,	invoked	and	then	managed	to	produce	maximum	effect.	She	is	to	grieve	and	then	paradoxically	not	grieve.	The	invocation	‘shaheedon	ki	maan	roya	nahi	kartein’	(mothers	of	martyrs	don’t	cry)	is	repeated	often,	yet	there	are	numerous	images	of	mothers	crying	and	breaking	down.	What	is	highlighted	in	these	testimonies	is	her	stoicism	and	her	willingness	to	sacrifice	for	her	nation	her	most	treasured	relationship,	her	son.	Mothers’	testimonies	are	carefully	balanced,	and	the	mother	stands	for	a	brief	contradictory	moment	in	the	public	space	of	the	nation,	a	nation	that	normally	grants	her	little	subjectivity	or	voice.	In	this	moment	she	is	on	a	par	with	and	as	masculine	as	the	soldier	she	glorifies,	even	as	she	represents	the	archetypal	feminine	role:	that	of	the	grieving	mother.	She	symbolizes	the	final	moral	authority,	maadar-e-watan	(the	mother	of	the	nation),	who	gives	her	blessing	to	the	violence	on	the	body	of	her	loved	one.		
			 56	
The	widow,	referred	to	as	the	wife	(according	to	a	religious	edict	drawn	from	the	Quran	and	quoted	often,	martyrs	never	really	die),	is	also	routinely	invited	and	is	the	second	most	emotive	figure	on	stage.			 A	man	has	two	relationships.	One	is	that	with	the	mother	and	other	is	that	of	romantic	love;	romantic	love	is	tricky	because	it	is	considered	un-Islamic.	Everyone	has	a	mother,	plus	one	may	or	may	not	have	a	romantic	attachment	with	the	wife;	romantic	love	may	or	may	not	be	part	of	the	marriage.	 																											(Major	1,	ISPR,	24th	August	2015)	
		The	above	text	displays	some	of	the	tensions	associated	with	the	figure	of	the	wife.	The	overreliance	on	the	mother	figure	is	partly	due	to	the	fact	that	the	soldiers	who	die	are	often	young	and	unmarried.	The	reference	to	the	perceived	un-Islamic	connotations	of	romantic	love	also	points	to	the	need	for	a	pure	asexual	figure	who	folds	more	neatly	into	this	narrative.	Some	wives	no	longer	live	with	the	family	of	the	deceased,	some	move	on	and	get	remarried,	thus	the	demands	of	the	narrative	that	memory	and	suffering	are	kept	alive	are	better	met	by	mothers.	The	wife	is	also	a	contentious	figure	as	there	may	be	family	discord	because	of	dissatisfaction	over	how	compensation	has	been	divided	between	the	heirs	of	the	deceased.	This	does	not	mean	that	the	wife	does	not	appear	on	stage,	she	often	does,	but	the	challenges	above	point	to	how	her	inclusion	is	peppered	with	these	considerations.			The	father	is	also	an	important	figure,	for	whom	the	son’s	death	is	constructed	within	these	ceremonies	as	a	loss	of	companionship.	Fathers	are	also	depicted	as	role	models	for	sons,	and	sons	of	dead	soldiers	often	voice	their	desire	to	join	the	military.	For	the	military,	this	desire	to	enlist	emboldened	by	the	father’s	sacrifice	and	death	is	an	important	script,	voiced	through	the	on-stage	testimonies	of	male	children/brothers,	as	when	a	son	came	on	stage	wearing	a	mock	army	uniform	in	2010.	A	popular	dialogue	in	mothers’	and	fathers’	testimonies	is	‘if	I	had	ten	more	sons,	I	would	send	them	to	the	military’.	Back	home,	in	the	villages	from	which	these	men	are	mostly	drawn,	the	desire	to	enlist	another	family	member	is	often	a	direct	reflection	of	the	scarce	options	for	making	a	living	and	the	need	to	make	up	for	the	loss	of	income	that	the	family	was	dependent	upon.	In	recognition	of	this	dependency,	the	military	assures	military	service	to	a	male	member	of	the	family	as	part	of	the	compensation	package,	yet	when	such	an	offer	is	made	it	is	presented	as	a	(voluntary)	desire	to	serve	the	nation	and	sacrifice	for	it.		
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Fathers,	and	mothers	even	more	so,	are	portrayed	as	having	brought	up	their	sons	in	ways	that	made	this	sacrifice	possible,	a	deliberate	rearing	of	the	child	to	make	him	more	selfless	and	more	willing	to	risk	his	life.	Painted	as	collusion	from	the	beginning,	the	sacrifice	is	not	just	about	passive	acceptance	of	a	glorious	death	but	gratitude	and	pride	that	the	son	is	dead	(in	the	cause	of	the	nation).			While	the	testimonies	of	male	family	members	are	part	of	these	events,	the	military	clearly	foregrounds	the	female	figures	–	daughters,	wives	and	especially	mothers.	Scholars	have	highlighted	how	these	events	appropriate	women’s	agency	and	subjectivity	and	signify	moments	where	‘patriarchal	representations	of	women,	(…),	speak	for	the	women	by	projecting	the	women’s	voice	and	visibility	(agency)	to	align	with	broader	patriarchal	desires	of	the	nation’	(Rajan	2013:159,	emphasis	in	original).	I	posit	additionally	that	the	military	seeks	female	affirmation	because	the	masculinized,	militarized	and	nationalized	self	cannot	be	imagined	without	reference	to	the	feminine,	hence	the	feminine	is	invoked	to	strengthen	and	underline	the	differences	between	men	and	women.	So	the	tears	and	helplessness	of	the	woman	are	deliberately	juxtaposed	with	the	strength	and	resolve	of	the	male	soldier,	a	binary	that	can	then	be	extended	as	a	metaphor	for	the	relationship	between	the	military	and	the	nation,	of	the	nation	as	feminine	and	in	need	of	protection	by	the	more	masculine	military.	The	repeated	reference	to	the	feminine,	to	tears,	serves	to	create	the	complementarity	in	gender	relationships	that	the	militarist	project	seeks	to	reinforce:	armies	(men)	whose	bodies	protect	the	honour	of	the	nation	(vulnerable	female	bodies);	and	the	nation	(women),	which	in	turn	produces	and	nurtures	the	army	(men)	and	then	sends	it	to	war.	So	the	nation	and	the	military,	just	like	male	and	female	subjects,	become	intertwined:	partners	in	the	project	of	war.	The	masculine	militarist	project	needs	this	suggestion	of	complementariness	to	survive,	and	hence	reference	is	continually	made	to	relations	in	gendered	ways.			This	relationship	between	the	qaum	and	the	military	figures	obsessively	in	YeS	shows,	and	the	slogan	for	the	2011	YeS	ceremony,	One	Force,	One	Family,	One	Nation,	captures	this	symbolic	folding	in	of	relationships	within	a	militarist	frame.	This	serves	to	silence	or	hide	from	view	voices	that	may	not	be	one	with	this	narrative,	and	also	and	more	importantly	does	so	under	the	shadow	of	metaphors	of	kinship:	gendered	familial	relationships	that	inspire	love	and	thus	are	deemed	natural	and	rendered	unquestionable.	In	2013,	a	special	video	poem,	‘Tum	ye	kaise	kar	lete	ho’	(how	do	you	do	this?)	consisted	of	a	dialogue	between	the	incredulous	nation	and	the	warrior	soldier.	
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The	poem	first	sets	up	a	sense	of	incredulity	at	sacrifice	for	the	nation	through	a	series	of	contrasting	images	of	supposedly	happy,	carefree	and	safe	civilian	family	life	and	dangerous	and	risky	warfronts,	asking	the	soldier	again	and	again	how	he	can	choose	to	do	what	he	does.	The	narrative	then	shifts	beyond	the	intimate	to	the	larger	landscape,	where	the	soldier	figure	is	shown	helping	and	assisting	those	stricken	by	national	calamities	like	floods	and	earthquakes.	The	question	shifts	to	‘How	do	you	take	on	the	troubles	of	the	entire	nation	and	make	them	your	own?’	The	soldier	then	responds,	giving	two	reasons:	first	because	his	family’s	support	gives	him	the	strength	to	fight,	and	second	because	the	nation	stands	alongside	him:	‘I	am	not	alone;	the	entire	nation	stands	
with	me’.	The	script	also	highlights	a	tension,	and	in	so	doing	speaks	of	an	anxiety.	Paradoxically,	the	very	bonds	of	kinship	that	are	invoked	again	and	again	within	the	script	are	the	bonds	that	need	to	be	weakened,	for	he	has	to	choose	the	nation	above	his	family	if	he	is	to	perform	his	duty	and	be	willing	to	fight	and	die.	This	theme	is	also	reflected	in	military	training:30	an	invocation	of	relationships	and	then	their	negation,	representing	a	choice	which	is	made	easier	when	the	mother	is	replaced	with	the	motherland,	the	family	or	home	by	the	idea	of	the	nation	as	home,	and	the	son	of	the	mother	by	the	son	of	the	nation.	
The	Craft:	Lights,	Camera,	Action	This	section	brings	into	focus	the	craft	of	the	show.	I	use	the	word	craft	to	denote	the	performance	aspects	of	these	spectacles,	the	techniques,	gimmickry	and	skills	involved	in	invoking	the	appropriate	and	necessary	affect	for	the	military’s	purposes.	This	involves	the	careful	and	artful	use	of	direction	and	technology,	the	performance	of	these	emotive	scripts	for	maximum	effect	on	the	audience	through	what	Teresa	Brennan	(2004)	calls	‘the	transmission	of	affect’,	referring	to	how	we	can	be	influenced	from	within	and	without	by	the	affective	energies	of	both	other	people	and	the	outer	environment.	This	contagiousness	of	affect	allows	it	to	travel	beyond	affective	selves	and	act	as	relay	points	within	sets	of	people.		
	In	her	discussion	of	the	Assad	regime	in	Syria,	Lisa	Wedeen	(1999)	argues	that	political	spectacles	restrict	avenues	for	independent	political	thought	and	action.	The	claim	here	is	that	spectacles	transform	viable	political	thought	or	challenges	to	mainstream	discourse	and	state	ideology	into	something	that	is	passive	and	incapable	of	action.	In	her	account	of	Uzbekistan’s	holiday	spectacles,	Laura	Adams	(2010:3)	adds	a	further	nuance	to	this	ability	of	the	spectacle	to	foreclose	action	when	she	suggests	that	the	spectacle																																									 																					30	This	is	further	addressed	in	Chapter	3.	
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‘has	properties	that	enable	elites	to	close	opportunities	for	input	from	below,	but	without	making	the	masses	feel	left	out’:			 [S]pectacle	monopolizes	discourse	by	privileging	the	definition	of	truth	and	reality	belonging	to	the	elites	and	by	using	technology	such	as	the	mass	media	to	create	a	one-way	flow	of	communication,	speech	without	response,	which	isn’t	really	communication	at	all.	In	silencing	response	spectacle	turns	its	participants	into	spectators	(Adams	2010:3).			I	complicate	this	apparent	passiveness	or	silencing	that	reduces	participants	in	these	spectacular	events	to	spectators	and	argue	for	more	fluidity	in	the	participant-spectator	dyad	through	examination	of	the	processes	that	enable	these	shifts	(between	participants	and	spectators)	to	happen.	If	we	position	the	qaum	as	the	subject	of	the	military,	produced	within	certain	militarist	discourses,	and	further	distil	from	this	mass	the	semi-militarized	families	of	the	dead	and	the	civilian	qaum,	there	are	two	sets	of	subjects	that	shift	between	participant	and	spectator	roles	in	different	but	interrelated	ways.	In	the	context	of	semi-militarized	families	of	the	dead	we	may	need	to	reframe	these	processes	as	collusive	affairs	in	which	families	participate	by	allowing	their	affective	selves	to	become	spectacles.	I	use	the	word	collusion	with	caution	here,	recognizing	that	the	relationship	between	the	state	and	its	subject	will	always	be	a	wildly	skewed	power	equation	with	the	former	wielding	far	more	power	and	control.	To	study	collusion	and	symbiosis	between	the	powerful	and	the	subordinated	is	not	to	disregard	the	domination	and	coercive	power	of	the	state,	but	to	‘relocate	their	conditions	of	possibility	and	relation	and	forces	of	production’	(Stoler	2001:894).	These	ceremonies	are	collusive	affairs,	made	possible	as	a	function	of	the	relationship	between	the	military	and	the	families	of	the	dead	and	played	out	both	on	the	main	stage	of	this	grand	spectacle	and	backstage.			The	second	set	of	subjects	implicated	within	these	spectacles	under	scrutiny	is	the	civilian	qaum	 (I	will	 divide	 the	 civilian	qaum	 into	 two	 subsets	 in	 a	 later	 section).	These	 spectacles	 of	 mourning	 are	 crafted	 by	 the	 military	 so	 as	 to	 appear	 to	 be	supported	not	 just	by	 families	but	also	by	civilian	populations,	who	participate	as	co-organisers,	 performers	 and	 receptive	 and	 emotive	 audiences	 both	 within	 the	physical	space	of	the	ceremony	and	watching	on	television.		
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A	‘Calculated	Dose	of	Grief’:31	Preparing	Families	for	the	Stage			
Major	1	(teasingly):	Are	you	wearing	mascara?	
Male	Master	of	ceremonies-MC	(breaks	into	a	smile)	
Major	1:	I	hope	you	checked	if	it	was	waterproof?	
MC:	I	asked	the	same	question	when	they	were	putting	it	on	(laughing	loudly).		
Major	1:	 Are	 you	 going	 to	 ask	 any	 question	 of	 the	 father	 [of	 a	 dead	soldier,	who	is	to	appear	on	stage]?	
MC:	I	will	see	if	it	is	needed,	it	is	a	live	show	and	I	don’t	want	to	cause	any	problems.		
Major	 1:	 No,	 he	 [father]	 is	 very	 strong,	 he	 is	 too	 good,	 don’t	 worry.	(Pause)	You	can	decide	if	you	want	to	make	a	prick	or	two.	(Prick	here	refers	to	a	drawing	out	of	emotion	in	case	the	testimony	of	the	father	is	unemotional.)		Fieldnotes,	Back	stage,	YeD	ceremony,	GHQ,	6th	September	2015		
v 		The	exchange	above	between	the	military	convener	and	the	MC	speaks	to	the	concern	for	the	right	image,	depicting	pain	yet	showing	the	unshrinking	resolve	of	the	family	member	of	the	dead	soldier.	It	also	indicates	cynicism	on	the	part	of	the	organizers	as	much	as	the	subjects,	who	are	‘too	good’	and	‘very	strong’,	something	that	was	obviously	determined	in	the	preceding	prepping	session	and	which	I	will	now	address.	The	intent	above	is	not	to	paint	the	organizers	as	heartless	or	manipulative	or	the	subject	as	duped,	but	simply	to	foreground	the	fact	that	putting	this	spectacular	event	on	unavoidably	involves	a	surreal	blend	of	the	contrived	and	the	authentic.		According	to	the	organizers,	those	who	appear	on	stage	and	those	whose	testimonies	are	recorded	as	part	of	video	packages	played	out	on	giant	screens	on	that	day	are	carefully	screened	to	convey	diversity	in	sacrifice	for	the	nation.	It	is	deemed	essential	that	all	types	of	bodies	that	die	in	the	war	on	terror	are	represented	with	special	attention	paid	to	markers	of	identities	such	as	class	and	ethnicity,	different	military	forces,	army	regiments	and	other	civil	law	enforcement	agencies.	However,	the	selection	of	those	who	appear	for	public	consumption	is	not	yet	over,	and	the	next	step	is	to	prepare	those	who	are	allowed	on	stage.	Interviews	with	the	officers	in	charge	of	prepping	the	families	who	go	on	stage	reveal	their	confidence	in	their	ability	to	shape	the	testimonies	of	family	members	and	suggest	that	a	fair	amount	of	backstage	instruction	ensures	that	just	the	right	message	is	delivered.	These	exchanges	determine	who	is	(or	is	not)	selected	for																																									 																					31	Major	1,	ISPR,	24th	August	2015.	
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participation	in	these	spectacles	of	state	mourning	and	what	is	to	be	spoken	(and	what	will	remain	unsaid).			
Major	2:	It	is	a	hard	job	because	we	pull	at	their	scabs,	the	son	died	two	years	ago	and	we	want	him	to	talk	about	it,	relive	it.	We	have	to	give	the	right	dose,	injection,	because	he	can’t	break	down	completely.	I	prepped	this	baba	ji	[father],	who	used	to	cry,	for	two	days.	It	is	a	delicate	task,	just	the	right	emotion	and	some	acting.	It	has	to	be	a	mix.	We	tell	him	his	grief	is	not	just	his	grief;	his	son	is	not	just	his	son.	He	needs	to	think	about	grief	beyond	him.	He	has	to	share	his	grief	so	others	can	also	grieve	and	know	what	it	feels	like	(…)	he	did	a	good	job,	spoke	well	and	the	whole	audience	was	crying	and	he	didn’t	cry,	just	a	little	bit,	and	then	as	he	walked	away	he	made	a	thumbs-up	sign	at	me.		
Major	1:	In	front	of	everyone?	
Major	2:	No,	it	was	when	he	was	back	stage,	but	it	was	a	strange	moment	because	[it	showed	that]	he	was	acting.	It’s	a	mix	of	grief	and	two	percent	of	acting.	That’s	the	way	it	is	done.	It’s	a	performance	that	uses	real	emotions.		 	 	 	(Conversation	between	Majors	1	and	2,	ISPR,	during	preparatory	meeting	for	YeD	2015,	ISPR	office,	4th	September	2015)		This	is	a	surreal	exchange,	where	the	very	raw	and	personal	emotions	of	the	person	become	material	for	state	scrutiny	and	crafting.	Raw	material,	genuinely	felt	emotion	that	must	now	be	channelled	such	that	it	becomes	just	the	right	dose	of	feeling.	The	performance	on	stage	must	invoke	the	right	response,	and	the	illusion	of	realness,	of	authenticity,	must	remain,	as	evidenced	in	Major	1’s	concern	when	he	asks	Major	2	if	the	man’s	thumb	up	sign	was	visible	to	the	audience	(or	the	camera).	The	testimony	is	made	possible	by	entangling	the	fake	with	the	authentic:	‘just	the	right	emotion	and	some	acting’.	And	yet,	even	as	the	fake	and	authentic	lie	together,	the	ability	to	recognize	the	fake	remains:	the	old	man’s	thumbs-up	sign	speaks	to	that	ability,	that	consciousness,	the	realization	that	this	is	a	moment	where	he	must	perform	and	not	cry	or	break	down.	The	scripts	of	the	nation	then	become	a	crutch,	allowing	him	to	stand	there,	a	language	that	he	can	speak	without	breaking	down,	a	language	that	will	strengthen	his	ability	to	stand	and	not	crumple,	a	language	that	when	spoken	often	becomes	devoid	of	emotion,	though	tears	seep	through	when	a	deeply	intimate	memory	of	the	son	is	‘pricked’	by	the	MC,	as	per	the	instruction.	Raw	affect	is	reformatted	and	reworked	through	the	concerns	not	just	of	the	military	but	of	the	subjects.	A	reformatting	and	reworking	that	still	permits	the	realization	that	this	is	acting,	the	thumbs	up	sign	acknowledging	a	job	well	done	but	one	that	cannot	be	questioned	because	it	rests	on	real	emotion.		
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Re-enactments:32	In	Search	of	Fictions	that	Happen		 Our	goal	is	to	tell	people	we	all	feel	pain.	Before,	we	used	to	tell	people	we	are	made	of	stone,	superheroes.	When	I	get	hit	as	a	soldier	I	feel	the	same	pain	(….)	[In	the	case	of	]	the	mother	of	the	shaheed,	why	should	I	tell	people	that	she	is	saying	at	his	grave	that	she	does	not	feel	any	sorrow,	it’s	a	lie.	Does	this	happen?	Both	[the	family	bonds	and	his	mission	as	a	soldier]	are	important,	he	had	a	self,	he	had	something	at	stake	[family].	[You	showed	in	re-enactment	clips]	the	children,	girlfriend,	then	he	was	not	remembering	them	because	he	was	on	a	mission.		 							(Major	2,	ISPR,	16th	September	2015)	
	The	above	exchange	perhaps	reflects	frustration	on	the	part	of	scriptwriters	in	their	search	for	a	more	believable	script,	a	script	that	does	happen.	The	stoic	mother	can	feel	sorrow.	The	stoic	soldier	is	not	‘made	of	stone’	either,	and	the	script	can	acknowledge	that	he	has	a	difficult	choice	to	make	between	love	for	his	family	and	love	for	his	nation,	the	goal	is	no	longer	to	show	that	these	sacrifices	are	easy	but	instead	to	impress	upon	the	audience	that	they	are	very	hard	and	that	the	soldier/mother	‘feels	pain’.	For	the	purposes	of	my	analysis,	this	shift	allows	re-enactments	to	focus	on	the	life	of	the	dead	man	beyond	his	identity	as	a	soldier	in	ways	that	can	be	utilized	more	effectively	for	invoking	affect.	Over	the	years	the	shows	have	become	more	video	intensive,	the	videos	technologically	more	superior	and	the	stories	more	developed	and	personal.	In	2014,	the	re-enactments	and	testimonies	were	no	longer	limited	to	one	section	of	the	show	but	were	littered	throughout,	not	so	much	an	increase	in	number	but	a	blending	in	of	these	stories	so	that	the	figure	of	the	martyr	is	omnipresent	even	as	the	themes	become	more	diverse.	No	longer	is	the	soldier	depicted	as	a	one-dimensional	man	in	uniform	storming	into	a	building	with	a	gun	or	saluting	a	flag,	nor	is	the	mother	only	sitting	on	a	prayer	mat	or	kissing	her	son’s	brow,	although	there	are	many	such	scenes.	Spliced	into	this	typical	imagery	are	newer	images	showcasing	the	human	soldier	and	all	his	family	members	(not	just	the	mother),	bonds	of	attachment	and	images	of	pain	and	loss.	Family	members	speak	of	him	in	the	video,	and	as	the	documentary	ends	the	MC	reads	out	the	script	welcoming	family	members	onto	the	stage	in	a	tearful	voice.	At	this	point	the	camera’s	gaze	captures	the	audience	already	close	to	tears,	with	some	already	crying,	and	then	the	family	member	they	saw	immortalized	on	screen	a	minute	ago	walks	on	stage.	In	the	earlier	shows,	the	MC	stood	on	a	separate	dais,	with	families	coming	in	and	speaking	at	another.	However,	since	2012	the	MC	has	stood	alongside	family	members,	often	with	an	arm	around	them,	ostensibly	to	give	them	support	or	lead	them	off	stage	in	case	they																																									 																					32	Re-enactments	refer	to	short	video	documentaries	that	recreate	the	dead	soldier’s	life	using	facts	from	his	personal	life	and	professional	career,	especially	the	operation	in	which	he	died.	
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break	down.	The	‘brilliant	moment’	is	carefully	orchestrated	to	deliver	the	‘calculated	dose	of	grief’.	In	a	comic	twist,	sometimes	the	relentless	build-up	to	emotion	can	have	unexpected	results,	and	such	moments	can	prove	all	too	powerful.	Major	1	recounts	how	in	the	2013	show	the	female	MC	‘started	to	cry	herself	with	the	mother,	the	mother	stopped	crying	(but)	she	was	crying,	she	couldn’t	speak.	This	can	complicate	things.’		
Spotlight	Audience	and	the	Gaze	of	the	Camera			 We	have	put	every	kind	of	mother	on	stage.	A	mother	is	a	mother.	We	put	a	Pashtun	mother	on	in	2012	and	she	spoke	[in	Pashto]	so	no	one	could	understand	her,	but	she	was	probably	the	best	mother	we	have	put	up	on	stage.	She	made	a	lot	of	sense.	Also	her	body	language,	she	stood	as	she	is,	pure.	Whatever	we	do	it	has	to	connect	with	our	feelings	[of	those	watching	the	show	and	it	has	to	make]	the	right	connection.	She	didn’t	cry.	The	best	thing	was	that	she	was	thankful	and	she	was	not	overdoing	it.	It	didn’t	bother	us	[when	the	mother	did	not	cry	on	stage]	we	compensated	through	songs.	We	had	a	cushion	in	the	songs,	when	the	song	was	playing	I	could	see	people	were	crying	(….).																																													 		(Major	2,	ISPR,	16th	September	2015)			In	this	section	I	draw	upon	the	text	quoted	above	to	focus	attention	on	how	the	‘right	connection’	is	made	between	what	is	happening	on	stage	and	the	‘crying	people’	in	the	audience,	and	how	this	‘showing’	(to	the	people)	is	made	possible.			One	property	of	a	spectacle	is	that	it	gives	participants	‘a	feeling	of	inclusion	without	[them]	being	obligated	(or	allowed)	to	respond’	(Adams	2010,	155).	However,	I	posit	that	the	audience	in	these	spectacles	plays	a	distinct	if	carefully	controlled	role.	As	the	YeS	programme	unfolds	with	re-enactments	of	the	bravery	of	dead	soldiers,	through	recorded	and	on	stage	testimonies	of	mothers	and	other	family	members,	with	the	MCs	speaking	in	choked	voices	and	with	wet	eyes,	the	audience	is	often	in	tears.	The	camera	captures	this	display	of	emotion,	shifting	from	the	stage	with	remarkable	and	almost	obsessive	frequency	and	focusing	on	the	audience,	on	women	and	men	visibly	moved,	some	shedding	silent	tears,	others	sobbing	openly.	For	the	purposes	of	analysis,	the	blanket	category	of	the	qaum	can	be	divided	into	two	sub-sets,	the	audience	at	the	show	and	the	wider	nation	watching	on	television.	The	audience	of	apparent	civilians	watching	the	show,	who	are	not	strictly	military	and	who	mourn	visibly,	do	not	remain	spectators	but	become	participants,	crying	with	the	families	and	sharing	their	grief.	The	camera	captures	this	for	the	benefit	of	the	wider	nation	watching	on	television.	How	this	image	is	received	by	the	nation	is	something	that	this	thesis	does	not	respond	to.	However,	the	
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fact	that	the	show	is	crafted	so	reveals	much	about	the	institution’s	intent	to	rely	on	affect	and	use	it	as	a	technology	of	rule.		In	these	spectacles	of	mourning,	the	ability	of	affect	to	resonate	with	other	people,	to	spread	beyond	the	individual,	is	central.	I	posit,	however,	that	this	transmission	is	more	complicated.	In	talking	of	the	objectivity	of	belief,	Slavoj	Žižek	(2008:31-33)	suggests	that	states	such	as	belief,	as	well	as	the	most	intimate	feelings	like	crying,	sorrow	and	laughter,	which	we	often	associate	with	the	interiority	of	the	subject,	can	be	delegated	to	others,	an	‘exteriorization’	or	‘transference	of	our	most	intimate	feelings’.	An	example	of	this	is	the	act	of	weeping,	which	in	some	societies	can	be	delegated	to	professional	weepers,	women	hired	to	cry	instead	of	us,	a	common	practice	in	Punjabi	villages	in	Pakistan.	The	chorus	in	classical	Greek	tragedy	likewise	performed	the	same	function	as	does	canned	laughter	in	popular	TV	shows.	This	exteriorization	of	affect	happens	in	subtle	yet	important	ways	in	these	shows	and	is	what	I	draw	attention	to	now.		What	often	marks	these	spectacles	is	the	composure	of	the	families	despite	their	deep	grief.	This	composure	and	stoicism	is	carefully	constructed,	a	delicate	oscillation	between	crippling	grief	and	resolute	commitment	to	more	sacrifice.	As	Major	2	suggests,	‘the	objective	(of	the	show)	is	not	to	show	that	it	(death	of	a	loved	one)	is	easy	but	to	show	that	it	is	hard,	very	hard	and	yet	they	do	it	(sacrifice).’33	So	subjects	(families)	resonate	with	emotions	that	simmer	on	the	surface	and	spill	over	into	tears,	yet	their	speech	never	falters	and	their	words	never	go	off	script,	at	least	as	far	as	the	audience	and	nation	are	concerned.	This	composure	is	often	at	odds	with	the	unbridled	and	ready	display	of	tears	in	the	audience,	and	the	camera	seeks	out	and	displays	shots	of	women,	and	sometimes	men,	sobbing,	heaving	with	emotion.	These	affective	flows	between	the	families	and	the	immediate	audience	are	crucial	to	complete	the	spectacle	for	the	nation,	where	the	emotive	audience	acts	as	the	channel	of	emotional	discharge	for	the	less	emotive	family.	There	is	a	need	to	project	the	devastation	of	loss	and	grief,	but	the	families	cannot	fulfil	that	purpose	because	that	would	destabilize	the	script	of	willing	sacrifice.	However,	the	loss	has	to	be	highlighted	and	tears	invoked	to	garner	sympathy,	and	the	audience	fulfils	this	function.	They	thus	add	to	and	further	layer	the	ranks	of	those	who	serve	as	conduits	for	the	relationship	between	the	military	and	the	nation.	The	immediate	audience,	representing	the	feminized	weak	nation	in	need	of	protection	from	the	stoic	more	controlled	and	masculine	family	representing	the	institution	of	the	military,	becomes	locked	together	in	an	emotive	relationship	through	the	transmission	of	affect.	Through																																									 																					33	Major	2,	ISPR,	16th	September	2015.		
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this	relationship,	grief	and	sacrifice	become	the	powerful	authentic	tropes	through	which	the	military	and	nation	communicate	with	each	other.	
Mourning	No	More	Investigation	of	YeS	reveals	that	a	stage	where	the	dead	are	mourned	by	the	nation-state	is	never	just	that.	While	it	serves	to	shape,	define	and	craft	a	particular	narrative	of	sacrifice	and	service	to	the	nation,	in	some	ways	it	slides	into	domains	that	are	no	longer	about	the	dead.	In	this	section	I	draw	upon	four	specific	features	of	these	shows	to	investigate	how	this	theatre	of	mourning	shifts	into	a	theatre	of	war,	an	assertion	of	military	power	and	the	validation	of	militarism.	
The	Elusive	Enemy	As	shown	earlier,	officers	responsible	for	planning	YeS	shows	clearly	state	that	one	objective	was	to	‘reclaim	the	strategic	concept	of	the	shaheed’	(for	the	military).	The	fact	that	the	enemy	in	the	war	on	terror	lays	claim	to	the	same	Muslim	identity	that	the	ideology	of	the	Pakistani	state	repeatedly	enforces	has	been	a	site	of	contestation,	as	mentioned	above.	Interestingly,	until	2014	the	show	reiterated	the	status	of	the	dead	as	
shaheed	through	familiar	invocations	from	the	Quran	and	Pakistan’s	history	and	identity	as	an	Islamic	nation-state.	The	COAS’s	speeches	in	2012	and	2013	alluded	to	these	contestations,	but	it	was	not	until	2014	that	the	military	boldly	turned	the	debate	on	its	head,	redefining	the	enemy	as	lying	outside	the	folds	of	faith	(an	allegation	that	the	Tehreek	Taliban	Pakistan	has	made	against	the	military).	In	2014	there	was	a	specific	poem	video/documentary	about	the	enemy,	and	it	is	important	to	point	out	that	this	came	after	the	2013	shaheed	controversy	cited	above.	The	poem	attacks	the	Muslimness	of	the	new	enemy,	calling	it	a	mask,	a	curtain	behind	which	he	hides	and	manipulates	minds.	The	enemy	is	portrayed	as	backward,	one	who	uses	religion	and	culture	to	exploit	and	manipulate	young	minds.	The	narrative	focuses	on	progress	and	attachment	to	Pakistan	as	an	Islamic	nation-state,	its	progress	and	survival	threatened	by	an	enemy	who	exploits	religion.	The	military	here	asserts	the	right	to	claim	shahadat	in	the	name	of	Islam,	because	the	enemy	is	not	a	(true)	Muslim	in	the	first	place;	a	message,	which	does	not	separate	religion	from	nationhood,	but	instead	questions	the	enemy’s	interpretation	of	shariat	(Islamic	Law).			In	2015	a	slight	slippage	in	this	narrative	was	seen	in	a	clip	showing	the	army	intelligence	headquarters	profiling	the	enemy.	Two	of	the	three	terrorists	are	shown	as	Muslims,	one	an	Afghan	national,	while	the	third	is	depicted	as	an	unknown,	whose	religion	and	nationality	cannot	be	ascertained,	hinting	at	the	presence	of	a	foreign	
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(Indian)	hand	in	this,	without	stating	it	explicitly.	The	play	between	the	emphasis	on	internal	Muslim	enemies	and	external	enemies	reveals	interesting	tensions.	It	seems	that	the	amount	of	focus	that	can	be	on	the	internal	enemy	without	losing	sight	of	the	perceived	threat	from	the	external	enemy,	India	is	a	concern	for	the	military.	The	first	three	YeS	programmes	did	not	mention	the	external	enemy,	but	it	seems	that	in	2013,	more	forcefully	in	2014	and	much	more	clearly	in	2015	there	was	a	resolution	of	this	tension,	with	both	enemies	being	conflated	as	one.	The	COAS’s	speech	in	2015	also	referred	repeatedly	to	external	threats	without	naming	India.	These	tensions	highlight	how	the	stage	designed	for	the	payment	of	tribute	to	martyrs	becomes	a	strategic	site	for	how	the	nation	thinks	and	re-thinks	the	enemy.	
Celebrating	War	
Ghazis	(Muslim	soldiers	who	fight	in	battles)	were	given	a	special	tribute	in	the	2015	YeD.	The	short	package	was	a	re-enactment	depicting	how	conflict	played	out	in	Zarb-e	Azab,	an	operation	declared	by	the	Pakistan	military	in	North	Waziristan	in	June	2014.	The	clip	is	slick,	depicting	the	military	as	equipped	with	modern	weaponry	and	technology,	the	soldiers	speaking	English	and	the	enemy	as	a	mix	of	Pakistani	and	foreign	nationals.	In	the	final	encounter,	the	enemy	and	the	soldier	throw	down	their	weapons	and	engage	in	hand	to	hand	combat,	with	the	soldier	emerging	victorious.	The	tone	here	is	markedly	different	from	earlier	re-enactments,	where	tears	and	pride	mingled	and	which	bordered	on	being	heavy	and	somewhat	morose,	if	resolute.	Here,	the	mood	is	light,	as	if	war	is	a	sport,	almost	enjoyable.	In	the	video’s	first	shot,	the	officer	takes	cover	behind	a	large	rock	and	declares,	‘Here	we	go,	ab	maaza	aye	ga’	(now	we	will	have	fun).	The	last	minute	of	the	video	breaks	into	a	catchy	song	and	shows	troops	gathered	around	the	fire	singing	‘humara	naam	ghazi	hai’	(We	are	warriors).	Here,	the	stage	for	paying	tribute	to	the	dead	becomes	one	where	war	can	be	glorified	and	violence	and	killing	can	be	enjoyed	and	even	celebrated.	
Sharing	the	Stage	The	first	three	YeS	shows	presented	the	dead	as	being	from	the	military.	Only	in	2013	did	the	army	decide	to	pull	in	other	civilian	law	enforcement	agencies,	such	as	the	Frontier	Corps	and	the	police,	as	well	as	journalists	and	politicians.	In	2014,	the	ordinary	man	was	also	shown	as	dying	in	terrorist	attacks.	A	more	inclusive	event	that	acknowledged	martyrdom	for	all	members	of	the	nation	was	an	admission	by	the	military	that	all	lives	are	equal	and	must	be	honoured.	The	opening	line	of	a	re-enactment	posits	an	equivalence	between	the	dead	from	the	police	and	the	military:	Wardi	ka	rang	mukhtalif	
ho	saktein	hain	farz	ke	nahi	(The	colours	of	the	uniform	can	be	different	but	the	colours	of	
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duty	remain	the	same).	I	suggest	here	that	the	blurring	of	boundaries	between	the	military	and	civilian	spaces	creates	a	false	equivalence,	for	the	YeS	shows	hold	the	khaki-clad	military	martyr	above	others.	The	civilian	dead	are	included	in	this	terrain,	where	exaltation	occurs	according	to	militarized	scripts,	within	parameters	set	by	the	military,	and	the	focus	remains	on	the	military	martyr.	Their	inclusion	also	serves	to	mask	very	real	differences	in	the	compensation	accorded	to	the	civilian	dead,	including	civilian	armed	forces	such	as	the	police	and	the	Frontier	Corps,	and	creates	a	false	equivalence	in	the	honour	and	tribute	granted	to	them,	even	as	it	also	sets	them	up	as	an	added,	unintended	consequence	of	the	real	war	being	fought	by	real	soldiers	from	the	military.	
The	Policy	Speech	An	address	by	the	Chief	of	Army	Staff	is	a	traditional	feature	of	this	event.	This	is	a	space	where	the	COAS,	in	the	context	of	Pakistan	considered	the	most	powerful	man	in	the	country,	having	summoned	politicians,	foreign	dignitaries,	leading	media	personnel	and	leading	national	celebrities,	speaks	to	the	nation,	standing	literally	in	the	shadow	of	the	
Shuhada	monument,	constructed	at	the	heart	of	the	General	Headquarters,	televised	live	across	the	nation.		The	army	chief’s	speeches	at	the	first	and	second	YeS	shows	were	about	martyrdom	for	religion	and	the	state	and	the	need	for	the	nation	to	acknowledge	this	immense	sacrifice	and	show	support	to	the	families.	He	spoke	of	establishing	the	nation	and	the	military	as	one	united	entity,	‘a	rista	(relationship)	that	can	never	end’.	These	themes	continue	in	subsequent	speeches,	but	they	read	more	like	policy	statements,	and	martyrdom	and	families	are	relegated	to	the	beginning	and	end,	while	the	heart	of	the	speeches	is	dedicated	to	a	range	of	governance	issues	such	as	elections,	democracy,	re-assertion	of	Pakistan’s	sovereignty	and	foreign	policy,	including	Pakistan’s	relations	with	its	neighbours.	The	text	of	the	speeches	is	also	instructive	in	how	it	refers	to	the	war	and	the	enemy.	The	former	escalates	over	the	years	from	soldiers	dying	due	to	terrorism,	to	Pakistan	going	through	difficult	times,	to	Pakistan	being	in	a	state	of	war,	to	total	war,	where	the	whole	citizenry	and	all	institutions	have	to	fight	together.			Within	this	section	I	have	drawn	on	certain	features	of	the	YeS	programmes	that	delineate	how	these	commemorative	events	go	beyond	mourning	and	tribute	making	and	instead	provide	the	symbolic	capital	for	the	military	to	legitimately	spill	over	into	domains	that	strengthen	its	hegemony	and	control	over	the	state.	This	capital	allows	it	to	instrumentally	and	constantly	shift	the	enemy,	glorify	and	situate	militarism	and	war	as	something	to	be	celebrated,	create	illusions	of	equivalence	and	solidarity	among	civil	and	
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military	dead	and	provide	a	legitimate	stage	(literal	and	otherwise)	for	the	military	(the	COAS)	to	address	the	nation	and	comment	on	affairs	of	governance.	
Of	Other	Spaces	and	Stages	Blatant	content	is	often	but	half	the	story,	and	within	this	content	there	is	much	which	remains	hidden,	visible	only	through	its	conspicuous	absence.	Who	is	to	be	allowed	on	stage,	what	is	not	to	be	said,	what	is	to	hidden	from	view	is,	I	contend,	important	if	we	are	to	really	imagine	more	clearly	what	the	state	constructs.	
Going	off	Script	Accepting	that	the	spectacle	put	in	front	of	us	is	carefully	crafted	opens	up	the	possibility	of	seeing	what	this	illusion	masks:	an	illusion	that	stands	in	the	grey	zone	between	fact	and	 fiction.	 Officers	 acknowledge	 that	 when	 family	 members	 are	 on	 stage	 they	 can	sometimes	 say	 things	 that	 are	 not	 considered	 appropriate.	 Examination	 of	 this	inappropriateness	 reveals	 interesting	 insights	 into	 the	anxieties	of	 the	military	and	 the	voices	 and	 expressions	 that	must	 be	managed	 if	 the	 narrative	 of	 sacrifice	 is	 not	 to	 be	destabilized.	More	importantly,	I	turn	to	this	examination	because	it	reveals	the	tensions	and	 ripples	 within	 these	 relationships,	 which	 on	 the	 surface	 seem	 untrammelled	 and	impregnable.		Mothers	and	other	family	members	are	discouraged	from	making	the	death	too	real.	Officers	are	very	clear	that	depiction	and	talk	of	the	dead	must	not	become	too	vivid.			 She	[the	mother]	should	not	talk	about	the	dead	body	of	her	son,	some	things	are	very	gory,	we	don’t	want	them	to	be	said	on	stage.	It	is	gory	for	example	that	his	body	had	bullets	in	(….)	when	you	give	this	kind	of	a	message	there	is	a	line	about	being	brutal,	like	you	don’t	show	blood	on	TV,	so	we	tell	them	not	to	get	too	graphic.									(Major	1,	ISPR,	24th	August	2015)	
	Souls,	eternal	life	and	some	blood	are	acceptable,	but	too	much	blood	or	too	much	talk	of	wounds	to	the	body	are	not.	Much	as	the	coffin	is	nailed	shut	when	it	is	handed	over	to	family	members	 and	 they	 are	 discouraged	 from	opening	 it	 to	 touch	 the	 body,	 they	 are	also	discouraged	from	speaking	of	the	body	on	stage.	The	body	can	be	glorified	in	death	only	if	it	is	seen	as	intact:	whole,	smiling	and	at	peace,	and	not	as	a	gruesome,	bloodied,	mutilated	 image.	 This	 discomfort	 with	 the	 mutilated	 body	 is	 apparent	 also	 in	 the	ambivalence	 the	 military	 shows	 towards	 those	 maimed	 by	 the	 war,	 known	 as	 War	Wounded	 Persons	 (WWPs)	 in	 military	 parlance.	 WWPs	 made	 no	 appearance	 at	 YeS	
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shows	 until	 2012,	 and	 then	 only	 in	 the	 audience.	 However,	 short	 documentaries	were	dedicated	to	them	in	2013	and	2014.	They	disappeared	from	the	stage	in	2015	except	for	when	male	celebrities	paid	tribute	to	them	towards	the	end.	The	shows	thus	give	them	space	and	then	take	it	away,	the	camera	rests	on	them	during	the	ceremonies,	but	not	for	too	 long,	 so	 that	 the	 image	 of	 glorious	 and	 joyous	 sacrifice	 and	 the	 able-bodied	 living	warrior	is	not	marred	by	the	maimed,	helpless	and	incomplete	body.	The	disabled	can	be	spoken	for,	as	is	obvious	in	the	short	documentaries	presented,	and	the	same	symbiotic	relationships	 that	 serve	 the	 military	 in	 attaining	 consent	 from	 the	 families	 of	 the	deceased	are	at	play	here	too.	Yet	their	late	inclusion	and	subsequent	exclusion	points	to	the	 fact	 that	 the	disabled	represent	a	cost	of	war	 that	 is	 inscribed	on	 the	body	 in	ways	that	make	 the	military	 anxious.	 The	disabled	 occupy	 spaces	 between	 the	 dead	 and	 the	living,	the	valiant	ghazi	and	the	glorious	dead,	a	body	that	is	incomplete,	both	a	man	and	as	 helpless	 as	 the	 feminine	 other.	 They	 are	 liminal	 figures	 that	 refuse	 categorization.	Despite	 this,	 the	 narrative	 has	 had	 to	make	 space	 for	 them	 since	 2012	 in	 response	 to	their	growing	numbers,	as	the	number	of	maimed	for	life	in	this	war	is	purported	to	be	three	times	the	number	of	dead,	but	it	does	so	in	constrained	and	ambivalent	ways.	The	military’s	 inability	 to	 assimilate	 them	 into	 these	 narratives	more	 centrally	 points	 to	 a	continuing	discomfort.34			The	testimonies	of	families	can	also	potentially	threaten	the	official	transcripts	of	certain	events.	Sometimes	family	members	may	share	sensitive	information	about	the	operation	in	which	a	soldier	died.	At	other	times,	a	family	member	may	express	rage	against	the	enemy	in	an	uncontrolled,	unbridled	way.	The	military	seeks	to	control	not	just	the	pain	but	also	the	anger,	for	in	this	case	the	enemy	is	still	liminal	and	confrontation	with	him	has	to	be	carefully	managed,	an	acknowledgement	that	he	may	not	have	been	discredited	totally	with	the	masses	or	within	the	military.	Whatever	the	strategic	compulsions	for	controlling	expressions	of	anger	against	the	enemy,	what	is	of	interest	for	my	thesis	is	discomfort	with	the	depiction	of	the	family	member	as	angry.	The	politics	of	anger,	of	rage,	can	threaten	the	politics	of	sorrow,	and	perhaps	the	image	of	a	grief-stricken	family	member	does	not	sit	as	comfortably	with	the	angry	father	who	seeks	revenge.			Any	mention	or	trace	of	monetary	compensation	for	the	dead	of	the	army	is	missing	from	the	show,	and	families	are	discouraged	from	mentioning	it.	It	is	well	known	that	compensation	for	military	dead	is	greater	than	that	received	by	members	of	other	law	enforcement	agencies	or	that	handed	out	by	the	state	to	civilian	NoKs	after	death	or																																									 																					34	Chapter	5	examines	the	disabled	figure	in	more	detail.	
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injury	in	terror	incidents.	Yet	this	materialist	thread	is	missing	to	the	extent	that	all	that	is	made	visible	on	the	surface	is	the	ideological	narrative,	almost	as	if	compensation	did	not	exist.	The	military	goes	to	great	lengths	to	ensure	that	the	realities	of	bitter	property	disputes	and	family	estrangement	are	hidden	from	public	view.	The	intent	of	the	show	is	to	build	the	military’s	image	as	saviours	and	muhafiz	(protectors),	and	it	cannot	afford	to	be	thought	of	as	a	well-compensated	security	establishment.35		These	are	terrains	on	which	families	and	the	military	sometimes	find	themselves	at	odds,	and	relationships	and	trust	become	strained.	This	is	important,	for	it	tells	us	something	about	these	relationships	of	power,	how	they	are	forever	locked	in	bonds	that	bristle	with	tension	and	need	management.	What	the	military	seeks	to	hide	from	the	grand	stage	is	equally	if	not	more	important	if	we	are	to	look	beyond	the	glare	of	these	blinding	spectacles	of	mourning.		
The	Next	of	Kins	Enclosure	The	vast	NoKs	enclosure	is	marked	by	a	number	of	billboards	surrounding	it.	Its	physical	separation	from	the	rest	is	typical	of	how	the	military	attempts	to	categorize	and	organize	space	as	a	way	of	maintaining	discipline	and	making	crowd	management	easier.	Yet	this	physical	separation	also	serves	as	a	metaphor	for	other	differences.	These	differences	include	the	obvious	categories	of	location,	ethnicity	and	class,	for	the	vast	majority	in	this	enclosure	are	from	rural	areas	of	Punjab.	These	differences	bring	into	focus	how	the	collective	narratives	of	the	nation	and	sacrifice	mask	the	fact	that	the	nation-state	offers	unequal	representation	and	demands	unequal	sacrifice	(at	least	in	terms	of	military	service)	from	different	members	of	its	community.	The	over-representation	of	Punjab	is	partly	reflective	of	Punjabi	dominance	of	the	military	and	partly	because	the	audience	at	the	GHQ	ceremony	is	drawn	from	the	immediate	environs,	the	Rawalpindi	division.	To	smooth	over	these	distinctions,	on-stage	re-enactments	and	testimonies	also	show	soldiers	and	families	from	villages	and	cities	in	Khyber	Pakhtunkhwa	(KP),	Baluchistan	and	Gilgit	Baltistan.	The	number	of	casualties	is	higher	in	the	soldier	class,	which	is	largely	drawn	from	rural	areas,	and	these	differences	haunt	the	show,	for	the	NoKs	enclosure	is	dominated	by	people	from	villages:	men	in	traditional	white	shalwar	kameez	and	women	with	chaadars	on	their	heads.	While	there	are	some	people	in	suits	in	the	NoKs	enclosure,	as	well	as	more	fashionably	dressed	city	folk,	(parents	of	officers	who	have	died),	the	difference	between	enclosures	is	more	pronounced	because	of	the	complete	absence	of	these	rural	men	and	women	from	lower	
																																								 																					35	Chapter	5	addresses	military	compensation	regimes	in	more	detail.	
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socio-economic	backgrounds	in	the	other	enclosures.	This	is	not	only	a	sign	that	the	nation	may	demand	unequal	sacrifice	from	different	classes,	but	also	that	that	the	only	way	rural	men	and	women	can	be	visible	on	the	national	stage	is	when	they	make	this	sacrifice.			The	other	difference	between	the	NoKs	enclosure	and	the	rest	is	one	of	mood,	for	people	within	this	enclosure	remain	uncertain,	vigilant	and	uneasy	in	this	vast	terrain	of	grandeur	set	out	ostensibly	in	their	honour.	The	NoKs	in	this	enclosure	watch,	relegated	to	audience	status,	while	their	stories	are	played	in	front	of	their	eyes.	The	camera	seeks	them	out	when	the	re-enactments	play	out,	when	their	testimonies	are	presented	and	when	the	COAS	mentions	them.	Thus,	every	time	the	script	speaks	for	them	and	through	them	for	the	dead,	the	camera	rests	on	this	enclosure.	The	camera’s	gaze	serves	to	make	them	participants	too,	complicit	by	their	decision	to	attend	the	ceremony,	their	very	presence	an	expression	of	unwavering	support	for	the	military.			As	shown	in	the	vignette	which	opened	the	introduction	of	this	thesis,	the	persons	whose	lives	and	stories	are	told	on	the	grand	stage	do	not	always	resonate	in	sync	with	the	rest	of	the	audience.	Yasmin,	the	mother	whose	son	had	died	in	the	Swat	operation	with	whom	I	sat	during	the	YeD	ceremony,	remained	sceptical	and	cynical	about	the	mother	who	came	on	stage	and	presented	her	other	son	to	the	army.	She	distanced	herself	from	that	mother,	saying,	‘I	don’t	know	who	these	women	are’,	even	as	she	cried	openly	through	much	of	the	ceremony.	Yasmin	herself	had	refused	to	send	her	second	and	only	surviving	son	to	the	army,	although	a	secure	place	in	her	dead	son’s	unit	had	been	offered	to	him.36			When	I	went	to	visit	Nawaz’s	(N)	house	a	week	later,	I	was	witness	to	the	following	exchange,	which	brings	out	the	complexities	of	this	relationship.		
N’s	sister:	Mother	told	us	about	the	show	and	how	grand	it	was,	but	she	remained	upset	by	it,	her	heart	felt	uneasy.	She	said	there	were	many	people,	there	were	lots	of	other	mothers	and	they	all	cried.	She	was	saying	that	they	[the	military]	should	just	take	this	money	and	distribute	it	to	the	people,	so	that	someone	could	benefit.	She	said	watching	the	parade	just	made	her	heart	sad	and	she	missed	Nawaz.	
N’s	father:	Yes,	they	spend	a	lot	of	money,	they	give	us	money	for	travel	and	also	put	us	up	in	a	fancy	hotel	and	feed	us,	but	if	they	gave	us	this	money	it	would	never	be	enough,	even	if	they	gave	us	a	crore																																									 																					36	Yasmin,	Nawaz’s	mother,	24th	November	2014	and	fieldnotes,	YeD	ceremony,	6th	September	2015.	
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each	it	would	never	be	enough.	Who	will	remember	them	(the	dead)?	We	will	forget	otherwise.	
N’s	sister:	My	father	is	a	political	man,	he	did	his	matric	when	very	few	people	in	our	village	had	done	so,	he	thinks,	he	sees	things	differently.	My	mother	is	uneducated,	she	is	emotional,	she	only	feels.																																												(Sister	and	father	of	Nawaz,	Palwal,	14th	September	2015)		The	mother,	who	‘only	feels’	and	whose	bonds	of	attachment	and	ability	to	express	affect	is	deemed	vital	in	these	commemorations,	says	that	the	money	should	be	distributed	so	that	someone	can	benefit	from	it,	and	so	seems	to	imply	that	no	one	really	benefits	from	these	grand	shows,	therefore	making	them	pointless.	She	further	suggests	that	her	grief,	expressed	within	nationalist	frameworks	and	spaces,	grows	and	is	not	eased.	This	signifies	a	disconnect	and	an	unease,	where	the	nation	no	longer	figures	in	private	scripts.	The	nation	is	also	missing	from	the	‘political’	father’s	comments,	but	for	him	the	need	to	remember	through	meaning	making	and	memory	remains	an	important	way	to	ease	his	grief.	His	rejection	of	money	as	a	salve	for	pain	is	deeply	significant	when	examining	the	ambivalence,	guilt	and	unease	associated	with	receiving	compensation	in	lieu	of	the	dead	son.		One	argument	for	how	complicit	testimonies	on	stage	are	made	possible,	like	these	relationships,	is	that	these	families	are	militarized	civilians	who	are	producers	of	statist	ideologies.	Yet	this	would	be	hard	to	explain	in	view	of	the	old	man,	whose	thumbs-up	sign	signals	awareness	of	the	act	of	performing	as	he	spoke	about	something	that	overwhelmed	him.	It	would	also	be	hard	to	explain	in	view	of	the	reactions	of	families	during	and	after	the	ceremony.	I	argue	that	these	testimonies	are	made	possible	not	just	by	the	internalization	of	ideologies	of	nation	and	religion	but	by	affect	which	is	produced	within	the	webs	of	the	military’s	disciplinary	power	but	which	seeks	its	own	response,	its	own	balm,	and	not	just	that	so	glibly	and	clumsily	offered.	Much	as	prepping	is	considered	essential	and	the	language	and	text	of	the	nation	and	religion	are	deemed	critical,	collusion	with	the	militarism	project	works	in	subtle	layered	ways	and	is	not	a	result	of	appropriations	and	manipulations	summoned	by	the	national	and	religious	script	alone.	It	is	a	compliance	not	made	possible	because	of	a	firm	belief	and	faith	in	ideology,	but	a	sort	of	desperate	clinging	to,	a	desire	not	to	see	even	as	vision	seeps	through	in	the	spaces	where	the	camera	(or	the	gaze	of	the	military)	does	not	reach,	sometimes	expressed	as	cynicism.	The	scripts	offered	by	the	nation	then	become	the	language	used	to	stand	there,	a	crutch	leant	on	to	face	an	intolerable	reality	that	can	only	be	made	bearable	if	it	fits	within	available	cultural	constructions	of	sacrifice	and	honour.	I	argue	that	when	grief	is	so	deep,	the	nation	becomes	an	afterthought.		
			 73	
Other	moorings,	more	subtle	than	the	nation,	rise	up	in	the	fog	and	make	these	compliance	possible,	moorings	haunted	by	memories,	the	need	to	remember	and	the	fear	of	forgetting.	Yasmin,	Nawaz’s	mother,	turned	to	me	during	a	video	about	‘ghazis’	which	showcased	brave,	well	trained	soldiers,	saying,	‘look	how	fit	they	are,	how	they	train	and	all	they	have	to	do	to	be	able	to	fight’.	She	said	this	ruefully,	yet	with	pride.	I	remembered	the	many	conversations	I	had	had	with	her	in	which	she	lamented	how	army	training	was	very	tough,	how	weak	Nawaz	had	become	and	how	she	had	cried	when	she	saw	him	the	first	time	he	had	returned	from	training.	Nawaz’s	father	proudly	pointed	out	the	Northern	Light	Infantry	as	his	son’s	unit	as	they	came	into	view.	Yasmin	pointed	out	the	uniform	and	the	feather	in	the	green	beret,	telling	me	how	her	son	used	to	wear	it	when	he	came	home.	These	symbols,	colours,	music	and	wars	were	alien	yet	familiar	to	them.	Sohaila,	the	mother	of	Imran,	an	18	year	old	soldier	from	Palwal	who	died	after	seven	months	of	service,	was	also	seated	next	to	us	and	told	me,	‘We	come	[for	YeS]	because,	they	[the	army]	call	us,	look	after	us.	We	always	do	because	he	[her	son]	was	fond	of	the	army’.37	These	moorings	are	evoked	by	hauntingly	familiar	terrain,	for	this	is	what	was	familiar	to	their	loved	one:	the	sounds	of	the	army	band,	this	uniform,	the	parade,	and	so	they	attend	as	parents	because	it	is	their	child’s	world.			These	feelings	are	heightened	by	the	glare	of	the	bright	lights	in	the	public	space	of	the	nation,	feelings	of	groups	of	people	that	finally	have	a	chance	to	stand	in	that	space,	people	from	villages	or	women	suddenly	allowed	into	the	national	narrative.	A	deep	sense	of	obligation	to	honour	the	son’s	memory,	an	obligation	felt	even	more	keenly	because	of	haunting	unease	at	the	amount	of	compensation	received	by	very	poor	families.	These	symbiotic	relationships	are	fuelled	by	deeply	felt	affect	that	leads	them	to	cling	to	and	be	soothed	by	the	familiar,	familiar	not	so	much	to	them	but	to	the	ears	and	eyes	of	their	dead	sons.	Sounds,	images	and	associations	saturated	by	affect	calm	them:	the	sound	of	the	military	band,	the	sight	of	men	marching	in	well-known	garbs	and	so	communities	of	sacrificing	families	talk	about	a	war	that	is	alien	yet	achingly	familiar	through	the	language	of	a	keenly	felt	loss.		
Conclusion	In	this	chapter	I	have	shown	that	the	apparent	support	and	complicity	of	the	families	is	imperative	to	make	grand	stages	like	the	YeS	possible	and	sustain	narratives	of	sacrifice	for	the	nation.		The	militarization	of	civilian	spaces	is	a	manoeuvre	by	the	military	institution	marked	by	the	bringing	of	military	discipline,	control	and	regulation	into																																									 																					37	Fieldnotes,	YeD	ceremony,	GHQ,	6th	September	2015.	
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otherwise	civilian,	chaotic,	disorganized	spaces,	where	a	multitude	of	cacophonous	narratives	may	strive	for	claim	and	attention.38	In	YeS	ceremonies,	the	manoeuvre	is	opposite,	and	the	unruly	chaotic	civilian/nation	are	drawn	into	military	spaces.	This	move	allows	military	narratives	and	spaces	to	seem	less	about	military	policy	and	the	harsh	realities	of	war	and	instead	play	out	like	warm,	familiar	scripts	that	are	heart	wrenching	for	the	watching	nation.	Here,	on	the	hardest	and	most	fortified	of	terrains	–	the	power	nucleus	of	the	country,	the	General	Headquarters	of	the	Pakistan	Army	–	habits	of	the	heart	are	crafted.	The	military	incorporates	civilians	into	these	commemorative	ceremonies	and	they	participate	in	the	reproduction	of	military	power	in	formally	military-controlled	spaces	–	what	I	call	the	apparent	civilianization	of	military	events	and	spaces.	These	spectacular	events	–	massive	celebrations	of	sacrifice	choreographed	through	skilful	scripting	(which	decides	what	themes	are	allowed	on	stage	and	what	is	edited	out),	affective	management	of	families	and	the	use	of	technology	–	purport	to	speak	not	just	for	the	dead	but	also	for	their	families	and	the	nation.	They	create	an	image	of	families	as	willing,	compliant	selfless	beings	who	offer	up	their	sons	to	the	military	and	an	image	of	a	nation	that	weeps	and	stands	alongside	these	families	and	soldiers,	which	translates	into	standing	alongside	the	military	and	its	policies.	The	camera’s	gaze	allows	the	immediate	spectators	to	step	in	as	participants	in	these	spectacles,	where	the	passion	of	the	families’	grief	is	harnessed	(not	fabricated)	and	then	watched	within	these	spaces,	which	resonate	with	affect.	This	inter-subjective	transmission	of	affective	energy	between	grieving	families	and	the	qaum	allows	these	spectacles	to	become	ways	to	speak	to	the	nation	about	appropriate	ways	of	responding	to	and	showing	support	for	the	military.		
The	shifting	emphasis	in	the	content	of	the	YeS	and	now	the	YeD	programme	speeches	over	the	years	shows	that	the	subject	matter	expands	from	martyrdom	and	commemoration	to	affairs	of	governance,	and	is	indicative	of	the	military’s	growing	confidence	that	it	can	comment	on	and	interfere	more	openly	in	politics.	This	hardly	represents	a	shift	against	the	backdrop	of	Pakistan,	where	direct	and	indirect	military	interference	in	foreign	policy	and	politics	is	an	accepted	fact	(Jalal	1990;	Rizvi	2003;	Siddiqa	2001).	What	is	interesting	for	the	purposes	of	this	thesis	is	the	nature	of	the	platform	used	for	this	expansion,	the	stage	that	pays	homage	to	its	dead.		In	2015,	the	Pakistani	military	decided	to	merge	the	YeS	and	YeD	events,	which	perhaps	reflected	that	the	military	felt	it	had	made	sufficient	headway	in	reclaiming	the	narrative																																									 																					38	These	manoeuvres	will	be	discussed	in	subsequent	chapters,	where	I	discuss	the	martial	district	of	Chakwal	(Chapter	2)	and	village	funerals	(Chapter	4).	
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of	the	shaheed	so	that	those	who	died	fighting	other	Muslims	could	now	stand	(or	lie,	as	they	are	now	six	feet	under)	shoulder	to	shoulder	with	those	who	died	fighting	in	wars	with	(Hindu)	India.	This	confidence	is	reflected	in	the	excerpt	from	an	interview	with	Major	2	below.		 Back	in	2006	I	was	asked	to	take	the	dead	body	of	a	soldier	home.	It	didn’t	have	a	head	(…)	There	was	nobody	except	for	the	family	who	wanted	to	come	for	the	jananza	(funeral).	(…)	I	gave	a	motivational	lecture	and	some	people	rallied	and	came.	So	on	that	day	there	was		nobody	to	bury	him,	but	I	am	sure	today	his	grave	is	a	shrine	where	people	come	and	pray.	That	is	how	we	have	changed	the	narrative.	(Major	2,	ISPR,	16th	September	2015)	
	The	brief	comparison	of	YeS	and	YeD	made	earlier	in	this	chapter	is	instructive	as	it	allows	us	to	see	the	effect	of	the	merger	of	these	two	shows	in	2015.	What	the	merger	does	most	effectively	is	to	take	away	even	the	illusion	of	civilian	control	over	the	war,	the	defence	of	Pakistan’s	borders	and	its	relationship	with	its	neighbours	that	the	YeD	had	hitherto	portrayed.	The	YeD	on	6th	September	2015	played	out	as	a	slightly	revised	version	of	the	YeS	format,	complete	with	the	GHQ	venue,	military	uniforms,	a	band	and	a	parade.	It	was	a	military	affair,	and	the	COAS	made	a	policy	speech	about	democracy,	governance	and	foreign	policy	while	the	civilian	leadership	and	the	nation	watched.		 	
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Chapter 2: The Making of Militarized Spaces - History, Geography and 
Politics 	In	his	book	Rusticus	Loquitur,	or	the	Old	Light	and	The	New	in	The	Punjab	Village	(1930:30),	Malcom	L.	Darling	narrates	how,	when	on	a	tour	of	Punjab	in	1929,	he	asked	villagers	why	they	joined	the	army.	He	asked	them	to	choose	one	of	two	options,	which	while	simplistic	were	perhaps	descriptive	of	how	the	motivation	for	military	service	has	traditionally	been	explained:	shauq	(interest)	or	bhuq	(hunger).	He	reports	that	they	said	
bhuq	first	and	shauq	later.			In	2015,	as	I	met	with	person	after	person	in	villages	in	the	Chakwal	district,	a	key	recruitment	area	for	the	British	Indian	Army	and	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces,	the	first	response	to	my	research	topic	(which	I	would	present	as	an	attempt	to	understand	why	people	from	the	district	enlist)	would	circle	around	one	word:	ghurbat	(poverty),	followed	by	a	second	phrase:	pakki	naukri	(secure	employment	associated	with	government	service).	Claims	of	a	warrior	past	and	of	defending	national	honour	and	religion	rarely	came	up	first	in	these	discussions,	although	they	would	come	up	later	and	were	rarely	missing.			Three	features	of	this	comparison	over	time	are	important:	the	first	represents	how	much	has	not	changed	–	the	reasons	for	enlistment	are	largely	materialist,	as	before.	
Second,	over	the	years	enlistment	has	come	to	be	seen	as	a	profession,	a	long-term	systematic,	often	generational	investment	that	may	mean	the	difference	between	a	life	of	penury	and	a	more	settled	existence	with	the	security	of	social	welfare.	Third,	while	my	interlocutors	nearly	always	articulated	nationalistic	or	religious	drivers,	they	were	mentioned	much	later	in	these	conversations.		In	order	to	better	understand	the	physical	spaces	and	the	persons	who	stand	ready	to	serve	and	sacrifice	in	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces,	this	chapter	investigates	the	Chakwal	District	by	tracing	patterns	of	relationships	established	during	colonial	times	that	replay	and	morph	in	modern	day	Pakistan.	The	protagonists	in	this	chapter	are	military	institutions	and	their	policies	(the	British	Indian	Army	and	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces),	and	persons	both	civilian	and	military,	both	those	who	are	alive	and	the	dead	who	haunt	the	landscape	and	whose	graves	are	visible	across	the	district.	More	specifically,	I	explore	how	these	martial	districts	have	been	shaped	by	the	geographical	terrain,	by	historical	proclivities	and	by	the	whims	of	the	Pakistani	military’s	recruitment	policy.			
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The	conditions	that	drive	people	to	continue	to	invest	in	the	military	are	often	cited	as	a	complex	mix	of	economic	desperation,	brought	on	by	the	constraints	of	geography	and	deepened	by	historical	anchoring	in	the	idea	of	martial	races.	The	chapter	argues	that	although	these	conditions	act	as	foundations	for	the	present	context,	there	are	also	subtle	shifts	in	both	the	mechanics	of	these	relationships	(the	actors	between	whom	they	are	conducted)	and	how	they	are	portrayed.	The	parameters	of	the	relationships	continue	to	rest	on	welfare	and	economics,	yet	their	protagonists	have	morphed	and	there	is	a	weaving	in	of	newer	themes	of	the	nation	and	religion	by	the	military.	This	chapter	will	argue	that	these	newer	themes	are	also	woven	in	by	the	district’s	population	and	serve	as	justification	for	continued	entitlement	to	the	benefits	that	military	service	brings	to	their	lives:	the	livelihood	opportunities	and	the	accompanying	generous	welfare	services	it	offers	them.			I	present	my	arguments	in	this	chapter	through	the	lens	of	demand	–	how	the	colonial	state	set	out	to	create	the	conditions	for	certain	districts	of	Punjab	to	enlist,	conditions	on	which	the	Pakistani	military	later	capitalized	–	and	supply	–	why	the	people	of	Punjab	meet	this	demand.	I	use	terms	such	as	demand	and	supply	deliberately,	for	I	argue	that	recruitment	arrangements	are	characterized	by	two-way	transactional	market	dynamics,	which	are	often	obfuscated	by	the	paternalistic	nature	of	military	welfare	policies	and	discourses	of	the	nation.	This	maintains	a	façade	that	hangs	over	this	exchange	like	a	shifting	cloud,	sometimes	opaque	and	at	other	times	relentlessly	transparent.	The	relationship	between	the	district	and	the	military	remains	firmly	hinged	on	gratefulness,	welfare,	and	national	honour,	and	does	not	tilt	into	demand,	economic	desperation	and	transaction.	This	is	managed	with	skill	and	subtlety	by	a	host	of	local	paternalistic	and	watchful	military	apparatus	and	by	the	subjects	themselves,	who	strive	to	inscribe	service	and	sacrifice	for	the	nation	on	their	imaginations,	their	bodies	and	the	landscape	of	the	district.			This	chapter	will	first	explore	the	historical	landscape	and	the	paternalistic	relationship	between	the	British	Raj	and	the	martial	districts	of	Punjab.39	It	will	then	look	at	the	post-colonial	trajectory	of	this	relationship,	which	over	the	years	has	morphed	into	a	direct	social	contract	between	the	soldier,	his	family,	the	district	and	the	military,	side-lining	not	only	the	more	traditional	feudal	and	kinship	groups	but	also	the	government	itself.	It	
																																								 																					39	Here	and	in	the	first	section,	Ghosts	of	the	Past,	unless	otherwise	specified,	Punjab	refers	to	undivided	Punjab	as	it	stood	before	partition.	In	the	subsequent	section,	Punjab	refers	to	those	parts	of	the	region	that	fell	to	Pakistan	after	1947.	
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will	then	turn	towards	the	local	space	of	Chakwal	for	a	more	detailed	look	at	how	these	dynamics	play	out	within	these	more	intimate	spaces.			Like	the	thesis	as	a	whole,	this	chapter	focuses	mostly	on	the	Pakistan	Army	as	the	largest	and	most	influential	branch	of	the	military.	However,	in	the	context	of	the	district	it	addresses	all	three	forces	(with	the	proviso	that	the	Recruitment	and	Selection	office	deals	only	with	induction	into	the	Pakistan	Army).	This	became	necessary,	as	the	district’s	population	regards	the	three	as	a	collective,	falling	within	the	rubric	of	military	service.	In	addition,	the	beneficiaries	of	the	institutions	discussed	below,	like	the	District	Armed	Services	Boards-DASBs	and	the	Fauji	Foundation,	are	from	all	three	services.	However,	of	the	three	the	Pakistan	Army	is	the	largest	recruiter	of	labour	in	the	district,	and	thus	has	the	largest	number	of	beneficiaries.		
Ghosts	of	the	Past:	The	Making	of	Militarized	Districts		To	even	begin	to	discuss	the	militarization	of	Chakwal	District	(previously	part	of	Jhelum	District)	without	glancing	at	history	would	render	the	story	incomplete.	This	is	not	a	symbolic	perfunctory	nod	to	the	past	but	a	necessity,	because	the	present	contours	of	the	relationship	between	the	district	and	the	institution	of	the	military	are	tied	into	structural	colonial	antecedents.	Historicizing	this	present	through	past	trajectories	also	throws	up	the	dualities	of	how	much	has	shifted	and	how	much	has	not.	
	The	historical	processes	that	led	to	the	specialization	of	certain	districts	in	Punjab	as	the	labour-pool	for	the	British	Indian	Army	have	been	extensively	debated	(Talbot	1988;	Pasha	1998;	Yong	2005;	Saif	2010;	Mazumder	2011).	The	racist	recruitment	doctrine	of	the	martial	race	was	set	in	motion	after	the	Revolt	of	1857.	Muslim	soldiers	from	the	Salt	Range	(the	hilly	part	of	Western	Punjab	where	Chakwal	is	located)	had	proved	useful	in	military	campaigns	against	the	Sikhs	from	1848-1849	and	further	proved	their	loyalty	to	the	Raj	during	the	1857	uprising	against	the	British.	Many	demonstrated	their	willingness	to	enlist	because	they	had	suffered	economic	hardship	during	Sikh	rule	in	Punjab.	For	the	British	they	were	also	an	effective	counter	to	the	Sikhs	in	the	British	Indian	Army,	whose	divide	and	rule	policy	meant	that	regiments	and	companies	were	subdivided	according	to	religion,	class	and	locality	to	ensure	that	if	a	rebellion	broke	out	they	could	be	used	against	each	other	(Mason	1974;	MacMunn	1984;	Pasha	1998;	Mazumder	2011).	In	the	third	quarter	of	the	nineteenth	century,	military	thinking	went	through	another	shift.	The	British	Indian	Army	ceased	to	be	conceived	of	as	just	an	internal	policing	mechanism	and	began	to	be	organized	as	a	protective	force	against	an	
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attack	expected	from	the	northwest,	with	Russia	a	potential	foe.	The	earlier	divide	and	rule	policy	took	a	back	seat,	and	recruiting	the	best	possible	fighting	material	became	the	foremost	concern	(Mason	1974;	Pasha	1998;	Mazumder	2011).	This	led	to	even	more	intensive	class-specific	recruitment,	with	intake	restricted	to	certain	races	and	districts.	By	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	this	was	no	longer	a	preference	but	a	full	blown	recruitment	doctrine	that	remained	in	place	for	the	next	fifty	years.	Various	handbooks	for	the	Indian	Army	were	produced	during	the	last	decades	of	the	British	Raj,	describing	the	men	from	these	regions	as	possessing	bravery,	loyalty	and	masculinity.	In	The	
Testimonies	of	Indian	Soldiers	and	The	Two	World	Wars,	Gajendra	Singh	(2014:11-17)	highlights	three	aspects	of	the	martial	race	discourses	promoted	by	the	British	Indian	Army:	‘climatic,	the	division	of	Indian	on	a	martial–unmartial	axis,	and	the	granting	of	pseudo-British	qualities	to	sipahis’.	He	suggests	that	they	represented	not	so	much	the	martial	race	but	‘colonial	fantasies’	or	‘repeated	efforts	by	colonial	military	theorists	to	bridge	the	gap	between	idealized	images	of	colonial	soldiers	in	India	and	the	realities	they	lived’.	These	were	discarded	over	time,	sometimes	to	be	reproduced	or	to	include	newer	races	due	to	the	vagaries	of	demands	during	the	two	subsequent	world	wars.		Six	territorial	recruitment	depots	were	set	up	in	1891	in	the	areas	where	the	martial	races	(Pathans,	Punjabi	Muslims,	Hindu	and	Sikh	Jats,	Dogras	and	the	Hindu	castes	east	of	the	Jumna	River)	were	concentrated.		Of	these,	four	were	in	Punjab.	(Yong	2005:65).	The	Rawalpindi	depot	was	reserved	for	recruiting	Punjabi	Muslims,	and	was	ideally	suited	for	drawing	men	from	the	Salt	Range	(especially	the	districts	of	Jhelum,	Attock	and	Rawalpindi).	These	localized	recruiting	patterns	enabled	the	army	to	have	close	contact	with	the	classes	and	districts	from	which	it	was	recruiting.		Let	me	now	turn	to	the	supply	side.	In	keeping	with	the	martial	race	doctrine	above,	it	has	been	suggested	(mostly	by	proponents	of	the	martial	race	theory)	that	for	some	of	the	so-called	martial	races	a	readiness	to	pursue	a	vocation	in	arms	reflected	a	cultural	propensity	to	be	militarized.	While	cultural	propensity	may	be	an	essentialist	term,	there	may	be	some	twisted	truth	in	it.	Muslim	tribes	such	as	Gakkars	and	Awans	of	the	Salt	Range	had	traditionally	been	part	of	armies	even	before	British	rule,	and	this	area	is	located	on	the	strategic	northwestern	gateway	to	India	from	Central	Asia	that	has	seen	an	interminable	onslaught	of	invasions	(Pasha	1998).	Some	of	these	tribes	perceived	military	service	as	evidence	of	their	high	social	status,	an	escape	from	manual	trade	and	labour,	which	they	considered	beneath	them.	However,	historians	agree	that	by	and	large	what	drove	this	region	towards	military	service	as	a	source	of	livelihood	was	the	
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physically	broken,	rain-fed	terrain	that	made	agricultural	activities	unpredictable	and	led	to	low	yields	(Omissi	1994;	Pasha	1998;	Saif	2010;	Mazumder	2011).	Mustapha	Kamal	Pasha’s	book	Colonial	Political	Economy:	Recruitment	and	Underdevelopment	in	the	
Punjab	goes	one	step	further	in	suggesting	that	the	‘concentration	of	recruitment	to	a	specific	region,	namely	the	Punjab,	was	the	historical	outcome	of	the	legacy	of	1857	and	the	intensification	of	backwardness	in	the	barani	(rain	fed)	tracts	resulting	from	the	development	of	colonial	capitalism’	(1998:7,	emphasis	mine).40	The	British,	by	legalizing	the	private	right	to	absolute	land	ownership,	deliberately	created	a	landowning	class,	a	class	they	could	then	bargain	with.	Hamza	Alavi	(1980:371)	notes	that	this	‘new	concept	of	property	in	land	that	was	introduced	by	the	colonial	regime	was	premised	on	the	dispossession	of	peasants’.	According	to	these	scholars,	this	economic	re	organization	resulted	in	an	increase	in	the	vulnerability	of	the	peasantry	and	the	concentration	of	land	in	the	hands	of	a	loyal	class	of	landowners.41	The	remarkable	ability	of	the	newly	created	elite	to	meet	the	massive	manpower	demands	of	the	war	machinery	in	WWI	is	evidence	of	how	effective	the	wheels	of	colonial	capitalism	were	in	pushing	sections	of	Punjab’s	rural	population	towards	the	Army.42		 At	the	beginning	of	World	War	I,	Punjab	had	about	one	hundred	thousand	men	of	all	ranks	in	the	Army.	At	the	close	of	the	war,	no	less	than	half	a	million	served	it.	Roughly,	360,000	Punjabi	recruits	were	enlisted	in	4	years	between	1914	and	1918,	comprising	one	half	of	the	total	number	raised	in	India	(Lieutenant	Governor	of	the	Punjab,	Michael	O’Dwyer	qtd.	in	Saif	2010:22).		Five	districts	of	Rawalpindi	division,	including	Jhelum	(parts	of	which	constitute	today’s	Chakwal	district),	were	amongst	the	eight	most	heavily	recruited	districts	in	Punjab;	33%	of	the	total	male	population	of	Jhelum	had	enlisted	by	the	end	of	WWI	(Saif	2010:22).			Beyond	official	rhetoric,	the	colonial	authorities	accepted	the	mercenary	nature	of	the	army,	which	served	the	colonial	state.	The	British	Indian	Army	served	the	British	‘when	all	is	said	and	done,	for	the	monthly	wage,	the	other	pecuniary	wages	and	the	pension’	(E.E.H	Collen	qtd.	in	Yong	2005:79).	As	a	recruiting	ground,	Punjab	developed	as	a	‘garrison	state’	that	benefitted	enormously	from	British	patronage	in	terms	of	pay,																																									 																					40	Pasha	suggests	that	with	the	coming	of	British	colonial	rule,	the	pre-colonial	economy	experienced	three	profound	changes:	‘the	institution	of	private	property	in	land,	the	growth	of	merchant	capital	in	Punjab	and	the	establishment	of	cash	nexus	as	the	primary	form	of	surplus	extraction	by	the	colonial	state’	(Pasha	1998:108).	41	The	land	settlement	policy	and	the	Land	Alienation	Act	served	respectively	to	create	and	protect	local	intermediaries	who	were	loyal	subjects	(Alavi	1980;	Pasha	1998).		42	During	wartime,	recruitment	did	not	always	remain	‘voluntary’	and	there	are	numerous	accounts	of	forced	enlistment.	(Salim	1975;	Leigh	1997;	Yong	2005:107-108).	
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pensions	and	land	allocation	(Yong	2005).	Here,	those	who	stood	to	benefit	were	first	and	foremost	the	local	landowning	intermediaries,	the	deliberately	fortified	feudal	class	and	pirs	(Sufi	spiritual	guides),	who	were	generously	rewarded	with	land	grants	and	later	political	status	(Talbot	1988;	Ali	1988;	Omissi	1994).	The	Punjabi	peasant,	who	was	recruited	en	masse,	also	gained	in	pay,	pension,	land	and	continued	military	patronage.43		Rajit	Mazumder	reminds	us	of	this	‘advantageous	reciprocity’:		 The	recruited	peasantry	of	Punjab	benefited	directly	from	the	British	Indian	Army.	Pay	and	pensions	bolstered	economic	capability,	close	interaction	with	the	British	raised	social	standing,	and	the	policies	of	the	government	strengthened	the	political	positions	of	these	supposedly	martial	races.	These	advantages	fed	into	each	other,	and	the	cumulative	benefits	were	considerable	(2011:258-260).		What	is	said	above	is	undoubtedly	true	if	one	is	to	take	the	martial	races	as	one	homogenous	group,	but	it	is	important	to	acknowledge	that	there	were	gradations	among	recipients	in	how	much	benefit	was	earned,	as	well	as	differences	in	how	much	was	staked	for	that	earning,	something	to	which	the	above	text	does	not	do	justice.	At	one	end,	we	have	the	likes	of	Sikandar	Hayat	Khan	of	the	powerful	Khattar	family,	who	became	the	first	premier	of	Punjab	in	1936	and	whose	primary	claim	to	status	and	wealth,	in	addition	to	having	served	as	an	officer	within	the	army,	was	his	generosity	in	recruiting	people	from	his	areas	to	the	army	(Yong	2005).	At	the	other	end	we	have	the	ordinary	tiller	who	was	recruited.	Mazumder	(2011:259-260)	goes	on	to	cite	fierce	loyalty	on	the	part	of	combatant	troops,	evidenced	by	censored	correspondence	between	
sipahis	and	their	families	during	the	First	World	War.	While	he	cites	some	letters	expressing	anger	and	resentment,	he	suggests	that	many	more	were	appreciative	of	the	government,	and	peasants	knew	that	being	‘faithful	to	the	salt	of	the	Sarkar’	(the	government)	would	yield	material	benefits	for	them	and	their	families.	He	cites	a	letter	from	a	Sikh	soldier	to	his	wife	asking	her	not	to	worry:	‘Do	not	be	anxious.	If	I	die,	you	will	profit	greatly.	For	the	Government	will	give	you	a	pension.	Why	should	you	worry?	If	I	live,	then	Government	will	give	us	still	more’.		
																																								 																					43	After	the	First	World	War,	land	grants	amounting	to	420,000	acres	were	given	to	over	6000	army	personnel	(Saif,	2010:39).		
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This	is	really	a	win-win	situation,	unless	one	stops	and	thinks	of	what	the	former	predicament	means	for	the	person	in	question	and	the	level	of	desperation,	as	well	as	the	faith	in	the	benevolent	Sarkar	(government),	it	would	require	to	suggest	this	to	his	wife.		
		Photograph	1:	Commemorative	plaque	placed	in	Chakwal	by	the	British	government		In	some	annals	of	history,	Punjab	is	represented	as	the	traitorous	province	that	helped	the	British	to	gain	control	of	the	subcontinent	after	the	sepoy	revolt	of	1857	and	then	ensured	its	reign	by	virtue	of	being	the	recruitment	base	for	the	British	Indian	Army.	Of	course,	this	‘advantageous	reciprocity’	(Mazumder	2011:259)	between	colonizer	and	colonized	existed,	and	it	would	be	foolish	to	suggest	otherwise,	but	a	reading	of	this	history	needs	to	be	nuanced	through	an	analysis	of	class	(Salim	1975).	The	creation	of	militarized	districts	in	Punjab	was	only	possible	through	the	creation	and	protection	of	a	class	of	landowners	willing	to	exploit	their	mutually	advantageous	partnership	with	the	British,	with	the	cost	paid	by	Punjab’s	rural	population	as	a	whole.	It	is	therefore	perhaps	rightly	argued	that	Punjab’s	loyalty	to	the	colonial	military	machinery	should	not	be	seen	in	the	‘context	of	modernization’,	but	that	a	better	parallel	would	be	feudalism	(Ali	1988:109).	This	is	a	more	nuanced	lens,	for	historical	accounts	can	be	harsh	and	can	
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paint	the	oppressor	and	oppressed	in	one	colour,	even	when	the	oppressed	or	colonized	group	is	more	varied,	and	where	one	stands	in	the	pecking	order	can	determine	the	benefits	to	be	derived	from	these	symbiotic	partnerships.	And	yet	this	corrective	lens	must	also	acknowledge	that	the	peasants	who	served	in	the	army	also	entered	into	a	relationship	with	the	colonizer.	This	relationship	was	perhaps	marked	by	a	starker	imbalance	of	power,	partly	because	of	the	local	intermediaries	who	served	as	middle	men,	leaving	the	peasants	with	much	less	bargaining	power,	but	it	was	nonetheless	a	symbiotic	relationship	that	allowed	benefits	such	as	pay,	pensions,	status	and	land	allocation	to	trickle	down	to	them	too.			Land	distribution	by	the	colonial	state	needs	to	be	understood	not	just	as	an	incentive	to	attract	and	retain	people	in	military	service	(ex-soldiers	were	eligible	after	the	completion	of	21	years	of	service)	but	as	a	mechanism	to	ensure	the	‘loyalty	of	the	military	classes	to	the	state’.	Grants	were	made	on	assurances	of	continued	loyalty	to	the	state,	which	were	verified	(Yong,	2005:91).	The	incentives	or	rewards	offered	to	the	soldier	were	couched	in	a	language	of	welfare	and	assistance,	hand-outs	by	a	benevolent	state	that	was	protective	of	its	loyal	subjects	who	had	served	in	its	military.	The	military	was	the	maa	baap	(mother-father	or	all	in	all)	–	a	paternalistic	entity	that	gives	generously	and	in	return	expects	loyalty,	as	opposed	to	a	professional	institution	that	must	provide	for	it	soldiers	in	return	for	services	rendered.			The	successful	mobilization	process	during	World	War	One	was	due	in	part	also	to	the	integration	of	the	functions	of	the	military	and	civil	provincial	authorities	and	laid	the	grounds	for	the	emergence	of	the	District	Soldiers	Boards	(DSBs).	These	were	set	up	by	the	colonial	state	to	offset	rising	discontent	among	demobilized	troops	after	the	war	about	allegedly	unfulfilled	promises	of	land	grants	(Ali	1988;	Yong	2005:142).	Economic	adversity	as	a	result	of	wartime	controls	and	inadequate	monsoon	rains	at	the	end	of	the	war,	coupled	with	growing	political	unrest	as	a	result	of	growing	nationalist	movements	in	the	rest	of	the	country,	aroused	strong	trepidation	in	the	British	state	that	the	loyalty	of	the	martial	districts	could	be	affected.	It	was	vital	for	the	British	that	the	recruiting	bases	remained	pacified	and	inoculated	against	subversion	or	disaffection.	To	ensure	continued	loyalty,	the	DSBs	were	introduced	at	district	level,	as	this	was	considered	a	site	where	the	soldier’s	loyalty	could	be	won	or	lost.		By	performing	their	functions	as	dispensers	of	‘prizes’	from	the	government	and	as	agencies	protecting	the	welfare	of	serving	and	
			 84	
retired	soldiers	and	their	families,	soldiers’	boards	were	visible	manifestations	of	a	caring	and	accessible	Sarkar	(Yong	2005:163).		The	fact	that	the	ex-soldier	had	an	audience	and	a	space	in	which	to	vent	his	grievances	was	essential	in	crafting	the	image	of	the	benevolent	and	caring	Sarkar	that	listened	and	was	accessible	in	local	spaces,	not	just	in	some	distant	and	alien	regimental	centre.	Over	the	years	these	welfare	organizations	for	war	veterans	developed	into	local	institutions	that	safeguarded	the	interests	of	both	the	military	institution	and	those	who	served	in	it.			Drawing	on	this	historical	trajectory,	I	now	highlight	three	features	of	the	recruiting	areas	that	constitute	today’s	Chakwal	District	which	are	useful	for	my	analysis.	Two	of	these	are	drawn	from	Mustapha	Kamal	Pasha’s	(1998)	work	on	colonial	political	economy	in	Punjab.	First,	Pasha	suggests	that	these	districts	became	‘specialized	zones’	for	recruitment,	where	livelihood	was	reduced	to	a	‘single	major	activity’,	military	service.	According	to	Pasha,	to	simply	reduce	this	effect	to	economic	desperation	would	be	inadequate	as	‘[t]he	cultural	effect	of	military	specialization	in	the	barani	areas	reproduced	self-valorization	of	its	population	as	a	military	class’.	In	these	districts,	military	service	assumed	a	‘natural	order,	becoming	intertwined	with	the	regularities	and	habits	of	rural	life’	(1998:182).	Second,	these	backward	barani	areas	became	locked	in	a	co-dependent	relationship	with	the	colonial	state,	where		 the	state	could	only	reproduce	itself	(and	the	colonial	political	economy	to	which	it	belonged)	by	ensuring	the	recruitment	process,	the	barani	tract	itself	could	not	guarantee	its	survival	without	performing	its	structural	role	as	a	source	of	military	recruitment	(1998:182).		Third,	another	important	socializing	effect	of	the	specialization	of	these	areas	as	a	labour	market	for	the	military	lay	in	the	details	of	how	the	paternalistic	state	asserted	itself	by	uniting	its	military	and	civil	functions	and	ruling	through	a	militarized	bureaucracy,	i.e.	in	the	emergence	of	the	DSBs.	These	institutional	mechanisms	brought	the	caring	Sarkar	down	to	the	local	in	ways	that	blurred	the	lines	between	the	civil	and	military	and	set	the	contours	of	the	paternalistic	relationship	between	the	soldier	class	and	the	institution	of	the	Pakistani	military.	I	argue	in	the	next	section	that	the	tone	of	these	relationships	between	the	colonial	state	and	its	subjects	had	profound	consequences	for	the	relationship	between	soldiers	and	the	military	institution	that	emerged	in	the	post-colonial	state	of	Pakistan.	
			 85	
Demand	and	Supply	in	the	Post-colony:	Welfare,	Loyalty	and	Recruitment	It	may	be	pertinent	to	mention	here	that	martial	districts	in	the	areas	that	fell	to	Pakistan	were	not	restricted	to	Punjab,	as	parts	of	KP,	then	known	as	the	North	West	Frontier	Province,	were	also	used	as	a	labour	pool	for	the	British	Indian	Army.	However,	my	focus	and	interest	remains	on	Punjab44,	as	it	is	the	larger	supplier	of	recruits	and	due	to	its	dominance	in	the	military	after	partition.	At	the	time	of	partition,	Punjabi	preponderance	stood	at	80%	in	the	military	(Cohen	1988:318)	and	55%	in	the	bureaucracy	(Kennedy	1987:194).	It	is	a	well-established	fact	that	in	these	early	days	and	the	ensuing	years	the	Punjabi-controlled	military	and	bureaucracy,	along	with	the	feudal	class	that	had	been	closely	aligned	with	it	in	colonial	times,	continued	with	the	project	of	the	militarization	of	state	and	society	(Alavi	1972;	Jalal	1990;	Yong	2005:308-309).	Colonial	economic	structures	remained	intact,	and	newer	exploitative	groups	such	as	the	indigenous	bourgeoisie	were	added,	in	the	guise	of	industrial	development,	to	the	feudal	baggage	that	Pakistan	inherited	(Saif	2010:114).	This	alliance	further	strengthened	in	the	Cold	War	scenario,	when	Pakistan	chose	to	become	a	client	state	of	the	US	(Saif	2010).45	In	its	early	years	Pakistan	was	led	by	a	Punjabi-dominated	pro-west	and	anti-communist	group	of	politicians	and	bureaucrats,	with	military	leaders	actively	involved	in	and	later	leading	this	trajectory.46	The	first	budget	to	be	announced	pledged	a	massive	amount	of	the	central	government’s	total	revenue	(over	65%)	to	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces,	a	trend	that	has	continued	with	little	variation,	to	the	detriment	of	the	country’s	social,	industrial	and	economic	development	(Rizvi	2003:62-63).		The	Pakistan	Army	is	a	volunteer	force,	as	per	Article	39	of	the	1973	constitution	(Participation	of	People	in	Armed	Forces).	The	composition	of	the	Pakistan	Army	is	largely	Punjabi,	with	Pashtuns	in	second	place,	an	ethnic	domination	reflective	of	the	British	Army’s	martial	races	policies.	Recruitment	patterns	remained	largely	localized	in	key	districts	in	Punjab	(Chakwal,	Jhelum,	Attock,	Rawalpindi	and	some	surrounding	areas),	along	with	martial	districts	from	Khyber	Pakhtunkwa,	although	the	spread	within	Punjab	and	KP	did	expand	(Rizvi	2003:240).	Until	2001,	7%	of	the	Pakistan	Army’s	manpower	came	from	Punjab.47																																									 																					44	From	here	onwards,	all	mentions	of	Punjab	refer	to	the	territory	that	fell	to	Pakistan	after	1947.	45	Signing	defence	agreements	in	the	1950s,	such	as	SEATO	(the	South	East	Asia	Treaty	Organization)	and	CENTO	(the	Central	Treaty	Organization),	made	Pakistan	one	of	the	earliest	Cold	War	allies	of	the	US	power	system.	These	developments	facilitated	the	military’s	growing	ascendancy	in	state	policy	and	contributed	to	the	first	military	takeover	in	1958.	46	The	addition	of	religious	factions	to	build	anti-communist	frenzy	and	boost	Islam	as	a	bulwark	strategy	further	fuelled	the	already-appropriated	idea	of	religion	that	has	haunted	Pakistan	since	its	birth.	47	Staff	Correspondent	(2007,	September	14th).	Punjab’s	dominance	in	army	being	reduced.	Dawn.	Retrieved	from	http://www.dawn.com/news/266159/punjab	
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The	Pakistan	Army	Act	1952	states	that	compulsory	conscription	can	be	introduced,	although	the	army	has	never	had	to	resort	to	this.	This	is	unlike	the	route	many	post-colonial	states	have	taken,	where	nationalist	governments	have	emphasized	representativeness	and	citizenship	through	the	use	of	compulsory	military	service.	One	simple	reason	for	this	may	be	that	the	army	receives	more	applications	each	year	than	it	needs	to	fill	its	ranks	(Cohen	1984).	According	to	recruitment	data	for	2004	to	2013	provided	by	the	Personnel	and	Administration	Directorate	(PA),	each	year	on	average	over	130,000	applicants	apply	to	be	a	soldier	in	the	Pakistan	Army,	from	which	an	average	of	38,000	are	inducted.48	In	response	to	the	question	of	why	people	enlist	from	
martial	districts,	the	army	officers	I	interviewed	almost	unequivocally	mentioned	widespread	unemployment,	rain-fed	terrain	and	the	exposure	of	the	area	to	military	service	over	several	decades.	There	seemed	to	be	no	mystery	to	solve	here,	it	was	a	simple	fact,	presented	without	obfuscation,	an	open	understanding	that	it	was	sheer	economic	desperation	and	a	lack	of	other	viable	secure	forms	of	employment	that	drove	people	in	droves	to	the	long	queues	at	the	recruitment	and	selection	centres	the	military	sets	up	in	these	districts.	In	addition,	the	specialization	of	this	district	as	the	labour	pool	for	the	military	has	resulted	in	it	being	locked	in	a	co-dependent	relationship	based	on	state	patronage	in	terms	of	pay,	pensions	and	land	grants.	This	has	ensured	that	there	is	a	steady	stream	of	potential	recruits	who	want	to	join,	believing	that	this	is	their	best	possible	shot	at	pakki	naukri	based	on	their	historical	advantage	of	generational	service	to	the	military.		Reluctance	to	introduce	conscription	or	expand	army	recruitment	to	other	areas	has	also	been	attributed	to	a	deliberate	intent	on	the	part	of	the	postcolonial	military-bureaucratic	oligarchy	to	continue	with	the	Punjabi-dominated	profile	of	the	military.	This	adherence,	referred	to	as	the	‘hangover	of	the	martial	race	theory’	(Rizvi	2003:128),	is	ascribed	to	a	number	of	factors,	the	most	significant	of	which	would	be	the	obvious	strategic	benefit	to	the	Punjabi-dominated	ruling	class	that	Pakistan	inherited.	Another	reason	that	has	been	cited	is	tactical	advantage,	as	especially	in	Pakistan’s	early	years	it	allowed	the	army	to	ensure	that	various	ethno-nationalist	insurgencies	in	Baluchistan,	Sindh	and	KP	could	be	handled	without	conflict	of	interest	(Cohen	1984:45).	Of	course,	the	fact	that	many	of	these	nationalist	struggles	are	rooted	partly	in	anger	against	unfair	treatment	by	the	Punjabi-dominated	establishment	at	the	centre,	including	inadequate	representation	in	military	recruitment,	suggests	that	this	tactical	logic	is	somewhat	counter-productive.	The	Bangladesh	debacle	is	a	case	in	point,	as	Bengalis	were																																									 																					48	PA	Directorate-GHQ,	15th	January	2015.		
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underrepresented	in	service	and	their	inclusion	was	resisted	by	the	army	(Cohen	1984:43).	
Sustaining	the	(Old)	Martial:	Relationships	New	and	Old		 With	500,000	men	constantly	moving	through	their	ranks,	the	armed	forces	of	Pakistan	are	the	largest	employers	of	under-employed	labour	in	Pakistan	(Dewey	1991:	261).			Using	the	same	recruitment	pool	for	almost	the	first	fifty	years	of	its	post-colonial	existence	has	enabled	the	military	to	establish	enduring	roots	in	thousands	of	villages	in	Punjab,	especially	in	the	Salt	Range.	Pay	and	pensions	form	the	bulk	of	many	village	incomes,	and	military	service	represents	a	bulwark	against	destitution,	providing	stability	and	social	security.			The	pay	and	pension	and	welfare	schemes	(education,	health	and	housing	facilities)	offered	by	the	army	to	its	officers	and	enlisted	personnel	continue	to	be	by	far	the	most	comprehensive	provided	by	any	public-sector	employer	in	Pakistan	(Dewey	1991;	Siddiqa	2007:206-207).	These	services	extend	not	just	to	men	in	service	but	also	to	their	families,	as	well	as	ex-soldiers	and	their	families.	According	to	Clive	Dewey	(1991:271),	pay	scales	are	index-linked	to	inflation,	and	so	the	army	dominates	the	labour	market	in	these	areas.	The	fact	that	this	happens	more	effectively	in	older	recruitment	grounds	than	in	other	non-martial	districts	(see	below)	is	indicative	that	while	economic	incentives	may	be	a	necessary	condition	for	apparent	enthusiasm	for	war,	they	are	not	sufficient.	Within	martial	districts	there	is	also	considerable	valence	and	prestige	associated	with	military	service,	especially	at	the	local	district	and	village	level.		In	addition	to	pay	and	pensions,	two	types	of	benefit	are	particularly	important	to	highlight,	as	they	are	perhaps	those	that	cause	maximum	discontent	in	the	classes	not	recruited	to	the	military.	The	first	is	urban	and	rural	landholdings	given	to	ex-servicemen,	both	soldiers	and	officers.49	The	second	are	the	military’s	extensive	industrial	holdings,	ostensibly	intended	to	serve	retired	soldiers	(Siddiqa	2007).50	In	1954,	the	British	Military	Reconstruction	Fund	intended	for	soldiers	who	had	fought	in	WWII	was	invested	by	the	Pakistani	military	in	commercial	ventures	with	the	aim	of	using	its	profits	to	support	ex-servicemen.	In	1967	it	was	re-named	the	Fauji	Foundation,	and	it	has	now	become	a	large	military-owned	business	conglomerate	with																																									 																					49	At	the	officer	level,	these	are	lucrative	landholdings	sold	to	officers	on	reduced	terms,	which	they	can	then	sell	at	market	rates,	resulting	in	large	gains.	50	In	Military	Inc.:	Inside	Pakistan’s	Military	Economy,	Ayesha	Siddiqa	(2007)	discusses	the	Pakistani	military's	economic	empire	and	its	impact	on	the	country’s	political,	economic	and	social	landscape.	
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commercial	and	welfare	wings.	In	addition,	it	offers	health,	educational	and	vocational	services	to	families	of	ex-servicemen,	including	the	families	of	those	killed	or	disabled	in	war,	and	also	assists	them	in	finding	jobs,	mostly	with	its	numerous	businesses,	including	cereal	companies,	farms	and	factories	producing	cement,	petroleum	and	fertilizers	to	name	a	few.51			Two	other	institutions	–	District	Recruitment	Offices	and	Centres	and	District	Armed	Services	Boards	(DASBs)	–	serve	a	practical	facilitating	purpose	for	the	district’s	population.	Their	visible	presence	in	the	district	and	their	extensive	network	allows	the	institution	of	the	military	to	establish	deep	roots	in	these	local	spaces.	There	are	24	army	Selection	and	Recruitment	Offices	and	Centres	across	Pakistan,	which	open	for	recruitment	twice	a	year.	There	are	ten	in	Punjab,	four	in	Sindh,	five	in	Baluchistan,	three	in	KP	and	one	each	in	GB	and	AJK.52	Their	primary	purpose	is	to	recruit	from	the	district	according	to	criteria	and	in	numbers	set	out	by	the	General	Headquarters,	using	a	pre-defined	multiple	hurdle	model	of	selection	including	a	medical	examination	and	a	battery	of	physical,	intelligence	and	personality	tests.53	After	partition,	the	DSBs	were	absorbed	into	the	civil	bureaucracy	and	renamed	District	Armed	Services	Boards	(DASBs),	continuing	their	functions	in	the	martial	districts.	These	boards	serve	all	three	of	the	Pakistan	Military’s	forces.	As	membership	of	the	military	has	grown,	the	boards’	services	have	been	extended	to	other	provinces	and	their	districts.	There	are	twenty-six	in	Punjab,	thirteen	in	KP,	eight	in	Sindh,	two	in	Baluchistan,	three	in	GB	and	ten	in	Azad	Jammu	&	Kashmir,	with	a	total	of	62	DASBs	in	various	districts	across	the	country.	Six	provincial	directorates	exist,	four	in	the	main	provinces	and	one	each	in	Gilgit	Baltistan	and	Azad	Kashmir.	These	report	to	the	Pakistan	Armed	Services	Board	(PASB),	which	itself	reports	to	the	Ministry	of	Defence.	Retired	military	officers	head	the	National	and	Provincial	Boards.	The	District	Commissioner	heads	the	District	Board,	but	its	functions	are	run	by	the	Secretary	of	the	Board,	who	is	also	an	ex-military	officer.	A	further	body	of	welfare	officers,	ex-NCOs	and	JCOs,	act	as	honorary	welfare	officers	(WOs),	with	the	idea	being	to	ensure	that	facilitation	reaches	into	every	village	in	the	district.	The	DASBs	continue	to	carry	out	their	earlier	functions,	acting	as	localized	doorstep	welfare	systems.	Their	main	function	is	to	maintain	records	of	ex-servicemen	in	the	area	and	facilitate	regiment	centres	in	verifying	the	information	needed	to	provide	welfare	to	ex-servicemen.	They	assist	families	in	the	preparation	of	the	documentation	etc.	needed	to	claim	pensions,	benevolent	funds	and	other	compensation,	as	well	as	arbitrating	disputes																																									 																					51	Fauji	Foundation	website.	Retrieved	from	http://www.fauji.org.pk/fauji/about-us/aboutus-overview	52	Pakistan	Army	website,	Retrieved	from		http://www.joinpkarm.base.pk/asrc.html		53	PA,	Directorate	–	GHQ,	15th	January	2015.	
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between	family	members	on	compensation	and	pensions.54	They	also	facilitate	the	re-employment	of	ex-servicemen	in	the	public	sector,	by	military	affiliated	groups	such	as	the	Fauji	Foundation	and	with	private	companies.	In	addition,	they	form	a	bridge	between	the	civil	and	military	machinery,	ostensibly	serving	as	an	arm	of	the	civil	machinery,	but	acting	fairly	independently	by	virtue	of	the	nature	of	their	services	and	their	direct	links	to	the	GHQ	and	the	regimental	centres	and	units.	An	annual	general	meeting	is	also	organized,	where	WOs	and	heads	of	district	departments	such	as	Education,	Health,	and	Forestry	can	meet,	presided	over	by	the	District	Commissioner.	This	forum	allows	WOs	to	put	forward	suggestions	for	the	development	of	their	area.	The	DASBs	are	an	important	local	mechanism	that	uses	the	civil	machinery	for	the	benefit	not	only	of	those	who	serve	in	the	army	but	also	their	dependents.	Much	like	the	earlier	DSBs,	one	of	the	most	important	functions	of	these	local	bodies	is	a	localized	district	facilitation	service	that	ex-servicemen	can	count	on	and	make	claims	from.			Scholars	such	as	Anatol	Lieven	(2011)	have	suggested	that	over	the	years	these	relationships	have	come	to	be	based	on	ideas	of	collective	defence,	much	like	a	kinship	group.	The	Pakistan	Armed	Forces	is	the	only	institution	that	is	modelled	along	modern	meritocratic	lines,	with	opportunities	for	upward	mobility	in	terms	of	class	and	socioeconomic	status	(Dewey	1991;	Lieven	2011:55).			It	has	been	argued	that	kinship	loyalties	undermine	the	Pakistani	state,	as			 true	sovereignty	–	in	the	sense	of	primary	collective	loyalty	and	the	enforcement	of	collective	customary	law,	and	even	the	provision	of	effective	security	forces	at	the	local	level	–	resides	in	the	kinship	group	rather	than	the	state	(Lieven	2011:56-57).		Lieven	suggests	that	the	military	in	Pakistan	is	exceptional	in	being	the	only	state	institution	that	is	not	plagued	by	traditional	kinship	loyalties,	patronage	politics	or	ethnic	or	religious	divisions.	Ironically,	the	reasons	for	the	military’s	immunity	to	the	‘demands	of	kinship’	lie	in	its	ability	to	extract	a	large	share	of	resources	from	the	Pakistani	state,	enabling	it	to	function	as	a	kinship	group	itself,	extracting	patronage	from	the	state	and	distributing	it	to	its	own	members	(2011:62).	The	Pakistani	military	meets	two	essential	criteria	of	kinship	groups:	the	ability	to	look	after	and	protect	the	interests	of	the	group	and	affective	investment	in	the	group	through	ideas	of	honour	and	prestige.	The	
extension	of	honour	from	families	and	tribes	to	the	regiment	and	the	military	is																																									 																					54	Pakistan	Armed	Services	Board	(PASB)	Islamabad	and	DASB	Chakwal,	March-May	2015.	
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deliberately	sought	by	the	military	in	training	and	service.	The	institution	of	the	military	can	demand	this	loyalty	because	of	the	unparalleled	economic	benefits	it	offers,	not	as	job	incentives	but	as	paternalistic	welfare	patronage	garbed	in	robes	of	honour	and	collective	solidarity.	Entry	into	military	service	is	a	desire	for	membership	in	an	institution	that,	once	it	takes	you	into	its	folds,	protects	you	from	the	vicissitudes	of	life	that	are	your	fate	in	a	state	that	is	perceived	as	predatory	and	as	failing	to	fulfil	its	promises	about	social	justice	and	welfare.		
The	Politics	of	Recruitment:	Cultivating	the	(New)	Martial	In	this	section,	I	briefly	examine	the	Pakistan	Army’s	recruitment	policies,	laying	bare	for	inspection	the	politics	that	drive	these	decisions	and	the	processes	involved	in	cultivating	districts	for	service	in	the	military.	While	the	former	may	be	somewhat	tangential	to	my	research	project,	the	latter	provides	me	with	insights	into	how	these	relationships	are	formed,	and	more	importantly	provides	support	for	my	earlier	argument	that	building	districts	that	provide	recruits	is	not	just	a	simple	process	of	handing	out	financial	rewards.	In	other	words,	material	gains	on	their	own	are	not	sufficient	explanation,	and	the	desire	for	enlistment	is	filtered	through	paternalistic	ties	which	are	crafted	over	time	between	these	districts	and	the	institution	of	the	military.	
Recruitment	policies	for	the	soldier	class	of	the	Pakistan	Army	can	be	divided	into	three	broad	phases.	The	first	phase,	immediately	after	partition,	was	most	clearly	marked	by	the	‘martial	race	hangover’	(Rizvi	2003:128),	as	British-trained	native	officers,	who	mostly	came	from	the	same	region,	continued	British	policies.55	Clive	Dewey	(1991)	suggests	that	this	also	made	strategic	sense,	as	due	to	their	district’s	long	association	with	the	military	these	inductees	were	halfway	to	being	soldiers	already.	They	needed	less	training	and	were	willing	volunteers,	who	met	the	immediate	demands	of	the	Pakistani	military	as	it	struggled	to	fill	up	the	moth-eaten	force	it	had	inherited	after	partition	(Rizvi	2003;	Cloughley	2000).	The	army’s	regiments	were	mostly	pure,	meaning	that	their	soldiers	and	officers	were	of	broadly	the	same	ethnic	origin,	as	most	of	their	members	were	drawn	from	the	same	localized	recruiting	pools	created	by	the	British.	The	three	large	infantry	regiments	–	Punjab,	Frontier	Force	and	Baluch	–	were	comprised	mostly	of	Punjabis,	with	Pashtuns	in	second	place.	After	the	1965	war,	the	smaller	East	Bengal	Regiment,	also	formed	after	partition,	was	upgraded,	and	there	was	an	increase	in	induction	from	East	Pakistan.			
																																								 																					55	General	1	(retd.)	20th	June	2015.	
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After	1971,	the	clamour	against	Punjabi	domination	of	the	military	increased,	intensifying	further	in	1973	when	Prime	Minister	Zulfiqar	Ali	Bhutto	called	in	the	Pakistani	military	to	settle	the	insurgency	in	Baluchistan.	This	marks	the	second	phase,	featuring	some	movement	towards	the	encouragement	of	induction	from	Sindh	and	Baluchistan.56	However,	the	predominant	groups	represented	remained	Punjabi	and	Pashtun,	albeit	from	a	wider	net	in	Punjab.	The	Sindh	Infantry	Regiment	was	raised	by	General	Zia	in	1980,	partly	to	offset	the	popularity	of	Zulfiqar	Ali	Bhutto,	and	here	we	see	recruitment	into	the	military	army	being	used	as	a	tool	to	win	over	support	in	areas	that	were	resentful	of	a	Punjabi-dominated	military.	Around	this	time,	regiments	stopped	being	pure.	This	move	was	largely	due	to	lessons	learned	from	the	Bangladesh	debacle,	when	pure	Bengali	units	mutinied	against	West	Pakistan.			The	opening	up	of	recruitment	did	not	mean	that	inductees	were	automatically	attracted	from	these	areas.	The	soldier	class	has	traditionally	been	rural,	and	in	many	of	the	newer	provinces	educational	qualifications	were	not	sufficient	to	meet	the	selection	criteria,	while	many	young	men	were	also	hesitant	to	enlist	in	the	military.	Military	discipline	and	service	–	which	came	so	easily	to	Punjab,	or	so	it	has	been	suggested	(Dewey	1991)	–	was	an	alien	way	of	living	on	these	newer	terrains	that	had	not	been	disciplined	through	generational	service.57	The	initial	response	from	Sindhis	and	Baluchis	was	not	enthusiastic.	As	such,	even	as	criteria	were	lowered	and	they	joined,	dropout	rates	were	higher	amongst	these	recruits.58	Hence	the	shift	towards	more	ethnically	mixed	regiments	was	sluggish,	and	while	men	from	these	provinces	were	encouraged	to	apply,	no	serious	quotas	were	set.	Recruitment	happened	largely	through	mobilization	teams	working	through	local	schools	and	mosques	rather	than	through	local	institutional	apparatus	like	the	recruitment	centres	scattered	strategically	across	Punjab,	although	some	centres	were	set	up	in	these	areas.	The	number	of	Sindhis	and	Baluchis	did	increase,	but	they	included	sons	of	Punjabi	ex-servicemen	who	had	settled	on	land	given	to	them	by	the	army	in	Sindh	and	Baluchistan.59		
																																								 																					56	Two	more	infantry	regiments	were	raised	in	this	period:	Azad	Kashmir	or	AK	(1971)	and	Sindh	(1980).	The	former	had	previously	been	known	as	the	Azad	Kashmir	Regular	Force	(AKRF)	and	had	been	a	territorial	force	whose	recruitment	and	operations	were	restricted	to	Pakistani-controlled	Kashmir.	57	General	1	(retd.)	20th	June	2015.	58	Colonel	2,	infantry	regiment	training	centre,	11th	August,	2015.	59	This	information	is	based	on	interviews	with	a	number	of	army	officers,	including	two	retired	generals	(1	and	2)	,		two	serving	colonels	(2	and	3)	and	Major	3,	interviewed	on	24th	June,	25th	June,	11th	August,	17th	April		and	12th	May	2015	respectively.	
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The	third	phase,	starting	in	the	late	1990s,60	saw	the	Pakistani	military’s	move	away	from	geographical	and	ethnic	localization	towards	a	more	nationally	integrated	force.	From	this	time	on,	the	Pakistan	Army	claimed	to	follow	a	specific	policy	of	broadening	its	recruitment	base,	and	in	2001	it	put	forward	a	ten-year	recruitment	plan	not	just	to	encourage	but	to	ensure	recruitment	from	Sindh	and	Baluchistan,	as	well	as	to	increase	minority	recruitment.61	A	purported	fall	in	recruitment	from	Punjab	from	63.86%	in	1991	to	43.33%	in	2005	was	accompanied	by	a	corresponding	rise	in	all	other	areas	of	Pakistan.	Furthermore,	in	2005,	central	Punjab	had	a	higher	recruitment	rate	(7500)	than	northern	Punjab	(5000),	where	the	martial	districts	are	located	(Nawaz	2008:571).		
The	GHQ	maintains	that	soldier	recruitment	occurs	strictly	according	to	the	new	national	integration	policy,	which	sets	district	quotas	based	on	male	population	figures	from	the	1998	census.62	Induction	numbers	are	based	upon	yearly	rates	of	wastage,	a	term	used	by	the	GHQ	to	refer	to	soldiers	lost	due	to	death,	injury,	desertion	or	retirement.	While	provincial	quotas	are	fixed,	district	quotas	can	be	shifted	if	targets	within	a	district	are	not	met.	It	is	important	to	highlight	here	that	these	quotas	are	provincial,	not	ethnic,	and	second	generation	Punjabis	who	are	residents	of	less	represented	provinces	can	apply	from	Sindh	or	Baluchistan.63		
The	move	towards	a	nationally	integrated	army	is	ostensibly	an	acknowledgment	that	it	no	longer	serves	the	military’s	purpose	to	largely	draw	upon	and	subsequently	benefit	only	one	or	two	provinces.	While	this	might	be	couched	in	language	about	the	right	to	serve	and	national	integration,	it	also	translates	into	increasing	military	patronage	in	other	parts	of	Pakistan,	in	districts	and	provinces	that	were	marginalized	in	the	past	and	did	not	benefit	from	the	job	opportunities	and	extensive	welfare	system	that	the	military	offers	its	employees.	Extending	the	benefits	of	military	service	to	a	wider	group	garners	more	support	and	loyalty	for	the	institution	and	also	addresses	the	criticism	that	the	military	is	Punjabi-dominated.		
Opening	up	recruitment	does	not	immediately	translate	into	long	lines	at	the	army’s	door.	Over	the	years,	recruitment	from	less	represented	areas	has	increased	gradually.																																									 																					60	The	Northern	Light	Infantry	was	raised	during	this	period,	its	status	was	changed	from	a	paramilitary	force	to	a	regular	army	regiment,	an	acknowledgement	of	its	services	in	the	Kargil	war.	Enlistment	had	previously	been	from	Gilgit	Baltistan,	but	from	this	point	on	it	functioned	as	a	mixed	regiment.	61	Staff	correspondent	(2007,	September	14th).	Punjab’s	dominance	in	army	being	reduced.	Dawn.	Retrieved	from	http://www.dawn.com/news/266159/punjab	62	These	quotas	have	set	for	the	soldier	class	only.	A	corresponding	policy	of	increasing	the	representation	of	all	parts	of	Pakistan	among	officers	also	exists,	but	there	are	no	strict	quotas.	Christina	Fair	and	Shuja	Nawaz	(2011)	report	that	the	demographics	of	the	officer	class	are	changing,	but	here	too	the	available	data	is	subject	to	the	problem	that	numbers	reflect	residency	in	a	province	rather	than	ethnicity.	63	PA	Directorate-	GHQ,	15th	January	2015.	
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This	has	been	made	possible	by	relaxing	criteria	and	boosting	recruitment	drives	by	increasing	the	number	of	recruitment	and	selection	centres	in	districts,	as	well	as	by	sending	recruitment	teams	to	districts,	which	are	less	amenable	to	military	service.	The	military	has	also	invested	in	efforts	to	reach	out	to	these	areas,	many	of	which	are	long	term	mechanisms	such	as	the	construction	of	cadet	schools	and	colleges,	regiment	centres	and	military	cantonments	to	establish	a	visible	presence	and	build	trust	with	local	populations.	Unlike	the	British,	the	military	in	these	provinces	does	not	rely	only	on	local	feudal	leadership	–	some	of	which	may	actually	lean	towards	the	ethno-nationalist	struggles	that	the	state	has	suppressed.	Instead,	it	also	relies	on	its	own	considerable	resources	and	network	of	auxiliary	organizations	to	slowly	increase	military	valence	within	the	area.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	economic	backwardness	is	not	an	important	push	factor.	As	Colonel	3	remarked,	‘the	situation	in	some	of	these	areas	[backward	parts	of	Baluchistan]	is	dire,	and	I	have	seen	soldiers	cry	when	they	receive	their	first	pay	as	they	have	never	seen	so	much	money’.64	Continued	success	in	developing	areas	amenable	to	military	service	depends	on	a	blend	of	economic	desperation,	embedding	a	positive	image	of	the	military	and	establishing	a	presence	through	investment	in	infrastructure,	education	or	health,	welfare	services	and	steady	rewards	through	land	grants.	Over	the	years	this	develops	into	a	relationship	of	patronage	that	can	be	hard	to	dislodge,	which	Colonel	3	likened	to	a	‘chaska’	(taste),	an	addiction	which	once	tasted	is	hard	to	let	go	of.	Ensuring	loyalty	from	these	non-martial	classes	may	not	be	such	a	huge	obstacle,	as	paternalistic	bonds	and	relationships	continue	to	strengthen	over	time.	However,	expanding	the	recruitment	pool	to	the	rest	of	the	country	poses	a	challenge	for	the	military	in	terms	of	how	it	will	meet	the	more	costly	demands	for	welfare	and	surveillance	that	is	not	geographically	concentrated.	
Living	in	the	‘Land	of	the	Valiant’:	Chakwal	District	
		Photograph	2:	Entrance	to	Chakwal	city																																									 																					64	Colonel	3,	Rawalpindi	District	Recruitment	Centre,	17th	April	2015.	
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	In	this	section	I	investigate	Chakwal	District	in	order	to	better	understand	how	the	dynamics	I	highlighted	in	the	first	sections	of	this	chapter	play	out	in	local	spaces.	To	contextualize	this,	I	briefly	present	the	geographical,	socio-economic	and	political	landscape	of	the	district.		
General	Zia-ul	Haq	upgraded	Chakwal	to	district	status	in	1985	by	combining	parts	of	Jhelum	District	with	one	Tehsil	from	Attock	District.	Chakwal	District	forms	part	of	the	Salt	Range	and	the	Potohar	Plateau,	which	are	characterized	by	uneven	terrain,	large	deposits	of	rock	salt	in	the	soil	and	uncertain	rainfall.	The	Salt	Range	is	situated	between	the	valleys	of	the	Indus	and	Jhelum	rivers	in	northern	Punjab.	Its	terrain,	covered	with	scrub	forest	in	the	southwest	and	featuring	plains	interrupted	by	dry	rock	in	the	north	and	northeast	has	been	described	as	‘a	confused	medley	of	hillock	and	hollow’	(Darling	1947:74).	This	district	is	what	is	known	as	a	barani	area,	and	96%	of	agricultural	demand	for	water	is	met	by	rainwater	(Punjab	Lok	Sujaag	n.d.:22).	As	a	result,	not	only	is	there	little	land	for	cultivation,	it	is	agriculturally	insecure	even	in	areas	where	agricultural	activities	are	carried	out.	Agricultural	land	holdings	are	typically	small,	and	the	district’s	primary	reliance	is	on	service	in	the	armed	forces,	including	the	army,	air	force,	navy	and	civilian	law	enforcement	including	the	police.	The	Pakistan	Army	is	the	largest	employer	among	these,	followed	by	the	air	force.	Other	sectors	that	provide	some	employment	in	the	district	are	mining,	transport	and	poultry.	A	growing	employment	trend	has	been	migration	to	the	Gulf	States	and	Saudi	Arabia	for	work.	
Chakwal’s	rural	population	is	amongst	the	highest	in	Punjab,	with	only	12.9%	of	its	people	residing	in	urban	settings	according	to	the	Multiple	Indicator	Cluster	Survey	2007-2008.		(Bureau	of,	Statistics,	Planning	and	Development	Department,	Government	of	the	Punjab,	2009:4).	Its	population	has	grown	from	1,083,725,	according	to	the	1998	census,	to	1,384,000	today	(Bureau	of	Statistics,	Government	of	Punjab	2015:292).	It	has	a	relatively	high	literacy	rate	of	over	71%,	among	the	highest	in	Punjab	(ibid.:152-153).	Chakwal	has	eighty	one	Basic	Health	Units	(BHUs)	and	dispensaries,	ten	Rural	Health	Centres	(RHCs)	and	six	government	hospitals	(ibid.:198).			In	their	paper	The	Geography	of	Poverty,	Evidence	from	Punjab,	which	looks	at	patterns	of	poverty	at	the	sub-provincial	level,	Ali	Cheema	et	al.	(2008)	make	some	interesting	observations	about	North	Punjab,	where	Chakwal	is	located.	This	placement	is	based	on	Andrew	Wilder’s	(1999:34)	division	of	Punjab	into	four	regions:	North,	Central,	South	
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and	West.65	The	North	includes	four	of	the	region’s	traditional	military	recruitment	areas:	Chakwal,	Rawalpindi,	Jhelum	and	Attock.	North	Punjab	has	the	least	registered	factories	and	the	fewest	adults	who	report	daily	labour	as	their	primary	occupation.	It	has	the	most	concrete	houses,	the	highest	figure	for	remittances	as	a	proportion	of	total	household	income,	the	largest	proportion	of	houses	reporting	migrant	labour	and	the	greatest	percentage	of	the	working	age	population	employed	by	government	(Cheema	et	al,	2008:168).	The	number	of	those	who	have	completed	matric	(the	basic	qualifying	criterion	for	entrance	to	the	armed	forced)	is	also	the	highest,	and	Cheema	et	al.	suggest	that	households	in	the	North	are	‘well	integrated	into	the	national	and	international	labour	market’	with	the	North	doing	better	than	other	regions	‘in	spite	of	low	levels	of	industrialization	and	dependence	on	rain-fed	agriculture’	(2008:187).	It	can	well	be	argued	that	these	statistics	partly	reflect	the	cumulative	impact	of	years	of	acting	as	a	recruitment	base	for	the	armed	forces.	More	importantly,	it	highlights	the	district’s	willingness	to	search	outside	its	borders	for	employment,	as	well	as	an	inability	to	find	secure	employment	locally,	a	socialization	that	has	been	honed	over	years	of	service	in	the	military. 	
Chakwal	has	two	National	Assembly	seats	and	four	provincial	assembly	seats	and	is	considered	a	Pakistan	Muslim	League-Nawaz	area.	Chakwal’s	political	landscape	is	complex,	and	it	is	claimed	that	the	hold	of	the	local	Shia	feudal	landlords	has	lessened	over	time,	in	part	due	to	the	rise	of	the	middle	class,	aided	by	remittances	coming	from	abroad,	the	rising	influence	of	religious-political	Sunni	parties	and	also	a	new	political	elite	with	military	roots.66	General	(retd.)	Majeed	Malik,	who	served	in	WW	II	under	the	British	Indian	Army,	has	controlled	one	of	the	local	National	Assembly	seats	through	five	general	elections	since	1985,	defeating	Sardar	Ghulam	Abbas,	a	key	Shia	political	rival	and	an	important	landlord.	In	2002	graduation	from	university	became	a	mandatory	educational	qualification	for	National	Assembly	members	and	Malik	retired	from	active	politics,	but	his	nephew,	Major	(retd.)	Rao	Tahir,	has	won	the	same	seat	in	subsequent	elections,	except	in	2007	when	a	power	sharing	agreement	led	to	the	retired	general	backing	another	politician	(Punjab	Lok	Sujaag	n.d	:34-37).	Chakwal’s	political	scene	is	considered	a	seedbed	of	organized	religious	influence,	closely	related	to	a	rising	Sunni	middle	class	with	ties	to	the	military-derived	elite	(Nelson	2016).																																											 																					65	The	classification	is	based	on	a	mix	of	factors,	including	geographical	boundaries,	the	borders	of	older	divisions,	differences	in	agricultural	patterns	and	historical	influences.		66	These	religious	cleavages	have	played	out	along	political	lines,	with	the	Shias	of	Chakwal	supporting	pro-Shia	Majlis-e-Wahdat-e-Muslimeen	(MWM)	and	Sunni	support	invested	in	Sipah-e-Sahaba,	known	as	Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat	(ASWJ).	
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Owing	to	its	large	military	class,	a	sizeable	portion	of	the	district’s	development	has	been	linked	to	senior	military	officers	who	have	carried	out	development	work	in	their	own	villages	during	their	service	or	after	retirement.	While	some	of	these	have	been	private	efforts	only	partially	subsidized	by	the	military,	such	as	the	setting	up	of	schools,	colleges	and	hospitals,	others	are	district	development	projects,	funds	for	which	have	come	from	provincial	and	district	governments.	Generals	have	facilitated	the	construction	of	metalled	roads	or	the	supply	of	gas	to	their	villages,	and	often	to	villages	along	the	way.	It	is	important	to	add	here	that	these	development	works	are	not	carried	out	by	ex-army	officers	acting	as	elected	officials,	but	represent	actions	taken	by	former	or	serving	senior	military	officers	who	use	their	influence	over	the	civil	machinery.67	While	it	may	be	inaccurate	to	say	that	the	demand	to	establish	Chakwal	District	materialized	only	as	a	result	of	military	patronage,	it	is	an	interesting	reflection	that	the	district	was	approved	by	General	Zia	with	active	lobbying	from	a	retired	general	from	the	area,	Majeed	Malik,	at	a	time	when	the	Governor	of	Punjab	also	happened	to	be	a	General	–	General	(retd.)	Ghulam	Jillani.		Five	projects	in	Chakwal	are	run	by	the	Fauji	Foundation,	one	of	which	is	a	70-bed	hospital.	The	Fauji	Foundation	estimates	its	beneficiary	population	within	the	district	at	70,9176,	meaning	that	nearly	half	(51%)	of	the	district’s	population	is	considered	a	beneficiary	in	terms	of	health,	education	and	employment.	This	figure	represents	dependents	of	ex-servicemen,	but	does	not	include	retired	personnel	themselves	or	families	of	serving	personnel	who	are	eligible	for	medical	care	in	the	Combined	Military	Hospitals	(CMH)	that	exist	in	all	major	cantonments	across	Pakistan.68	It	is	estimated	that	2500	to	3000	ex-servicemen	or	their	next	of	kins	in	Chakwal	are	employed	in	the	Fauji	Foundation’s	various	projects	in	the	District.	In	addition,	five	Vocational	Training	Institutes	for	women	and	girls	train	both	civilian	and	army	dependents.69		Chakwal	has	its	own	Category	A	DASB70	which	was	set	up	in	1988,	three	years	after	the	district	was	formed.	It	deals	with	approximately	105,000	pensioners,	including	mothers	and	widows,	and	has	a	total	of	68	Welfare	Officers	(WOs)	for	Chakwal’s	72	Union	Councils.	An	additional	office	in	Talagang	Tehsil	has	been	set	up	to	handle	the	greater	higher	number	of	pensioners	in	that	area.71	The	Selection	Recruitment	Office	(SRO)	in																																									 																					67	General	Majeed	Malik,	Chaudary	Zafar	and	Ayaz	Amir,	interviewed	5th	Jan,	30th	April,	2015	&	12th	June	2015	respectively.	68	For	Chakwal	this	would	be	the	CMH	in	the	neighbouring	districts	of	Jhelum	or	Rawalpindi.	69	Colonel	4,	Fauji	Foundation,	3rd	March	2015.	70	Category	A	reflects	boards	in	areas	with	a	large	number	of	ex-servicemen	(over	15,000).	71	Secretary	DASB	Chakwal,	21st	January	2015.	
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Chakwal	was	established	in	2013,	until	when	aspiring	recruits	had	to	travel	to	the	Selection	and	Recruitment	Office	in	Jhelum.	It	appears	that	the	Jhelum	office	was	having	a	hard	time	maintaining	discipline	and	handling	the	large	number	of	applications	received	from	both	Jhelum	and	Chakwal	districts.			The	Fauji	Foundation’s	health	programs,	DASBs	and	SRO	in	Chakwal	serve	as	local	accessible	mini	versions	of	the	military	institution,	especially	for	the	extended	military	family,	the	dependents	of	the	soldier	class	in	these	local	spaces.	These	are	friendly	local	reminders	that	the	institution	is	invested	in	the	district	and	will	continue	to	provide	it	with	patronage.	To	some	extent	this	was	the	same	purpose	served	by	DSBs	in	colonial	times,	yet	these	relationships	need	to	be	analysed	closely	to	uncover	some	of	the	shifts.	The	next	section	examines	these	dynamics	through	the	lens	of	local	recruitment	practices.	
Local	Recruitment	Politics		Intake	from	Chakwal	is	4%	of	the	national	total,	a	ratio	assigned	based	on	the	National	Integration	Policy	announced	by	the	Adjutant	General	of	the	Pakistan	Military	in	2001.		This	ratio	is	based	on	male	population	projections	from	the	1998	census.	
	
Year	 Registration	 Total	Induction	 Inducted	from	
Chakwal	2004	 178,974	 33,152	 1,330	2005	 153,917	 37,355	 1,587	2006	 113,632	 41,343	 1,903	2007	 80,765	 30,665	 1,719	2008	 77,246	 38,238	 2,093	2009	 117,678	 56,243	 2,494	2010	 139,518	 53,804	 2,099	2011	 143,940	 27,133	 861	2012	 166,530	 37,529	 1,248	2013	 146,320	 21,041	 650	
													Table	1:	Pakistan	Army	Induction	Data	2004-201372		Data	provided	by	the	Personnel	Administration	(PA)	Directorate	at	the	GHQ	shows	that	Chakwal’s	contribution	ranged	from	3%	to	5.6%	of	the	total	intake	over	the	ten-year	period	from	2004	to	2013.	There	are	two	intakes	every	year,	one	in	October/November	–	a	more	popular	season	as	it	coincides	with	the	results	of	the	Matriculation	exams	(the	ten-year	school	certification	that	is	a	minimum	qualification	for	entry)	–	and	one	in	April/May	–	for	which	applicant	numbers	are	lower	due	to	the	reaping	season	and	the	
																																								 																					72	Data	provided	by	the	PA	Directorate-	GHQ,	Rawalpindi,	15th	January	2015.	
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fact	that	many	boys	and	their	families	work	as	farm	labour.	Another	reason	for	the	lower	turnout	during	this	intake	is	that	police	service	inductions	happen	around	the	same	time.	Although	cognizant	of	this,	the	Major	(3),73	in	charge	of	the	SRO,	felt	no	great	trepidation	regarding	targets,	for	an	average	of	7000	to	9000	apply	each	year	anyway,	of	which	the	total	intake	will	be	between	650	and	2494	(the	lowest	and	highest	intake	figures	for	Chakwal,	in	2013	and	2009	respectively).	Interestingly,	this	intake	peaked	in	2007	and	2008,	with	5.6%	and	5.5%	of	total	intake,	while	there	was	a	corresponding	decrease	in	the	number	of	applicants	nationwide.	As	the	PA	Directorate	informed	me,	district	quotas	can	be	adjusted	within	provinces,	which	suggests	that	Chakwal’s	willingness	to	line	up	outside	the	recruitment	centre	serves	as	a	back-up	in	case	the	need	for	recruits	is	not	met	elsewhere.	On	the	whole,	however,	there	has	been	a	steady	decline	in	recruits	from	Chakwal,	with	only	650	men	selected	in	2013	(3%	of	the	total).		The	selection	and	recruitment	process	is	a	step-wise	multiple	hurdle	model,	with	applicants	screened	out	at	each	stage.	An	official	notification	in	the	city’s	newspapers	announces	the	commencement	of	induction,	accompanied	by	banners	announcing	the	opening	dates.	A	two	to	three	week	registration	process	follows,	which	screens	the	thousands	of	applicants	who	line	up	every	day	for	basic	eligibility	criteria	such	as	education,	domicile	and	their	father’s	military	discharge	papers	if	applicable.	A	special	column	allows	the	person	applying	to	state	whether	he	is	a	next	of	kin	of	a	shaheed.	Approximately	60%	make	it	to	the	next	stage,	a	physical	examination.	Large	posters	on	the	verandah	where	these	boys	wait	before	going	in	for	the	physical	exam	display	various	physical	deformities	that	make	them	ineligible.	Boys	can	be	rejected	at	this	stage	due	to	their	height	or	chest	measurements	falling	below	standards	or	for	having	knock	knees,	flat	feet,	poor	muscle	development,	colour	blindness,	a	depressed	chest	or	leukoderma,	the	last	being	a	skin	disorder	with	no	apparent	manifestation	other	than	a	discolouring	of	the	skin.	Major	3	informed	me	that	‘the	men	need	to	look	smart,	a	person	with	this	disease	is	disfigured,	so	if	I	have	so	much	choice,	why	not?	I	can	pick	the	best	of	the	best’.	Apparently	the	rejection	rate	at	this	stage	is	almost	50%,	as	many	of	these	boys	are	undernourished	and	have	been	exposed	to	hard	manual	labour	in	the	fields	during	their	developmental	years.			I	provide	here	a	summary	of	my	conversations	with	twelve	of	the	applicants	I	interviewed	during	the	April/May	2015	intake	to	present	a	glimpse	of	how	the	district	and	its	aspiring	recruits	view	enlistment.	A	large	number	were	from	families	with	male																																									 																					73	Major	3,	SRO	office,	Chakwal,	17th	April	2015.	
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members	who	had	served	in	the	military.	There	was	a	mix	of	sentiments:	many	seemed	determined	to	get	in,	some	applying	for	the	second	or	third	time	(the	military	allows	them	to	re-apply	provided	they	are	under	23).	Others	were	there	to	placate	anxious	parents	who	wanted	them	to	apply	and	try	to	get	into	the	army	at	least	once.	This	rang	true	to	my	experience,	for	it	was	hard	to	meet	a	male	who	met	the	minimum	educational	criteria	in	these	villages	who	had	not	at	some	point	applied	to	the	armed	forces.	Pressure	often	comes	from	parents,	particularly	fathers	who	have	served	in	the	military,	and	it	seems	the	older	generation	is	more	invested	in	continuing	with	the	area’s	specialization	in	this	type	of	labour.	As	one	young	man	wryly	put	it:	‘In	our	village,	when	a	child	is	born	the	village	maulvi	(local	cleric)	gives	azan	in	one	ear	(a	ritual	which	involves	the	Islamic	call	to	prayer	being	whispered	in	the	ear	of	the	new	born,	marking	the	child	as	Muslim),	and	in	the	other	the	mother	and	father	whisper,	son	grow	up	and	become	a	fauji	(military	man)’.74		
Me:	How	many	of	you	applied	from	your	class?	
Applicant:	We	were	 60,	 out	 of	which	 30	 passed	 and	 about	 21	 of	 us	have	applied.	
Me:	Why	do	people	from	this	area	apply?	
Applicant:	 We	 want	 a	 bright	 future	 and	 also	 we	 want	 to	 serve	 the	country.	 If	 something	 happens	 to	 us,	 then	 our	 families,	 brothers	 and	sisters	will	benefit.	Whether	we	serve	or	die,	we	get	a	pension,	medical	coverage.	 If	we	talk	about	civilians,	 they	are	not	serving	the	nation	 in	the	same	way	we	do.	They	are	thinking	of	their	own	selves,	like	you	are	doing	your	PhD,	you	are	thinking	about	yourself.	
Me:	Those	in	the	fauj	don’t	think	about	their	own	selves?	
Applicant:	 No,	 the	 fauji	 is	 not	 thinking	 about	 himself,	 he	 is	 handing	himself	over	to	the	fauj,	he	is	serving	his	country	and	he	is	serving	his	family.		 (19-year	old	applicant	at	the	SRO	office,	Chakwal,	4th	June	2015)		
	The	above	excerpt	points	to	the	reasons	for	applying	to	the	Army	and	is	oddly	reminiscent	of	the	letter	from	the	Sikh	soldier	in	the	British	Indian	Army	cited	earlier.	The	military	remains	a	benevolent	institution	that	you	can	risk	your	life	for	because	it	looks	after	the	family,	and	dying	and	living	can	mean	the	same	thing	in	some	ways.	Yet	it	is	also	something	different:	the	applicant	now	also	looks	on	the	army	as	a	‘bright’	career	path,	a	path	of	sacrifice	that	is	superior	to	the	selfish	civilian	way	of	life.	I	will	pick	up	on	some	of	these	themes	in	the	next	chapter,	which	deals	with	the	training	of	soldiers	and	the	dichotomies	that	are	constructed	between	civilian	and	army	ways	of	life.	Much	like																																									 																					74	Saleem,	adjoining	village	local,	20th	April	2015.		
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colonial	times,	when	the	Sarkar	was	looked	on	as	a	benevolent	caregiver	who	would	look	after	the	sipahi,	these	relationships	are	set	within	the	same	paternalistic	frames.	However,	they	are	also	different	in	three	distinct	ways,	the	first	of	which	has	to	do	with	the	process	of	recruitment	itself.			
First,	in	colonial	times	loyalties	and	bonds	with	tribal	kinship	groups	remained	strong	despite	enlistment	in	the	military,	as	enlistment	itself	was	bound	up	with	membership	of	these	kinship	groups.	The	Pakistani	military	is	not	a	foreign	force	that	needs	local	intermediaries,	and	moreover	years	of	sustained	contact	with	these	districts	through	institutional	apparatus	that	have	local	direct	outreach	have	to	a	large	extent	made	this	intermediary	layer	redundant.	This	distinction	has	come	more	into	play	since	the	initiation	of	the	national	integration	policy.	Prior	to	this,	military	recruitment	at	village	level	continued	to	be	looked	on	as	a	kinship	privilege,	and	a	family	or	biraderi	(extended	clan)	member	who	was	ex-army	personnel	would	encourage	younger	men	in	his	clan	to	show	up	on	recruitment	day	at	the	recruitment	centre	or	accompany	them	directly	to	the	regiment	centre	to	which	he	himself	was	attached	and	where	he	could	ensure	entry.	Mobile	teams	would	also	visit	village	schools	and	mosques,	and	potential	recruits	would	be	encouraged	to	visit	the	nearest	recruitment	centre	for	qualifying	tests	etc.	With	the	announcement	of	stringent	district	quotas	as	well	as	the	centralization	of	selection	at	GHQ	level,	the	recruitment	process	has	become	more	streamlined.		As	a	result,	the	role	of	local	influential	people	(including	ex-military	officers	and	soldiers)	has	declined.	In	my	discussions	with	the	DASB	Secretary,75	and	Major	3		76	in	charge	of	the	Recruitment	Office,	the	fact	that	local	influential	people	put	pressure	on	them	and	interfered	in	their	work	was	brought	up	repeatedly.	I	will	deal	separately	with	these	two	types	of	influencers,	the	civilian	(feudal	landowners	and	politicians)	and	the	military	(former	senior	officers	from	the	area).		Considerable	pressure	from	local	civilian	politicians	and	other	influential	people	in	the	area	over	recruitment	and	the	settlement	of	disputes	around	compensation	was	frequently	reported.	This	is	hardly	surprising	in	the	national	context,	where	patronage	politics	is	part	and	parcel	of	daily	bureaucratic	functioning.	However,	I	highlight	this	with	respect	to	the	tone	in	which	it	was	mentioned.	Where	pressure	and	influence	was	considered	stressful,	and	where	it	probably	impacted	decision-making,	in	other	words																																									 																					75	26th	March	and	15th	April	2015	76	21st	May	and	4th	June	2015.	
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where	these	actors	continue	to	be	influential	to	some	extent,	they	were	mentioned	as	encumbrances	not	facilitators.	These	groups	no	longer	act	as	intermediaries,	as	they	did	in	the	time	of	British	rule.	Their	position	seems	to	have	shifted	from	being	an	important	link	in	the	chain,	needed	to	ensure	the	ongoing	supply	of	men,	a	link	that	had	been	created	and	protected	earlier,	to	encumbrances	who	need	to	be	placated	but	are	now	a	nuisance	who	create	obstacles	to	the	delivery	of	service.			However,	even	though	recruitment	systems	have	become	more	formalized	and	criteria-driven,	the	sifarish	(recommendations)	that	come	from	ex-servicemen,	both	the	officer	class	and	JCOs	who	have	access	to	the	senior	officers	with	whom	they	have	served,	still	hold	weight.77	The	institution	is	increasingly	insulated	from	civilian	pressure,	or	at	least	tries	to	be,	but	is	vulnerable	to	pressures	from	within.	As	suggested	earlier,	the	military	acts	a	kinship	group,	where	favours	and	patronage	are	given	to	members	of	its	own	class	in	a	perpetuating	fashion.	It	provides	patronage	and	protection	directly	to	its	constituents	and	increasingly	regards	local	politicians	and	influentials	as	encumbrances	that	can	and	probably	do	interfere	with	the	bureaucratic	functioning	of	the	Board	and	the	Recruitment	Office.	In	short,	decades	of	the	presence	of	these	institutions	in	these	local	spaces	and	their	integration	with	bureaucratic	machinery	has	institutionalized	the	presence	of	the	military	in	these	districts	and	built	a	direct	relationship	with	the	soldier	class	it	serves.		
	
Second,	unlike	in	colonial	times,	when	loyalty	was	tied	to	the	monolithic	Sarkar,	in	the	former	colony	this	bond	is	with	the	institution	of	the	military,	which	can	at	various	times	be	locked	in	a	power	struggle	with	the	government.	In	Pakistan,	with	its	history	of	three	distinct	military	coups	and	military	interference	in	politics	and	civilian	affairs	even	during	times	where	power	rests	with	the	civilian	establishment,	the	Sarkar	is	no	longer	perceived	as	an	uncomplicated		singular	category,	but	instead	the	fauj	(military)	and	the	
hakumat	(government)	are	often	viewed	as	two	distinct	entities.	The	opening	of	an	exclusive	office	in	Chakwal	was	welcomed	by	the	district	at	large	as	it	saves	applicants	the	expense	of	the	repeated	visits	to	the	SRO	that	the	induction	process	entails.	There	was	some	competition	between	the	district’s	civil	administration	and	local	military	influentials	as	to	who	would	take	credit	for	bringing	the	recruitment	office	to	the	district.78	At	one	level	this	speaks	to	the	dynamic	in	the	district,	where	facilitation	of	recruitment	from	the	district	is	a	way	to	score	points	with	the	population,	an	indication																																									 																					77	Ibid.	78	DASB	Secretary	and	Major	3,	15th	April	2015	and	21st	May	2015	respectively.	
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of	the	district’s	strong	valence	towards	military	recruitment.	It	also	clearly	points	to	how	the	Sarkar	is	no	longer	seen	as	a	monolithic	category	in	present	day	Chakwal,	where	the	military	establishment	is	seen	as	distinct	from	and	sometimes	in	competition	with	the	civil	administration.	This	is	more	pronounced	among	the	military	class	in	the	district:	soldiers,	ex-soldiers	and	families.	They	refer	to	hakumati	(governmental)	policies	versus	military	polices	and	hakumati	modes	of	working	(defined	as	incompetent	or	often	corrupt)	and	military	discipline	(defined	as	efficient	and	fair)	as	distinct	and	sometimes	incompatible.	The	soldier	enters	into	a	social	contract	with	the	military	and	it	is	to	this	entity	that	his	loyalty	is	tied,	sometimes	over	and	above	loyalty	to	the	civilian	government,	with	the	latter	often	viewed	in	pejorative	terms.	It	would	be	accurate	to	say	that	over	the	years,	with	continued	direct	and	indirect	military	rule	and	the	accessibility	of	more	systematic	and	organized	welfare	schemes	for	the	soldier	class	at	the	district	level,	the	relationship	between	the	military	and	the	soldier	class	has	morphed	into	a	direct	relationship,	with	the	military	as	a	group	standing	distinct	from	the	government,	often	without	the	presence	of	the	traditional	local	feudal	leadership.		
Third,	there	is	a	need	to	garb	this	mercenary	and	paternalistic	relationship	in	tropes	of	nationalism	and	religious	zeal.	In	colonial	times	this	was	an	attempt	to	glorify	martial	spirit,	ideas	of	ghairat	(honour)	associated	with	caste	and	loyalty	to	the	Sarkar	(Caplan	2010;	Singh	2014).	In	the	former	colony,	the	Pakistani	military	has	relied	heavily	on	constructing	a	more	ideological	and	religiously	motivated	imagining	of	the	soldier,	as	evidenced	in	the	analysis	presented	in	Chapter	1.	I	address	this	in	more	detail	in	the	next	section.	
Inscribing	Service	and	Sacrifice:	Re-assertions	of	the	Martial		In	this	section,	I	focus	on	the	weaving	in	of	martial	spirit	and	the	nation-state	with	the	threads	that	bind	the	district	to	the	military,	threads	intertwined	with	other	strands	of	
ghurbat	(poverty),	naukri	(job)	and	sahulat	(facilities).79	More	specifically,	my	interest	lies	in	how	this	weave,	often	presented	as	an	afterthought	by	my	interlocutors	(as	the	conversations	I	alluded	to	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter	suggest)	continues	to	be	inscribed	by	the	subjects	themselves	on	their	imaginations,	on	their	bodies	and	on	the	landscape	of	the	district	and	the	purpose	this	inscription	serves.		
A	hundred	years	and	fifty	years	and	more	of	steady	specialization	as	military	labour	have	produced	a	district	that	pronounces	itself	the	embodiment	of	all	that	is	martial.	The	entrance	to	Chakwal	city,	the	main	city	in	Chakwal	District,	is	marked	by	a	wooden																																									 																					79	These	terms	came	up	repeatedly	in	my	conversations	with	villagers.	
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structure	made	of	thick	planks	displaying	its	martial	legacy	in	large	silver	letters:	‘Well	Come(sic)	to	Chakwal	City,	The	Land	of	the	Valiant’.	It	is	a	district	that	has	served	both	the	colonial	and	the	national	state,	and	it	has	sacrificed	the	lives	of	its	loved	ones	for	it.		
		Photograph	3:	Martyrs’	monument	in	Chakwal	city		The	sacrifices	are	visible	across	the	graveyards	that	dot	the	rural	countryside	marked	by	the	national	flag,	tombstones	with	regimental	plaques	and	colours	and	white	stone	edifices	left	by	the	British	sarkar	that	state	the	number	of	men	who	went	from	a	particular	village	to	the	world	wars	as	well	as	the	number	of	those	who	did	not	return.	Service	is	visible	too	in	the	new	Yaadgar-e	Shuhada	(Martyrs’	Memorial)	monument	installed	in	2015	in	Chakwal’s	main	thoroughfare,	in	an	old	fighter	plane	installed	by	civil	society	in	a	public	park	with	support	from	the	district	government	and	in	references	made	to	military	service	and	sacrifice	in	both	national	commemorative	events	and	trade	and	cultural	promotional	events	in	the	district.		
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		Photograph	4:	A	poster	installed	for	‘Chakwal	Mega	Family	Festival’,	April	2015		As	a	district	of	the	martial	belt,	Chakwal	continues	to	fashion	its	imagining	around	its	martial	traditions,	even	as	competing	narratives	of	identity	creep	in.	These	competing	narratives	intersect	and	sometimes	conflict	with	each	other,	and	structures	of	power	in	communities	compete	for	new	forms	of	subjection	and	new	articulations	of	identity.	Examples	of	this	include	increasingly	urbanized	village	life	and	exposure	to	consumer	culture	and	lifestyles	that	make	military	discipline	less	appealing,	claims	from	rival	militant	religious	groups	that	may	be	in	contention	with	the	state	and	competing,	and	perhaps	more	attractive,	livelihood	opportunities	as	migrant	unskilled	labour	in	the	Gulf	States	and	Saudi	Arabia.	Steady	remittances	from	abroad	have	translated	into	upward	mobility	for	a	rising	middle	class	(Cheema	et	al.	2008).	The	shifts	in	fortunes	of	these	families	is	evident	because	the	improvement	in	lifestyle	happens	faster	than	investment	in	army	service	and	perhaps	because	earlier	migrants	were	from	poorer	families	with	little	or	no	landholdings.80	Work	in	the	Gulf	was	initially	regarded	as	demeaning,	as	it	is	largely	manual	labour,	hence	those	willing	to	venture	abroad	were	from	the	non-landholding	class.	This	pejorative	attribution	has	lessened	over	time,	but	the	prestige	and	long-term	security	associated	with	military	service	remains,	although	the	valence	around	it	may	have	decreased	somewhat	due	to	these	shifts.		
Although	these	competing	articulations	of	identity	need	to	be	acknowledged,	my	specific	interest	remains	on	the	gradual	unlocking	of	the	relationship	between	the	district	and	the	military	institution	as	the	military	turns	to	the	new	national	integration	policy,	and	the	response	this	unlocking	evokes	in	its	subjects.	Based	on	my	interviews	in	the	districts,	it	was	clear	that	the	reduction	in	quotas	for	Chakwal	has	given	rise	to	anxiety																																									 																					80	Based	on	interviews	with	villagers	and	district	politicians.	
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and	resentment	among	the	district’s	residents,	especially	(but	not	only)	for	its	rural	base,	which	continues	to	depend	heavily	on	employment	in	the	military	for	its	livelihood.	
Sindhis	don’t	want	to	serve,	they	rob	and	steal	at	night,	how	can	they	work	in	the	morning?	It	is	a	still	a	feudal	system	there,	very	low	education.	Our	area	has	been	in	service	for	a	long	time,	war	is	our	livelihood,	the	army	has	brought	prosperity,	it	has	brought	in	a	regular	monthly	income	(…)	Now	people	don’t	get	service	in	the	army,	many	sell	land	and	their	animals	and	go	to	the	Gulf.	The	army	is	taking	from	everywhere	now,	Chakwal	is	no	longer	that	important.		(Retd.	Havildar	Sohaib	Khan,	Palwal,	28th	October	2015)					One	of	the	problems	now	is	caste,	this	Sindhi,	Balouchi,	Pathan	and	Punjabi.	Our	people	face	a	number	of	difficulties	because	of	this.	A	Sindhi	gets	in,	he	is	primary,	a	Punjabi	goes	(to	the	centre),	he	is	FA	or	even	BA,	but	the	Sindhi	gets	in	because	there	is	a	vacancy	in	the	Sindh	quota.	The	poor	Punjabi	is	left	holding	the	degree	in	his	hand,	his	space	has	been	taken	up	by	this	uneducated	boy.	[In	case	of	of]	promotion	also,	the	Punjabi	is	sitting	idle	and	the	Sindhi	is	getting	promoted	after	two	years.	[…]	the	policy	is	ok,	it	is	everybody’s	right	to	serve,	but	they	should	set	vacancies	looking	at	areas’	needs	and	resources.	(Retd.	Senior	Technician,	Air	Force,	Bashir,	Palwal,	5th	November	2014)	There	is	clear	resentment	expressed	for	what	is	perceived	as	unfair	treatment	of	Punjabis.	The	district’s	residents	see	themselves	as	more	suited	to	serve,	an	entitlement	based	on	higher	literacy	rates,	a	track	record	of	having	served	in	the	military	and	lower	rates	of	industrialization	and	employment	opportunities	in	their	area.	People	from	Chakwal	have	come	to	view	military	service	as	their	‘muraba	and	saanat’	(land	and	industry),81	and	they	feel	justified	in	staking	the	first	claim	to	it	over	and	above	other	parts	of	Punjab	and	Pakistan	with	irrigated	land	or	industry.		
Resentment	is	also	expressed	about	the	centralization	of	the	recruitment	process.	The	recruitment	system	demands	that	names	are	sent	to	the	GHQ	after	selection,	which	then	finalizes	entrants.	According	to	the	PA	Directorate	at	the	GHQ	this	allows	them	to	fine-tune	lists	based	on	their	current	induction	requirements	and	keep	a	strict	check	on	unfair	recruitment	practices	at	the	district	level.	For	the	district	this	translates	into	a	reduction	in	their	ability	to	use	their	local	patronage	systems	–	local	influentials	and	ex-army	servicemen	–	who	before	this	centralization	were	in	a	better	position	to	influence	the	final	selection.	By	and	large	the	district	perceives	that	these	final	lists	are	not	always																																									 																					81	Retired	Subedar	Mohd.	Saleem,	Kandwal,	4th	May	2015.	
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based	on	merit,	but	are	influenced	by	those	who	have	contacts	in	the	military	itself,	something	that	for	many	is	out	of	reach.	Some	are	still	able	to	utilize	loopholes	such	as	direct	intake	at	the	regimental	level,	which	they	access	through	servicemen	in	their	area.	Army	regiment	centres	are	mandated	to	take	in	recruits	for	the	army	soldier	class,	a	parallel	system	of	induction	through	which	regimental	centres	can	carry	out	the	selection	process	independently.	According	to	the	District	Recruitment	Officer,	Major	3,	this	preoccupation	with	sifarish	(recommendation	based	on	unfair	use	of	contacts)	and	not	being	given	a	fair	chance	is	reflective	of	the	district’s	response	to	reduced	quotas.	He	suggests	that	many	feel	they	are	being	cheated	out	of	what	they	believe	is	their	birth	right,	an	entitlement	to	military	service.	
In	response	to	this	loosening	of	ties,	the	district	holds	on	to	its	martial	contribution	tenaciously,	with	a	firm	grip,	unwilling	to	let	go.	The	district	is	fearful	of	the	inevitable	change	this	will	bring	and	feels	a	sense	of	frustration	at	its	paternalistic	master,	yet	it	is	loath	to	confront	it.	This	anxiety	and	resentment	expresses	itself	through	an	assertion	of	the	district’s	martial	history,	hoping	to	remind	the	military	institution	of	the	district’s	contributions	and	sacrifices.	It	does	so	to	stake	a	claim	to	continued	patronage	from	the	military,	much	as	the	military	institution	stakes	a	claim	to	continued	sympathy	and	support	from	the	nation	in	the	commemorative	ceremonies	discussed	in	Chapter	1.	I	draw	upon	some	discussions	and	events	which	took	place	during	my	fieldwork	in	Chakwal	to	bring	out	this	this	anxiety	and	the	district’s	desire	to	reiterate	its	martial	identity.		
In	the	third	week	of	December	2014,	the	Chakwal	District	Government	inaugurated	the	Allied	Bank	Park.	The	park	is	centrally	located	in	Chakwal,	a	small	distance	away	from	the	now	defunct	railway	station	built	during	colonial	times.	It	displays	a	decommissioned	air	force	plane	donated	by	the	Pakistan	Air	Force	as	an	acknowledgement	of	Chakwal’s	‘askari	khidmaat’	(military	services).82	A	retired	squadron	leader	and	a	Pakistan	Air	Force	chief	technician	from	a	nearby	village	(who,	along	with	a	number	of	retired	army	servicemen,	runs	a	welfare	and	development	foundation)	initiated	this	idea.	On	their	initiative,	a	request	was	made	to	the	Air	Headquarters	in	Islamabad.	The	district	government	was	initially	not	as	forthcoming	on	funds,	but	with	some	local	media	lobbying	it	supported	the	installation	and	also	donated	funds	for	it.	The	inauguration	ceremony	was	endorsed	by	the	local	civil	machinery,	politicians	and	the	business	community,	as	well	as	the	ex-military	elite	of	the	area,	and	was	covered	extensively	in	the	local	media.	The	headline	inscribed	on	the	banner	for	the	event	was	‘For	the	people	of																																									 																					82	A	term	commonly	used	by	Chakwal	city	residents,	including	members	of	the	civil	administration.	
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Chakwal,	the	land	of	martyrs	and	warriors’.	The	banner	was	decorated	with	pictures	of	senior	officers	from	Chakwal,	including	Sepoy	Khudadad	Khan,	a	resident	of	Chakwal	who	was	the	first	Indian	Army	recipient	of	the	Victoria	Cross	during	World	War	One.	
We	have	served	the	country,	we	call	this	a	martial	area	but	there	is	no	sign	that	marks	it.	In	the	time	of	the	British,	they	asked	the	soldier	‘what	do	you	want?’,	they	said	‘we	want	a	cannon’,	so	they	installed	a	cannon	in	their	village	(...)83	This	(plane)	is	not	a	decoration	piece	only,	there	is	a	cause	behind	it.	Chakwal	needs	to	be	recognized,	if	a	person	enters	the	city	he	should	know	that	this	is	the	area	that	loves	the	Armed	Forces,	the	one	that	is	called	martial.	(...)	The	idea	is	that	Chakwal	needs	to	be	recognized,	that	it	is	not	a	martial	area	by	name	only,	but	we	have	sacrificed	and	are	doing	so	every	day	and	this	should	be	visible	(…)	visibility	is	important.	We	have	graveyards	full	of	shaheed,	we	have	their	families,	their	parents,	who	instead	of	pain	feel	pride.	So	this	pride	is	reflected	through	these	things.																					(Retd.	Chief	Technician	Baber,	Pakistan	Air	Force,	village	adjoining	Palwal,	26th	March	2015)	It	is	important	to	note	here	that	this	was	a	civilian	affair,	an	initiative	of	ex-servicemen	in	the	area,	the	media	and	the	district	government.	There	was	no	representative	from	the	Air	Headquarters,	whose	role	was	simply	to	respond	to	a	request	and	dispatch	the	plane.	I	do	not	take	away	from	the	fact	that	the	plane	was	dispatched	to	Chakwal,	a	district	that	the	Armed	Forces	recognizes	as	having	been	over-represented	in	the	past,	nor	do	I	neglect	the	fact	that	the	request	letter	to	the	Air	Force	highlighted	the	askari	khidmaat	(military	service)	of	the	district,	but	my	emphasis	here	is	on	the	military	institution’s	role	as	a	passive	facilitator.	The	desire	to	inscribe	loyalty	to	and	affiliation	with	the	Armed	Forces	upon	the	district	visibly	comes	from	the	district	itself,	or	more	precisely	its	large	ex-military	population.		
Independence	Day	celebrations	and	other	national	commemorative	events	in	Chakwal	celebrate	the	district’s	martial	identity	and	honour	the	sacrifice	and	service	of	the	district’s	men	in	the	various	armed	forces.	Parents	of	martyrs	will	often	be	invited	to	these	events	and	local	school	children	will	be	asked	to	prepare	speeches	or	stage	plays	on	the	same	themes.	Vernacular	literature,	some	written	by	former	military	servicemen	in	Chakwal,	also	pays	homage	to	the	district’s	military	service.	The	community	centre	caretaker	informed	me	that	in	the	light	of	the	war	in	Waziristan	the	district	government	had	decided	to	show	support	for	the	Armed	Forces	of	Pakistan	by	building	a	white																																									 																					83	This	is	a	reference	to	the	cannon	installed	by	the	British	in	Dulmial	village	in	Chakwal	as	acknowledgement	of		the	many	soldiers	offered	by	this	village	in	WWI	(Minhas	2002:366).	
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marble	memorial	called	Yaadgaar	e	Shuhada	(Martyrs’	Memorial)	like	the	one	at	the	General	Headquarters	in	Islamabad.	They	planned	to	list	the	names	of	all	the	dead	on	this	monument	in	the	city’s	main	thoroughfare	so	‘they	could	not	be	forgotten’.84	
I	argue	that	Chakwal	holds	on	to	its	military	roots	not	only	because	the	repressive	mechanisms	of	power	lead	to	the	emergence	of	subjectivities	but	also	through	the	productive	and	generative	mechanisms	whereby	the	village	‘produces	domains	of	objects	and	rituals	of	truth’	(Foucault	1991:194).	It	is	an	ambivalent	production,	ambivalent	not	by	the	strength	of	its	resolve	to	produce	or	ritualize,	but	an	ambivalence	that	lies	in	its	substance,	where	it	mentions	the	nation-state	and	its	martial	past	in	an	almost	rhetorical	way.	So	while	it	may	build	monument	upon	monument,	decorate	grave	upon	grave	and	fly	the	flag	of	Pakistan	higher	and	higher	on	the	bodies	of	its	dead,	the	parameters	of	what	drives	these	men	to	continue	to	invest	in	the	military	lie	in	ghurbat	(poverty)	and	the	desire	for	membership	of	a	kinship	group	that	provides	social	welfare.	This	production	is	made	all	the	more	desperate	because	of	the	fear	that	the	maa	baap	may	be	withdrawing.	Here	service,	sacrifice	and	lives	become	bargaining	chips	for	claims	to	benefits.	The	nation-state	comes	in	much	later,	reflecting	how	the	nation-state	is	a	newer	invention	in	the	long	history	of	these	people‘s	willingness	to	serve	and	sacrifice	in	the	military.	
Conclusion	This	chapter	has	investigated	the	historical,	physical	and	political	terrain	of	Chakwal,	a	famed	martial	district	in	Punjab	that	provides	troops	for	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces,	through	the	lens	of	the	symbiotic	relationship	between	this	district	and	the	Pakistani	military.	To	say	that	the	only	appeal	of	military	recruitment	is	the	military’s	ability	to	offer	a	comprehensive	and	competitive	job	package	unrivalled	by	other	public	sector	employers	would	not	do	justice	to	the	ways	these	relationships	function.	Generous	financial	incentives	certainly	form	the	foundations	of	these	relationships,	but	their	mechanics	and	substance	are	equally	significant.			In	these	rural	martial	areas	of	contemporary	Pakistan,	the	military	institution	functions	in	large	part	as	a	social	welfare	system	that	looks	after	its	soldiers	(and	their	families)	from	the	‘cradle	to	the	grave	and	beyond’.85	The	district’s	population,	especially	those	directly	affiliated	to	the	military,	regard	it	as	a	benefactor,	a	modern	kinship	group	in	a	historically	feudal	society.	Unlike	the	colonial	sipahi,	who	often	looked	to	the	Sarkar	for																																									 																					84	Community	centre	caretaker,	26th	March	2015.	85	Brigadier	3,	PASB,	Rawalpindi,	25th	March	2015.	
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benevolent	support	through	patronage	mechanisms	bound	up	with	kinship	and	tribal	ties	in	the	village,	the	subjects	of	modern	day	militarism	have	a	deep	sense	of	entitlement	and	an	ability	to	access	and	obtain	patronage	directly	from	the	military	institution.	Furthermore,	in	the	context	of	Pakistan,	where	different	times	the	military	can	be	locked	in	a	power	struggle	with	the	civil	government	or	even	take	over	from	it,	the	Sarkar	is	no	longer	perceived	as	a	monolithic	category.	Instead	the	fauj	emerges	as	a	category	independent	of	the	hakumat	(government)	or	the	larger	Sarkar.	The	relationship	or	social	contract	is	not	with	the	Sarkar	but	with	the	institution	of	the	military,	and	it	is	to	this	institution	that	the	subject’s	loyalty	is	bound.		Both	the	military	institution	and	the	subjects	of	the	project	of	militarism	have	an	obsessive	need	to	garb	these	more	mercenary	and	transactional	attachments	in	robes	of	honour	and	selfless	sacrifice.	This	chapter	has	outlined	how	subjects	strive	to	make	their	martial	status	visible	in	the	district,	an	inscription	made	more	visible	because	of	rising	anxieties	about	reduced	intake	quotas	from	a	district	no	longer	considered	martial	by	the	new	military	recruitment	policy.	The	chapter	has	argued	that	while	discourses	of	the	nation-state	and	memories	and	myths	about	a	martial	past	and	tradition	are	abundantly	voiced	and	echo	through	this	terrain,	they	remain	just	that,	echoes,	hollow	sounds	that	endlessly	repeat	themselves.	These	are	not	the	threads	that	hold	this	relationship	in	place.	It	is	the	systematic,	organized	and	generous	welfare	services	for	troops	and	their	families	that	legitimize	the	military’s	claim	on	the	bodies	of	men.	In	this	local	terrain,	narratives	of	service	and	sacrifice	become	a	bargaining	chip	for	continued	membership	and	claim-making	in	the	modern	kinship	group	that	is	the	Pakistani	military.	  
			 110	
Chapter 3: Regimes of Discipline, Regimes of Difference 	 You	have	to	take	a	civilian,	you	cannot	afford	to	waste	a	single	minute,	he	is	absolutely	raw	material,	he	doesn’t	know	how	to	talk	or	walk.	He	is	basically	a	wild	animal	in	a	shalwar	kameez.	I	wish	you	could	see	the	recruit	when	he	comes	to	us.	You	should	see	his	body	language.	You	only	have	23	weeks	and	you	have	to	make	him	into	a	proper	fighting	soldier	(….)	who	on	completion	of	training	must	be	converted	into	someone	who	is	physically	fit,	almost	hyper	fit.	He	must	be	mentally	robust.	It	is	only	23	weeks	of	training,	and	there	is	no	time	to	spare,	it’s	like	putting	the	boy	through	a	
bhatti	(kiln),	he	goes	through	these	hardships	so	the	fear	inside	him	comes	out.	He	must	be	professionally	trained	in	battle	tactics,	firing	weapons	and	admin,	and	he	must	be	a	motivated	solider.	By	this	I	mean	esprit	de	corps,86	to	feel	a	sense	of	pride	in	my	unit,	my	platoon,	my	regiment.	If	a	man	learns	to	fight	for	his	unit,	he	will	fight	for	his	country	because	we	fight	for	our	home	and	what	we	love.	Second,	there	is	the	religious	point	of	view:	it	is	a	sacred	profession.											(Colonel	2,	Chief	Instructor	–	infantry	regiment	training	centre,	Abbottabad,	11th	August,	2015)		The	above	extract	from	an	interview	gives	a	glimpse	of	how	the	soldier	figure	is	imagined	by	his	superiors	and	the	qualities	they	believe	he	must	possess.	It	also	draws	attention	to	the	methods	and	processes	through	which	the	shift	from	the	civilian	to	the	martial	is	made	possible.	Methods	marked	by	urgency	(‘only	23	weeks’)	and	a	sense	of	incredulity	that	the	object	before	turns	into	the	object	after.	‘There	is	no	time	to	spare’	refers	to	the	challenge	of	the	task	ahead	and	the	need	for	time	to	be	carefully	managed,	divided	up	into	minutes	and	seconds,	each	to	be	accounted	for	and	each	planned.	No	time	to	spare	and	no	spare	time!	These	are	processes	of	transformation	that	claim	to	turn	the	‘wild	animal’	into	a	‘proper	fighting	soldier’,	a	new	being	that	functions	and	changes	at	three	levels:	the	body,	the	mind	and	the	heart.	Training	aims	to	change	all	three,	a	‘mukammal’87	(complete)	transformation,	he	looks	different	(‘hyper	fit’),	he	feels	different	(‘motivated	soldier’)	and	he	thinks	differently	(‘mentally	robust	and	professionally	trained’).	A	sculpting	of	the	rustic,	backward	body	(‘in	shalwar	kameez’)	that	transforms	him	from	an	object	of	ridicule	(‘you	should	see	his	body	language’)	into	a	person	worthy	of	respect	(‘sacred	profession’).	A	mind	that	is	disciplined	or	put	through	the	fire	so	he	can	think	in	militarized	ways,	in	terms	of	tactics,	where	everything	has	a	name	and	everything	is	a	battle.	A	heart	that	does	not	fear,	that	is	sculpted	by	love	and	
																																								 																					86	The	literal	meaning	of	this	French	term	which	is	often	invoked	by	officers	of	the	Pakistani	military	is	‘group	spirit’.	Similar	terms	have	been	used	to	describe	the	morale	of	troops	since	the	time	of	the	Roman	legions.	87	Sipahi	Zafar	Khan,	Palwal,	14th	November	2014.	
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loyalty	to	new	objects	of	attachment	built	on	primordial	essences	like	religion,	land	and	home.			Two	competing	visions	of	the	soldier	of	the	modern	nation-state	that	I	find	relevant	to	draw	on	as	I	begin	this	chapter	are	the	soldier	as	a	professional,	distanced	from	civilian	life,	achieved	through	meticulous	training	and	discipline	(Huntington	1964;	Finer	1976;	Perlmutter	1977)	and	the	soldier	as	an	armed	peasant	or	worker	(Trotsky	1967).	In	his	fascinating	account	of	the	Indian	soldier	in	the	service	of	the	British	Indian	Army,	The	
Testimonies	of	Indian	Soldiers	and	The	Two	World	Wars,	Gajendra	Singh	(2014:4-5)	suggests	that	British	imaginings	of	colonial	soldiers	operated	between	two	poles.	The	
siphai	was	an	‘occidental	soldier’,	subject	to	the	military	bureaucracy,	laws	and	discipline,	and	yet	the	same	time	he	was	still	‘recognizably	Indian’,	a	‘pseudo	historical’	subject,	an	accident	of	the	ever	changing	definitions	of	the	mythical	martial	race.	In	the	former	he	is	no	longer	a	civilian	or	a	primitive,	a	dramatic	shift	from	his	earlier	being,	while	in	the	latter	he	is	essentially	unchanged,	just	armed	and	perhaps	better	trained	in	violence.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	the	Pakistani	military’s	dependence	on	martial	areas	for	troops	lasted	until	as	late	as	2001,	and	it	continued	to	rely	on	a	certain	pool	of	districts	(albeit	somewhat	expanded	within	Punjab	and	KP)	as	its	primary	recruiting	ground.	Many	officers	and	soldiers	I	interviewed	suggested	that	men	from	the	martial	regions	of	Punjab	and	KP	had	greater	willingness	and	ability	to	serve	due	to	their	extended	exposure	to	the	military	lifestyle.	This	exposure	made	it	easier	for	boys	coming	from	families	and	districts	where	the	ethos	of	the	army	was	not	so	alien	to	adapt	to	the	demands	of	military	discipline.	Despite	this,	as	the	passage	at	the	beginning	of	the	chapter	shows,	what	happens	in	the	military	training	institution	is	looked	upon	as	a	transformation	that	completely	metamorphoses	the	being	subjected	to	it.	It	seems	that	the	imaginings	of	the	British	Indian	Army	continue	to	haunt	the	modern	Pakistani	jawan,88	a	double	articulation	of	his	subjectivity	that	positions	him	as	socialized	into	martialness	and	already	half	a	soldier	(Dewey	1991:263),	yet	also	the	uncouth	primitive	who	has	to	be	trained	into	an	occidental	soldier.			This	chapter	interrogates	the	figure	of	the	jawan,	the	subaltern	soldier	of	the	Pakistan	Army,	from	two	primary	standpoints.	Addressed	first	is	how	the	soldier	is	imagined	and	moulded	through	training,	or	in	other	words	how	the	military	institution	itself	sees	its	soldier	class,	the	aspirations,	desires	and	anxieties	it	carries	and	the	kind	of	soldier	it	wishes	to	create.	This	imagining	is	shaded	by	its	colonial	antecedents	and	rests	on	a																																									 																					88	The	literal	meaning	of	this	term	is	young	man.	It	is	used	in	the	Pakistani	military	to	refer	to	the	soldier	class,	
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number	of	split	visions	or	conflicting	juxtapositions	of	the	imagined	soldier:	the	instinctual	given	of	the	martial	race	versus	the	necessity	of	the	monotonous	steady	inculcation	that	is	soldier	training;	the	image	of	the	honed	diamond	that	emerges	after	training	versus	that	of	the	mindless	automaton	he	is	reduced	to;	the	soldier	figure	who	follows	orders	in	battle	much	like	a	machine	versus	the	soldier	who	is	paralyzed	in	battle	and	has	to	be	cajoled	like	a	child	or	taunted	and	humiliated	to	fight.	I	use	the	words	split	and	conflicting	to	convey	the	fluidity	of	these	imaginings	and	the	inability	of	my	interlocutors	to	present	a	settled	image	of	the	soldier.	Instead,	the	picture	they	present	is	incoherent	and	unstable.	
The	second	standpoint	that	the	chapter	takes	is	how	the	soldier	lives	and	experiences	this	moulding,	the	experiences	he	brings	to	these	rituals	of	transformation	and	the	ways	he	copes	within	these	regimes	of	difference	and	discipline.	This	living	traverses	a	multiplicity	of	characters	and	moods	in	myriad	physical	placements.	The	semi-naked	17-year	old	puffs	up	his	chest	and	throws	out	his	shoulders	as	the	measurement	tape	is	put	around	him	in	the	district	recruitment	centre.	The	hesitant	new	recruit’s	tears	and	homesickness	hang	like	smoke	in	the	bathrooms	of	the	regiment	training	centre.	The	‘bewakoof’	(fool)89	flees	the	moulding	and	the	‘pakki	naukri’90	(secure	government	service),	running	back	to	the	familiar	village.	The	retired	simpleton	returns	after	service	and	floats	about	the	village,	forever	changed,	‘insoluble’91	and	distinct.	These	varied	glimpses	of	the	soldier	figure	are	separated	by	time	and	are	presented	not	as	stone	cast	edifices	representing	what	the	soldier	experiences	at	different	points	of	service	but	as	elusive,	blurry	snapshots,	colours	that	bleed	into	one	another,	casts	that	are	distinct	perhaps	only	because	interpretation	may	be	attempted	more	easily	by	the	use	of	these	lenses.	
The	analysis	presented	below	follows	thematic	areas	drawn	from	fieldwork	notes	made	during	my	visits	to	an	infantry	regiment	training	centre	in	Abbottabad,	the	District	Selection	and	Recruitment	office	in	Chakwal	and	my	interviews	with	soldiers,	some	of	whom	were	home	on	leave,	some	of	whom	had	retired	and	some	of	whom	had	deserted.	It	is	also	based	on	interviews	with	JCOs	(junior	commissioned	officers)	and	NCOs	(non-commissioned	officers)	and	the	officer	class	that	trains	these	soldiers	including	two	retired	infantry	generals.		
																																								 																					89		Waqas,	army	deserter,	Kandwal,	4th	January	2015.	90	A	reason	for	military	service	commonly	given	by	villagers.	91	College	Professor	Shamil,	Chakwal	city,	5th	January	2015.	
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Imagined	Soldiers,	Living	Soldiers	Before	I	move	on	to	a	describe	how	the	soldier-subject	is	manufactured,	it	is	important	to	state	that	I	am	not	attempting	here	to	tell	the	authentic	story	of	the	soldier	subaltern,	but	rather	perhaps	to	simply	provide	an	incomplete	recording	of	the	experiences	that	were	made	available	to	me.	I	say	this	not	so	much	due	to	post-modernist	pique	that	the	authentic	objective	self	and	experience	available	to	the	other	is	but	a	myth,	but	more	to	record	the	sense	of	incompleteness	that	haunted	these	exchanges.	For	as	I	sat	with	these	men,	talking	to	them	about	their	lives,	their	hopes,	their	anxieties	and	their	hesitations,	I	was	conscious	that	while	they	said	much,	much	remained	unspoken.	This	inhibition	was	brought	on	not	so	much	by	the	confines	of	gender	and	class	or	an	awareness	of	the	watchful	gaze	of	the	military	–	although	I	am	aware	that	that	too	must	have	played	a	part	–	but	instead	sprung	from	self-censorship,	from	carefully	cultivated	habits	of	the	heart,	mind	and	body,	a	resignation	to	the	inability	of	knowing	and	the	impossibility	of	accessing	oneself.	These	were	halted	silent	conversations,	even	when	the	words	flowed	freely.	
Organizing	Time,	Space	and	Movement:	Overstating	the	Automaton		 This	 training	makes	you	mechanical.	All	 this	 training	 in	peace-time,	 they	have	 to	 tune	 your	 reflexes,	 [make	 them]	 mechanical,	 (…)	 make	 it	conventional,	 expected	 (…)	 You	 don’t	 have	 to	 think	 at	 that	 time,	 what	should	 I	 do,	 but	 your	 reflexes	 have	 been	 automated	 it	 becomes	 your	second	 nature	 (…)	 You	 start	 to	 think	 in	 black	 and	 white,	 your	 grey	finishes.	(Retd.	General	1,	Served	as	Corp	Commander,	Peshawar	during	military	operations	in	northwest	Pakistan,	20th	June	2015)		In	his	seminal	work	Discipline	and	Punish:	Birth	of	the	Prison,	Foucault	(1991:135)	speaks	extensively	of	the	mechanics	of	disciplinary	power	and	its	ability	to	create	‘docile	bodies’.	The	way	life	is	organized	in	the	infantry	training	centre	I	visited	is	perfectly	described	by	Foucault’s	(1991:141-154)	detailed	rendition	of	classic	disciplining	mechanisms	involving	space	and	control	of	activity.	In	case	of	space	these	mechanisms	include	the	principle	of	enclosure	(isolation),	and	partitioning	(so	that	the	bodies	being	disciplined	can	be	distributed	among	partitions,	making	them	easily	locatable).	For	control	of	activity	mechanisms	include	the	use	of	strict	timetables	(‘to	establish	rhythms’),	the	‘temporal	elaboration	of	acts’	(as	in	marching),	a	focus	on	the	most	efficient	correlation	of	body	and	gestures	(such	as	the	correct	posture	for	walking	or	running),	body-tool/weapon	articulation	(the	most	efficient,	predictable	and	aesthetic	way	to	fire	or	hold	a	weapon)	and	exhaustive	use	(‘the	principle	of	non-idleness’).	This	is	an	artificial	world,	
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separated	from	the	familiar,	bounded	by	walls	and	guarded	by	sentries.	It	is	also	separated	from	the	known	in	terms	of	how	life	is	organized	within	it,	each	unit	of	space	and	time	accounted	for.	Here,	each	individual	is	marked	in	ways	that	make	him	forever	visible,	locatable	and	accounted	for,	yet	this	visibility	also	renders	him	invisible.	As	General	2	told	me,	‘when	they	finish	training,	you	can’t	tell	them	apart’.92		
In	her	historical	reading	of	the	training	techniques	employed	during	the	two	world	wars	and	the	Vietnam	War,	Joanna	Bourke	(1999:67)	traces	similar	patterns	in	the	preparation	of	men	for	war	and	killing.	The	fundamentals	of	training	included	‘depersonalization,	uniforms,	lack	of	privacy,	forced	social	relationships,	tight	schedules,	lack	of	sleep,	disorientation,	followed	by	rites	of	reorganization	according	to	military	codes,	arbitrary	rules	and	strict	punishments.’		These	mechanisms	produce	bodies	that	respond	to	commands	that	‘trigger	off	the	required	behaviour’,	commands	that	are	precise	and	clear	so	that	obedience	becomes	almost	an	automatic	action,	a	‘prearranged	code’	set	in	motion	as	if	from	within	(Foucault,	1991:166).	This	detail	–	a	purpose	to	every	act,	gesture	or	movement	–	may	seem	baffling	to	the	external	observer,	but	as	I	interviewed	the	instructors	at	the	training	centre	it	became	obvious	that	they	were	meticulously	organized	and	planned.	
As	suggested	by	the	colonel	in	this	chapter’s	opening	quote,	the	busloads	of	boys	that	arrive	at	the	training	centre	on	the	first	day	are	uncouth	primitives	whose	lives	have	so	far	been	restricted	to	the	village.	They	are	an	unruly	lot,	coming	from	different	locations	with	varying	experiences	and	perceptions	of	military	service,	their	uniqueness	a	challenge	to	be	overcome,	boys	that	need	to	pruned,	made	into	predictable,	classifiable	beings.	Their	bodies	must	look	similar	in	dress,	in	haircuts	and	in	movement	and	posture.	However,	this	is	only	part	of	the	transformation.	What	happens	to	their	bodies	perhaps	reflects	in	more	tangible	ways	the	moulding	of	the	mind	and	heart	that	happens	or	is	desired.	They	must	also	feel	and	think	in	ways	that	are	predictable	and	classifiable.	Describing	this,	Subedar93	Zahid,	an	instructor	at	the	training	centre	told	me,	‘the	zehen	(mind)	shifts	slowly,	it	takes	two	to	three	weeks	to	make	the	zehen.	The	first	week	is	the	hardest,	and	most	want	to	run	away.’94		Foucault	(1982)	builds	a	picture	of	modern	institutions’	ability	to	use	technologies	of	power	not	only	to	make	subjects	but	also	to	silence	their	ability	to	resist,	question	or	
																																								 																					92	Retired	General	2	(served	as	Director	General	Military	Training),	24th	June	2015.	93	There	are	three	ranks	at	the	Subedar/JCO	level:	Naib	Subedar,	Subedar	and	Subedar	Major.	94	Subedar	Zahid,	course	instructor,	infantry	regiment	training	centre,	Abbottabad,	11th	August	2015.	
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subvert.	This	seems	to	preclude	the	possibility	of	finding	in	the	subaltern	a	worldview	that	might	resist	or	even	think	through	the	conditions	of	its	formation.	As	I	attempt	to	shift	the	gaze	to	the	subject,	to	record	his	response,	I	too	cannot	help	but	acknowledge	that	his	body	continues	to	respond	to	and	meet	the	demands	of	disciplinary	power.	My	focus	below	is	on	how	these	bodies	experience	this	moulding,	this	subjection,	even	if	these	regimes	of	power	seem	formidable	in	their	ability	to	appropriate	every	gesture,	movement,	thought	and	habit.		
For	most	soldiers	I	spoke	to,	the	training	period,	the	stage	marking	their	transition	from	civilians	to	soldiers,	was	experienced	as	the	most	formative	period	of	their	lives.	Many	were	able	to	describe	in	great	detail	the	various	disciplinary	mechanisms	they	were	exposed	to	and	why	they	were	imposed	on	them.	This	sense	of	entering	a	new	world,	isolated	and	removed	from	the	familiar,	was	highlighted	by	many	as	they	spoke	of	their	memories	of	the	training	period.	Many	distinctly	articulated	a	sense	of	things	shifting	and	a	sense	of	transformation.	Everything	was	done	according	to	a	timetable;	a	regulated	time	was	even	set	aside	for	recreation,	time	for	fun	bookended	between	the	afternoon	drill	and	the	call	to	dinner.	There	was	a	sense	of	urgency,	of	always	being	in	a	state	of	preparedness	for	the	next	slot	in	the	timetable,	predictable	but	rushed.	Each	slot	in	the	day	was	a	test	of	which	they	had	to	prove	themselves	worthy.	Many	experienced	a	feeling	of	mastery,	of	pride	at	having	survived	the	harsh	army	training.	Much	like	how	Colonel	2	describes	this	transformation	in	the	chapter’s	opening	quote,	they	experienced	the	change	as	affecting	all	aspects	of	their	being:	the	body,	the	mind	and	the	heart.	The	things	that	shifted	included	tangibles	like	bodily	fitness	and	a	respect	for	routine	and	discipline,	as	well	as	more	nebulous	realms	such	as	a	sense	of	time	and	a	cool-headedness	that	set	them	apart	from	the	emotionality	and	animal-like	nature	of	the	folk	in	their	villages.	This	change	was	experienced	as	superiority,	as	specialness,	as	becoming	more	than	they	would	have	been	had	they	stayed	in	the	village.	It	was	also	experienced	in	terms	of	financial	prowess,	a	rise	in	stature	coming	not	only	from	the	ability	to	command	a	stable	and	secure	income	but	also	from	a	newly	acquired	love	of	discipline.	A	routine	that	was	initially	experienced	as	cumbersome	and	limiting	became	part	of	the	self,	and	the	unruliness	and	lack	of	order	in	the	village	became	irksome	and	inferior.			Yet	the	much-coveted	transition	was	rarely	presented	as	smooth	and	welcome,	and	in	fact	many	spoke	of	the	initial	few	weeks	as	being	extremely	painful	and	bewildering.	Some	expressed	a	sense	of	being	watched,	of	being	constantly	monitored,	never	free	of	the	gaze	of	superiors.	There	was	a	heightened	awareness	of	the	self,	a	need	to	hide	
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certain	kinds	of	emotion,	especially	those	associated	with	weakness,	hence	homesickness	had	to	be	hidden	and	bottled	up,	to	be	released	only	in	bathrooms	where	there	was	some	sense	of	privacy	or	when	the	lights	went	out	at	10pm.		
I	did	not	mind	the	hardships	or	the	punishments,	but	when	I	returned	to	my	barracks	in	the	evening	I	would	miss	home.	I	would	burst	into	tears,	I	would	go	to	the	bathroom	and	cry	my	heart	out	and	then	return	dry	eyed	to	the	room.	All	of	us	were	like	that	at	the	beginning.	(Havildar95	Nasir,	Kandwal,	24th	June	2015)		Punishments	were	a	regular	feature	of	these	training	institutions,	proof	itself	that	the	mind	and	body	resisted	this	subjection,	at	least	initially.	Punishment,	or	the	threat	of	it,	was	never	far	away,	and	it	was	often	a	test	of	physical	endurance	and	humiliation.	These	were	corporal	punishments,	like	sit-ups	or	being	made	to	stand	upside	down,	and	were	always	public,	in	full	view	of	the	other	boys.	The	physical	pain	accompanying	the	punishment	was	often	looked	on	as	a	mark	of	endurance,	improving	the	body,	as	in	Foucault’s	(1991)	suggestion	that	corrective/coercive	measures	come	to	be	looked	upon	as	productive.		
Many	spoke	about	the	challenges	of	settling	in.	For	many,	the	first	few	weeks	were	about	a	secret	desire	to	run	away,	while	for	others	this	desire	was	not	secret	and	led	to	action.	This	action	had	to	be	carefully	weighed	against	the	reaction	of	family	members,	censure	and	ridicule	from	the	village	and	most	of	all	pragmatic	considerations	of	material	needs.		
	 If	your	family	can	afford	it,	you	may	run	away.	I	knew	my	family	would	never	agree,	but	I	used	to	miss	my	village,	my	heart	was	not	in	it	[the	military].	It	was	an	odd	feeling.	I	thought	if	I	returned	home	my	family	would	ridicule	me,	they	would	say	‘you	ran	away	from	service,	couldn’t	survive	it’.	I	even	thought	of	doing	something,	running	away	from	life	itself	(…)	My	family	was	very	happy	when	I	got	in	(the	army)	but	my	
zehen	was	not	able	to	accept	this.	A	friend	I	spoke	to	said	there	are	many	benefits	in	the	army.	It	was	true,	but	in	the	army	you	feel	very	odd	at	the	beginning.	We	were	free	before	this,	now	even	if	I	move	to	this	side	I	have	to	tell	someone.	You	can’t	move	without	telling	someone.	I	said	this	is	not	the	army,	this	is	like	a	prison,	and	you	have	to	live	in	this	prison	for	18	years	or	20	years.	(…)	My	heart	was	restless	and	I	picked	up	my	box	and	ran.	(…)	When	I	returned,	there	was	much	arguing	and	fighting	in	my	house.	People	started	finding	out	that	I	was	home,	my	parents	were	worried	that	it	would	bring	shame	to	our	house.	One	morning	my	father			
																																								 																					95	Havildar	is	the	highest	rank	in	the	NCO	cadre.	There	are	three	NCO	ranks:	Sipahi,	Lance	Naik	and	Havildar.	
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woke	me	up	and	my	bag	was	ready	and	he	came	all	the	way	to	drop	me	at	Mardan	[the	training	centre].	I	was	17	and	half	then,	just	a	bacha	(child).																																																																																								(Havildar	Nasir,	24th	June	2015)			This	 exchange	brings	home	quite	 starkly	 the	materialist	drivers	 and	 the	 accompanying	pressure	 from	 these	 young	men’s	 families	 that	 bear	 heavily	 on	 a	 soldier’s	 decision	 to	serve	in	the	military.	Nasir,	a	havildar	with	over	16	years’	experience,	still	looks	back	on	his	 initiation	 into	 the	army	as	 forced	and	coercive,	 something	he	could	not	 resist	as	he	was	but	a	child.	He	speaks	of	 the	army	as	a	 ‘prison’,	a	metaphor	that	echoes	how	many	soldiers	 describe	 their	 experience	 as	 being	 paband	 (restricted).96	I	 mentioned	 earlier	how	these	boys	accept	gruelling	bodily	discipline	and	punishment	as	a	sign	of	endurance,	pride	and	masculinity.	Resistance	lies	not	in	the	body;	it	is	the	heart	and	mind	that	find	it	hard	 to	 conform,	 and	 the	 above	 exchange	 refers	 to	 the	 ‘restless	 heart’	 that	 could	 not	accept.	 Another	 havildar	 (Sohail),	 who	 was	 about	 to	 retire	 after	 21	 years	 of	 service,	referred	 to	 his	 upcoming	 retirement,	 saying,	 ‘in	 six	 months	 I	 will	 be	 azad	 (free)’.	 He	remarked	on	his	good	luck	that	 ‘it	was	time	to	retire	and	that	he	had	suffered	no	major	loss’,	as	 if	military	service	were	a	gamble	he	had	undertaken	with	his	 life	 that	had	paid	off.	97			There	is	a	realization	that	fitting	into	the	army,	becoming	a	fauji	(military	man),	means	giving	up	the	right	to	question	or	think,	leading	to	others	regarding	them	as	automatons,	incapable	of	independent	action	and	thought.	Sipahi	Omar	described	the	experience	of	mindlessly	following	orders	as	musalsal	zehni	koft	(continuous	mental	irritation),	a	paradox	in	itself,	for	the	zehen	of	the	fauji	is	apparently	is	no	longer	meant	to	be	capable	of	reacting	independently.	Omar	goes	on	to	describe	how	the	jawan	views	the	discipline	to	which	he	is	exposed,	an	account	somewhat	at	odds	with	the	automaton	imagined	by	General	1	at	the	beginning	of	this	section,	who	follows	orders	without	thinking.	
The	person	who	is	a	fauji,	especially	one	who	is	a	siphai,	he	doesn’t	need	to	use	his	brain.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	even	if	he	has	to	do	something	like	dig	a	hole,	he	will	do	it	on	the	orders	of	his	superior,	otherwise	he	doesn’t	do	it.	If	he	sits	he	must	sit	in	a	particular	way,	although	in	his	home	he	is	a	completely	responsible	man	(…)	At	home	I	am	a	responsible	adult	(…)	I	know	what	I	need	to	do,	dig	a	hole,	plant	a	tree,	work,	get	clothes	and	shoes	for	my	child.	But	when	I	go	there	[army	unit]	I	become	an	innocent,	like	I	know	nothing.	This	is	because	if	I	take	
																																								 																					96	This	term	was	repeated	across	interviews	a	by	a	number	of	serving	and	retired	siphais.	97	Havildar	Sohail,	Palwal,	14th	November	2014.	
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initiative	there	and	dig	a	hole	they	will	ask	me	‘why	did	you	do	this?’.	So,	in	the	fauj	a	person	cannot	have	free	will.	If	I	do	anything	they	will	ask		me	‘why	did	you	do	this,	who	ordered	you	to	do	this?’.	So	I	stopped	using	my	brain	and	I	waited	for	orders.												(Sipahi	Omar,	Kandwal,	18th	January	2015)		This	solider	subject	follows	orders,	yet	he	recognizes	what	this	demands	of	him:	a	willingness	to	give	up	thinking.	This	is	a	conscious	letting	go,	where	he	‘becomes’	the	‘innocent’	when	he	is	in	the	barracks	and	ceases	to	be	a	‘responsible	[thinking]	adult’.	Here	he	speaks	of	an	ability	to	switch	and	live	in	split	worlds:	as	a	different	being	back	home	than	in	the	barracks.	The	soldier	knowingly	gives	up	his	freedom	and	performs	the	‘innocent’.	I	will	discuss	this	switching	later,	as	I	believe	it	is	an	important	hallmark	of	the	soldier	figure	and	the	toll	that	soldiering	takes	on	his	life.	
Officers	and	the	soldier	class	alike	suggested	three	interconnected	reasons	for	recruits	running	back	to	their	villages.	Most	commonly	mentioned	was	the	financial	condition	of	the	family	they	had	left	behind.	Those	from	decidedly	poorer	families	were	more	likely	to	stay,	as	for	them	the	discomfort	associated	with	homesickness	and	enforced	discipline	was	acceptable	compared	to	the	uncertainty	and	the	hard	life	of	work	in	the	fields	that	awaited	them	back	home.	It	seems	that	poverty	and	the	famed	martial	resilience	to	training	go	hand	in	hand.	The	second	reason	was	the	geographical	location	from	which	recruits	come	and	their	consequent	familiarity	with	the	military,	including	having	family	members	who	had	served	previously	in	the	military.	The	third	reason	cited	was	an	inability	to	rise	above	the	pangs	of	separation	from	loved	ones.	Those	who	managed	to	flee	were	referred	to	as	bhagoras,98	meaning	those	who	run	away	from	hardship.	This	is	a	pejorative	term,	but	disparagement	in	the	village	is	not	derived	from	the	shame	of	buckling	under	pressure	and	shying	away	from	the	hardship	of	military	service	or	service	to	the	nation-state.	Instead,	these	people	were	censured	as	bewakoof	(fools)99	and	called	‘short-sighted’,100	as	they	had	thrown	away	their	chance	to	better	themselves	and	their	families	financially	and	in	status.	The	decision	to	so	recklessly	throw	away	this	chance	of	
pakki	naukri	was	equated	to	madness,	an	act	without	reason.	Most	importantly,	such	people	more	often	than	not	viewed	themselves	this	way,	especially	when	comparing	themselves	to	their	contemporaries	who	had	decided	to	stay	and	were	receiving	pensions.	Many	expressed	regret	at	their	actions.		In	this	sub-section	I	have	attempted	to	show	how	subjects	live	and	experience	these																																									 																					98	This	is	a	standard	term	used	by	most	villagers	to	refer	to	army	deserters	and	is	repeated	across	interviews.	99	Waqas,	army	deserter,	Kandwal,	4th	Jan	2015.	100	Jaffer,	army	deserter,	18th	January	2015.	
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disciplinary	techniques	and	thus	highlight	their	awareness	of	the	various	mechanisms	they	were	exposed	to	and	why	they	were	imposed	on	them.	This	could	partly	be	a	temporal	effect,	a	gradual	understanding	over	time,	as	many	of	my	interlocutors	were	men	whose	training	took	place	between	five	and	twenty-two	years	ago.	However,	I	hold	these	self-descriptions	to	be	important.	In	his	work	Weapons	of	the	Weak,	James	Scott	(1985)	argues	somewhat	problematically	for	the	idea	of	penetration	and	the	complete	demystification	of	the	prevailing	ideologies	by	peasant	classes.	In	critiquing	Scott’s	work	as	over	generous	in	its	attribution	of	a	complete	demystification	of	structures	of	power	by	subjects	(peasants),		
Timothy	Mitchell	(1990:569)	argues	that		
new	modes	of	power,	by	their	permanence,	their	apparent	origin	outside	local	life,	their	intangibility	(…	)	[appear]	as	something	non	particular	and	unchanging	–	as	a	framework	that	enframes	actual	occurrences.	In	this	context,	power	appears	to	be	inevitable	and	unchangeable,	‘external	to	practice’	(Mitchell	1990:571).	The	subjects	of	militarism	thus	view	the	world	as	‘enframed’,	and	because	of	their	inability	to	see	it	any	other	way	they	are	limited	in	their	capacity	to	demystify	it	completely.	For	soldiers,	the	transition	they	experience	was	essential	for	the	kind	of	service	the	military	demanded:	they	had	to	be	toughened	up	for	harsh	military	service	and	they	had	to	mindlessly	follow	orders	for	military	systems	to	work,	thus	they	see	their	world	as	‘enframed’.	And	yet	they	had	a	pronounced	ability	to	see	through	what	these	mechanisms	did	to	them,	which	was	significant	for	many.	I	stand	with	this	idea	of	‘enframing’,	but	I	hold	that	it	essentially	limits,	although	does	not	take	away,	the	subject’s	capacity	to	be	aware	of	how	it	is	itself	imbricated	in	disciplinary	mechanisms	of	power.	I	reiterate	that	this	is	a	‘seeing	through’	that	does	not	preclude	subjects’	willingness	to	be	moulded,	nor	create	any	subversive	action.	Instead	it	just	implicates	subjects	as	conscious	beings	in	this	process,	and	they	continue	to	acquiesce	despite	the	failure	of	these	disciplinary	mechanisms	to	make	them	complete	automatons.		
Affective	Regulations:	Of	Kinship	and	New	Families			 Emotions	need	to	be	streamlined	and	channelled,	all	of	us	have	the	same	basic	emotions,	but	to	convert	them	(civilians)	into	standing	armies	they	(emotions)	need	to	be	channelled,	they	don’t	just	go	away.																											(Retd.	General	1,	20th	June	2015)		
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If	modern	militaries	and	standing	armies	are	at	least	partly	about	controlled	and	regulated	acts	of	violence	and	killing,	then	it	can	be	argued	that	the	manufacture	of	bodies	for	these	acts	is	closely	tied	to	the	management	of	emotion.	A	considerable	amount	of	scholarship	has	looked	at	the	ways	in	which	the	enemy	is	dehumanized	and/or	objectified	and	made	into	an	object	of	hate	to	make	killing	easier	(Kennet	1987,	Ballard	and	McDowell	1991,	Shay	1995).	After	partition,	the	version	of	Pakistani	selfhood	constructed	by	the	state	relied	on	the	physical	and	cultural	othering	of	the	other:	the	Hindu	(Jaffrelot	2002;	Racine	2002).	This	included	the	dehumanization	of	the	Hindu	enemy	and	the	steady	inculcation	of	an	attitude	of	bravado	and	superiority	over	him	(Nayer	and	Salim	2003;	Saigol	2013).	Yet,	in	his	discussion	of	patriotism	in	Imagined	
Communities,	Benedict	Anderson	(2006:141)	does	well	to	remind	us	that	the	roots	of	nationalism	lie	not	only	in	racism,	fear	and	hatred	of	the	other,	but	also	in	love.	In	her	book	The	Intimate	History	of	Killing,	Joanna	Bourke	(1999)	outlines	the	influence	of	psychology	on	soldiers’	training	and	the	turn	towards	crowd	theories,	group	dynamics	(84-87)	and	more	specifically	the	deliberate	development	of	affective	relationships	with	fellow	soldiers	and	the	group	leader	–	who	signifies	a	father	figure	–	to	prepare	men	for	killing	(129-133).	According	to	these	theories,	love	and	not	hate	is	thought	to	provide	the	motivation	for	aggressive	acts.			Intense	group	identification	would	lead	to	the	displacement	of	self-love	on	to	the	group,	resulting	in	a	declining	fear	of	self-annihilation	and	the	consequent	reduction	of	inhibition	about	the	expression	of	aggression	(Bourke,	1999:87).		Along	the	same	lines,	I	argue	that	while	amplifications	of	hate	are	central	to	military	strategies,	they	are	only	part	of	the	story	of	how	fighting	and	dying	for	the	nation	is	made	possible.	The	YeS	imagery	discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	1	can	be	understood	as	representing	two	images	through	which	the	institution	of	the	military	imagines	its	soldier	figure.	On	the	one	hand	there	is	the	brave	warrior	who	takes	to	war	like	a	sport,	while	on	the	other	is	the	self-sacrificing	heroic	creature.	In	her	book	Women	in	War,	Jean	B.	Elshtain	(1995:206)	suggests	something	similar	when	she	discusses	the	prototypical	soldier	in	the	West,	who	also	stands	somewhere	between	the	‘reluctant	warrior’	and	the	‘bloodthirsty	militant’.	The	former	‘places	highest	value	not	on	killing	but	on	dying	–	dying	for	others,	to	protect	them,	sacrificing	himself	so	others	might	live’.	He	does	not	say	‘I	will	kill	for	my	country’,	but	his	slogan	instead	is	‘I	will	die	for	the	sake	of	my	homeland’.	Training	in	the	Pakistani	military	uses	a	mix	of	both	images,	but	I	will	focus	on	the	second,	the	willing	self-sacrificing	soldier,	as	this	is	the	image	that	the	military	
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invokes	most	often.	As	I	argue	in	Chapter	1,	this	can	to	some	extent	be	considered	political	rhetoric	which	deflects	from	the	reality	and	actual	purpose	of	the	war	to	which	the	military	sends	its	men.	Here,	I	also	position	the	willingness	to	serve	and	die	as	the	essence	of	military	training,	achieved	through	the	management	of	sadness	and	the	production	of	love.	I	argue	that	this	affective	regulation	is	a	critical	feature	of	the	docile	bodies	created	by	modern	militaries.	
	In	explaining	the	rural	roots	of	militarism	in	Pakistan	and	the	reasons	that	recruits	from	such	environs	are	already	half	made,	Clive	Dewey	(1991:276)	suggests	that	the	Pakistani	military	appropriates	primordial	notions	such	as	ghairat	(honour)	and	izzat	(prestige)	that	are	deeply	embedded	in	these	districts.	These	notions,	which	are	traditionally	associated	with	female	members	of	the	household	or	with	the	biraderi	(extended	clan),	are	extended	to	everything	military.	Affection	for	the	regiment	and	determination	to	uphold	its	honour	is	what	locks	soldiers	together	like	a	family.	In	my	examination	of	the	dynamics	that	extend	these	kinship	bonds	and	the	notion	of	honour	from	the	clan,	tribe	or	family	to	the	military,	I	do	not	rely	excessively	on	the	primordial	instinct	to	explain	how	the	soldier	subject	is	formed,	instead	focus	on	how	the	military	goes	about	developing	these	new	affections,	not	simply	as	an	extension	of	earlier	bonds	but	to	their	detriment.		I	mentioned	above	three	interconnected	reasons	often	given	for	recruits	running	away:	better	economic	conditions	at	home,	a	lack	of	familiarity	with	army	service	and	pangs	of	homesickness.	Training	instructors	repeatedly	spoke	of	the	need	to	handle	the	homesickness	of	boys	who	were	too	attached	to	families,	perhaps	because	this	was	the	only	one	of	the	three	reasons	that	could	be	dealt	with	by	the	training	institute.	Female	family	members	back	home,	mothers	and	grandmothers,	were	singled	out	by	instructors	as	stubborn	objects	of	attachment.	Despite	the	different	reasons	suggested	for	absconding,	the	dominant	view	at	the	centre	was	that	those	who	wished	to	run	away	were	not	tough	enough	for	army	discipline	and	had	failed	to	live	up	to	the	ideal	of	the	soldier.	They	were	often	referred	to	pejoratively	as	ladle	(spoilt)	or	‘beghairat’	(without	honour),101	made	weak	by	too	much	female	love	and	attention.			 [The	runaway	is]	a	child	who	has	never	left	his	home	or	his	village.	He	has	only	eaten	roti	made	by	his	mother’s	hands	(…)	so	when	he	comes	here	he	can’t	cope.	There	was	a	recruit	last	year	whose	father	brought																																									 																					101	Colonel	2,	infantry	regiment	training	centre,	11th	August,	2015.	
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him	back	after	he	ran	away;	he	said	he	hadn’t	slept	without	his	dadi	(grandmother)	in	all	his	life,	so	it	was	hard	for	him.			(Colonel	2,	infantry	regiment	training	centre,	11th	August,	2015)	
	The	longing	for	familiarity	and	the	home	is	made	all	the	more	intense	by	the	fact	that	the	training	centre	functions	as	an	artificial	world,	physically	separated	from	the	rest	of	the	city	by	walls	and	gates.	Glimpses	of	the	previous	world	are	strictly	regulated,	and	the	clean	whitewashed	and	organized	inside	stands	distinct	from	the	unpredictable	and	unruly	environment	outside.	General	1	suggested	that	‘they	need	to	be	away	from	the	city,	from	other	people	(so)	they	feel	like	an	entity,	and	then	the	espirit	de	corp	develops.’	It	seems	that	the	intent	is	not	to	ease	homesickness	but	to	underline	it	by	severing	contact	with	familiar	things,	jolting	the	individual	into	a	sharp	awareness	of	his	new	and	unfamiliar	surroundings.	The	bonds	with	the	family	arouse	sadness	so	overwhelming	that	it	is	an	almost	infantile	separation	anxiety,	threatening	the	ability	to	stay.	The	bonds	are	temporarily	severed	so	they	can	then	be	reimagined	through	newer	bonds,	which	is	perhaps	only	possible	if	the	shock	and	isolation	are	severe	enough.	The	earlier	bonds	of	attachment	have	to	be	weakened	and	the	boys	toughened	up,	not	through	the	renunciation	of	love	and	attachment	but	by	channelling	the	love	in	other	directions,	to	the	new	family,	the	army,	with	the	superior	officer	as	the	father	and	the	fellow	soldiers	as	brothers.	This	deliberate	investment	in	developing	ideas	of	love	(camaraderie	and	espirit	
de	corps)	relies	heavily	on	the	same	kinship	metaphors	used	for	the	YeS	ceremonies	discussed	in	Chapter	One.	The	military	institution	uses	these	metaphors	and	the	love	they	invoke	at	two	levels:	first	the	larger	landscape,	with	the	homeland	as	mother,	the	nation	as	family	and	the	soldiers	as	sons	of	the	soil,	and	second	within	the	institution	itself,	with	its	units,	officers	and	soldiers	as	one	family.	The	unit	is	referred	as	the	new	home	and	the	army	as	the	new	maa	baap,	a	benevolent	benefactor	that	loves	you,	grooms	you,	shapes	you	and	then	looks	after	you,	but	which	also	has	the	right	to	then	ask	you	to	die	or	kill	for	it.			 Your	fight	is	here	(…)	you	four	boys	in	this	trench,	each	one	of	you	is	more	important	to	each	other	than	your	real	brother.	Because	tomorrow	if	a	shell	lands	your	blood	will	all	be	in	one	pool	and	if	one	of	you	is	injured	and	the	other	is	not,	he	is	the	one	who	will	help	you	and	take	you	out,	not	your	father.																																																																																																											(Retd.	General	1,	20th	June	2015)	
	The	injunction	above	from	a	commanding	officer	to	his	troops	extols	the	virtues	of	camaraderie	with	fellow	jawans	as	vital	for	survival.	What	is	also	interesting	is	the	need	
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to	replace	earlier	blood	relations	with	new	attachments	forged	in	blood.	This	reimagining	of	familial	attachments	through	the	concerns	of	the	state	doesn’t	just	involve	metaphorical	reference	to	primordial	givens,	although	that	is	an	intrinsic	part	of	this	manufacture	of	love,	but	also	demands	a	replacement.	This	allows	a	response	of	love,	loyalty	and	attachment	to	emerge.			Motivation	to	stay	in	training	is	also	couched	in	appeals	to	pragmatism,	familial	duty	and	masculinity.		 What	does	real	courage	mean?	It	means	you	are	a	man,	sorry	to	say.	I	am	not	suggesting	that	women	can’t	perform,	but	he	[the	new	recruit]	is	but	a	child,	and	sometimes	children	can	be	unwilling.	They	are	in	the	fauj	and	now	they	want	to	resign.	Mostly	the	issue	is	that	their	parents	are	old,	they	need	support,	so	I	tell	them	you	are	a	man,	you	can’t	do	a	woman’s	job.	Give	it	a	year	maybe	two,	tolerate	it,	you	will	earn	money,	you	have	a	government	job,	you	will	get	married,	and	if	you	are	so	concerned	about	your	parents	then	ask	your	wife	to	look	after	your	mother	and	father	(…)	Now	if	you	go,	you	can	try	and	look	after	your	parents,	you	have	no	money	for	medical	expenses	or	for	food.	Then	these	children	understand.	(...)	If	you	stay	[in	the	army]	the	CMH	(Combined	Military	Hospital)	will	treat	you	for	free.	You	will	also	get	a	salary	when	you	are	sick,	in	hospital;	even	if	you	die	you	get	a	salary,	what	more	could	you	ask?	(…)	You	have	the	whole	fauj	behind	you.	Officers	are	like	your	fathers,	every	soldier	is	your	brother,	and	you	can	never	find	a	family	like	this.	(Psychologist	–	Captain	2,	infantry	regiment	training	centre,	Abottabad,	11th	August,	2015)		The	desired	transition	is	from	an	irresponsible	feminized	infant	to	a	responsible	adult	man,	one	who	can	hold	his	head	high.	He	is	asked	to	make	a	pragmatic	decision	that	will	yield	both	material	and	affective	rewards,	the	rejection	of	which	is	laughable	for	it	represents	a	reversion	to	infantilism	and	the	dreaded	feminine.	I	will	take	up	this	need	to	distance	oneself	from	the	feminine	in	the	next	section.			The	tightening	of	bonds	with	fellow	soldiers	in	the	unit	can	also	mean	a	corresponding	distancing	from	the	family	and	village	back	home.	This	distancing	is	produced	by	the	way	the	new	self	is	experienced,	a	self	that	respects	routine	and	discipline,	a	way	of	being	that	sets	one	apart	from	the	emotionality	and	unruliness	of	village	folk	back	home.	I	argue	that	this	distancing	is	not	an	accidental	by-product	of	the	transformation	into	the	soldier	figure	but	is	actively	desired.	It	may	be	instructive	to	explore	why	this	is	considered	necessary,	why	these	newer	bonds	of	attachment	are	tied	to	a	loosening	of	bonds	with	
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the	home	and	why	these	bonds	do	not	function	solely	as	a	metaphor	for	the	newer	relationships.	I	revert	here	to	Chapter	One,	where	a	tension	was	highlighted	in	the	discussion	of	the	script	for	the	YeS	programmes.	A	delicate	balancing	act	is	required,	for	the	very	bonds	of	kinship	–	between	the	bodies	of	dead	soldiers	and	the	grief	of	their	relatives,	the	conduits	for	the	military’s	message	of	purpose	and	sacrifice	to	the	nation	–	need	to	be	weakened	at	the	training	centre	if	the	soldier	is	to	perform	his	duty	to	the	nation	and	be	willing	to	fight	and	die.	These	very	bonds,	so	vital	for	the	military,	can	become	the	reasons	for	a	soldier	being	unwilling	to	fight	or	running	back	to	his	village.	In	the	YeS	script,	this	rechannelling	or	weakening	of	bonds	has	to	be	handled	sensitively,	as	the	entire	show	revolves	around	an	invocation	of	relationships.	The	rechannelling	has	to	be	presented	as	a	choice	that	represents	a	willing	sacrifice.	Within	the	confines	of	the	training	centre,	however,	the	gloves	come	off,	and	there	is	no	longer	an	allusion	to	choice	but	an	inculcation,	a	steady	drilling,	where	the	price	of	not	conforming	or	failing	to	rechannel	these	objects	of	love	can	be	quite	high.	The	consequences	for	those	who	run	away	and	are	returned	by	their	family	or	come	back	on	their	own	can	range	from	solitary	confinement	to	court	martial	and	civilian	prison,	depending	on	the	severity	and	frequency	of	the	offence.				For	many	of	the	soldiers	I	interviewed,	the	development	of	these	new	bonds	reflects	a	pragmatic	channelling,	one	that	ostensibly	serves	the	interests	of	the	earlier	bonds	of	affection	and	harnesses	the	deliberately	heightened	sadness	of	homesickness.	The	soldier	flits	between	the	two	worlds	of	attachments,	the	civilian	and	the	martial,	the	old	and	the	new,	the	demands	often	pulling	him	in	different	directions	even	as	both	set	of	attachments	lead	or	push	him	in	one	direction:	towards	military	service.	From	the	soldier’s	point	of	view,	although	pride	in	and	attachment	to	the	unit	came	through	in	their	conversations,	it	was	when	they	spoke	of	their	colleagues	that	they	allowed	themselves	to	smile.	The	camaraderie	that	the	army	sets	out	to	inculcate	was	often	expressed	as	personal	friendship	and	shared	experiences.	The	soldiers	turn	to	each	other	as	fellow	travellers	on	the	same	journey,	sometimes	unable	or	unwilling	to	find	similar	camaraderie	and	attachment	back	home.	Their	new	beings	perhaps	relate	less	to	earlier	bonds	and	relationships,	and	there	is	comfort	and	ease	in	living	with	people	who	have	seen	and	lived	through	the	same	mouldings	and	speak	the	same	language.	This	is	perhaps	best	captured	by	a	joke	shared	with	me	by	a	subedar:		
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Some	fauji	arrived	in	hell,	yet	they	seemed	happy.	Others	around	them	asked	them	why	they	were	happy.	They	said,	we	are	together,	we	have	
created	the	same	atmosphere	here	as	the	unit..		(Naib	Subedar	Habib,	Kandwal,	2nd	October,	2014)		There	are	two	implications	here:	first	that	army	life	is	similar	to	hell	and	second	that	it	is	a	hell	you	learn	to	enjoy	because	your	bonds	with	your	comrades	or	the	sense	of	togetherness	enable	you	to	make	hell	your	home.		The	intention	in	this	sub-section	was	to	highlight	that	old	and	new	affective	attachments	play	a	significant	role	in	how	the	soldier	is	trained.	This	is	a	domain	that	is	critical	to	the	manufacture	of	these	docile	bodies,	with	affective	regulation	used	as	a	disciplinary	mechanism	by	the	army	and	grasped	at	by	the	soldier	figure	to	ease	the	pain	of	separation	and	the	possible	tension	associated	with	knowingly	becoming	an	automaton.	
States	of	Suspension:	Distancing,	Differences	and	Dissociations		In	 the	 previous	 sub-sections	 I	 have	 described	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 soldier	 figure	through	ideas	of	transformation,	a	being	that	shifts	from	one	thing	to	another,	from	being	primitive,	 civilian	 and	 feminine	 to	 being	 civilized,	 martial	 and	 masculine.	 I	 now	investigate	this	shift,	an	inquiry	not	so	much	into	how	this	happens	or	how	successful	or	unsuccessful	 the	project	 to	manufacture	 the	soldier	 is,	but	 instead	a	qualitative	 inquiry	into	its	substance	and	the	toll	it	may	take	on	these	lives.			One	way	this	transition	is	experienced	that	many	family	members	of	soldiers	articulated	is	as	a	distancing	from	loved	ones.	Soldiers	describe	this	as	an	emotional	distancing,	a	silencing	from	others	who	were	once	the	same	but	who	can	no	longer	understand	or	relate	to	what	soldiering	is	about.	The	home,	family	and	village	represent	people	and	places	they	loved	but	which	were	different,	caught	in	patterns	of	thinking	and	ways	of	doing	that	seem	alien	to	the	new	self.	Immersion	in	the	new	self	demanded	the	severing	of	the	communication,	sharing	and	openness	that	may	have	existed	earlier.	Ijaz,	a	Special	Services	Group	(SSG)	commando,	told	me	‘they	[his	family]	can’t	understand	what	we	do	there,	they	will	just	worry	and	make	it	harder	for	us’.	102	This	is	an	othering	not	just	of	the	enemy	but	of	relations	and	acquaintances.	Mothers	would	say	that	their	son	grew	quieter	over	the	years,	and	some	noticed	this	sharp	change	while	he	was	in	training	as	a	recruit,	the	most	common	complaint	being	that	he	had	stopped	talking.	This	quietness	bordered	on	broodiness	for	some,	irritability	for	others,	relieved	by	occasional	bursts	of																																									 																					102	Ijaz,	Special	Services	Group	(SSG)	commando,	Kandwal,	18th	January	2014.	SSG	is	a	special	operations	force	of	the	Pakistan	Army,	known	for	its	gruelling	training.	
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unreasonable	temper.	Ijaz’s	wife	jokingly	complained	that	her	husband	thought	their	home	was	the	army	and	expected	her	and	the	children	to	obey	orders	and	follow	a	routine.103		The	making	of	a	soldier	entails	the	creation	of	distance	not	only	from	civilian	life	and	the	primitive	peasantry,	from	which	most	of	Pakistan’s	soldier	class	has	been	traditionally	drawn,	but	also	from	those	stubborn	female	objects	of	attachment	I	mentioned	earlier.	Training	involves	a	fair	amount	of	cajoling,	insults	and	humiliation	that	revolve	around	not	being	man	enough,	or	worse	still	being	called	a	woman.	I	argue	that	this	distancing	rests	on	the	prototypical	separation	from	the	cocoon	of	the	feminine	as	young	boys	transition	into	manhood.	In	the	South	Asian	context,	the	separation	of	the	boy	from	the	feminine	world	and	his	removal	to	a	more	masculine	one	is	a	rite	of	passage	that	accompanies	the	transition	into	adulthood.	This	involves	an	almost	physical	shift	like	that	Bouhdiba	(1998)	describes	when	the	boy	moves	from	the	women’s	bath	to	the	men’s	collective	or	public	bath	(hammam).	This	distance	translates	into	both	a	physical	separation	and	a	qualitative	difference	from	the	feminine,	and	thereby	becomes	a	source	of	a	permanent	anxiety	and	crisis	that	can	only	be	resolved	by	moving	further	and	further	from	all	that	is	regarded	as	feminine.	In	a	study	conducted	by	Rozan,	a	local	NGO	in	Pakistan	(Rozan	2010:22)	young	men	invariably	expressed	their	sense	of	maleness	through	negation	of	the	feminine,	where	a	real	man	was	‘not	a	woman’.	In	my	conversations	with	army	men,	the	fauji	was	defined	as	a	non-civilian,	non-primitive	subjectivity,	much	as	manhood	is	articulated	through	negation	as	not	being	feminine.	The	subjectivities	of	soldiers	emerge	from	a	conscious	and	deliberate	effort	to	create	distance	from	the	contaminating	effect	of	the	civilian	and	primitive,	equated	to	femininity.	The	anxiety	is	of	evaluation	and	possible	humiliation	in	front	of	other	men	(fellow	soldiers	and	superiors)	for	the	masculine	militarist	subject	is	informed	through	the	approving	or	shaming	gaze	of	other	men.			I	spoke	above	of	sadness	and	love,	but	to	look	at	how	this	distancing	is	made	possible	it	may	be	useful	to	discuss	fear	and	shame,	as	the	mastery	and	manipulation	of	these	two	emotions	perhaps	define	the	very	core	of	how	the	soldier	is	constructed.	In	preparing	the	soldier	for	battle,	a	deliberate	aim	of	training	is	to	sequence	and	break	down	each	battle	tactic	and	manoeuvre	in	such	a	way	that	when	the	soldier	steps	into	the	line	of	fire	he	performs	the	next	sequential	stop	in	series	of	coordinated	moves	that	he	has	been	practising	day	in	and	day	out	as	a	soldier	in	waiting.																																									 																					103	Ijaz’s	wife,	Kandwal,	5th	February	2015.	
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	 [This	means]	that	individual	bravery	or	chivalry	is	not	needed.	It	happens,	it	has	to	happen	like	that,	because	you	have	been	drilled	like	that.	(…)	You	just	have	to	follow	the	steps.																															(Retd.	General	1,	20th	June	2015)		The	goal	here	is	to	ensure	that	fear	becomes	secondary	and	the	automaton	takes	over.	Yet	it	seems	that	all	does	not	always	go	smoothly	in	battle.	Fear	is	managed	better	in	some	soldiers	and	is	trickier	to	master	in	others;	shame	and	consequences	loom	large.		 The	one	who	shows	fear	is	lost,	he	has	lost	his	honour	and	his	reputation	and	he	will	be	taken	to	task.	His	promotion	may	be	blocked.	It’s	the	same	concept	at	home.	You	try	many	ways	to	fix	your	child,	many	times	he	does	things	that	you	cover	for	him.	Because	you	fear	that	you	[the	regiment]	will	be	shamed	if	people	find	out	(…)	the	senior	officer	might	try	and	encourage	him,	so	he	may	say	get	up	child	its	ok,	shabash	
shabash	(verbal	encouragement)	come,	come.	If	he	still	doesn’t	move	then	the	commander	will	become	harsh:	he	will	push	him,	kick	him,	drag	him,	he	will	ask	two	other	people	to	take	the	weapon	from	him.	He	will	be	verbally	abused	and	they	will	shame	him	by	calling	him	a	coward,	a	woman.		 															(Retd.	General	1,	20th	June	2015)		Fear	is	real	and	common	on	the	battlefield	and	needs	to	be	disciplined	and	‘fixed’.	When	describing	 the	 scene	 above,	 the	 general	 also	 referred	 to	 the	 soldier’s	 almost	 catatonic	posture	–	an	infantile	immobility	–	and	the	soldier’s	dreaded	return	to	the	primitive	and	feminine.	 Fear	 is	 an	unwanted	 aberrant	 emotion,	 and	 it	must	 be	hidden	 from	others	 if	possible	because	visibility	will	bring	shame	to	the	unit.	Drawing	on	earlier	familiar	tropes	of	family,	the	first	attempt	will	be	to	‘cover’	for	the	person,	but	if	that	is	not	possible	there	are	repercussions,	and	the	punishment	will	depend	upon	rank.	At	first	the	senior	will	try	and	 cajole	 him	 like	 a	 child,	 but	 this	 can	 slide	 into	 violence,	 and	 physical	 torture	 and	verbal	insults	invoking	ghairat	may	ensue.			The	soldiers	I	interviewed	during	the	course	of	my	fieldwork	used	a	double	language	to	speak	of	fear.	It	was	a	perplexing	discussion;	nobody	denied	experiencing	fear,	and	many	said	it	was	a	natural	emotion,	yet	they	spoke	about	it	as	a	thing	of	a	past,	something	that	they	had	once	felt	but	could	no	longer	relate	to.	Instead,	some	spoke	of	being	prevented	from	concentrating	on	the	job	at	hand,	or	even	made	to	desert	the	battlefield,	by	worries	about	home.	This	seemed	to	be	an	unspoken	code	according	to	which	a	soldier’s	inability	to	perform	is	attributed	to	his	inability	to	break	the	bonds	with	home	and	to	his	excessive	
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worry	 about	 the	 situation	 there,	 and	 never	 to	 fear	 of	 imminent	 injury	 or	 death	 on	 the	battlefield.			There	were	dents	in	this	armour	of	silence	for	those	posted	in	areas	where	combat	operations	were	going	on.	In	halting	conversations	about	experiences	at	the	battlefront,	fear	was	sometimes	mentioned	as	a	memory	of	the	first	time	they	saw	the	dead	bodies	of	their	comrades	or	even	of	the	enemy.	Forced	proximity	to	the	dead	bodies	of	the	enemy	or	their	comrades	was	something	that	many	had	experienced	and	which	stayed	with	them.	Descriptions	of	these	memories	were	vivid,	laced	with	sounds,	smells	and	sights,	and	they	were	expressed	as	if	they	had	happened	the	day	before,	defining	moments	when	they	had	seen	death	first	hand	and	realized	that	they	too	could	die.	Some	described	it	as	feeling	of	terror,	others	as	a	deep	unease,	still	others	simply	as	a	time	they	could	not	forget	that	kept	coming	back	to	them.	There	was	an	unspoken	rule	not	to	share	or	discuss	this	either	back	home	or	with	other	colleagues,	apart	from	describing	the	facts.	There	was	deep	shame	of	being	found	out	as	fearful,	a	deep	fear	of	fear	itself	and	a	need	to	dissociate	and	not	accept	the	helplessness	or	terror	experienced	in	that	moment.		
	This	could	be	expressed	through	other	means,	such	as	grief	for	a	fellow	comrade	who	had	died.	Many	 spoke	 about	 how	 they	would	 cry	 and	wail	without	 shame	 for	 their	 friends	who	had	died	in	battle.	Havildar	Nisar,104	who	had	lost	two	comrades	from	his	unit,	one	after	the	other,	was	particularly	articulate,	bordering	on	macabre,	as	he	spoke	of	this.	He	described	the	sequence	of	events	 that	 led	up	to	 their	deaths,	 the	 injuries	his	colleagues	had	sustained,	how	many	minutes	 it	 took	for	them	to	die,	what	they	said	and	how	they	looked.	 He	 had	 kept	 pictures	 of	 their	mutilated	 dead	 bodies	 on	 his	 phone	 and	 said	 he	looked	at	them	from	time	to	time	so	he	could	cry	and	not	forget	them.	This	seemed	a	less	shameful	 release,	 permitted	 because	 it	 was	 not	 for	 the	 self.	 It	 was	 a	 deep	 grief	 for	brothers	in	arms,	perhaps	tinged	with	fear	for	himself,	that	could	be	expressed	openly	in	tears.	The	latter	emotion	has	to	find	creative	ways	of	expression,	for	it	is	not	permissible	in	its	own	right.		Many	soldiers	I	spoke	to	experienced	their	time	in	battle	as	a	dissociative	state,	an	ability	to	act	without	feeling	or	sensation.	Bourke	(1999:213-220)	describes	this	as	‘separation	from	the	self	–	including	the	moral	self	in	battle’	and	goes	on	to	suggest	depersonalization	as	a	way	to	justify	acts	of	killing	and	violence	during	combat.	This	includes	a	temporarily	
																																								 																					104	Havildar	Nisar,	Kandwal,	24th	June	2015.		
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cessation	of	the	being	that	existed	earlier	was	and	hence	experiencing	oneself	as	alien	from	the	real	self.	For	many	this	sense	of	alienation	followed	them	home.		
Ijaz:	Your	domestic	life	gets	a	little	disturbed.	My	wife,	my	sister,	my	mother;	I	do	not	feel	it,	but	they	do,	that	I	have	become	hard,	(pause),	I	don’t	feel	it.	(lowers	voice)	It	is	true	we	change,	for	example	laughing	and	joking,	we	can’t	do	easily,	I	don’t	know	why.	Maybe	it’s	because	when	I	do	that	a	little	[laugh	or	joke]	then	my	other	zehen	(mind)	returns	[which	tells	me]	no,	don’t	do	this	so	much,	this	is	enough.	
Me:	What	do	you	mean	by	your	‘other	zehen’?	
Ijaz:	Some	things	happen	together	in	life,	in	practical	life.	Some	people	feel	at	the	right	time:	for	example,	when	someone	dies	they	will	feel	for	a	few	days	then	they	will	move	on,	perk	up	and	forget	and	come	back	to	life	and	start	enjoying	it.	I	think	as	an	army	soldier	that	instant	happiness	or	sadness	that	people	feel,	we	don’t	feel	that.	The	reason	we	can’t	do	that	(…)	we	have	seen	so	much	that	our	zehen	is	working	on	both	sides,	so	today	we	are	enjoying	ourselves	and	at	the	same	time	another	disc	is	playing	in	our	zehen	that	it	was	so	hard	to	pick	up	that	person	whose	body	had	been	half	blown	away,	earlier	we	did	that	and	now	we	do	this,	so	both	these	are	playing	in	our	heads.	Just	like	a	normal	man	enjoys	something	fully,	we	cannot	do	so.						(Ijaz,	SSG	commando,	Palwal,	4th	January	2015)		Havildar	Nisar	echoes	this	sense	of	dissociation,	of	living	in	two	parallel	worlds,	a	sense	of	a	splitting	of	the	self.	He	also	speaks	of	experiencing	it	as	a	sense	of	difference	from	‘normal’	others,	not	a	feeling	of	superiority	from	the	primitive	but	a	sense	of	loss	of	the	ability	to	feel.		 I	don’t	think	we	stay	normal.	We	may	look	normal.	We	are	disturbed	and	don’t	feel	a	sense	of	peace.	There	is	an	odd	sense	of	unease.	I	can’t	explain	it.	(…)	My	heart	is	not	easy	in	the	city	with	my	family	and	it	is	not	easy	when	I	get	back	(to	my	station).	Over	time,	when	for	fifteen	sixteen	years	you	have	seen	the	same	thing,	we	don’t	stay	normal,	we	are	disturbed,	(we)	forget	things.	Sometimes	you	are	faced	with	the	realization,	my	friend,	I	wasn’t	like	that,	this	forgetting	of	things,	we	don’t	know	what	this	feeling	is.			 	 	 	 	 					(Havildar	Nasir,	24th	June	2015)		The	difference	so	carefully	sought	and	crafted	through	the	meticulous	organization	of	space,	time	and	movement	exacts	a	less	tangible	toll,	a	sense	of	dissociation.	The	two	excerpts	above	are	from	soldiers	who	have	been	involved	on	the	battlefront	for	some	time.	These	were	interlocutors	who	were	not	only	able	to	articulate	this	but	seemed	almost	desperate	to.	Their	sense	of	dissociation	from	others	around	them	and	in	many	
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ways	from	their	own	self	is	certainly	more	marked,	and	it	would	unwise	to	attribute	this	strong	dissociative	quality	to	all	soldiers	in	the	military.	Their	stories	are	more	dramatic,	coloured	with	blood,	death	and	sharp	contrasts	between	what	they	saw	in	Waziristan	and	their	lives	back	home.	Yet	what	I	presented	in	the	earlier	sections	speaks	to	similar	strains,	albeit	less	pronounced,	found	in	the	way	most	soldiers	describe	their	relationships	with	their	families	and	their	(in)ability	to	switch	back	to	village	life	when	they	go	home	on	leave.			In	the	introduction	to	this	section	I	referred	to	the	sense	of	incompleteness	that	haunted	my	discussions	with	the	soldiers	I	spoke	to.	This	is	how	I	experienced	the	conversations,	a	sense	of	fragmentation	that	seemed	to	intensify	rather	than	dissipate	the	longer	I	spent	with	respondents.	This	feeling	was	more	pronounced	with	soldiers	I	spent	more	time	with	or	those	I	sensed	were	more	open	or	willing	to	talk.	Thus,	I	do	not	attribute	this	inhibition	to	less	rapport	or	deliberate	censorship.	Rather,	I	experienced	it	as	the	appearance	of	a	self	that	felt	spilt,	fragmented	and	incomplete,	a	self	that	was	uncomfortable	with	appearing,	but	still	wanted	to	engage.	I	argue	that	this	splitting	and	fragmentation	is	a	result	of	the	experiences	of	the	knowing	automaton:	the	deliberate	creation	of	distance	from	former	objects	of	affection	and	ways	of	living	and	repeated	regulation	and	control	of	ffear	and	sadness.	This	regulation	becomes	so	internalized	that	parts	of	the	self	become	inaccessible,	yet	here	too,	as	the	conversations	above	illustrate,	there	was	an	awareness	of	what	had	been	lost.	
Re-entry:	Chakwal’s	Retired	Soldiers		Discussion	of	the	manufacture	of	the	soldier	and	his	experiences	would	be	incomplete	without	mentioning	what	happens	to	the	soldier	figure	once	he	returns	to	his	village,	for	return	he	must	as	the	military	demands	his	service	for	a	defined	period	of	time	only.	Charting	this	re-entry	is	important,	not	just	for	poetic	or	aesthetic	reasons	but	perhaps	because	the	dynamics	of	re-entry	serve	as	further	evidence	of	the	transmutation	that	he	undergoes	in	order	to	be	a	soldier.			The	retired	soldier	returns	to	the	village	after	between	18	and	32	years	of	service,	depending	on	how	high	he	was	allowed	to	climb	in	the	army’s	hierarchy.	He	is	an	interesting	figure,	although	one	I	did	not	seek,	but	rather	one	who	kept	being	referred	to	me	as	a	possible	interlocutor,	or	more	typically	one	who	found	me	because	he	felt	I	should	speak	to	him.	As	someone	sarcastically	put	it,	‘there	are	as	many	Subedars	in	
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Chakwal	as	there	are	used	shopping	bags’.105	The	reference	to	shopping	bags	here	is	a	not	so	attractive	image	of	used	bags	strewn	across	streets	and	fields,	a	common	sight	in	overcrowded	cities	such	as	Chakwal.		He	is	typically	envied	as	someone	who	was	lucky	enough	to	get	into	military	service	and	managed	to	escape	the	prison	in	one	piece,	someone	who	has	received	his	commutation	and	will	continue	to	receive	his	pension	for	the	rest	of	his	life.	Over	the	years,	because	of	his	steady	income,	he	may	also	have	accumulated	a	number	of	material	comforts,	such	as	a	television	set,	a	washing	machine,	a	refrigerator,	a	computer	and	other	household	goods	that	set	his	house	apart	from	others.	In	addition	to	this	he	may	have	installed	a	plaque	outside	his	home	displaying	his	military	rank	and	his	retired	status.	He	may	also	have	used	his	military	contacts	to	get	his	brothers	or	cousins	into	service	or	financially	helped	his	father	and	brothers	to	acquire	more	land	or	modern	machinery	for	farming,	resulting	in	a	more	comfortable	financial	situation.	At	retirement,	depending	upon	his	age,	which	can	be	anywhere	between	35	and	50,	he	may	also	decide	to	invest	his	accumulated	savings	and	the	commutation	he	receives	at	the	end	of	service	in	a	business	venture.	He	will	be	a	welcome	member	of	village	committees,	and	generally	people	will	regard	him	as	trusted,	disciplined	and	reliable.			This	is	one	side	of	the	story,	applicable	to	those	who	rise	higher	up	the	army	hierarchy	to	the	rank	of	subedar	(JCO)	or	those	who	came	from	relatively	less	impoverished	backgrounds	to	begin	with.	The	less	fortunate	ones	(and	the	much	larger	proportion),	who	retire	after	18	to	20	years	of	service,	may	find	themselves	too	young	to	retire	from	work.	The	younger	retired	fauji	may	continue	his	employment	through	army	supported	mechanisms	(the	local	DASB	or	the	Fauji	Foundation),	which	will	facilitate	his	entry	into	other	jobs.	His	army	background,	exposure,	training	and	contacts	are	an	asset,	and	he	will	rarely	stay	in	the	village	but	will	continue	related	service	elsewhere.	He	will	also	act	as	a	reserve	for	some	time	to	come,	called	back	to	his	unit	from	time	to	time	for	refreshers.		Let	me	return	once	more	to	the	older	soldier,	he	who	remains	in	the	village,	and	the	remark	about	shopping	bags.	This	soldier	walks	a	fine	line	between	being	ridiculed	and	revered.	On	the	one	hand	he	is	respected	and	admired,	as	mentioned	earlier,	while	on	the	other	he	is	the	butt	of	many	jokes	from	the	very	civilians	and	uncouth	villagers	from	whom	he	so	carefully	established	distance	and	superiority:																																											 																					105	Professor	Shamil,	Chakwal	city,	5th	January	2015.	
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His	mental	make	up	is	different	[from	others].	He	can’t	easily	readjust,	but	he	has	skills	in	administration,	paper	work.	If	he	adjusts	he	can	lead,	those	who	cannot	become	redundant.	It’s	a	joke	that	there	was	a	person	in	our	village	who	wrote	to	the	GHQ	and	said	please	don’t	make	any	person	from	our	village	a	subedar	for	when	they	come	back	they	don’t	listen	to	anyone.	There	are	those	that	are	soluble	and	those	that	are	insoluble,	who	stay	away	from	people,	who	can’t	mix	with	normal	people.	 (Professor	Shamil,	Chakwal	city,	5th	January	2015)		This	‘insolubility’	is	attributed	to	his	mind’s	inability	to	re-adapt,	his	‘fauji	zehen	(army	mind)	stays	and	doesn’t	go	away’	(Havildar	Sohail).106	Sipahi	Omar	describes	it,	saying	‘it	is	a	restrictive	institution,	and	the	person	inside	it	is	also	becomes	restricted,	can’t	function	outside’	and	following	orders	day	in	and	day	out	‘finishes	their	brain’.107	The	‘insoluble’	fauji,	(army	man)	is	viewed	as	rigid	and	uncompromising	in	his	ways,	a	stickler	for	detail,	a	simpleton	who	cannot	understand	the	real	ways	of	the	world.	He	is	fit	only	for	taking	orders	and	living	in	the	confined	space	of	the	barracks,	a	self-contained	world,	created	so	deliberately.	He	is	a	target	for	schemers,	and	I	was	told	many	tales	of	how	such	and	such	subedar	lost	all	his	commutation	money	in	a	business	venture	that	didn’t	pan	out	or	was	cheated	of	his	money	because	he	was	too	‘simple’.108	This	was	often	told	with	a	chuckle	and	a	wink;	it	seemed	the	village	perversely	enjoyed	the	idea	that	the	superior	fauji	was	brought	down	a	notch	or	two,	to	their	level.		To	some	extent,	the	retired	faujis	I	interviewed	also	viewed	themselves	in	the	same	frames.	Many	were	acutely	conscious	of	their	limitations,	their	‘insolubility’,	and	tended	to	view	this	as	the	defining	and	irrevocable	influence	of	fauji	life,	a	life	that	was	simple	and	easy	to	predict.	It	seemed	that	their	ability	to	switch	had	diminished	over	the	years,	or	perhaps	they	did	not	want	to	switch	anymore.	They	found	themselves	unprepared	for	the	civilian	world,	which	was	referred	to	in	pejorative	terms,	as	crooked,	disrespectful	and	unreliable.	Being	a	retired	fauji	was	an	asset,	it	granted	them	status,	but	they	were	aware	that	it	also	made	them	somewhat	vulnerable	to	covert	ridicule.	The	many	retired	
subedars,	havildars	and	siphais	I	met	in	the	village	were	easy	to	tell	apart	from	the	rest	of	the	village	folk	in	their	manner	of	dress,	posture	and	even	language,	as	many	could	converse	in	fluent	Urdu	as	well	as	their	native	Punjabi	dialect.	The	difference	that	had	been	created	so	carefully	seemed	difficult	to	shake	off,	and	this	was	reiterated	and	experienced	by	their	wives	and	children,	some	of	whom	had	also	spent	time	with	them	in																																									 																					106	Havildar	Sohail,	Palwal,	14th	November	2014.	107	Sipahi	Omar,	Kandwal,	18th	January	2015.	108	ibid	
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various	units.	They	were	highly	nostalgic	about	their	past:	the	friends,	experiences	and	environments	that	had	been	so	different	from	the	ones	they	lived	in	now.	And	where	there	had	earlier	been	a	continuous	balancing	as	the	soldier	flitted	between	the	two	worlds	of	attachments,	the	civilian	and	the	martial,	the	flitting	was	now	between	past	and	present.	Ironically,	now	they	were	finally	free,	back	in	the	civilian	world,	they	continued	to	live	stubbornly	in	the	martial	world,	for	as	one	of	them	said,	‘the	poor	man,	he	stands	still	because	he	cannot	do	anything	else,	the	fauji	(military	man)	is	only	good	for	the	
fauj.’109	
Religion	and	Nationalism	in	the	Making	of	the	Soldier	
	 Religion	and	the	army	have	a	deep	relation.	It	warms	the	blood.	Once	they	shout	Allah-o-Akbar	(God	is	greatest)	then	they	don’t	think.	You	say	it	at	a	particular	point,	when	you	are	at	a	certain	distance	from	the	enemy	or	from	danger.	Then	you	attack.	Jazba	(passion)	starts	from	here,	because	of	this	he	will	go	forward,	not	back.		(Subedar	Zahid,	instructor,	infantry	regiment	training	centre,	Abbottabad,	11th	August	2015)		The	nexus	between	the	Pakistani	military	and	Islamic	militancy	has	been	the	subject	of	much	political	interest,	especially	since	9/11	(Shahzad	2011;	Gul	2012;	Fair	2014).	My	interest	in	discussing	religion	and	the	Pakistani	military	does	not	reside	strictly	within	this	frame.	Instead,	this	section	attempts	to	provide	insight	into	the	kind	of	religious	subjectivity	the	military	deems	appropriate	for	its	soldiers	and	how	it	goes	about	developing	it.	To	be	more	specific,	I	examine	the	practices	through	which	religious	nationalism	is	invoked	in	soldier	training.	I	will	also	briefly	explore	how	these	carefully	constructed	religious	subjectivities	respond	to	the	challenges	of	the	new	Muslim	enemy.		Scholarship	has	suggested	that	the	relationship	between	Islam	and	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces	dates	back	to	before	the	Zia	era	(Rizvi	2003;	Cohen	2004).	Many	of	the	older	officers	I	spoke	to	felt	that	religious	influence	was	a	facet	of	the	pre-Zia	army	and	that	the	mixing	of	religion	and	nationalism	with	the	military	ethos	was	a	given	from	the	beginning,	particularly	regarding	the	imagining	of	the	enemy	as	a	kafir	(non-believer).110	The	marked	intensification	of	this	under	General	Zia	ul	Haq	brought	religion	into	the	military	in	more	structured	and	institutionalized	ways.	During	General	Zia’s	time,	formal	Islamic	teaching	was	introduced	in	military	academies	when	Zia	established	a	Religious																																									 																					109	Sipahi	Omar,	Kandwal,	18th	January	2015.	110	Examples	of	this	are	the	many	war	songs	and	slogans	that	imagined	the	soldier	figure	as	a	soldier	of	Islam	that	became	popular	during	the	1965	war	(Saigol	2013:253).	The	officers	referred	to	here	are	retired	generals	1	and	2	and	colonels	2	and	3.	
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Directorate	within	the	Educational	Directorate,	headed	by	a	brigadier,	and	formalized	the	position	of	the	khateeb,111	who	until	then	had	been	a	civilian	(Rizvi	2003:245).	The	
khateeb	was	inducted	through	a	special	recruitment	process	and	became	part	of	the	order	of	ranks.	He	was	given	a	salary	and	benefits	and,	like	other	soldiers,	he	was	promoted	as	he	grew	in	seniority.	In	1974,	General	Zia	also	introduced	the	Khutbaat-e-
Askaar	(religious	military	sermons),	twelve	designated	sermons	printed	and	distributed	by	the	Religious	Directorate,	into	training	schools,	regiments	and	field	units	for	use	by	the	khateeb	on	Fridays.			In	the	present-	day	military	training	institute	that	I	visited	there	were	a	number	of	references	to	Islam.	I	analyse	these	references	through	an	examination	of	the	use	of	religion	in	formal	teaching	curricula,	its	presence	in	the	strictly	regulated	space	of	the	training	centre,	as	well	as	the	figure	of	the	khateeb	and	his	positioning	within	the	centre.		There	were	a	number	of	large	signs	and	stone	edifices	at	the	training	centre	inscribed	with	sayings	from	the	Quran,	as	well	as	four	mosques,	four	imams	and	a	full	time	khateeb.	The	day	started	with	recitation	from	the	Quran.	According	to	the	khateeb	and	the	course	instructor,	during	the	first	few	weeks	boys	were	assessed	on	their	ability	to	know	the	
namaz	(Muslim	prayer)	and	read	the	Quran.	If	found	lacking	they	were	assigned	to	remedial	training	during	the	evening,	where	they	were	to	go	to	the	khateeb	and	learn	these	basic	tenets.	Regular	soldiers	who	wished	to	memorize	the	Quran	by	rote	(hifz)	could	do	so	with	their	commanding	officer’s	permission	and	a	recommendation	from	the	
khateeb.	Soldiers	were	also	encouraged	to	go	for	namaz.		The	23-week	recruitment	training	course	being	run	at	the	infantry	centre	I	visited	was	divided	into	three	units:	Physical	Training	and	Discipline	(338	classes),	Skill-based	(310)	and	Awareness	and	Motivation	(100).112	It	is	instructive	to	look	at	this	division	in	terms	of	the	relative	importance	of	each	area.	Of	the	748	taught	classes	spread	over	the	23-week	time	frame,	the	bulk,	45%,	were	dedicated	to	physical	training	and	building	discipline.	It	is	important	to	note	that	this	was	in	addition	to	the	general	organization	of	the	day,	the	use	of	space	and	the	strict	rules	and	regulations	regarding	movement,	language	and	dress	that	had	to	be	followed	by	recruits	at	all	times.	Approximately	41%	were	dedicated	to	skills	such	as	weapons	training,	map	reading	etc.	Fourteen	percent	of	classes	were	dedicated	to	the	Awareness	and	Motivation	Course.	Colonel	2	elaborated																																									 																					111	Refers	to	someone	who	delivers	sermons	in	the	mosque.	The	term	is	used	by	the	military	to	refer	to	a	religious	cleric	who	serves	with	the	military	institution.	112	Details	provided	by	Colonel	2,	infantry	regiment	training	centre,	11th	August	2015.	
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further	on	the	content	of	this	portion,	saying	it	was	a	mix	of	religion	and	nationalism.	But	of	the	19	topics	offered	in	the	‘Motivation	and	Awareness	Course’,	twelve	were	linked	directly	to	Islam	and	only	seven	were	about	Pakistan’s	political,	geographical,	cultural	and	military	history,	and	I	discovered	on	questioning	that	this	latter	portion	also	used	liberal	references	to	religion.113			The	army	is	a	deeply	hierarchal	institution	and	the	khateeb	is	placed	on	the	lower	rungs,	very	much	subservient	to	both	the	commanding	officer	and	even	the	JCOs,	and	he	is	subject	to	the	same	disciplinary	mechanisms	as	the	rest	of	the	soldiers,	such	as	court	martials	and	adverse	reports.	The	khateeb	thus	cuts	an	interesting	and	somewhat	paradoxical	figure,	and	his	treatment	by	the	military	is	to	some	extent	indicative	of	how	religion	is	viewed	by	the	Pakistani	military.	The	first	clue	lies	in	the	fact	that	the	awareness	and	motivation	course	is	taught	by	army-trained	NCOs	and	JCOs	(havildars	and	subedars),	not	the	khateeb,	although	he	is	a	full	time	appointee	at	the	training	centre.	He	has	little	or	no	say	in	the	course	that	is	delivered;	he	may	be	asked	for	teaching	material	and	aids,	but	much	of	the	course’s	outline,	content	and	delivery	is	designed	by	mainstream	army	personnel.	Despite	the	khateeb’s	superior	religious	credentials	as	a	religious	scholar	–	ten	years	of	schooling	followed	by	eight	years	in	a	religious	seminary	–	he	is	not	considered	an	appropriate	teacher	for	the	religious	sections	of	the	course.	According	to	Colonel	2,	who	was	in	charge,	Islam	has	to	be	taught	in	a	way	that	supports	the	goals	of	nationalism,	and	it	is	important	that	these	classes	do	not	get	diverted	into	pure	religious	instruction.			When	I	expressed	an	interest	in	meeting	the	khateeb,	Colonel	2	first	expressed	surprise	and	then	suggested	I	meet	with	the	instructors	of	the	Motivation	and	Awareness	Course,	as	they	would	be	able	to	tell	me	more.	However,	when	I	insisted	he	agreed.	As	we	waited	he	told	me	he	had	no	problem	with	me	meeting	him,	as	‘he	is	a	harmless	enough	chap’,	but	he	didn’t	think	I	would	get	anything	useful	there.	At	this	point	both	the	khateeb	and	the	psychologist	walked	in	(we	had	called	in	the	psychologist	earlier	but	he	had	been	busy).	The	psychologist	was	wearing	full	army	attire,	in	combat	uniform	including	cap	and	boots,	while	the	khateeb	wore	a	shalwar	kameez	and	black	waistcoat.	I	was	told	to	meet	with	the	psychologist	first	as	he	may	not	have	been	available	later,	and	the	khateeb	was	told	to	wait.	When	I	returned	an	hour	and	a	half	later	I	found	the	khateeb	waiting	for	
																																								 																					113	This	is	similar	to	the	Pakistan	Studies	courses	that	were	introduced	and	made	compulsory	in	public	education	during	the	Zia	regime,	where	Pakistan	and	its	history	are	depicted	as	inextricably	linked	to	Islam	and	Muslim	identity	(Azizi	1993;	Nayer	and	Salim	2003).	
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me	in	the	colonel’s	office.	Unlike	the	privacy	I	was	given	to	interview	the	psychologist,	I	was	asked	to	interview	the	khateeb	in	the	colonel’s	office.114			 My	job	is	to	fulfil	all	the	religious	requirements	and	needs	of	this	centre	(…)	My	job	is	rohani	tarbeeyat	(spiritual	teaching).	Just	as	a	country	has	geographical	boundaries,	there	are	also	ideological	boundaries	that	need	to	be	protected.	My	job	is	to	link	this	training	with	the	Quran,	with	
namaz	and	with	the	masjid	(mosque).	I	interact	with	the	recruits	during	the	Friday	sermon,	or	sometimes	the	asr	or	maghrib	prayers,	where	I	will	say	something	to	them	about	iklaqiyaat	(ethics).	I	also	start	the	day	with	tilawat	(recitation)	from	the	Quran	in	the	morning	at	assembly	and	I	will	often	leave	them	with	something	to	think	about.	(…)	We	talk	openly	about	the	current	war,	about	who	is	on	the	right	path.	I	also	talk	to	them	about	the	philosophy	of	shahadat	and	how	the	purpose	of	war	is	
shahadat,	and	by	the	grace	of	God	they	all	wish	for	it.		(Khateeb	at	the	infantry	regiment	training	centre,	Abbottabad,	11th	August	2015)	
	In	the	above	exchange	the	khateeb	reiterates	that	his	role	is	vital	and	positions	himself	as	the	‘spiritual	teacher’	of	the	recruits,	a	position	somewhat	belied	by	the	earlier	description	of	my	encounter	with	him	and	some	accounts	that	I	provide	below.	General	1	shared	many	stories	of	how	he	had	confronted	the	khateeb’s	influence	in	units	under	his	command	during	his	years	of	service.	A	particular	khateeb	under	his	command	during	the	Kargil	War	was	asked	to	go	to	a	post	to	motivate	the	troops.	The	cleric	refused	on	the	grounds	that	certain	requirements	of	jihad	(holy	war)115	had	not	been	fulfilled,	so	he	could	not	support	the	effort:			 I	summoned	him	and	told	him,	you	talk	of	jihad,	God	will	decide	what	is	
jihad,	this	is	a	war	zone	and	I	am	ordering	a	district	court	martial	of	you	and	I	will	ensure	that	you	are	put	before	a	firing	squad	right	over	here	in	front	of	my	office.		 (Retd.	General	1,	20th	June	2015)			He	then	had	him	posted	out	of	the	area	with	immediate	effect.	This	exchange	is	interesting,	for	the	khateeb	is	told	here	that	he	is	in	no	position	to	adjudicate	what	jihad	is,	the	implication	clearly	being	that	the	military,	in	this	case	the	commanding	officer,	has	the	right	to	adjudicate	this	over	and	above	religious	authority,	whose	only	role	is	to	motivate	troops	in	the	name	of	jihad	as	and	when	ordered	to	do	so	by	the	military	officer.	The	khateeb	is	a	‘spiritual	guide’,	with	no	real	official	authority,	an	army	person	but	not																																									 																					114	Fieldnotes,	infantry	regiment	training	centre,	11th	August	2015.	115	Here	the	word	jihad	is	used	in	direct	reference	to	war/combat.	
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regular	army	personnel.	A	‘harmless’	person,	yet	one	who	must	be	monitored,	as	evidenced	by	Colonel	2’s	initial	reluctance	to	let	me	talk	to	him.	The	sermon	he	delivers	is	prescribed	(or	at	least	the	range	of	subjects	is)	and	depending	upon	the	commanding	officer	it	may	even	be	vetted	the	day	before.	It	is	regular	policy	to	have	the	khateeb	hand	the	Friday	sermon	in	by	Thursday	for	approval	by	the	commanding	officer.116	Much	like	his	soldier	class	contemporaries,	he	is	regarded	by	the	officer	class	as	somewhat	uncouth,	lacking	real	knowledge	of	religion,	but	nonetheless	essential	for	the	training	centre.	As	(retired)	General	2	jokingly	put	it,	‘he	is	uneducated	but	very	motivating’.117	It	seems	that	the	khateeb	has	the	specific	task	of	motivating	troops	and	acting	as	religious	mascot	to	lend	religious	credence	to	the	militarism	project.			The	figure	of	the	religious	cleric	at	the	training	institution	is	in	some	ways	a	metaphor	for	what	I	call	the	controlled	instrumentalization	of	religion	in	the	Pakistani	military,	something	that	is	in	many	ways	similar	to	the	larger	state	project	in	Pakistan.	Compared	to	the	curricula	of	other	militaries	what	I	describe	may	seem	excessive	exposure	and	inculcation	of	religion	in	military	training,	yet	it	is	important	to	recognize	that	this	is	but	an	indicator	of	how	religion	has	been	absorbed	and	appropriated	into	most	of	Pakistan’s	public	institutions.	Much	like	the	Pakistani	state,	the	military	borrows	generously	from	popular	understandings	and	concepts	of	religion	and	uses	them	as	fertile	ground	for	instilling	particular	forms	of	nationalist	and	militarist	subjectivities	in	the	soldier	(Fair	2014;	Cohen	1984).			I	further	support	my	argument	about	this	controlled	instrumentalization	of	religion	through	the	analysis	presented	earlier	of	the	distribution	of	classes	in	the	training	course.	This	distribution,	and	particularly	the	weight	given	to	religious	instruction,	highlight	two	distinct	features	of	how	the	development	of	religious	subjectivity	in	the	jawan	is	viewed	by	the	military	institution.			
First,	this	is	just	one	of	the	ingredients	(and	not	the	most	important)	that	make	up	the	soldier	figure.118	Exposure	to	religion	is	deemed	an	essential	element	in	the	potent	cocktail	that	is	offered	to	the	soldier,	but	the	correct	dose	is	mixed	in	so	as	not	to	upset	the	balance	of	the	various	factors	that	drive	him.	Second,	and	this	may	seem	contradictory,	the	idea	of	Pakistan	and	the	brand	of	nationalism	fed	to	the	soldier	to																																									 																					116	General	1	and	Colonels	2	and	3,	20th	June	2015,	11th	August	2015,	and	17th	April	respectively.	117	General	2,	24th	June	2015.	118	This	is	mirrored	in	officer	training	at	the	Pakistan	Military	Academy	(PMA),	where	according	to	Stephen	Cohen	‘Islamic	teaching	only	complements	regular	professional	and	academic	disciplines’	(2004:115).	
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motivate	him	to	fight	rely	heavily	on	religion.	In	other	words,	the	idea	of	Pakistan	is	tenable	as	a	motivator	only	when	attached	to	Islam.			I	contend	that	while	the	military	institution	considers	religious	education	and	alignment	as	important	for	its	soldier,	it	is	also	seeks	to	ensure	that	it	does	not	delve	into	what	it	regards	as	unnecessary	theological	argument	and	steers	clear	from	complexity	or	possible	contention.	Here,	Islam’s	purpose	is	to	unify,	to	act	as	a	bond	and	a	motivator	to	fight	a	common	enemy.	Officers	and	instructors	consider	religion	a	necessary	ingredient	for	motivating	the	village	primitive,	who	in	their	opinion	holds	some	notion	of	religion	very	close	to	his	heart.	Any	disavowal	of	the	necessity	of	religion	in	training	would	evoke	a	strong	defensive	response	in	officers	being	interviewed,	but	religion	would	also	be	viewed	as	a	threat	that	could	get	out	of	hand	and	hence	one	that	must	be	controlled	and	monitored.	According	to	General	1,	the	regularization	of	the	religious	teacher	during	Zia’s	time	was	a	strategic	move,	because	‘he	then	became	just	another	employee’,	bound	by	the	same	rules,	subject	to	the	same	code	of	obedience	and	disciplinary	mechanisms	and	most	of	all	a	recipient	of	material	benefits.		
	This	strict	vetting	of	the	kind	of	Islam	allowed	at	the	training	centre	did	not	prove	sufficient	when	the	controversy	over	Pakistan’s	participation	in	the	GWOT	exploded.	Soldier	subjectivities,	so	carefully	crafted	and	considered	immune	due	to	the	strict	army	discipline,	were	not	sufficient	to	bear	the	weight	of	the	ambivalence	around	the	war,	its	Muslim	enemy	and	the	status	of	its	dead.	There	were	reports	of	refusal	to	fire	on	the	enemy119	and	desertions	(Shahzad	2011;	Qadir	2012:167;	Jaffrelot	2015:563)	and	my	interviews	with	officers	involved	in	early	military	operations	(2002-2006)	suggest	the	same.120	Interestingly,	unlike	the	officers	I	interviewed,	no	sipahis	admitted	to	deserting,	but	nearly	all	spoke	openly	about	strong	doubts	they	had	had	about	the	Muslim	enemy,	especially	at	the	beginning	of	the	GWOT.	Over	time,	these	seem	to	have	been	appeased,	not	so	much	by	religious	teaching	but,	as	many	told	me,	by	the	increase	in	the	scale	of	terrorism	in	Pakistan	after	military	operations	began	and	the	large	number	of	casualties,	especially	among	their	own	brothers	in	arms.		I	argue	that	this	initial	insufficiency	is	not	so	much	a	feature	of	radicalization	in	the	army	but	the	result	of	interaction	between	forces	outside	and	inside	the	institution.	Within,	the																																									 																					119	Farooq,	U.	(2015,	March).	Islam	in	the	garrison.	The	Herald.	Retrieved	from		http://herald.dawn.com/news/1152791/islam-in-the-garrison		120	General	1	,	Colonel	2,	infantry	regiment	training	centre	and	Major	2,	ISPR,	25th	June,	11th	August	&	16th	September	2015	respectively.	
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susceptibility	stems	from	how	the	military	positions	Islam	in	its	doctrine.	Soldier	training	develops	ideas	of	nationalism	which	are	closely	tied	to	religion.	Course	topics	about	the	state	itself	nearly	always	pull	in	religion,	almost	as	if	the	state	is	not	tenable	as	an	idea	without	Islam.	So	when	Islam	is	pitted	militarily	against	the	state,	as	it	has	been	in	the	recent	GWOT,	soldier	ambivalence	is	high.	Soldiers	found	the	neutralized	version	of	Islam	being	taught	inside	insufficient	to	counter	the	claims	of	the	more	virulent	version	which	alleged	that	the	war	was	not	jihad	and	its	dead	not	shaheed.	Influences	outside	the	training	centre	and	the	military	institution	have	more	power	to	influence	soldiers’	subjectivities	with	respect	to	religion	than	the	controlled	version	of	Islam,	subservient	to	army	authority	and	discipline,	taught	at	the	centre.	Perhaps	outside	influences	have	always	been	stronger,	but	the	discrepancies	did	not	matter	before	as	there	was	no	direct	contention	between	the	two.	Now	that	some	religious	clergy	stand	starkly	counter	to	the	military,	things	became	more	complex	and	the	military	and	its	soldiers	were	initially	unprepared.			This	by	no	means	implies	that	vast	numbers	have	deserted	or	will	desert.	It	merely	throws	light	on	the	high	level	of	ambivalence	about	the	new	enemy	that	existed	in	soldiers’	minds	at	the	start	of	this	war.	As	Chapter	6	demonstrates,	the	imperatives	that	guide	military	service	are	largely	materialist	and	affective	and	have	never	been	religio-nationalist.	Moreover,	as	this	chapter	has	demonstrated,	soldiers’	subjectivities	may	be	steeped	in	rhetoric	about	religion,	but	it	is	largely	army	discipline	and	affective	regulation	(attachment	to	their	unit	etc.)	that	keeps	them	in	order	and	compliance.		It	is	unlikely	that	the	army	will	ever	release	figures	for	the	number	of	desertions	or	court	martials	(although	current	army	policy	is	to	let	absconders	go,	as	it	prefers	not	to	draw	this	issue	into	the	limelight).121	However,	the	military	has	formally	acknowledged	the	need	to	modify	the	narrative	of	jihad	or	holy	war	for	the	nation-state	by	incorporating	the	new	enemy	into	its	training	curriculum.	A	number	of	sessions	on	Low	Intensity	Conflict	(LIC)	have	been	added	to	the	current	recruitment	course.	In	addition	to	military	tactics	and	strategy	linked	to	terrorism,	these	deal	with	defining	the	new	enemy.	These	strategy-focussed	LIC	courses	were	included	from	around	2002-2003,	with	the	more	specific	discussion	of	the	enemy	being	a	more	recent	addition	after	2006.122	The	objective	
																																								 																					121	General	1,	25th	June	2015.	122	Colonel	2,	Subedar	Zahid		infantry	regiment	training	centre,	11th	August,	2015.	
			 140	
is	to	ensure	that	‘there	are	no	doubts,	for	we	cannot	afford	doubt,	so	when	they	leave	they	are	clear	who	is	a	terrorist	and	that	he	is	not	a	Muslim’.123			In	keeping	with	the	past,	Islam,	and	the	particular	version	that	suits	current	military	policy,	is	now	once	again	being	instrumentalized	by	the	military	to	shape	the	subjectivities	of	the	soldiers	that	are	to	fight	this	war.	The	military	continues	to	stand	aligned	irrevocably	with	religion,	even	if	the	religious	frame	may	have	been	suitably	altered	to	fit	new	military	policy.		
Conclusion	If	we	pay	attention	to	the	narratives	and	experiences	of	these	soldiers	we	find	that	their	ability	to	de-mystify	and	understand	the	disciplinary	processes	of	manufacture	that	they	are	 exposed	 to	 is	 often	 pronounced	 and	 significant.	 Promises	 of	material	 gain	 and	 the	deliberate	invocation	of	affective	domains	are	implicated	in	these	disciplinary	processes,	and	while	they	may	seal	soldiers’	compliance	they	leave	their	vision	intact.	This	is	thus	a	seeing	through	that	does	not	preclude	a	willingness	to	be	moulded.	I	have	argued	in	this	chapter	that	this	vision	implicates	them	as	knowing	beings	in	this	process,	in	which	they	may	continue	to	acquiesce	due	to	a	range	of	affective	and	pragmatic	imperatives.			Affective	regulation	involves	the	destabilization	of	stubborn	familial	attachments	seen	as	feminine,	a	threat	to	the	soldier’s	ability	to	stay	at	the	centre.	In	their	place,	the	military	seeks	to	develop	loyalty	to	the	regiment.	Affective	regulation	requires	a	pulling	in	of	feelings	of	mastery,	of	masculine	and	rational	superiority,	of	attachment	to	one’s	army	battalion	and	a	suppression	of	feelings	of	sadness,	shame,	loss	and	fear.	Through	this	regulation,	the	soldier-subject	lives	and	makes	meaning	of	his	life	experiences	and	accepts	the	possible	koft	(or	tension)	associated	with	knowingly	becoming	an	automaton.		This	chapter	also	discusses	this	manufacture	and	transformation	of	the	soldier	as	the	creation	of	distance	between	the	being	that	was	(described	as	primitive,	civilian	and	feminine)	and	the	being	that	is	now	(civilized,	martial	and	masculine).	I	have	argued	that	this	distancing	is	experienced	as	a	sense	of	dissociation,	an	erosion	of	earlier	ways	of	feeling,	and	articulated	as	a	realization	that	one	lives	in	two	worlds	and	two	zehens	at	the	same	time.			
																																								 																					123	Colonel	2,	infantry	regiment	training	centre,	11th	August	2015.	
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I	have	also	highlighted	the	role	of	religion	and	nationalism	in	the	business	of	manufacturing	the	soldier.	Much	like	movement,	time	and	space	are	organized	meticulously	at	the	training	institute;	how	much	and	what	version	of	Islam	is	to	be	taught	is	controlled	by	the	military	establishment.	This	is	Islam	not	as	a	theological	frame	for	a	person	being	trained	or	groomed	as	a	soldier	in	the	army,	but	Islam	as	a	specific	motivator	in	times	of	both	war	and	peace,	a	controlled	instrumentalization	of	religion.	Thus,	the	Islam	that	is	absorbed	into	the	military	academy,	training	centres	and	barracks	remains	a	secondary	but	necessary	ingredient,	whose	dosage	has	to	be	strictly	monitored.	In	keeping	with	the	past,	Islam,	and	the	particular	version	that	suits	current	state	(military)	policy,	is	now	once	again	being	instrumentalized	by	the	military	to	shape	the	subjectivities	of	the	soldiers	who	are	to	fight	the	GWOT.			
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Chapter 4: Disciplining Narratives of Pain - Military Death in Rural 
Punjab 	
I	would	have	forgotten	you	by	now			 When	I	cry,	then	I	say	You	were	a	child	looked	after	by	God		My	child,	I	would	wake		I	would	wake	up	at	dawn	to	grind	wheat		You	would	be	lying	asleep	And	I	would	grind	the	wheat		Then	I	would	leave,		Sometimes	for	Rupwal,	sometimes	for	[Rawal]	pindi124		Sometimes	I	would	leave	you	in	the	room	inside		Sometimes	I	would	throw	you	on	the	cot	outside	You	were	a	child	looked	after	by	God		When	dusk	approached	I	would	feed	the	cattle		Or	I	would	pick	peanuts	from	the	field	Or	I	would	cut	sugarcane	When	I	returned	in	the	evening		Only	then	would	I	feed	you	the	little	milk	I	had		You	should	have	died	then	I	would	have	forgotten	you	by	now		Why	did	you	not	die	then?		 I	would	have	forgotten	you	by	now		Why	did	you	not	die	then?		 Quoted	 above	 is	 a	 Punjabi	 mourning	 ritual,	 or	 vaen,	 sung	 by	 Sajjida,	 a	mother	 who	 had	 lost	 her	 son	 in	 the	Wana	 conflict,	as	 we	 sat	 by	 her	 son	Tahir’s	grave.	The	grave	was	surrounded	on	all	 four	sides	by	walls	 (about	three	 feet	 in	 height)	 that	 had	 been	 painted	 and	 decorated	 with	 ornate	wrought	 iron	railings.	The	grave	 itself	was	still	un-cemented,	as	according	to	 tradition	 the	 pakki	 (cemented)	 grave	 would	 be	 made	 one	 year	 after	burial.	 A	 large	 Pakistani	 flag	 waved	 atop	 the	 grave,	 and	 there	 was	 a	cupboard	in	the	enclosure	containing	the	Quran.	Sajjida’s	husband	had	died	young	and	left	her	with	six	children	to	look	after.	She	had	farmed	her	own	small	landholding	and	also	worked	as	a	labourer	in	other	people’s	fields	for	much	of	her	life.	All	four	of	her	sons	had	applied	to	join	the	army,	and	two																																									 																					124	Names	of	a	village	and	a	city	respectively.	
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had	managed	to	get	 in.	Her	vaen	today	was	spontaneous;	she	broke	 into	 it	as	we	sat	discussing	the	barsi	(death	anniversary)	of	another	shaheed	from	the	village,	which	had	 just	concluded.	The	 tone	of	 the	vaen	was	bitter,	and	her	choice	of	words	reflected	a	deep	rejection	of	the	narrative	of	meaningful	death	 and	 a	need	 for	 release	 from	 the	pain	 of	 separation.	 I	 heard	her	 say	again	and	again	 in	her	deep	and	bitter	 voice	 that	 she	wished	her	 son	had	died	when	he	was	a	child,	when	death	would	have	been	less	painful,	even	if	less	meaningful.	This	was	a	lament	full	of	anger,	reproach	and	torment.		-Fieldnotes,	Palwal,	10th	December	2014.	
v 	This	chapter	continues	the	stories	of	the	soldiers	of	Chakwal,	those	who	have	lost	their	lives	and	have	been	permanently	marked	in	ways	more	corporeal	than	the	transmuted	body,	mind	and	heart	discussed	in	the	preceding	chapter.	The	son,	given	to	the	military	–	a	new	family,	a	new	mother	–	returns	as	a	dead	body.	The	military	continues	to	claim	him	in	this	return,	and	the	handing	over	is	not	final.	Instead,	he	is	handed	over	in	controlled	and	modulated	ways	and	then	claimed	once	more,	balancing	between	split	worlds,	a	theme	picked	up	in	the	last	chapter,	a	battle	for	possession	first	of	the	body	and	its	zehen	and	later	of	the	body	and	its	ghost.			This	chapter	focuses	on	the	family	and	the	village	through	the	lens	of	the	relationship	that	evolves	between	the	military	and	its	subject	at	an	affect-laden	moment:	the	death	of	a	son.	In	contrast	to	Chapter	1,	which	also	dealt	with	the	grief	of	death	on	the	national	stage,	these	stories	unravel	on	the	stage	of	the	local	village.	On	the	national	stage,	set	up	on	military	terrain,	the	military’s	control	is	supreme,	and	the	body	of	the	martyr	and	the	grief	of	his	family	can	be	utilized	to	its	full.	The	local	stage	needs	a	different,	more	intimate	management,	for	it	is	a	raw	moment,	where	the	mutilated	body	is	ever	present	and	the	grief	is	fresh.	Here,	the	encounter	between	the	military	and	its	subjects	is	in	a	space	which	is	not	entirely	predictable	and	where	the	tenor	of	the	relationship	must	be	set	in	careful	precise	ways.	It	is	within	these	spaces	that	the	military	concerns	itself	with	what	Anne	L.	Stoler	(2004:5)	calls	the	‘distribution	of	sentiment’,	seeking	to	control	both	‘its	excessive	expression	and	the	absence	of	it’	by	disciplining	affective	selves	through	‘techniques	of	affective	control’.			The	death	of	a	soldier	in	the	service	of	the	nation	is	handled	differently	from	an	aam	(regular)	death.	This	difference	is	enforced	by	the	military	in	both	obvious,	spectacular	
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ways,	such	as	the	performative	nature	of	the	funeral,	and	in	more	subliminal	ways	involving	the	disciplining	of	grief	by	drawing	on	gender	and	religion.	These	differentiations	involve	special	attention	to	the	expression	of	grief	in	families.	The	grief	of	women	signifies	a	necessary,	emblematic,	cathartic	force,	making	untimely,	violent	death	both	acceptable	and	at	the	same	time	a	point	of	concern,	a	cause	of	anxiety	dealt	with	by	seeing	the	woman	as	irrational	and	primitive.	Chapters	1	and	3,	as	well	as	previous	scholarship,	have	shown	how	religion	is	visible	in	militarist	imaginings	and	instrumentalized	in	the	making	of	the	soldier	subject	and	his	family	by	instilling	particular	forms	of	relgio-nationalist	subjectivities	(Jaffrelot	2002;	Racine	2002).	On	this	local	terrain,	the	grieving	rituals	for	these	soldiers	are	steeped	in	religious	ideology	and	practices	that	seemingly	sit	neatly	alongside	the	military	narrative.125	They	discipline	the	affect	of	families	and	prescribe	different	ways	of	grieving	and	thinking	about	this	death.		In	this	chapter	I	trace	the	grief	caused	by	the	death	of	a	soldier	in	three	temporal	phases,	marked	by	how	the	private	moment	shifts	into	the	public	space	and	moves	in	sync	with	the	demands	of	military	discipline	enforced	on	it	and	yet	retains	its	interiority.	The	first	phase	is	the	news	of	death	and	the	point	at	which	the	body	arrives	at	the	house.	The	second	phase	is	when	the	body	is	reclaimed	by	the	military,	taken	out	of	the	house	and	buried	in	the	village	graveyard	with	full	military	honours.	The	third	phase	begins	after	the	trucks	leave	and	military	attention	fades	to	some	extent.	There	is	also	a	fourth	stage,	covered	in	Chapter	1,	where	grief	goes	beyond	the	local	and	expands	to	the	nation.	I	acknowledge	that	these	stages	are	but	a	lens	that	allows	me	to	study	how	raw	grief	for	a	dead	son	is	transformed	into	willing	sacrifice	for	the	nation,	and	I	do	not	imply	a	linear	movement	here,	for	in	real	life	and	real	time	there	is	a	movement	back	and	forth	between	personal	and	public	grief.	I	present	the	ways	in	which	these	subjectivities	experience	these	phases	as	contiguous	realities,	and	through	this	try	to	complicate	these	enactments	of	grief	by	suggesting	that	these	moments	are	fraught	with	tension	and	contradiction,	even	as	they	play	out	smoothly.			I	argue	that	affect	does	not	remain	a	disciplinary	technique	of	governmentality	or	statecraft	alone	and	that	these	moments	and	spaces	are	as	much	about	the	production	and	harnessing	of	affect	as	they	are	about	its	afterlife.	Affective	excesses	last	long	after	the	military	trucks	roll	out	of	the	village,	and	they	continue	to	haunt	these	spaces	and	subjectivities.	At	times	these	excesses	and	slippages	seem	to	contest	and	challenge	these																																									 																					125	Contestations	in	this	narrative	are	visible	in	the	context	of	a	war	against	fellows	Muslims	on	Pakistan’s	own	territory,	aligned	with	the	global	war	on	terror,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	6.	
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carefully	disciplined	narratives	of	pain,	yet	they	do	so	without	unsettling	or	destabilizing	them.	I	will	present	the	dissonances,	the	many	times	that	the	military	script	of	service	and	sacrifice	falls	short.	I	show	how	although	ink	runs	and	stains	these	pages,	the	subjects	nonetheless	continue	to	read	from	them.	This	obstinacy,	this	desire	to	continue	reading,	is	what	the	chapter	tries	to	investigate	by	looking	at	the	emotional	and	affective	involvements	invoked	in	these	rituals	of	death	and	the	kind	of	political	subjects	that	perform,	watch	and	emerge	from	these	performances	of	grief.				
Degrees	of	Separation:	The	Right	Way	to	Grieve	The	difficulty	of	interrogating	the	dead	is	glaringly	obvious;	the	interlocutor	is	silent,	no	longer	able	to	speak	for	himself,	and	yet	the	corpses	in	this	chapter	are	not	mute.	The	voices	of	the	original	family,	the	next	of	kin	as	the	military	calls	them,	and	of	the	residents	of	the	village	(for	in	rural	areas	of	Punjab,	grief	is	not	a	private	or	silent	affair)	try	to	speak	for	him.	The	new	family	–	the	military	–	speaks	too,	in	unison	with	the	old,	but	sometimes	in	tones	that	jar,	that	displace	and	shift	the	notes	so	they	hang	askew,	even	if	together	they	seem	to	play	out	like	a	finely	tuned	harmony.	This	section	is	an	examination	of	how	the	military	goes	about	disciplining	mourning	at	the	time	of	military	death.			In	rural	Punjab,	grief	and	mourning	is	heavily	gendered,	with	women	and	men	playing	contrasting	and	complementary	roles.	Men	get	on	with	the	business	of	grief,	arranging	the	funeral,	and	although	they	too	will	weep	and	break	down,	these	are	more	isolated	incidents,	tolerated	for	short	periods.	Women	are	allowed	more	extravagant	displays	of	vocal	grief	featuring	loud	wailing,	beating	of	the	body	and	abandonment	to	the	throes	pain,	in	which	they	almost	refuse	to	accept	the	separation	of	death.	They	are	expected	to	hold	on	to	the	corpse,	which,	irrespective	of	its	gender,	is	placed	in	the	inner	(female)	sanctum	of	the	house	before	burial.	The	wailing	will	be	loudest	when	the	moment	of	separation	actually	happens	and	the	coffin	is	taken	out	of	the	house	to	the	mosque	or	a	nearby	field	for	the	funeral	prayer.	In	addition	to	members	of	the	family	and	the	biraderi	(extended	clan)	from	near	and	far,	neighbours	and	professional	female	weepers	will	descend	on	the	household.	The	weepers	will	undertake	vaen,	a	Punjabi	mourning	ritual	involving	weeping	and	wailing,	in	which	the	deceased	is	remembered	in	a	dramatic	elegy	that	can	convey	pain,	loss	and	anger	at	the	parting.	This	is	addressed	to	the	deceased,	and	the	women	will	recount	the	loss	to	the	family	and	the	fate	of	those	left	bereft	(Brard	2007).	Women	will	not	accompany	the	body	to	the	mosque	for	the	funeral	prayer	or	the	graveyard	for	burial.	Cases	of	military	death	and	mourning	stand	distinct	from	the	
			 146	
process	described	above,	a	difference	achieved	through	a	number	of	moves	by	the	military.	These	separations	between	mourning	for	military	death	and	an	aam	(regular)	death	perhaps	echo	the	many	disconnects	and	separations	that	also	mark	the	soldier	during	his	life.	
The	News	Families	recount	the	first	phase	as	beginning	with	the	news	reaching	them,	often	as	a	phone	call,	sometimes	official,	sometimes	from	a	friend	who	was	with	their	son.	If	the	news	is	unconfirmed	then	the	wait	for	confirmation	is	terrible,	and	even	when	the	news	is	from	an	official	source	the	wait	continues	as	the	dead	body	can	take	a	few	days,	sometimes	up	to	a	week,	to	arrive.	Control	over	information	is	deemed	vital	by	the	military	at	this	point,	for	this	is	a	moment	that	sets	the	tone	for	the	relationship	that	emerges	between	it	and	the	family.	The	military	is	concerned	that	the	news	reaches	the	NoKs	through	the	right	source	and	in	the	right	way,	before	the	family	is	informed	by	media	reports	or	friends.	The	military’s	administrative	machinery	rolls	out	pre-ordained	standard	operating	procedures	which	detail	who	will	inform,	who	will	be	informed,	how	many	will	go	to	the	funeral,	which	unit	will	be	mobilized,	how	the	body	will	be	transferred,	to	whom	money	for	funeral	expenditures	will	be	given	etc.	The	body	arrives	with	an	NCO	or	JCO	or	an	officer	(a	captain,	major	or	colonel),	depending	on	the	soldier’s	rank.	It	is	placed	inside	the	house	of	the	deceased	and	a	soldier	is	assigned	to	guard	it.	If	the	funeral	is	to	be	held	on	the	same	day,	30	or	40	soldiers	will	accompany	the	body.	If	it	arrives	at	night	and	the	weather	permits	burial	to	be	delayed,	more	soldiers	will	arrive	for	the	funeral	the	next	day.	The	military	officials	accompanying	the	body	brief	the	male	members	of	the	family	about	the	requirements	of	the	military	funeral.	For	the	military,	the	normalcy	of	death,	it	very	expectedness	and	their	preparedness	for	it,	is	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	intimate	permanent	rupture	that	the	family	experiences.			The	military’s	preoccupation	with	appropriate	grief	is	evident	at	this	point	in	their	call	to	the	family	not	to	cry	or	mourn.	This	refrain	or	concern	is	directed	more	towards	women,	with	men	called	upon	and	expected	by	the	military	to	ensure	that	women’s	affect	stays	within	prescribed	limits.	I	argue	that	management	of	the	family	and	their	affect	during	this	period	is	heavily	gendered	and	is	made	possible	through	two	moves.	In	the	first	move,	the	masculine	military	manages	the	external	business	of	dying,	much	like	the	men	in	a	traditional	Punjabi	household	in	the	case	of	a	regular	funeral.	In	the	case	of	a	military	funeral,	the	men	in	the	family	are	rendered	passive,	reduced	to	the	helpless	feminine,	merely	receiving	instructions	from	the	military.	In	a	second	move,	the	masculine	military	
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also	calls	upon	men	to	grieve	differently	to	women	by	involving	them	both	in	managing	women’s	grief	and	in	actively	paying	tribute	during	the	funeral,	which	in	keeping	with	village	tradition	acknowledges	only	the	male	in	the	public	space.	Women	and	their	grief	must	be	watched	and	controlled,	yet	it	is	this	very	grief	that	must	also	be	visible	and	emphasized	to	allow	the	separations	or	distinctions	between	the	gendered	bodies	of	stoic	men	and	those	of	helpless	women	that	are	so	crucial	to	the	militarism	project.	The	second	move	away	from	the	feminine	involves	the	male	members	of	the	family	being	given	the	opportunity	to	become	male	again.	Differentiating	the	ways	in	which	they	grieve	from	women	allows	men	to	experience	this	affective	regulation	as	less	intrusive,	for	as	I	spoke	to	the	families	in	the	village	it	was	the	women	who	spoke	more	often	about	the	many	ways	in	which	the	military	disciplined	and	controlled	this	moment.		
Matam	(mourning)	for	the	shaheed	is	discouraged;	instead,	this	is	a	time	to	rejoice.	This	is	a	religious	trope	repeated	by	military	officials,	the	village	cleric	and	villagers	as	they	console	the	family.		 In	an	aam	janaza	(regular	funeral)	the	public	reacts	and	responds	in	a	different	way.	Grief	and	sorrow	are	expressed,	but	differently.	It	is	true	that	the	sadness	of	separation	is	also	there	in	the	case	of	a	shaheed,	but	it	ebbs	away	under	the	flow	of	emotions.	Mothers	will	say	I	wish	I	had	another	son	so	I	could	sacrifice	him	in	Allah’s	way.	At	a	funeral	of	a	
shaheed	we	naturally	have	to	sometimes	give	a	[additional]	sermon	for	5-10	minutes	(…)	for	those	who	have	lost	a	dear	one.	He	should	let	go	of	this	grief	and	shock	and	instead	express	joy	that	he	is	the	father	of	the	
shaheed.	There	is	absolutely	no	mourning	for	the	shaheed.	This	is	a	moment	of	pride.		 (Village	cleric	1,	Palwal,	26th	January	2016)	
	Martyrdom	is	a	death	that	has	to	be	treated	differently,	with	displays	of	grief	controlled	and	emotions	held	in	check,	a	religious	trope	that	folds	well	into	the	demands	of	military	funeral	rites.	Yet	despite	this,	or	perhaps	because	of	it,	when	women	spoke	of	the	news	and	the	funeral	they	spoke	within	the	idiom	of	tears	and	crying.	The	following	excerpt	was	one	of	many	that	attested	to	the	policing	of	affect	by	men,	in	this	case	the	husband.		 They	did	not	take	me	to	the	graveyard.	Women	normally	don’t	go,	but	when	someone	is	a	shaheed	women	will	go	along	to	watch	the	parade.	His	[the	dead	son’s]	father	did	not	take	me.	He	said	to	me	a	woman	can	bear	less	for	she	is	weak.	He	said	to	me,	you	say	namaz,	the	shaheed	has				
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a	high	status,	you	can’t	cry	for	this	death	(…)	I	looked	at	the	flag	on	the		coffin	and	I	felt	okha	(uneasy).	I	still	feel	that	way	when	I	see	the	flag.	(Ayesha,	Naseem’s	mother,	adjoining	village,	18th	September	2014)		Another	way	of	trying	to	manage	affect	is	through	the	physical	access	to	the	body	the	family	is	allowed	once	it	is	handed	over	before	burial.	Women	often	discuss	whether	the	family	were	able	to	see	the	dead	body	and	whether	or	not	they	were	permitted	to	touch	it.	Sometimes	they	were	allowed	to	touch	the	face,	sometimes,	when	the	body	was	too	mutilated,	the	coffin	was	sealed,	and	mothers	would	remember	the	helplessness	of	not	being	allowed	to	touch	the	son	one	last	time.	For	some	women	it	signified	an	inability	to	be	private	in	that	last	moment	of	parting,	a	regret	they	lived	with.	For	others	it	became	a	moment	of	defiance,	a	taking	back	of	the	son	given	to	the	military	but	reclaimed	one	last	time	before	he	is	claimed	once	again	to	be	buried	forever.	One	mother	recalled	how	she	prised	open	the	glass	on	top	of	the	coffin	when	the	soldier	guarding	it	was	asleep	at	night.			 I	folded	back	the	cloth	that	covered	him,	there	was	a	criss-cross	of	bandages	on	his	body,	I	saw	this	myself.	I	didn’t	open	the	coffin,	I	just	removed	the	glass.	There	was	a	lock	on	the	coffin.	I	took	off	the	glass	to	look	at	him,	to	look	at	the	face	of	my	child,	I	saw	the	bandages	covering	his	wounds.	This	is	our	fate.	Then	the	next	day	they	did	the	janaza	(funeral),	They	did	not	let	us	touch	the	charpai	(traditional	woven	bed).	They	took	it	themselves.	(Parveen,	Manzoor’s	mother,	Palwal,	26th	January	2015)		
	The	way	women	grieve	and	the	way	they	should	grieve	becomes	a	point	of	concern	for	the	military,	for	male	members	of	the	village	and	perhaps	for	other	women	as	well.	Vaen	is	discouraged,	especially	once	the	military	has	arrived.	An	officer	I	met	at	the	military	directorate	who	organizes	funerals	explained	the	dilemma	the	military	faces	when	it	tries	to	discipline	pain.	According	to	him,	the	delicate	balance	between	good	(useful)	reminders	of	war	and	more	painful	(real)	ones	must	be	maintained	so	that	good	affect	is	produced	and	painful	affect	is	regulated.	This	is	important	if	discussions	of	war	and	the	warrior	are	to	stick	to	their	sublime	and	glorious	aspects	and	avoid	mutilation	and	trauma.	I	argue	that	women’s	grief	becomes	a	point	of	concern,	a	cause	of	anxiety,	which	is	dealt	with	by	seeing	them	as	primitive.		 The	soldiers’	family,	especially	the	mother	and	wife,	are	very	emotional.	The	solider	has	gone	through	training,	he	is	more	educated	and	less	emotional.	Grief	affects	the	zehen	and	can	demoralize	and	stop	future	generations	[from	joining	the	army].	We	don’t	want	to	distress	them	
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[the	family]	further,	so	sometimes	it	is	best	that	they	do	not	see	or	touch,	we	want	to	save	them	from	pain	and	distress.	(Brigadier	1,	PA	Directorate	GHQ,	Rawalpindi,	15th	January	2015)		The	subordination	of	emotions	beneath	the	faculties	of	reason	and	thought	also	serves	to	‘subordinate	the	feminine	and	the	body’.	Strong,	uncontrollable	and	unruly	emotions	are	associated	with	women,	who	are	considered	‘less	able	to	transcend	the	body	through	thought	will	and	judgement’	(Ahmed	2004:3).	126	There	is	an	acknowledgement	in	the	interview	presented	above	that	that	the	need	for	management	emanates	from	a	desire	not	to	upset	the	valence	that	military	service	has	in	these	terrains,	although	it	is	also	couched	as	a	benevolent	management	of	emotion	for	women’s	own	good.	In	this	case,	their	primitive	emotions	can	lead	them	to	demoralize	newer	generations	and	discourage	them	from	wanting	to	join	the	military.	This	benevolence	is	patriarchal,	with	the	masculine	military	stepping	in	to	support	the	helpless	woman	who	is	to	be	taken	care	of	now	that	her	son	or	husband	is	no	more.	Women	also	become	a	focus	because	they	are	singled	out	for	compensation,	and	money	exchanges	hands	right	from	the	beginning.	The	following	is	an	excerpt	from	a	widow	who	recalls	the	first	few	hours	after	the	body	was	placed	in	the	home:		 They	[the	military]	don’t	stop	us	from	crying.	They	know	they	can’t,	even	if	they	say	so.	They	do	say,	though,	stay	away	sister,	have	sabr	(faith/patience),	don’t	cry	so,	he	is	alive,	but	nobody	listens	at	that	moment.	Who	can	listen	to	anyone	at	that	moment?	(…)	They	put	their	hands	on	our	heads	and	say,	listen	sister,	mother,	don’t	cry,	your	brother,	your	son	is	alive,	he	has	left	you	with	so	much,	but	nobody	is	
listening.		 (Kausar,	Aslam’s	widow,	Palwal,	5th	February	2015,	emphasis	mine)			In	the	above	excerpt,	Kausar	depicts	the	rawness	of	the	emotion	unleashed	in	this	moment,	a	moment	that	the	military	navigates	cautiously.	It	allows	women	to	cry,	recognizing	that	it	has	little	control	at	this	juncture,	yet	its	anxiety	at	letting	this	grief	pour	out	unabated	is	evident	when	it	tries	to	discipline	them	with	religious	platitudes	(‘your	son	is	alive’)	and	by	pulling	into	view	the	compensation	that	the	mother	and	widow	will	receive	(‘he	has	left	you	with	so	much’).	The	compensation	is	used	as	a	balm,	and	more	importantly	also	as	a	way	to	bind	more	firmly	into	the	militarism	project	the																																									 																					126	A	similar	disciplining	of	affect	is	visible	with	regard	to	the	soldier	in	training	(Chapter	3),	where	attachment	to	the	family	back	home,	and	especially	the	female	figures	in	the	soldier’s	life,	needs	to	be	weakened.	
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woman	who	suddenly	finds	herself	the	object	of	attention	in	the	discourse	of	sacrifice	for	the	nation.	The	management	of	affect	that	transpires	in	this	moment	revolves	around	the	grief-stricken	woman	whose	affect	is	seen	as	primitive	and	irrational.	While	this	affect	is	regulated,	it	is	also	highlighted	in	order	to	allow	differentiations	between	men	and	women	to	occur.	By	grieving	differently,	the	men	in	the	family	delineate	their	own	manliness	and	hardiness	in	the	face	of	this	grief	and	regain	their	sense	of	masculinity,	which	is	threatened	by	their	own	overwhelming	grief	and	the	military’s	takeover	of	death	and	its	rites.	
The	Funeral	Funerals	are	fondly	remembered	events,	a	part	of	Palwal’s	history,	re-told	with	great	gusto	by	the	village	that	serves	as	the	audience	for	these	grand	spectacles.	The	colours,	inflexions	and	moods	in	these	descriptions	change	and	shift	according	to	the	narrator	and	his	or	her	proximity	to	the	deceased	family:	the	closer	the	relation,	the	more	morose	and	intimate	the	recollections.	However,	all	stories	mention	it	being	a	spectacular	and	impressive	event,	citing	the	sohni	(beautiful)	parade,	the	gun	salute	and	the	large	numbers	of	people	coming	from	afar	to	watch	these	events.			During	my	year	of	fieldwork,	no	funerals	were	held	in	Palwal.	However,	funerals	are	often	videotaped	by	families,	and	I	was	able	to	watch	some	of	the	recordings.	Below,	I	describe	the	videotape	of	Aslam’s	funeral,	and	through	this	retelling	I	try	and	bring	forth	the	ritualized	nature	of	military	ceremony	and	what	it	seeks	to	achieve.	I	also	highlight	moments	in	that	tightly	controlled	choreography	that	are	sometimes	at	odds	with	military	discipline.		The	first	shot	is	of	a	dead	body	shrouded	in	white.	It	is	not	a	serene	dead	body.	 The	 face	 is	 mutilated,	 with	 sutures	 across	 the	 mouth,	 possibly	 to	stop	 it	bleeding.	The	white	 shroud	has	 two	distinct	bloodstains.	The	eye	area	is	discoloured,	swollen	and	bruised.	The	shot	captures	the	body	from	all	sides,	almost	ruthless	 in	how	it	captures	the	pain,	 the	mutilation.	 It	 is	not	 a	 glorious	 body.	 It	 is	 a	 body	 of	 someone	 not	 at	 peace,	 who	 was	mutilated	and	in	much	pain	when	he	died.	The	desire	to	record	the	body,	I	contend,	is	a	need	to	own	or	re-possess	the	dead,	despite	the	mutilation	of	the	 body	 that	 the	 army	would	 like	 to	 veil,	 and	 it	 is	 in	 direct	 defiance	 of	how	military	protocol	demands	that	the	body	remain	covered.	There	is	no	sound	at	this	point.	The	body	is	inside	a	coffin	but	the	lid	has	been	opened	
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half	way.	Once	the	lid	is	closed,	the	body	is	lost	to	sight,	with	only	a	small	portion	of	the	face	showing	through	the	glass	section.	As	if	this	distancing	is	not	enough,	a	flag	is	draped	over	the	coffin.			The	second	shot	 is	of	an	all-male	crowd	of	villagers	carrying	 the	charpai	with	the	coffin	through	the	uneven	dusty	terrain	of	Palwal	village.	 In	the	background	 is	 the	 sound	 of	 bitter	 weeping,	 possibly	 a	 woman	 standing	close	to	the	person	filming.	There	is	no	order	to	this	crowd	of	mourners,	at	least	 to	 the	 onlooker.	 It	 seems	 that	 there	 is	 a	 central	 group	 holding	 the	coffin	 aloft,	 with	 others	 swirling	 around	 it.	 There	 is	 the	 sound	 of	 men	wailing,	 crying,	 chanting,	 a	 dull	 sound,	 rhythmic	 and	 repetitive.	 The	coffin’s	progress	is	not	even,	it	stops	apparently	for	no	reason	then	starts	again.	It	almost	meanders	through	the	field,	giving	the	impression	of	a	lack	of	purpose,	as	if	the	group	doesn’t	know	where	it	is	going	or	is	in	no	hurry	to	arrive	there.	The	men	in	the	front,	or	at	least	some	of	them,	are	visibly	distressed	even	as	they	chant	along.	Some	wipe	tears	from	their	eyes.			Women	 follow	 at	 the	 back,	 separated	 from	 the	 main	 crowd.	 Hesitant,	scattered,	yet	very	much	there,	these	women	have	come	to	see	the	janaza,	unlike	 the	 men	 who	 have	 come	 to	 read	 the	 namaz-e-janaza	 (funeral	prayer)	 and	 be	 part	 of	 the	 funeral	 procession.	 Many	 are	 perched	 on	rooftops	 that	dot	 the	 landscape,	 their	more	colourful	clothes	providing	a	welcome	relief	to	the	rather	gloomy,	drab	and	colourless	procession	that	moves	forward,	seemingly	going	nowhere.		At	 one	 point	 the	 camera	 swerves	 and	we	 acknowledge	 a	 new	 presence:	two	men,	strolling	along	wearing	combat	camouflage,	the	Pakistan	Army’s	battledress.	 The	 two	 officers	 have	 come	 to	 attend	 the	 funeral.	 Some	soldiers	 can	also	be	 spotted,	 JCOs	 in	 the	more	 traditional	khaki	uniform.	They	stand	out	as	different,	out	of	place,	on	the	fringes	of	the	crowd.	They	look	deferential,	almost	hesitant,	their	downcast	eyes	and	posture	totally	at	odds	with	what	is	to	follow.	Another	swerve	of	the	camera	and	we	see	three	army	vehicles:	one	a	large	truck	and	the	others	a	Toyota	Hilux	and	a	small	 bus.	 There	 is	 no	metalled	 road	 here,	 just	 the	 dusty	 terrain,	 so	 the	presence	of	these	vehicles	stands	out.		
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There	is	no	video	of	the	namaz-e-	janaza	(funeral	prayer)	itself.	I	was	told	that	 the	 video	 maker	 stopped	 filming	 in	 order	 to	 join	 the	 namaz	congregation	himself.			After	the	earlier	chanting	and	wailing,	the	silence	that	follows	the	funeral	prayer	is	almost	deafening.	The	body	has	been	handed	over	to	the	military	after	 the	 janaza.	Cocks	can	be	heard	crowing	 in	 the	background.	Around	200	 yards	 from	 the	 grave,	 the	 villagers	 are	 seated	 auditorium	 like,	watching	 and	 waiting.	 Four	 soldiers	 now	 carry	 the	 charpai	 to	 the	graveyard	from	the	open	field	where	the	namaz-i-janaza	(funeral	prayer)	was	 read.	 Gone	 is	 the	 studied	 nonchalance;	 these	men	 are	 charged	with	purpose	as	they	march	in	unison	past	the	tombstones,	through	a	corridor	of	soldiers,	 towards	the	open	grave,	a	 few	villagers	 in	sight.	As	the	coffin	moves	forward,	the	soldiers	salute	by	changing	the	position	of	their	guns.	The	 coffin	 is	 carried	 ceremoniously,	 each	 step	 is	 measured,	 in	 marked	contrast	to	how	it	was	carried	earlier,	 in	a	burdensome	manner,	as	if	the	men	 carrying	 it	 were	 grief	 stricken	 almost	 to	 the	 point	 of	 impotence,	without	purpose.	But	here	there	is	purpose,	order	and	meaning.			The	charpai	is	placed	on	the	ground,	the	men	carrying	it	march	away	and	four	other	men	walk	up	to	untie	the	flag	draped	over	the	coffin,	which	is	folded	ceremoniously	and	put	aside.	The	coffin	is	now	carried	to	the	grave,	with	 two	 men	 on	 each	 side,	 and	 lowered	 into	 the	 grave	 with	 ropes.	Villagers	 and	 family	 members	 join	 in,	 and	 as	 the	 coffin	 is	 lowered,	 the	camera	captures	it	descending.	There	is	the	sound	of	someone	sobbing,	a	continuous	monotonous	crying,	uninterrupted.	Someone	says	‘mere	bache’	(my	child).	But	these	are	inconsolable,	disjointed	sounds,	almost	an	aside,	and	no	 one	 takes	much	notice,	 nor	 does	 anyone	 join	 in,	 as	 is	 traditional	during	funeral	rites	for	other	deaths.	There	is	a	shot	of	a	man	sitting	next	to	 the	 open	 grave,	 emitting	 a	 steady	 crying	 sound.	 There	 is	 a	 flash	 of	colour:	a	woman	at	the	grave,	maybe	the	mother,	maybe	a	sister,	but	the	camera	 doesn’t	 linger	 on	 her.	 Unlike	 the	 national	 stage,	 women	 are	peripheral	to	the	image	here.			The	 soldier	 in	 charge	 shouts	 ‘doje	 admi	 peeche	 ho	 jayein’	 (unnecessary	men	please	retreat)	and	order	reigns	once	more.	The	momentary	lapse	in	
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the	 orderly	 picture	 when	 the	 coffin	 was	 being	 lowered	 passes	 and	 the	gravesite	becomes	visible	again.	Halfway	through	the	 filling	of	 the	grave,	the	soldier	holding	the	national	flag	walks	up	and	affixes	it	to	the	head	of	the	grave	as	earth	is	poured	in.			The	 next	 image	 we	 see	 is	 of	 a	 mound	 of	 earth	 covered	 by	 rose	 petals.	Three	wreaths	are	now	laid	on	the	grave,	one	each	by	the	regimental	and	unit	 commanders	 and	 one	 by	 the	 soldier’s	 father.	 The	 wreaths	 are	identical	but	their	bearers	differ,	as	does	their	grief,	which	may	last	longer	for	some	than	for	others.	The	men	are	brought	up	one	by	one	to	lay	their	wreaths,	each	accompanied	by	two	marching	men.	Their	arms	sway,	their	bodily	movements	 are	 exaggerated	 and	 their	 feet	 stomp	 on	 the	 ground.	Another	man	 then	marches	 up	 and	moves	 the	wreath	 to	 the	 side	 so	 the	next	one	can	be	placed.	There	is	a	man	for	each	job,	each	step	is	ordained,	following	in	a	seamless	fashion.	The	master	of	ceremonies	calls	the	father	to	step	forward	and	take	the	 flag	and	cap	from	the	officer	 in	charge.	The	father,	a	drooping	old	man	clad	in	a	chaadar	and	pagri	(traditional	Punjabi	head	 dress),	 steps	 out	 and	 moves	 to	 where	 an	 army	 officer	 is	 waiting,	perhaps	the	unit	commander.	He	stops	a	few	yards	away	at	a	designated	point,	 clearly	having	being	 coached	before.	Holding	 the	 flag	 and	 cap,	 the	officer	 and	 a	 soldier	 march	 forward	 and	 hand	 them	 to	 the	 father.	 The	officer	touches	the	father’s	arms	as	if	to	support	him	and	then	moves	back.	The	man	 continues	 to	 stand	 there	uncertainly,	 and	 then	 a	 younger	man,	maybe	his	nephew,	walks	up,	takes	the	flag	from	him	and	leads	him	back.	It	looks	as	if	the	father	has	broken	down	and	is	sobbing.	The	same	officer	is	seen	walking	up	to	the	father	and	embracing	him,	an	acknowledgement	of	the	father’s	uncontrollable	grief,	which	can	only	take	place	outside	the	prescribed	 ceremony.	 The	 ceremony	 goes	 on,	 for	 the	 chain	 of	 events	cannot	 be	 broken.	 The	 guard	 commander,	 a	 JCO,	 now	 takes	 the	microphone	and	recites	two	verses	from	the	Quran:		And	say	not	of	 those	who	are	slain	 in	 the	way	of	Allah,	 ‘They	are	dead’.	Nay,	they	are	alive,	though	you	perceive	(it)	not.	Quran,	2:154				
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	Think	not	of	those	who	are	slain	in	Allah’s	way	as	dead.	Nay,	they	live,	finding	their	sustenance	in	the	presence	of	their	Lord.			 	Quran,	3:169		The	 commander	 gives	 a	 brief	 sketch	 of	 the	 soldier	 who	 has	 now	 been	buried.	He	hesitates	while	he	searches	for	his	name	and	details,	but	finds	them	 and	 starts	 again.	His	 name,	 his	 village,	 his	 unit,	 his	 date	 of	 joining	and	where	he	died	are	the	most	significant	things	to	remember	about	him	here.	 That	 he	 played	 cricket	 in	 the	 very	 field	where	 the	 village	 read	 his	
janaza	today,	that	on	his	last	leave	he	lied	to	his	unit	officer	and	stayed	an	extra	 night	 so	 he	 could	 watch	 the	 kabadi	 (traditional	 wrestling)	 match	taking	place	in	this	field,	that	he	was	pale-faced	and	ashen	when	his	family	went	 to	 say	 goodbye	 to	 him	 as	 he	 left	 for	Waziristan	 with	 his	 unit	 are	unimportant	details	 in	 this	 rendition	of	his	 life.	The	 JCO	 then	announces	that	there	will	be	an	azazi	salami	(ceremonial	salute)	and	asks	everyone	to	stand.		 All	are	requested	to	stand	in	respect.	Those	of	you	in	uniform	and	those	civilians	wearing	a	cap/headdress	will	now	salute	this	loved	son.		The	call	 is	clearly	 to	men	only	and	addresses	all	men	 in	 the	gathering	as	one,	the	army	and	civilians,	even	as	it	addresses	them	separately,	as	those	in	uniform	and	those	wearing	a	headdress.	Women	are	not	called	on,	but	just	 watch.	 The	 complementary	 role	 assigned	 to	 them	 in	 the	 national	script	for	the	militarism	project	is	to	produce	brave	sons	and	then	grieve	in	controlled	ways.	It	is	not	for	them	to	salute	and	honour	the	dead	in	this	space,	where	paying	tribute	is	the	task	of	brave	and	resilient	men,	even	if	they	 are	 not	 equals,	 as	 civilian	men	 need	 to	 be	 differentiated	 from	men	who	risk	their	lives.			Two	 rows	of	 six	 soldiers	 standing	a	 few	yards	away	alongside	 the	grave	come	 into	 view	 as	 the	 guard	 commander	 asks	 them	 to	 change	 their	positions	from	attention	to	at	ease	and	the	guns	go	up	and	down	in	sharp	coordinated	 moves.	 Their	 synchronized	 movements	 are	 impressive	 as	they	shift	 their	weapons	from	neechay	fung	 (the	ground	arm	position)	to	
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bazoo	fung	(the	sling	arm	position),	then	to	the	front	of	the	body	with	both	hands	 in	 salam	 fung	 (the	 salute	 position),	 followed	 by	 a	 perfectly	coordinated	gun	salute.			A	soldier	standing	by	the	grave	takes	a	bugle	from	his	pouch.	He	plays	the	‘Last	Post’,127	a	direct	remnant	of	the	British	Army,	a	mournful	note	played	to	 signify	 the	 final	 farewell,	 symbolizing	 the	end	of	 the	day,	 the	 fact	 that	the	soldier’s	duty	is	done	and	he	can	now	rest	in	peace.			This	is	followed	by	an	invitation	to	a	local	maulvi	(cleric)	to	come	and	say	an	additional	dua	(prayer).	The	spectacle	needs	a	final	closure	to	seal	the	sacrifice	within	the	folds	of	faith,	and	here	too	it	needs	to	be	managed	so	it	is	 just	 the	 right	 length,	 hence	 the	 cleric	 is	 instructed	 by	 the	 military	beforehand.	The	camera	shuts	off	at	this	point.		-Notes	from	video	recording	of	Aslam’s	funeral	in	Palwal	village.		
v 	The	entire	time	from	the	moment	the	news	arrives,	followed	by	the	body,	to	the	moment	the	last	truck	leaves	is	a	zigzagged	patchwork	of	deeply	private	moments	of	pain	interspersed	with	ritualistic	regulated	grief	performed	for	effect.	There	are	many	moments	when	pain	threatens	to	take	over,	such	as	when	a	woman	opens	the	coffin	to	touch	her	son’s	face,	or	the	camera	captures	the	mutilation	of	the	body	in	defiance	of	military	orders,	or	the	father	breaks	down	when	the	cap	and	flag	is	handed	over	to	him	or	sobs	as	the	coffin	is	lowered.	These	are	contrasted	by	a	sequence	of	calm	measured	steps	and	carefully	performed	military	rites.	In	this	ceremony	of	grief	there	is	no	attempt	to	hand	over,	unlike	the	national	stage	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	where	the	mother	and	father	will	often	be	asked	to	come	onto	to	the	stage	and	speak.	Instead,	there	is	an	anxiety	to	reclaim	the	body	that	has	been	temporarily	handed	over.	In	national	ceremonies,	the	mother	and	father	civilianize	the	military	space	by	bringing	emotion	and	pathos.	In	this	local	setting,	the	need	is	the	opposite,	to	militarize	this	civilian	space,	to	bring	order	and	regulate	unbridled	grief.	‘It	would	be	too	difficult	for	the	father	to	speak,	the	loss	is	too	close’,	says	Brigadier	1.128	This	also	implies	anxiety	that	the	father	or	mother	will	be	incoherent	and	unable	to	portray	the	valiant,	compliant	and	willingly	self-sacrificing																																									 																					127	Also	played	at	the	end	of	the	day	at	army	training	centres.	128	Brigadier	1,	PA	Directorate-GHQ,	15th	January	2015.	
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subject.	There	is	also	no	question	of	the	mother	being	asked	to	speak	in	this	forum,	even	if	she	is	the	central	figure	on	the	national	stage	and	in	national	iconography.			It	is	evident	from	the	above	that	the	military	machinery	pays	careful	attention	to	the	affective	content	of	this	incident,	a	negotiated	stance	that	will	discipline	affect	and	yet	tolerate	excess	and	deviance	through	careful	benevolent	management,	such	as	accepting	women	who	cry	even	as	it	asks	them	not	to	and	going	over	to	console	the	sobbing	father	after	the	ceremony	of	handing	over	the	flag	and	cap	is	finished.	This	is	benevolent	gendered	management,	with	the	masculine	military	managing	the	external	business	of	dying	and	tolerating	the	excesses	of	the	naïve	feminine,	personified	here	by	the	family	and	village,	whose	permanent	and	devastating	rupture	has	to	be	managed	and	controlled	for	their	own	good.	These	tropes	also	gender	how	mourning	is	carried	out	in	the	village,	where	men	rally	in	more	obvious	ways	around	a	military	that	calls	on	them	to	be	men	and	separate	themselves	from	the	feminine,	the	weak,	the	primitive.	Traditional	gender	roles	are	appropriated	and	re-imagined	through	the	concerns	of	the	military,	just	as	they	were	earlier	when	the	soldier	went	through	similar	ministering	in	his	military	training.	In	examining	this	disciplining,	I	argue	that	even	though	the	careful	choreography	remains	undisturbed,	slippages	from	the	script	of	sacrifice	persist,	which	are	sometimes	folded	into	the	narrative	because	they	are	not	spoken	about,	or	at	other	times	are	attributed	to	the	naturalness	of	grief	of	beings	less	rational.	
After	the	Trucks	Leave	I	turn	now	from	this	dramatic	and	somewhat	spectacular	event	to	the	ceaseless	mundane	everyday	life	of	the	village	and	its	residents	that	I	encountered	as	I	went	about	interrogating	what	dying	for	the	nation	means	in	these	spaces.	The	picture	I	sketch	in	this	section	is	based	first	on	retrospective	recollections	by	the	families	and	friends	of	dead	soldiers	and	second	on	physical	reminders	of	these	young	men,	or	hauntings,	visible	in	the	homes	and	public	space	of	the	village.	For	the	former,	I	obtained	differential	access	to	a	range	of	gendered	characters,	based	on	my	gender	and	their	willingness	to	engage	with	me.	The	latter	is	an	exercise	in	‘hauntology’,	a	neologism	suggested	by	Jacques	Derrida	(1994)	which	acknowledges	the	presence	of	the	dead	not	just	in	the	speech	of	the	living	but	also	in	the	spaces	where	they	reside.			As	one	enters	Palwal,	it	is	impossible	to	avoid	the	main	crossroads,	Shaheedan	da	chowk	(Martyrs’	Junction),	named	after	the	dead,	and	the	larger	than	life	billboard	that	adorns	it.	Initially,	the	faces	of	the	seven	men	on	the	sign	were	just	a	blur	to	me,	indistinct	and	
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inseparable	from	each	other,	not	just	because	of	the	symmetry	imposed	by	the	photographer’s	shot	and	the	army	uniform	they	wore,	but	also	because	of	their	expressions:	solemn,	determined	and	uncommunicative.	As	my	fieldwork	progressed	and	I	spent	more	time	with	their	families,	seeing	pictures	of	their	pre-military	lives,	reading	their	diaries	and	hearing	their	childhood	stories,	their	faces	started	to	look	different.	Just	as	the	sign	changed	for	me	with	time,	so	did	the	substance	of	the	stories	that	emerged	from	my	interlocutors.	I	will	talk	of	these	shifts	in	the	next	section,	‘Grieving	All	Wrong’,	but	here	I	will	focus	on	the	predominant	narrative,	one	that	burst	out	almost	before	I	started	to	inquire.	Like	the	faces	on	the	signboard,	the	narratives	blur	and	merge	into	one	another,	so	there	are	not	seven	different	lives	and	seven	different	stories,	but	one	monolithic	version	of	what	happened	to	all	these	men.		
My	interlocutors	talked	about	the	inevitability	of	death,	how	it	was	preordained	as	God’s	will.	There	was	constant	reference	to	how	this	is	a	revered	and	coveted	death,	a	sense	of	pride	that	the	son	of	the	family	or	the	village	will	live	on	and	be	remembered,	unlike	many	others	whose	lives	and	graves	go	unmarked.	Dying	for	the	nation	was	considered	synonymous	with	dying	for	Islam,	thus	the	dead	soldier	was	a	shaheed	(martyr),	to	be	accorded	the	highest	place	in	heaven.	Another	common	theme	was	that	the	lost	son	had	been	special,	different	from	others,	brave	and	loving.	Many	shared	how	these	soldiers	had	expressed	a	desire	to	sacrifice	their	life	and	attain	shahadat.	I	heard	similar	scripts	of	willing	sacrifice	for	the	nation	repeated	to	me	again	and	again	as	I	was	welcomed	into	dead	soldiers’	homes.	It	was	obvious	that	the	families	were	accustomed	to	inquiries	and	scrutiny	of	their	lives,	and	their	scripts	were	ready	and	uncannily	similar	in	substance	to	those	of	the	various	YeS	programmes	I	had	reviewed.	Yet,	in	some	nebulous	way	they	also	seemed	different.	These	conversations	seemed	charged	with	affect	that	bristled	on	the	surface,	and	even	as	family	members	spoke	of	shahadat,	the	grief	and	sense	of	loss	in	the	room	was	palpable.	The	pride	they	expressed	seemed	like	a	veneer	that	wavered	over	the	conversation	but	never	quite	settled	down.	For	obvious	reasons,	the	dead	haunted	the	content	of	conversation,	but	the	physical	space	of	the	house	was	also	infused	with	their	presence.	These	homes	were	affective	spaces,	haunted	by	the	dead,	and	many	had	been	renovated	using	compensation	money	received	from	the	military	and	marked	with	the	name	of	the	martyr	and	his	father	on	a	plaque	at	the	gate.	A	framed	picture	of	the	dead	son	in	his	army	uniform	(recruitry	ki	photo	–	a	photograph	taken	on	graduation	day)	or	a	larger	than	life	poster	left	over	from	the	commemorative	ceremony	the	previous	year	would	also	be	placed	in	the	room.	Men	would	dominate	the	conversation,	but	as	I	was	a	woman,	the	mother,	sister	or	wife	of	the	dead	soldier	would	sit	in.	They	would	
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share	the	date	he	died,	where	he	had	been	serving,	how	they	heard	the	news,	who	had	come	to	tell	them	and	how	the	funeral	had	happened.	In	a	village	space	where	most	people	cannot	accurately	recall	their	own	or	sometimes	even	their	son’s	age,	where	time	and	space	seemed	suspended,	there	was	an	almost	uncanny	remembrance	of	the	son’s	death,	sometimes	down	to	the	day,	the	unit	he	was	in	and	his	military	enrolment	number.	The	details	were	clearly	significant,	and	family	members	would	share	their	grief.	Mothers	would	often	shed	tears,	not	uncontrollably,	but	tears	would	slide	out	of	their	eyes	as	they	spoke.	In	one	of	these	initial	encounters,	a	mother	kept	staring	at	a	fixed	spot	on	the	floor,	the	spot	where	she	told	me	her	son	used	to	put	his	army	boots	when	he	came	home	on	leave.	There	were	no	boots	there	today,	yet	as	she	spoke	of	her	son	her	eyes	stared	fixedly	at	that	space.	The	men	would	talk	of	grief,	but	only	briefly,	and	many	moved	on	quickly,	sometimes	brushing	aside	the	mother’s	conversation	as	less	significant.	They	would	tell	me	that	they	would	like	me	to	advocate	on	their	behalf	for	greater	recruitment	quotas	for	the	area	or	for	a	pakki	(metalled)	road	or	a	dispensary	in	Palwal	or	a	job	for	another	son.	The	latter	request	would	be	qualified	as	being	for	a	position	in	an	army	department	that	could	not	be	deployed	in	active	combat.	This	would	be	attributed	to	the	mother’s	insistence	that	her	other	son	should	not	be	placed	in	danger,	in	contrast	to	the	depiction	of	YeS	in	Chapter	1,	where	the	father	and	mother	willingly	and	unconditionally	offer	up	their	other	sons	to	the	military.		To	a	great	extent,	the	content	of	these	early	encounters	provides	a	glimpse	of	the	militarized	civilian	in	Palwal,	militarized	because	of	the	similarity	between	how	the	military	depicts	sacrifice	for	the	nation-state	and	how	it	is	depicted	by	the	dead	soldier’s	family	and	the	community.	This	rotates	around	scripted	themes:	pride	in	the	act	of	sacrifice	for	the	motherland,	belief	in	eternal	life	for	the	dead	and	a	plea	for	on-going	war	so	the	sacrifice	does	not	go	waste.	This	is	clear	evidence	of	state	power	working	in	a	more	dispersed	way,	with	the	state	narrative	finding	its	way	to	groups	beyond	its	immediate	gaze,	where	subjects	are	themselves	producers	of	statist	discourses	(Navaro-Yashin,	2002,	Weeden	1999)	and	affective	responses	strengthen	rather	dismantle	the	dominant	social	order	(Berlant,	1997).	Yet,	even	if	the	subjects	did	not	go	off	script	in	the	verbal	realm,	this	was	not	all	that	was	conveyed	in	these	encounters.	Not	only	was	grief	palpable,	but	the	physical	space,	the	material	objects	and	the	affective	residues	that	lingered	in	them	–	what	Yael	Navaro	Yashin	(2012)	calls	‘affective	geographies’	–	spoke	of	an	afterlife	of	affect	that	defied	easy	or	simple	closure.	These	were	residues	that	refused	to	be	painted	over	with	pride	alone	and	which	were	visible	in	the	posters	of	the	men	placed	at	the	entrance	to	the	village,	the	plaque	on	the	gate,	the	pictures	in	the	room,	
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the	distinct	graves	–	some	decorated	and	others	shabbier	–	and	the	empty	space	where	the	boots	once	lay.	
Grieving	All	Wrong	In	these	villages,	grief	caused	by	military	death	shifts	between	the	private	and	public	realms	and	familiar	and	unfamiliar	scripts	and	practices	of	death,	mixing	yet	insoluble,	like	two	different	coloured	dyes	swirling	around	each	other.	I	turn	here	to	other	scripts	of	grief	that	sit	side	by	side	with	the	military	scripts,	glimpses	of	which	I	have	shared	in	earlier	sections.		 I	have	noticed	him,	he	has	taken	it	to	heart.	He	has	not	thought	about	it	from	the	other	angle	[of	shahadat].	If	he	thinks	from	this	angle,	that	
shahadat	has	its	own	position,	reputation,	then	he	might	have	got	some	relief.	He	is	not	thinking	from	that	angle,	he	is	only	thinking	from	one	angle:	that	his	son	is	no	more.									(Schoolteacher,	Palwal,	29th	January	2015)		The	above	is	a	reflection	from	a	schoolteacher	about	the	father	of	Imran,	who	joined	the	army	when	he	was	a	little	over	17	and	died	in	operations	in	Swat	in	his	first	month	of	active	duty.	The	teacher	suggests	that	Imran’s	father	finds	it	difficult	to	follow	the	path	that	will	allow	him	to	move	on	and	come	to	terms	with	his	son’s	unexpected	and	sudden	death.	This	is	a	story	of	grief	that	refuses	to	follow	the	script,	despite	instruction.	This	and	other	similar	stories	are	expressed	even	as	the	parallel	script	of	shahadat	remains	intact,	flowing	along	unhindered	and	unchecked,	like	the	tears.	These	are	stories	of	grief	that	does	not	heal	despite	faith,	stories	of	failed	grief	and	failed	resolution.			Sajjida,	whose	son’s	death	was	the	most	recent	in	the	village,	performed	vaen	for	her	son	twice	during	my	interviews	with	her.	The	first	time	she	did	so	I	was	at	her	house.	As	she	spoke	to	me,	she	asked	her	sister	for	a	picture	of	her	son.	Her	sister	handed	her	two	photos,	one	taken	at	the	end	of	his	training	period	and	another	at	his	wedding,	six	months	before	his	death.	Other	family	members	were	there,	women	who	sat	around	her	and	let	her	sing	and	cry	as	she	rocked	back	and	forth,	the	pictures	in	her	hand.	The	vaen	was	slow,	mournful	and	melodic,	and	she	asked	for	death	for	herself	so	she	could	be	with	him	and	not	feel	pain.	The	other	women	did	not	try	to	comfort	her	but	joined	her	from	time	to	time	in	chorus	or	in	sobbing.129	In	Sajjida’s	second	vaen,	discussed	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	she	rejected	the	narrative	of	military	sacrifice	and	wished	her	son	had	died	in	childhood.	Like	Imran’s	father,	it	seemed	that	she	was	unable	to	find																																									 																					129	Sajjida,	Tahir’s	mother,	19th	November	and	10th	December	2014.	
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solace	in	the	narrative	of	shahadat	and	sacrifice	that	the	military	and	religion	offered	her,	defying	it	almost	against	her	own	will	through	crying,	a	practice	that	the	military	tries	to	discipline:		 I	can’t	help	it	(crying).	You	can	lock	someone	up	in	a	steel	cage,	but	she	still	can’t	help	it.	As	for	my	son,	it	is	fate,	even	if	I	try,	it	[his	death]	will	happen.	I	tell	myself	it	was	his	fate,	this	shaheedi,	even	then	my	tears	don’t	stop.																																																												(Sajjida,	Tahir’s	mother,	Palwal,	10th	December	2014)		Three	deaths	happened	in	the	village	within	a	year.	As	the	dead	bodies	and	military	trucks	rolled	in	there	was	a	growing	sense	of	fear	in	the	families	that	had	sons	posted	in	combat	areas:		 Families	were	under	pressure	as	the	situation	was	dangerous,	yet	they	couldn’t	ask	them	to	leave.	The	financial	condition	of	the	home	is	such	that	they	cannot	leave	so	they	wanted	them	to	continue.	So	they	tried	to	encourage	them	by	saying,	yes,	times	are	difficult	but	you	have	to	do	this	no	matter	what.	But	they	were	burdened,	stressed	by	the	situation.	There	was	another	boy	in	the	village,	around	the	same	age,	he	left	the	army	and	came	back.	His	family	told	him	to	come	back,	(…)	they	are	slightly	better	off	materially.	They	said	to	him,	you	come	back,	our	system	will	work,	unlike	the	others	[who	died].							(Schoolteacher,	Palwal,	29th	January	2015)		A	thread	that	surfaced	as	families	spoke	about	the	loss	of	their	sons	was	regret.	This	was	regret	that	he	went	into	service,	regret	that	they	didn’t	insist	that	he	desert	when	operations	started	and	regret	tinged	with	shades	of	guilt	that	they	couldn’t	save	him	when	he	expressed	a	desire	to	leave.	Some	spoke	about	it	wistfully,	some	in	anger,	some	in	deep	grief:		 The	last	time	he	went	back	he	was	very	unhappy	and	restless.	We	had	decided	that	we	would	not	send	him	back,	we	didn’t	want	him	to	go,	he	didn’t	want	to	go.	We	had	thought	we	would	somehow	get	him	free.	But	people	around	us	told	us	to	not	make	this	mistake	they	said	to	us	let	him	go,	he	will	return.												(Yasmin,	Nawaz’s	mother,	Palwal,	24th	November	2014)	
	Nawaz’s	father	agreed	to	speak	to	me	after	I	had	been	coming	to	his	house	for	over	six	months.	As	he	began	to	speak	of	his	son’s	entry	into	the	army,	his	subsequent	training	and	his	deployment	in	Swat,	the	conversation	became	more	emotional;	he	was	visibly	
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distressed	as	he	talked	about	his	last	few	encounters	with	his	son.	He	would	stop,	start	again,	and	then	stop,	his	eyes	would	become	wet	and	his	voice	would	break.			The	following	exchange	was	particularly	emotive	and	he	seemed	to	shiver	as	he	spoke:		 If	he	[Nawaz]	hadn’t	gone	into	service	he	would	not	have	become	a	
shaheed.	(…)	He	called	me	once	from	Swat.	He	told	me	that	there	was	a	boy	from	his	unit	that	had	died.	He	said	to	me,	Abu,	the	shaheed	boy,	is	lying	in	my	lap,	he	[Nawaz]	was	agitated,	sad	and	he	was	worried.	He	said	to	me,	‘Father,	get	me	out	of	here,	I	can’t	concentrate,	things	are	very	bad,	I	could	become	a	shaheed	too’.	I	had	told	my	older	brother	take	him	to	Saudi,	but	he	didn’t,	he	(Nawaz)	went	into	the	army	because	of	the	situation	in	the	house.	If	it	was	up	to	him,	he	would	have	studied	further.																																																																																						 	 	 	 	 (Nawaz’s	father,	Palwal,	10th	April	2015)		Sajjida’s	son	never	expressed	a	desire	to	come	home,	but	she	struggled	with	not	having	done	enough	to	stop	him.		
Sajjida:	My	son,	the	one	who	is	shaheed,	I	tried	to	stop	him	[from	going	back	to	his	unit]	I	said	to	him,	my	son,	the	goats	and	cows	have	
to	be	looked	after,	I	have	to	work	outside	the	home.	I	am	alone,	your	
father	is	dead	and	now	you	also	want	to	go.	You	can	do	so	much	here	
to	help	me.	
Me:	You	wanted	to	stop	him	because…	
Sajjida:	I	wanted	to	stop	him	for	my	sukh	(comfort).	You	sit	here,	and	I	sit	here,	who	knows	how	we	will	die,	what	will	be	the	means	through	which	death	will	reach	us,	fever	or	vomit?	
Me:	Or	in	war?		
Sajjida	(sharply):	I	don’t	know	anything	about	war.	I	just	wanted	him	to	retire	and	come	home,	and	that’s	why	I	got	him	married.																																																						(Sajjida,	Tahir’s	Mother,	Palwal,	19th	November	2014)		In	the	family’s	narratives,	thoughts	of	what	if	the	son	had	left	(or	deserted)	the	military	found	their	way	into	conversations,	although	they	continued	to	refer	to	him	as	shaheed.	That	title	was	difficult	to	dislodge,	even	when	they	wished	he	had	never	gone	into	service	in	the	first	place.	This	difficulty	was	due	to	religious	imperatives,	which	construct	his	death	as	sacred,	but	also	because	for	many	service	is	linked	to	one’s	family’s	aspirations	for	financial	security.	The	push	to	enlist	has	always	been	expressed	as	being	about	
ghurbat	(poverty)	and	bhuq	(hunger),	as	I	pointed	out	in	Chapter	2,	while	Chapter	3	also	highlighted	a	tendency	to	label	desertion	and	giving	up	a	secure	income	as	foolish.	Military	service	is	a	gamble,	a	risk	taken	in	the	knowledge	that	it	will	result	in	the	hardship	of	separation	and	a	life	away	from	the	familiar.	It	could	also	extract	a	heavier	
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toll,	and	when	the	odds	turn	against	them	a	terrible	price	is	extracted,	which	is	hard	to	face.	The	death	of	a	beloved	son	cannot	then	be	reduced	to	a	desire	or	an	aspiration	for	a	better	life,	and	the	inner	regret	within	for	having	allowed	that	it	to	happen	is	immense	and	creates	anxiety	that	lingers	and	must	be	managed.	I	speak	of	this	management	in	the	sections	below.	
Keeping	Memory	and	Hauntings	Alive	This	section	takes	forward	these	types	of	grieving,	some	appropriate	and	others	more	problematic,	to	the	point	where	they	infuse	and	shape	local	commemorative	practices	and	bring	the	spectre	of	the	military	into	local	space.	Palwal,	like	most	of	the	district’s	villages,	holds	on	to	its	military	roots	in	an	intimate	way	which	emerges	from	affect	associated	with	soldiers	who	have	physically	lived,	walked,	studied	and	prayed	in	the	spaces	where	these	practices	are	located.	Palwal’s	landscape	is	overrun	with	images	of	the	state	and	representations	and	recollections	of	the	dead,	both	physical	and	concrete	and	those	that	linger	in	spaces	and	hang	in	the	air.			Behind	the	main	crossroads	lies	the	village	graveyard,	where	the	graves	of	five	dead	soldiers	are	each	conspicuously	marked	by	a	large	Pakistani	flag.	The	adornment	and	reverence	accorded	to	the	graves	of	dead	soldiers	is	not	unique	to	this	village,	although	the	large	number	(seven)	brings	its	own	dynamics.	The	graves	of	the	shaheed	are	surrounded	by	chardevaris	(four	boundary	walls),	which	provide	space	for	additional	people	like	close	family	to	be	buried	alongside	the	shaheed	in	time.	While	these	boundaries	were	made	for	some	of	the	earlier	shaheeds,	the	appearance	of	these	graves	themselves	was	not	originally	distinct	from	regular	ones.	Adornment	has	become	more	pronounced	since	the	last	four	soldiers	died,	from	2007	onwards.	The	four	most	recent	graves	are	close	to	each	other	and	are	remarkably	similar	in	style	in	terms	of	colours	and	tombstone	engraving,	with	ornate	iron	grilles	and	plants,	while	the	Quran	is	also	placed	in	a	cupboard	within	the	enclosure.	I	am	told	that	these	graves	were	built	at	personal	expense,	and	the	military	has	no	role	to	play	in	their	upkeep	and	maintenance.	The	dynamic	mentioned	in	Chapter	2,	where	the	district	inscribes	service	and	sacrifice	on	its	physical	landscape	partly	to	claim	entitlement	to	military	service,	is	to	some	extent	operational	in	this	context	too,	yet	the	very	visible	presence	of	the	Martyrs	Junction,	the	ornate	graves	and	the	Pakistani	flags	also	serves	to	forever	mark	the	village	as	a	space	haunted	by	those	who	were	once	present	on	the	terrain	and	are	there	no	longer.		
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	Photographs	5	&	6:	Graves	of	shuhada	in	Chakwal		The	need	to	remember	or	the	desire	to	be	haunted	is	strong	here,	but	remembering	carries	a	different	ethos	and	meaning	for	different	people	who	are	differently	placed	in	the	village.	For	some,	it	is	a	marker	of	their	significance	in	the	larger	landscape	of	the	numerous	villages	that	lie	scattered	across	rural	Chakwal.	For	others	(the	family),	it	is	a	desire	to	keep	memory	alive,	claiming	a	status	and	a	sacredness	that	is	vulnerable	to	being	challenged	from	within	and	from	outside,	and	so	has	to	be	affirmed,	necessitating	reminders.	Questions	about	the	appropriateness	of	adorning	the	shaheed’s	grave,	the	fact	that	the	grave	occupies	a	larger	plot	and	a	certain	rivalry	about	whose	grave	is	the	best	looked	after	are	themes	that	emerged	as	villagers	and	family	members	spoke	about	the	
shaheeds.	Sometimes,	other	members	of	the	village	begrudged	the	extra	space	taken	up	by	the	grave,	and	on	two	occasions	there	were	altercations	about	how	much	space	could	be	taken	up.	In	one,	the	status	of	military	death	as	shahadat	was	questioned	in	the	context	of	the	current	war	against	Muslims.130	In	the	other	incident,	doubt	was	expressed	about	whether	a	death	had	been	due	to	war	injury	or	because	of	illness.	Sajjida’s	son																																									 																					130	See	Chapter	6	for	more	detail.	
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Tahir,	who	had	been	serving	in	Wana,	had	been	in	hospital	for	four	months	before	he	died.	The	family	claims	his	death	was	due	to	infected	shrapnel	wounds	from	a	blast,	and	the	military	gave	him	a	ceremonial	funeral,	but	rumours	persisted.	The	family,	poorer	than	most	in	Palwal,	had	set	up	the	four	boundary	walls	within	just	a	few	weeks,	and	by	the	fourth	month,	when	I	visited	the	grave	with	the	mother,	the	iron	grilles	had	been	installed	and	painted.	On	the	first	anniversary	of	Tahir’s	death,	the	family	held	a	public	commemoration.	However,	nobody	was	willing	to	talk	too	much	about	the	tensions	surrounding	either	of	the	cases	that	led	to	altercations.	This	reluctance	speaks	to	the	discomfort	at	disturbing	the	revered	status	of	the	shaheed	and	the	uneasiness	and	doubt	that	this	may	bring	up	for	the	honour	of	Palwal.		Every	year,	Aslam’s	adoptive	family	celebrates	the	anniversary	of	his	death	in	a	grand	ceremony	held	in	the	village	field,	complete	with	tents,	carpets	and	chairs.131	During	the	event,	a	local	cleric	delivers	a	special	sermon	after	Zuhr	prayers,	and	boys	from	the	local	school	will	attend,	although	only	boys.	The	school	announces	an	unofficial	half-day	and	the	boys	will	sing	naats	(poetry)	for	Prophet	Muhammad	(a	Barelvi132	hallmark)	and	make	patriotic	speeches.	Many	aspects	of	the	ceremony	mirror	national	commemorations,	yet	in	many	ways	it	is	an	altogether	more	intimate	affair.	It	is	a	male-only	event,	with	the	women	attending	a	more	private	ceremony	at	Aslam’s	house,	where	they	read	the	Quran.	Food	is	served	at	both	venues.	The	large	signboard	at	the	Martyrs	Junction	is	also	renewed.			The	year	I	was	in	the	Palwal,	Tahir’s	name	and	picture	were	added	to	the	signboard,	the	seventh	shaheed	to	return	to	the	village.	A	long	line	of	national	flags	adorned	the	graveyard,	and	the	voice	of	Noor	Jehan,	a	popular	female	artist	renowned	for	motivational	war	songs,	was	blaring	over	the	public	address	system,	singing	‘Eh	wataan	
ke	sajeele	jawano’	(the	handsome	young	men	of	my	country),	a	melody	that	became	iconic	during	the	1965	war	with	India	and	has	since	become	associated	with	military	commemoration	of	shaheeds.	I	was	told	that	a	group	of	village	elders	had	gone	to	each	martyrs’	grave	and	offered	dua	(prayer)	that	morning.	It	was	a	clearly	not	just	a	day	for	Aslam	but	an	attempt	to	acknowledge	all	of	Palwal’s	martyrs.	Aslam’s	adoptive	father	did	this	every	year,	paying	for	it	out	of	his	own	pocket.	Some	villagers	were	bemused	that	someone	would	spend	so	much	every	year,	others	were	slightly	critical,	saying	he	was	
																																								 																					131	Aslam’s	adoptive	father	is	a	relatively	well-off	man	in	Palwal,	who	had	been	childless	after	many	years	of	marriage	and,	as	is	often	the	case	in	rural	Punjab,	adopted	a	child	from	within	the	family,	his	sisters’	son.			132	A	dominant	Muslim	sect	in	Pakistan.	
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overly	sentimental	as	Aslam	was	not	his	real	son,	while	others	felt	he	was	asserting	his	social	status.		Below	I	present	two	excerpts	from	my	fieldnotes	to	describe	some	of	the	commemorative	practices	in	the	village:		 On	 the	 day,	 as	 I	 attended	 Aslam’s	 death	 anniversary,	 I	 saw	 young	 boys	emerge	from	the	school	at	the	back.	Most	were	between	nine	and	fifteen,	identical	dots	 in	 their	blue	shirts	and	grey	 trousers.	They	grew	 larger	as	they	 came	 nearer	 and	 became	 more	 distinct,	 some	 were	 smaller,	 some	older,	 some	walked	briskly,	 others	 chattered,	 giggled	 and	 loitered.	 Some	recognized	me	as	their	English	teacher	and	waved	at	me	and	I	waved	back	hesitantly,	as	 I	knew	I	was	already	conspicuous.	A	woman	sitting	behind	me	who	had	accompanied	me	from	the	women’s	event	shouted,	don’t	talk,	
walk	in	line.	Even	as	she	said	it,	a	man,	probably	a	teacher,	came	into	view	and	 they	 started	 to	 fall	 in	 line,	 files	 of	 three	waiting	 to	 enter	 the	 tented	area	with	the	line	of	Pakistani	flags	behind	them.	It	was	a	surreal	moment.	Row	upon	row	of	young	boys,	not	yet	men,	waiting	to	be	called,	to	join	the	(commemoration	of)	the	nation’s	dead,	a	disciplining	done	by	the	village,	men	 and	 women,	 young	 boys	 lining	 up	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 the	Pakistani	state,	represented	by	the	flags	waving	at	the	back.			-Fieldnotes,	Palwal,	10th	December	2014		Dramas	or	debates	 in	 schools	 often	have	 a	nationalistic	 theme.	This	 is	 reflective	of	 the	larger	 national	 scenario,	 but	 in	 Palwal	 this	 revolves	 around	 martyrdom.	 The	 private	school	down	the	road	often	puts	on	short	plays	for	its	prize	distribution	ceremony.	The	year	I	was	in	Palwal,	the	theme,	once	again,	was	martyrdom.			 The	children	performed	a	skit	where	five	of	them	stood	on	stage	holding	pictures	 of	 the	 village	 shuhada	and	 sang	 a	 patriotic	 song.	 On	 the	 side,	four	children	were	dressed	up	in	costume	as	the	family.	The	mother	sat	crying	and	holding	an	army	uniform	in	her	hand.	The	boy	dressed	up	as	the	father	was	sitting	and	writing.	He	would	look	up	from	time	to	time	to	stare	 into	 space	 as	 if	 thinking	 about	 his	 son.	 The	 younger	 brother	was	depicted	 playing	 with	 a	 ball	 and	 the	 sister	 was	 consoling	 the	 mother.	
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These	are	gendered	depictions	of	who	moves	on,	who	continues	to	hold	on,	 who	 is	 more	 modern	 and	 educated	 and	 can	 think	 and	 grieve	appropriately.	Yet	it	was	obvious	that	that	they	all	grieved.	It	was	a	sad	song,	even	as	the	children	sang	it	with	spirit	and	with	energy.			-Fieldnotes,	Palwal,	2nd	April	2015	
v 	It	is	clear	that	Palwal	chooses	to	remember	and	eulogize	its	dead	through	very	similar	scripts	to	those	seen	at	national	military	commemorations.	Within	the	local	space,	we	can	read	these	reproductions	of	the	state	along	the	lines	of	the	Foucauldian	analysis	of	power,	as	reiterations	of	power	in	which	the	subject	is	imbricated	(Foucault	1991).	My	slight	digression	from	this	analysis	lies	in	the	assumption	of	continuity,	the	closed	circuit	model	of	disciplinary	power,	the	presumption	that	these	representations,	reifications	and	reiterations	are	representative	only	of	the	productive	nature	of	power	and	its	unchallenged	hold	over	its	subjects.	I	hold	that	where	subjects	reify	the	military,	this	reification	is	also	reflective	of	affective	residues	and	effluxes	that	remain	in	the	interiority	of	the	subject	and	also	within	these	spaces,	residues	that	are	a	mix	of	grief	and	regret.	These	residues	create	anxiety	that	is	soothed	not	by	challenging	disciplinary	webs	but	by	grasping	them	even	more	strongly.	In	the	next	section,	I	seek	to	deepen	understanding	of	why	this	disciplinary	power	works	so	well	and	examine	the	reasons	for	the	subject	‘choosing’	to	exist	within	and	only	within,	and	move	within	and	only	within	the	webs	of	disciplinary	power,	even	though	through	its	affective	displays	it	sometimes	seems	to	stand	outside	them.	
‘Kehna	parta	hai’:133	Compliance	at	the	Heart	of	Ambivalence	In	the	sections	above	describing	the	unfolding	of	mourning	rituals,	the	negotiated	terrain	of	grieving	and	ceaseless	everyday	life	that	stretches	beyond	that	dramatic	moment,	it	is	instructive	to	see	how	shifts	in	the	script	of	willing	sacrifice	happen	over	time.	These	slippages	did	not	appear	to	me	as	a	dichotomy	between	public	and	private	narratives.	Perhaps	the	slippages	became	more	pronounced	in	private	narratives,	yet	the	two	seemed	to	sit	by	side	by	side,	a	lacing	together	of	both	critical	and	statist	narratives.	Although	this	seemed	contradictory	to	the	listener,	to	the	narrator	it	represented	two	realities	that	need	to	co-exist.	I	argue	that	villagers	fluctuate	between	fetishizing	the	military	and	betraying	a	knowing,	a	seeing	through	that	they	express	through	affect	even	
																																								 																					133	(You	have	to	say	this)	Nawaz’s	father,	10th	April	2015.	
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as	they	actively	perform	these	moments	and	endorse	the	desired	scripts	of	willing	sacrifice	and	shahadat	for	the	nation.		As	mentioned	earlier,	Nawaz’s	father	expressed	deep	regret	that	he	had	sent	his	son	to	the	army	and	did	not	have	the	connections	to	get	him	released	when	the	war	started.	Below	is	an	excerpt	from	our	conversation:		 As	I	walked	back	from	the	funeral,	I	received	a	call	from	the	colonel	of	his	unit.	I	said	to	him	if	I	had	ten	sons,	I	would	give	them	to	the	country.	(...)	You	say	this	because	we	exist	because	of	this	country	and	[only]	if	the	army	exists	then	we	have	this	country.	Kehna	parta	hai	(you	have	to	say	this)	to	the	colonel	[because]	your	jazba	(passion)	rises	as	the	army	gives	you	izzat	(prestige)	and	rutba	(status)	and	buries	you	with	azaz	(ceremony).																																	 	 	 	 	(Nawaz’s	father,	10th	April	2015)		Yasmin	and	Nawaz	were	looking	for	employment	for	their	other	son	but	only	in	civilian	departments	of	the	military	where	there	is	no	deployment	in	combat	areas.	In	the	excerpt	above,	Nawaz’s	father	seems	to	acknowledge	that	what	is	said	in	these	moments	is	sometimes	rhetorical,	as	subjects	feel	compelled	to	say	something	that	they	may	not	mean	because	it	is	expected	and	because	of	the	heady	mix	of	honour,	status	and	ceremony	that	goes	with	military	death.	Peter	Sloterdijik	(1988)	puts	forward	the	notion	that	the	dominant	mode	of	functioning	of	ideology	is	cynical;	the	cynical	subject	is	conscious	of	the	distance	between	the	ideological	mask	and	his	social	reality	and	yet	he	continues	to	cling	to	it.	Slavoj	Žižek	(2008:27),	citing	Adorno,	expands	this	further	when	he	says,	‘ideology	is,	strictly	speaking,	only	a	system	which	makes	a	claim	to	the	truth	–	that	is,	which	is	not	simply	a	lie	but	a	lie	experienced	as	truth,	a	lie	which	pretends	to	be	taken	seriously’.	According	to	Žižek,	ideology	is	not	maintained	by	its	‘truth	value’	but	‘by	simple	extra	ideological	violence	and	the	promise	of	gain’.	This	would	be	one	way	to	explain	the	military’s	obvious	and	extraordinary	hold	on	these	populations:	as	their	fear	of	the	military	apparatus	and	the	repercussions	of	making	their	dissonance	visible.	They	also	wish	to	benefit	from	the	compensation	that	is	handed	out	at	this	point,	and	safeguard	the	possibility	of	future	recruitment	into	the	military.	In	her	study	of	Syria	under	an	authoritarian	regime,	Lisa	Wedeen	(1999:121)	speaks	of	the	‘shared	condition	of	unbelief’,	in	which	Syrians	acted	‘as	if’	they	revered	the	regime,	while	in	the	context	of	the	Turkish	state,	Yael	Navaro	Yashin	(2002:162)	speaks	of	‘automatons’	who,	despite	their	consciousness	of	the	notion	of	the	state	as	an	abstraction,	continue	to	reproduce	the	state	in	practice.	Wedeen	calls	this	the	politics	of	‘as	if’,	while	Navaro-Yashin	names	the	condition	cynicism,	as	does	Lori	Allen	(2013)	in	her	more	recent	work	on	human	rights.	
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As	the	villagers	in	Palwal	themselves	constantly	reiterate,	it	is	a	mask	they	have	to	put	on,	and	that	they	know	they	put	on.	They	say,	‘Karna	parta	hai,	kehna	parta	hai’	(You	
have	to	do	this,	you	have	to	say	this),	clearly	signifying	an	awareness	that	it	is	a	symptom,	but	they	are	still,	somehow,	compelled	to	do	it.	Navaro-Yashin	(2002:165-166)	attempts	to	explain	this	compulsion	through	the	notion	of	‘mundane	cynicism’	or	a	‘pragmatic	recycling	of	statism	in	daily	life’:		 For	 these	 cynics,	 the	 line	 between	 carrying	 or	 deconstructing	 the	symptom	 is	 thin:	 it	 is	 the	 mark	 between	 livelihood	 and	 death;	 the	symptom	is	a	tool	for	survival.		
	If	the	symptom	is	a	belief	in	ideas	of	sacrifice	and	service	to	the	nation/military,	then	carrying	the	symptom	allows	a	secure	livelihood	and	social	position.	In	Palwal’s	case,	it	is	clearly	about	economics	and	material	benefits.	I	follow	Navaro-Yashin’s	analysis	up	to	this	point,	but	her	description	of	the	compulsion	that	makes	adherence	to	the	mask	so	necessary	leaves	the	story	only	half	explained	in	the	case	of	Palwal.	In	Palwal	it	is	also	about	grief	and	the	strong	emotions	it	generates,	a	need	to	make	meaning	out	of	what	has	been	lost	forever	so	the	loss	can	be	justified.	I	will	complicate	the	compulsion	to	hold	onto	the	mask	through	Slavjok	Žižek’s	(2008:45)	reading	of	Lacanian	psychoanalysis.	Žižek	posits	a	resolution	to	the	dilemma	posed	by	the	seeing	and	knowing	automaton:		 Ideology	is	not	a	dreamlike	illusion	that	we	build	to	escape	insupportable	reality;	in	its	basic	dimension	it	is	a	fantasy-construction	which	serves	as	a	support	for	our	‘reality’	itself:	an	‘illusion’	which	structures	our	effective,	real	social	relations	and	thereby	masks	some	unsupportable,	real,	impossible	kernel.	(…)	The	function	of	ideology	is	not	to	offer	us	a	point	of	escape	from	our	reality	but	to	offer	us	the	social	reality	itself	as	an	escape	from	some	traumatic,	real	kernel.			Here,	ideology	–	the	belief	in	the	narrative	of	sacrifice	for	the	nation	–	operates	not	to	help	us		evade	social	reality	–	the	death	of	a	loved	one	–	but	to	build	a	social	reality	(death	seen	as	meaningful)	to	escape	from	some	traumatic	real	kernel	(our	own	implication	in	the	death).	In	this	case,	the	‘traumatic	real	kernel’	consists	of	guilt	and	regret,	thoughts	of	
what	if	and	more	pragmatic	concerns	about	how	to	accept	the	compensation	money	that	is	to	be	received.	This	‘real	kernel’	is	what	that	makes	the	discarding	of	the	mask	unthinkable.	Moments	that	hold	the	potential	to	go	beyond	‘thinkable	thought’	(Chomsky	qtd.	in	Acton	2007:3),	moments	that	are	affect-laden,	where	there	is	tension,	unease	and	contestation,	paradoxically	become	the	very	junctures	that	allow	a	reconsolidation	of	power.	I	bring	two	further	elaborations	of	this	notion	of	ideology	as	‘fantasy’,		‘an	escape	
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from	some	traumatic,	real	kernel’	–	not	that	the	army	used	the	son	as	fodder,	but	that	family	members	themselves	are	implicated	in	that	fact	–	both	of	which	revolve	around	affect.	Affect	makes	these	fantasies	possible	and	becomes	its	substance,	and	it	is	affect	that	makes	these	fantasies	forever	tremulous,	never	at	ease	and	in	need	of	constant	reaffirmation.	The	phrase	karna	parta	hai,	(you	have	to	do	this)	speaks	in	the	present	continuous	tense,	a	constant	doing,	a	perpetual	fixing	of	meaning	that	seems	to	slip,	failing	to	stay	in	balance.	There	is	compliance	at	the	heart	of	ambivalence	that	refuses	to	settle.		The	practices	and	ritual	of	remembering	in	the	local	space	try	to	suture	through	this	space,	which	could	lead	to	a	disequilibrium	that	could	potentially	challenge	the	relationship	between	the	military	institution	and	the	district,	unsettling	the	district’s	dominant	source	of	secure	livelihood	and	bringing	in	its	wake	unsettling	affect	about	those	willingly	sent	in	order	to	improve	financial	status,	and	lost.	This	narrative	is	guarded	not	only	by	the	military	but	also	by	the	families	and	the	village,	expressed	as	reverence	and	love	for	the	transcendental	figure	of	the	shaheed	and	a	veiling	of	other	narratives	where	grieving	went	awry,	which	are	never	spoken	of,	yet	are	understood:	open	secrets	that	everybody	keeps.		The	next	of	kin	are	able	to	see	through	the	project	of	militarism;	they	recognize	the	futility	of	war	and	the	use	of	blood	to	serve	a	construct	in	which	they	may	not	believe.	Yet	they	accept	this	violence	inflicted	on	them	and	on	the	bodies	of	those	they	love.	They	say	
khena	parta	hai,	(you	have	to	say	it)	and	behave	as	if	they	do	believe.	They	say	it	because	they	know	the	military	is	watching.	They	say	it	because	without	this	frame	the	son’s	death	would	be	futile	and	the	grief	too	great	to	make	sense	of.	They	say	it	because	they	
need	to	say	it,	to	avoid	the	realization	and	guilt	that	the	risk	taken	was	maybe	too	great	and	because	they	must	accept	the	money	and	benefits	offered,	as	it	was	for	material	needs	that	the	tribute	to	the	nation	was	risked	in	the	first	place.			The	military	institution	hooks	onto	the	grief,	claims	it	and	ritualizes	it,	so	that	no	other	narrative	can	stake	a	counter	claim,	even	as	everyone	knows	that	people	are	people	and	will	have	their	own	stories.	For	the	families,	collusion	with	the	military	implies	that	they	wear	a	mask	that	does	not	stand	for	duplicity	but	signifies	a	veiling:	a	mask	that	is	never	at	ease,	for	it	nags	and	aches.	This	mask	is	held	up	for	fear	of	the	watchful	gaze	of	the	military	and	the	piercing	real	kernel,	the	affect	inside.		
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Conclusion	Through	an	ethnographic	exploration	of	death	and	its	reception	in	Palwal	village,	this	chapter	has	highlighted	the	complicated	ways	in	which	affect	undergirds	the	relationship	between	the	military	and	the	families	of	dead	soldiers.	The	military	sets	death	in	the	service	of	the	nation	apart	from	regular	death,	achieving	this	through	the	spectacular	and	controlled	nature	of	the	military	funeral,	setting	out	procedures	and	rules	for	each	step	and	disciplining	the	affect	of	families	by	drawing	on	tropes	of	gender	and	religion.	Control	is	of	the	essence,	and	is	founded	on	arrangements	which	manage	information	and	emotion,	create	connections	with	family	members	in	gendered	ways	and	form	coalitions	with	local	religious	leaders.	The	military	pays	special	attention	to	the	female	subjects	of	militarism,	the	mother	and	wife	of	the	dead,	and	manages	their	grief	so	it	can	be	produced	and	harnessed	to	just	the	right	degree,	for	both	excess	and	absence	of	grief	is	problematic.	While	unabated	grief	can	be	demoralizing,	a	lack	of	grief	can	weaken	the	separation	between	the	gendered	bodies	of	stoic	men	and	helpless	women.		Palwal	chooses	to	remember	and	eulogize	its	dead	through	very	similar	scripts	to	those	seen	at	national	military	commemorations.	Reminders	of	the	village’s	sacrifice	for	the	nation	and	the	seven	lives	loved	and	lost	are	visible	across	the	district’s	physical	landscape	and	in	the	privacy	of	people’s	homes.	I	have	argued	that	these	‘affective	geographies’	(Navaro	Yashin	2012)	are	not	just	reifications	and	reiterations	of	military	power,	but	also	represent	the	stubborn	afterlife	of	affect	that	defies	easy	or	simple	closure	through	the	narrative	of	shahadat	or	sacrifice	for	the	nation.	These	affective	residues	and	effluxes,	a	mixture	of	regret	and	guilt,	infuse	families’	narratives	and	are	visible	in	the	many	ways	in	which	mothers,	fathers	and	wives	in	Palwal	continue	to	grieve	inappropriately,	as	well	as	being	suggestive	of	the	existence	of	contestations	and	dissonances	in	these	subjects	of	militarism.	Service	in	the	military	is	linked	to	families’	aspiration	for	financial	security,	a	gamble	taken	by	the	soldier	and	his	family	to	secure	a	better	future.	As	such,	death	in	service	brings	its	share	of	guilt	and	regret,	and	thoughts	of	
what	if	find	their	way	into	families’	recollections	of	the	dead,	even	as	they	continue	to	refer	to	them	as	shaheed.	These	residues	create	an	anxiety	that	is	soothed	not	by	challenge	but	by	reiterating		military	narratives.	There	is	a	strong	desire	to	make	peace	with	the	permanent	rupture	of	death,	a	peace	that	is	uneasy	and	unsettled	and	must	be	constantly	reclaimed	in	the	interest	of	social	status	and	position,	and	more	importantly	for	the	affective	interiority	of	the	subject.			
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Hence,	I	have	argued	that	in	these	rural	spaces,	allegiance	to	the	script	of	sacrifice	for	the	nation	is	linked	to	the	need	to	keep	grief,	regret	and	guilt	at	bay.	Militaristic	scripts	of	service	and	sacrifice	are	grasped	tightly	because	they	function	as	salves,	a	re-purposing	and	meaning-making	that	serves	as	protection	from	external	and	internal	censure.	Palwal	keeps	its	dead	alive	in	order	to	make	sense	of	these	permanent	ruptures	and	soothe	the	hauntings.	Moments	of	tension	and	unease,	which	hold	the	potential	for	subversion,	paradoxically	become	the	very	junctures	that	permit	a	return	to	hegemonic	power.	 	
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Chapter 5: Economies of Loss - The Function and Limits of Compensation 	My	 heart	 explodes	 (in	 pain)	 when	 I	 think	 of	 him	 (…).	 Money	 has	 no	value,	agar	puttar	nahio	labda	(if	you	can’t	 find	your	son).	 If	he	had	not	become	a	naukar	(gone	to	serve)	he	would	not	be	a	shaheed	and	would	be	alive	today.										(Ayesha,	Naseem’s	mother,	adjoining	village,	18th	September	2014)		In	the	above	excerpt	from	my	interview	with	the	mother	of	a	shaheed,	there	is	a	glimpse	of	the	monetized	aspect	of	military	death,	an	imperceptible	narrative	that	exists	alongside	the	more	visible	stories	of	pride,	loss	and	sacrifice.	This	chapter	charts	the	functions	and	limits	of	the	material	compensation	and	reparation	offered	by	the	Pakistani	military	for	the	loss	and	damage	endured	by	the	soldier	and	his	family.			Compensation	policies	have	steadily	evolved	in	the	wake	of	Pakistan’s	escalating	role	in	the	GWOT	and	the	accompanying	large	numbers	of	casualties	among	both	security	personnel	and	civilians.134	According	to	a	review	of	policy	and	practice	of	compensation	regimes	in	Pakistan	carried	out	by	the	Institute	of	Social	and	Policy	Sciences	(2011),	provincial	and	federal	governments	began	introducing	administrative	measures	to	compensate	civilians,	including	government	officials	in	2005.	These	compensation	packages	are	often	one-time	cash	payments	and	have	tended	to	be	discretionary	and	to	vary	between	provinces.	Moreover,	these	mechanisms	are	often	criticized	for	uncertainty	over	when	they	are	delivered,	for	the	inadequacy	of	the	facilitation	mechanisms	available	to	beneficiaries,	and	most	of	all	for	a	lack	of	dedicated	funding,	which	may	result	in	the	government	not	delivering	what	it	claims	to.135	Compensatory	regimes	for	security	personnel	such	as	the	military	and	the	police	are	more	sustained	and	long-term,	and	have	been	upgraded	considerably,	although	disparity	between	the	military	and	police	remains	marked	in	terms	of	what	is	offered,	and	how	readily.	It	is	clear	that	lives	are	valued	differently	depending	on	the	manner	in	which	they	are	lost,	a	difference	which	is	constructed	as	being	between	passive,	unintended	and	unfortunate	victims	on	the	one	hand	and	active	defenders	of	the	nation,	sent	deliberately	into	harm’s	way,	on	the	other.	In	the	hierarchy	of	sacrifices,	military	death	is	accorded	the	highest	status	in	terms	of	both	honour	and	material	compensation	offered.																																											 																					134 At least 2000 Pakistanis have been killed annually on average in terrorism-related incidents since 2003. Source: South	Asia	Terrorism	Portal	–	SATP.		(2017,	January	17th).	‘Fatalities	in	Terrorist	Violence	in	Pakistan	2003-2016’.	Retrieved	from	http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm				135	Khan,	A.	(2016,	July).	The	price	of	a	life:	Compensating	victims	of	terrorism.	Herald.	Retrieved	from	http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153355/the-price-of-a-life-compensating-victims-of-terrorism		
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I	first	address	the	policy	and	institutional	mechanisms	that	deliver	army	compensation	and	then	examine	the	logic	behind	compensation	regimes	and	the	precarious	balance	involved	in	keeping	these	economies	hidden	and	also	forever	present.	The	lack	of	visibility	accorded	these	schemes	presents	an	interesting	point	of	analysis	for	understanding	how	these	regimes	work	within	militaristic	settings	in	Pakistan	and	yields	insight	into	the	anxieties	of	both	the	military	institution	and	of	those	that	receive	compensation.	I	argue	that	this	invisibility	allows	the	military	to	construct	the	loss	as	one	that	cannot	be	compensated	for,	in	order	that	the	dead	and	their	families	can	continue	to	act	as	conduits	for	(communication	and)	the	extraction	of	support	from	the	nation.	I	also	argue	that,	while	it	cannot	be	denied	that	material	gain	is	a	factor	in	the	formation	of	militaristic	subjectivities,	it	is	not	a	full	explanation	of	how	the	compensation	economy	works.	This	chapter	presents	the	complex	ways	in	which	material	tribute	offered	as	reparation	for	losses	that	are	essentially	irreparable	–	for	death	is	final	and	the	loss	of	limbs	or	faculties	is	permanent	–	becomes	acceptable	and	even	claimed	aggressively,	yet	does	not	assuage	the	families’	loss.	I	will	show	how,	for	both	the	military	and	for	families,	but	for	different	reasons,	these	regimes	function	as	economies	of	loss	where	compensation	for	death	remains	partial	and	does	not	fully	mitigate	the	loss.		This	chapter	also	brings	to	the	foreground	two	figures:	the	widow	of	the	deceased	soldier	and	the	disabled	soldier,	both	direct	recipients	of	the	compensation	packages	offered.	Through	the	lived	experiences	of	these	two	subjects,	this	chapter	will	put	forward	conditions	that	make	these	militaristic	subjects	unmanageable	and	harder	to	assimilate	within	tropes	of	sacrifice	and	service.	It	would	be	pertinent	to	point	out	here	that	most	of	the	chapter	addresses	compensation	for	death,	with	disability	being	discussed	separately	in	the	last	section.		
The	Mechanics	of	Compensation		The	institutional	and	procedural	mechanisms	described	in	this	section	refer	specifically	to	the	Pakistan	Army,	the	largest,	most	well-resourced	and	most	manpower-intensive	branch	of	the	Pakistani	military.	Compensatory	mechanisms	for	other	branches	of	the	military	closely	mirror	the	army	package,	although	there	may	be	some	differences	in	both	implementation	systems	and	benefits.		Compensation	packages	for	the	families	of	martyrs	in	the	Pakistan	Army	were	upgraded	in	1999,	after	the	Kargil	War,	and	then	in	2005	as	a	response	to	the	rise	in	casualties	from	operations	in	the	northwestern	region.	In	2009,	the	army	set		up	the	Shuhada	Cell	under	its	Welfare	and	Rehabilitation	Directorate	in	an	attempt	to	upgrade	compensation	
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mechanisms	and	reach	out	more	effectively	to	the	families	of	the	deceased.	The	Shuhada	Cell’s	central	office	is	located	in	the	GHQ,	with	branches	in	each	of	the	corps	headquarters.	These	are	further	supplemented	by	cells	in	regimental	centres,	linked	directly	to	the	District	Armed	Services	Boards	(DASBs)	in	62	districts	of	Pakistan.		Each	DASB	reaches	down	to	the	local	level	with	its	extensive	network	of	Welfare	Officers.	Moreover,	the	soldier’s	parent	unit	also	acts	as	contact	point	for	those	receiving	compensation.	The	services	of	the	Shuhada	Cell	and	its	regimental	counterparts	include	meticulous	record	keeping,	the	ceremonial	handing	over	of	the	dead	body,	organizing	funerals	and	regular	correspondence	and	connection	with	families,	including	invitations	to	YeS	ceremonies.	DASBs	support	these	cells	in	facilitating	the	compensation	process,	including	helping	families	to	complete	the	paperwork	for	claims	and	settling	any	disputes	that	arise	regarding	the	distribution	of	compensation.136		The	compensation	package	provided	by	the	Pakistan	Army	to	its	shuhadas	is	in	two	distinct	parts,	the	first	comprising	‘Benefits	and	Facilities’	given	by	the	Government	of	Pakistan	(GoP)137	and	the	second	offered	by	the	GHQ	itself.138	The	latter	portion,	covering	the	educational,	vocational	and	health	benefits	included	in	the	package,	is	funded	partly	by	deductions	taken	by	the	military	from	the	salaries	of	all	officers	and	soldiers	during	service,	and	partly	from	the	profits	of	the	military’s	business	activities.139	Land	allotment	is	reported	under	GHQ	emoluments,	and	the	rationale	given	for	this	by	officers	I	interviewed	is	that	undeveloped	land	which	the	government	releases	from	time	to	time	is	developed	using	the	military’s	own	funds	and	as	such	is	owned	by	the	Pakistani	military.140	This	division	between	government	and	military	essentially	serves	as	an	explanation	for	the	better	and	more	comprehensive	compensation	packages	offered	to	military	shuhadas	and	disabled	soldiers	compared	to	those	offered	by	the	police,	which	rely	primarily	on	government	funding.	Many	of	the	senior	officers	I	interviewed	attributed	the	difference	to	inefficient	management	by	the	police	and	their	lack	of	concern	for	demanding,	procuring	and	organizing	better	compensation	packages	for																																									 																					136	Much	of	the	institutional	and	procedural	information	given	here	is	drawn	from	interviews	with	the	Personnel	and	Administration	Directorate,	the	Shuhada	Cell,	and	DASB	Chakwal,	15th	January,	7th	August	and	21st	January	2015	respectively.	137	This	set	includes:	pension	–	100%	salary,	gratuity	–	years	of	service	multiplied	by	monthly	salary,	death	gratuity	–	twelve	months’	salary,	death	compensation	–	lump	sum	cash	payment	based	on	rank,		child	allowance	and	government-sponsored	group	insurance.	138	This	set	includes:	military	group	insurance,	distress	grant,	subsistence	allowance,	children	allowance,	plot	and/or	agricultural	land	–	applicable	on	merit,	retention	of	accommodation	for	up	to	five	years,	education	and	health	facilities	and	employment	for	one	family	member.	139	Brigadier	2,	Shuhada	Cell,	GHQ,	7th	August	2015.	The	considerable	military	aid	which	the	US	provides	in	return	for	Pakistan’s	participation	in	the	GWOT	possibly	contributes	to	this	fund.	However,	as	much	of	this	goes	directly	to	the	military	institution	and	not	to	the	Finance	Department	and	is	non-audited	this	could	not	be	confirmed.	140	Generals	1	&	2	and	Brigadier	2,	25th	June,	24th	June	and	7th	August	2015	respectively.	
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their	shuhadas.	Soldiers	and	families	are	aware	of	what	the	government	has	allotted	or	will	allot	to	them	and	the	emoluments	that	they	receive	from	the	military.	This	distinction	also	strengthens	the	exclusive	kinship	bond	between	the	military	and	its	subjects,	which,	as	I	set	out	in	Chapter	2,	stands	outside	the	social	contract	between	the	government	and	its	soldiers.			The	Pakistan	Armed	Forces	recognizes	the	female	dependent,	especially	the	wife,	as	the	primary	beneficiary	in	the	event	of	death.	The	military,	like	Pakistan’s	other	state	institutions,	was	inherited	from	the	colonial	past,	and	it	has	chosen	to	continue	with	the	tradition	of	recognizing	the	nuclear	family	(the	wife	and	children),	as	the	foremost	recipient	of	the	compensation	it	accords	its	subjects	in	the	event	of	death.	According	to	the	Joint	Service	Instructions	(JSI)	39/60,	soldiers	and	officers	are	expected	to	nominate	next	of	kin/s	during	their	service	from	among	their	legal	heirs,	defined	in	order	of	priority	(widow,	son,	daughter,	mother	and	father).141	The	nuclear	family	is	given	preference	in	this	list,	and	this	nomination	serves	as	a	guide	to	how	to	divide	benefits	between	legal	heirs.	If	a	soldier	is	unmarried,	all	emoluments	are	made	out	to	his	parents.	Here,	the	mother	is	not	specified	as	a	category	on	paper,	but	the	military	will	make	out	the	pension	and	other	deeds	in	her	name.142	In	case	no	nomination	is	made,	and	if	the	soldier	was	married,	all	emoluments	are	to	the	widow.	However,	if	the	widow	is	issueless,	emoluments	can	be	divided	50/50	between	the	mother	and	the	widow.	Furthermore,	for	married	soldiers	the	primary	beneficiary	of	most	GHQ	emoluments	(as	opposed	to	those	handed	out	by	the	GoP)	is	the	wife	and	children.	Deeds	for	plots	of	residential	or	agricultural	land	are	often	made	out	jointly,	with	their	sale	and	transfer	requiring	permission	from	the	GHQ.	Deeds	are	made	out	in	the	name	of	the	widow	and	her	children	at	the	time	of	the	death,	with	sale	prohibited	until	the	last	child	turns	21.	If	the	widow	is	issueless,	shares	are	also	allocated	to	the	parents,	again	mostly	the	mother.	
Shifting	Visibilities:	The	Masking	of	Compensation	I	pointed	out	in	Chapter	1	that	the	compensation	packages	offered	by	the	military	are	completely	missing	from	the	Youm-e	Shuhada	(YeS)	ceremonies.	In	this	section,	I	first	turn	to	the	military	to	explain	this	mask	of	invisibility	and	then	to	the	families	of	the	deceased	to	understand	why	this	masking	is	desirable.			
																																								 																					141	1982,	Pakistan	Legal	Decisions	(PLD)	Mirza	Muhammad	Amin	etc.	v	Government	of	Pakistan,	Federal	Shariat	Court	(FSC)	@Page	146.	142	Based	on	discussions	with	the	families	of	deceased	soldiers	and	the	DASB	Secretary.	
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The	logic	behind	most	compensation	regimes	offered	by	the	state	is	to	address	losses	incurred	by	its	citizens	for	which	it	takes	responsibility.	Strategically,	compensation	regimes	serve	to	present	and	uphold	the	image	of	a	benevolent	state	that	assumes	responsible	for	the	safety	and	protection	of	its	citizens.	They	also	partly	acknowledge	its	inability	to	fulfil	this	responsibility	and	pay	reparation	for	losses	thus	incurred.	Conversely,	some	have	argued	that	the	politics	of	compensation	works	instead	to	exculpate	the	state	of	its	responsibility	in	cases	where	its	action	or	inaction	has	led	to	the	loss	of	life	or	damage	to	property	and	assure	it	impunity	(Khattak,	2015).	143	Compensatory	regimes	for	security	personnel	such	as	the	police	and	the	military,	for	whom	death	and	disability	is	a	calculated	risk	of	employment,	are	additionally	driven	by	practical	concerns	such	as	sustaining	morale,	ensuring	loyalty	and	reducing	desertions	(Wasinski,	2008).		The	GoP	(including	provincial	police	departments)	openly	publishes	the	compensation	it	provides	to	civilians,	and	to	some	extent	to	civilian	law	enforcement	officers	–	specifically	the	police.144	The	deliberate	effort	to	publicize	this	can	be	seen	as	an	attempt	to	placate	or	appease	a	wounded	and	suffering	public	after	particularly	horrific	man-made	or	natural	disasters,	and	underlines	the	importance	of	preserving	the	image	of	a	benevolent	state.	The	next	of	kin	also	have	a	visibility	and	a	voice	other	than	that	which	is	institutionally	regulated.	Dissatisfaction	about	what	is	being	offered,	expressed	through	questions	about	unfairness	or	corruption	in	implementation	or	disputes	between	the	deceased’s	heirs	and	corresponding	civil	court	cases,	sometimes	ensues,	receiving	coverage	in	the	media.145	There	are	also	regular	images	of	the	affected	receiving	money	or	assistance	in	kind,	such	as	food	rations,	from	politicians	and	sometimes	army	officials,	as	when	the	Waziristan	conflict	caused	people	to	be	displaced	from	the	Federally	Administered	Tribal	Areas.146	Those	who	receive	aid	or	compensation	are	presented	as																																									 																					143	Khan,	A.	(2016,	July).	The	price	of	a	life:	Compensating	victims	of	terrorism,	Herald.	Retrieved	from				http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153355/the-price-of-a-life-compensating-victims-of-terrorism	144	Staff	Correspondent	.	(2016,	May	14).	Sindh	Cabinet	meeting:	Package	for	martyred	cops	raised	to	Rs	5	million.	The	Express	Tribune.	Retrieved	from	https://tribune.com.pk/story/1103034/sindh-cabinet-meeting-package-for-martyred-cops-raised-to-rs-5-million/		145	Ali,	N.	(2013,	December	22).	Families	of	‘shaheed’	Policemen	being	denied	compensation.	Dawn	Retrieved	from	http://www.dawn.com/news/1075518		Durrani,	F.	(2015,	September	11).	Families	of	martyred	policemen	face	hurdles	in	availing	welfare	package.	
The	News.	Retrieved	from	https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/61841-families-of-martyred-policemen-face-hurdles-in-availing-welfare-package		Khan,	J	(2015,	August	4).	KP	Police	propose	creation	of	600	ASI	seats	for	family	members	of	fallen	cops.	The	
News.	Retrieved	from	https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/54691-kp-police-propose-creation-of-600-asi-seats-for-family-members-of-fallen-cops			Khan,	A.	(2016,	July).	The	price	of	a	life:	Compensating	victims	of	terrorism,	Herald.	Retrieved	from	http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153355/the-price-of-a-life-compensating-victims-of-terrorism	146	Staff	Report	(2016,	July	5).	Martyrs	widow	awarded	11m	under	Shuhada	Package.	The	Daily	Times.		Retrieved	from		
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helpless,	pitiable	and	sometimes	‘suspect’	creatures	(Khattak,	2015:65),	in	desperate	need	of	assistance,	while	the	state	is	portrayed	as	benevolent	and	generous.	Simply	put,	while	the	compensation	regime	may	aspire	to	reflect	the	demands	of	the	social	contract	between	the	citizen	and	the	state,	compensation	can	often	be	arbitrary,	especially	in	the	case	of	civilians,	and	can	be	presented	as	an	act	of	charity.	It	is	also	presented	in	full	view;	in	fact	there	is	a	deliberate	attempt	to	ensure	that	these	images	go	out.		Compensation	for	military	death	and	damage	stands	distinct	from	these	compensatory	mechanisms	in	two	ways.	First, in	the	case	of	military	deaths,	compensation	regimes	operate	according	to	the	logic	that	what	has	been	lost	can	be	replaced	through	a	combination	of	material	means	and	affective	regulation	achieved	by	commemoration	and	meaning-making.	Hence,	there	is	not	just	a	reliance	on	material	compensation,	but	there	is	also	heavy	institutional	investment	in	commemoration.	While	the	latter	also	exists	for	civilian	deaths,	as	in	commemorative	events	for	police	martyrs	or	victims	of	terrorist	attacks,	these	tend	to	be	reactive	and	one-off	events,	and	they	are	not	as	sustained	and	systematic	as	military	commemorations.	Second,	while	both	material	reparation	and	commemoration	are	important	ways	in	which	the	military	attempts	to	provide	reparation	for	loss,	the	military	seeks	to	separate	these	two	functions.	In	the	entire	YeS	extravaganza,	set	up	to	talk	exclusively	of	the	shaheed,	there	is	no	deliberate	mention	of	compensation	or	the	transactional	part	of	this	arrangement.	No	money	is	handed	out	and	no	announcements	about	the	generosity	of	the	government	or	military	are	made.	The	image	painted	of	the	deceased	of	disabled	soldier	and	family	does	not	inspire	pity;	instead	we	have	the	brave	and	willing	soldier	and	the	stoic	and	resolute	family.	There	is	also	no	visibility	of	what	happens	behind	the	scenes	once	the	compensation	regime	rolls	out.	Instead,	all	martyrs	are	folded	into	the	military	infrastructure;	any	dissatisfaction	or	disputes	that	arise	are	managed	internally	within	the	institution	and	buffered	by	the	relationship.	Grievances	are	expressed	to	the	paternalistic	master	(the	military)	and	redress	is	expected	from	the	kinship	group	(again	the	military).	A	later	section	on	disputes	and	their	resolution	will	detail	this	further. 	Two	pragmatic	reasons	for	masking	military	compensation	are	obvious.	First,	compensatory	packages	for	military	dead	are	more	generous	than	for	civilians.147	Compensation	regimes	for	the	police	are	not	on	a	par	with	those	given	to	military																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																http://dailytimes.com.pk/khyber-pakhtunkhwa/05-Jul-16/martyrs-widow-awarded-rs-11m-under-shuhada-package		147	I	use	the	word	generous	in	comparison	to	what	is	offered	to	other	martyrs	of	the	state	and	not	to	imply	that	what	is	given	exceeds	the	compensation	due	for	the	loss	of	life	or	limb.	
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martyrs,	nor	does	the	police	force	have	comparable	infrastructure	in	place	to	assist	families	in	their	implementation.		Unlike	the	military	compensation	regimes,	the	Police	Department	often	has	to	negotiate	with	provincial	governments	in	order	to	improve	its	compensation	packages.148	The	military	seeks	to	downplay	this	disparity	in	the	value	assigned	to	dying	for	the	nation	on	the	basis	of	whether	a	uniform	is	worn,	and	what	colour	it	is.	Second,	while	the	intent	with	other	compensation	packages	is	to	appease	possible	discontent	by	building	the	image	of	a	benevolent	state	that	looks	after	its	subjects	financially,	the	military	passes	up	this	opportunity	to	build	its	image.	This	could	perhaps	be	because	its	relationship	with	its	constituents	is	firmly	entrenched	and	it	does	not	anticipate	any	organized	dissent.	The	kinship	group	that	is	the	military	is	well	insulated,	and	its	subjects	are	aware	that	they	will	be	compensated,	hence	any	image	building	in	this	regard	is	deemed	unnecessary.			The	military	may	also	derive	more	benefit	from	focusing	instead	on	tropes	of	honour	and	sacrifice,	which	brings	me	to	another	reason	for	excluding	compensation	from	visibility.	I	argue	that	the	reluctance	to	foreground	this	aspect	of	the	relationship	is	reflective	of	the	Pakistani	military’s	desire	to	construct	death	or	loss	as	willing	sacrifice,	one	that	is	not	regretted,	meaning	that	the	figure/s	that	now	embody	that	loss	are	not	be	pitied.	Imagined	as	unflinching	and	resolute,	they	cannot	be	depicted	as	needy,	and	more	importantly	they	cannot	be	seen	as	desirous	of	compensation	or	engaged	in	a	transactional	relationship	with	the	military.	Generous	and	predictable	material	compensation	handed	out	through	systematic	policy	and	structural	mechanisms	by	the	local	apparatus	is	at	odds	with	the	narrative	of	shahadat	where	the	reward	is	in	the	afterlife,	or	where	precious	life	or	limb	cannot	be	brought	down	to	an	exchange	system	that	values	life	in	terms	of	death	gratuities	and	plots	of	land.	This	dilemma	is	not	intrinsic	to	this	exchange,	and	in	fact	in	the	case	of	state	compensation	for	civilian	deaths,	including	the	police,	it	seems	not	to	exist	if	we	are	to	go	by	the	very	public	contestations	and	demands	for	redressal	from	NoKs.	In	these	cases,	those	who	are	affected	demand	redressal	and	compensation	and	show	willingness	to	enter	openly	into	a	system	of	exchange	that	can	monetize	the	loss.	The	military	instead	goes	to	great	lengths	to	ensure	that	the	bitter	property	disputes	and	family	estrangement	that	flow	once	this	compensation	economy	kicks	in	are	hidden	from	public	view.	It	is	a	dilemma	and	an	unease	that	stems	from	the	military’s	desire	to	shield	the	compensation	received.																																											 																					148	KP	Police	Special	Compensation	Package	(2015,	November	27th).	Khyber	Pakhtunkhwa	Police	website.		Retrieved	from	http://kppolice.gov.pk/news/index.php?NewsId=811	
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The	military’s	narrative	of	selfless	sacrifice	is	terrain	on	which	the	military	is	able	to	command	blanket	acceptance.	The	military	is	at	pains	to	not	advertise	the	transaction	with	the	families	of	the	deceased	because	a	generous	monetized	transaction	that	calculates	these	losses	and	efficiently	delivers	compensation	for	them	cannot	be	used	to	justify	the	narrative	of	sacrifice	that	it	repeatedly	uses	to	present	its	image	as	the	saviour	of	the	nation.	Calculating	and	transacting	a	loss	essentially	entails	that	the	price	has	been	paid	and	the	transaction	completed.	The	military	must	be	in	a	position	to	continue	to	demand	compensation	from	the	nation	for	sacrifices	it	has	made	in	its	defence	which	
cannot	be	compensated.	Thus,	it	cannot	publicly	acknowledge	the	exchange	system	even	though	it	exists.	The	reduction	of	transcendental	sacrifice	to	a	monetary	exchange	between	the	institution	and	the	family	must	therefore	be	avoided.	Ironically,	the	military’s	desire	not	to	destabilize	the	selfless	image	of	sacrifice	for	the	nation	results	in	a	need	to	distance	itself	from	a	financial	transaction	that	lies	at	the	core	of	its	ability	to	sustain	its	recruitment.	In	other	words,	the	paradoxical	quality	of	this	moment	is	that	this	monetized	transaction	must	be	ever	present	but	also	masked	in	the	relationship	between	the	family	and	the	military	institution	if	this	relationship	is	to	hold.	This	requires	an	oscillation	on	the	part	of	the	military	establishment	between	the	ideologies	of	nation	and	religion	expressed	through	tropes	of	honour	and	sacrifice	and	the	materialistic	drivers	of	service	emoluments	and	post-death	compensation	regimes	that	form	the	substance	of	the	relationship	between	the	subject	and	the	military	institution.			I	turn	now	to	the	drivers	that	construct	the	militaristic	subject,	the	families	of	deceased	soldiers,	also	invested	in	masking	this	compensation,	for	reasons	which	are	perhaps	more	obscure.	On	the	national	stage,	the	invisibility	of	material	aspects	of	sacrifice	is	easier	to	maintain,	for	this	is	largely	about	acknowledgement	and	commemoration	of	loss,	although	tensions	on	that	stage	were	explored	in	Chapter	1.	In	bureaucratic	spaces	and	local	arenas	in	villages	where	these	compensation	policies	are	formed	and	unfold,	this	is	a	narrative	that	is	hard	to	escape.	The	overriding	trope	is	one	of	gratefulness,	further	testament	to	the	area’s	deep	relationship	with	the	military.	These	local	spaces	regard	the	military	as	an	institution	that	looks	after	its	own	and	follows	through	on	its	commitments.	Interspersed	with	these	grateful	narratives	acknowledging	the	military’s	generosity	are	distinct	threads	of	overwhelming	grief	and	regret,	as	outlined	in	Chapter	4,	and	more	importantly	for	this	chapter,	of	unease.			He	was	our	jigar	ka	tukra	(piece	of	our	heart),	you	should	ask	mothers,	life	of	course	goes	on.	He	went	(into	the	military)	because	we	had	no	choice,	not	so	much	out	of	interest.	I	feel	proud	when	people	say	he	is	a	
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shaheed,	but	my	heart	also	feels	okha	(uneasy)	(…)	We	used	some	of	the	money	we	received	on	the	village,	gave	it	to	the	local	mosque,	and	also	got	boring	done	(a	ground	water	well)	for	the	graveyard.				(Yasmin,	Nawaz’s	mother,	Palwal,	15th	October	2014)			Fauj	ne	humain	paise	mein	tol	diya	hai	(The	 army	 has	weighed	 us	 [our	grief]	in	money).			 	 	 	 	 	(Imran’s	father,	Palwal,	5th	March,	2015)							We	 have	 everything	 now,	 house,	 money	 but	 puttar	nahi	 labda	 (I	 can’t	find	my	son).					(Saima,	Zohaib’s	mother,	adjoining	village,	18th	September	2014)		The	sense	of	exchange,	of	giving	something	up	to	receive	something	else	in	return,	is	palpable	in	these	conversations.	There	is	also	a	sense	of	having	one’s	grief	calculated	on	an	obscene	weighing	scale	that	can	assess	the	damage	caused	by	the	death	of	a	loved	one.	The	tone	of	these	conversations	is	laden	with	grief,	a	grief	that	in	addition	to	being	overwhelming	is	also	described	as	okha	(uneasy),	signifying	an	inability	to	find	peace.	Mothers	talked	about	the	compensation	received,	and	almost	in	the	same	breath	bemoaned	losing	their	son	forever.	The	loss	was	referred	to	almost	automatically,	the	minute	they	spoke	of	compensation,	as	if	the	knowledge	of	what	was	received	must	continually	be	juxtaposed	with	the	impossibility	of	it	being	enough	to	replace	what	was	lost.			To	elaborate	on	this	further	it	is	necessary	to	first	plough	through	the	semantics	of	loss	and	compensation	in	the	context	of	military	deaths.	I	turn	to	Adi	Ophir’s	book,	The	Order	
of	Evils:	Towards	an	Ontology	of	Morals	(2005:35),	which	unpacks	some	of	these	terms:		 [A]n	evil	is	an	injury	worsening	someone’s	condition	so	that	no	compensation	is	possible.	Compensation	assumes	the	existence	of	a	system	of	exchange	whose	terms	make	it	possible	to	assess	the	value	of	the	injury.	An	injury	involving	losses	that	are	expressible	in	terms	of	a	system	of	exchange	amounts	to	damage.	Damage	is	a	loss	whose	value	is	assessable.	Loss	is	the	irreversible	disappearance	of	some	irreplaceable	thing.	A	disappearance	is	the	transition	of	something	from	“is	there”	to	“is	not	there”.		
	Here,	the	evil	that	causes	someone	distress	is	the	loss	through	death	of	a	loved	one,	while	disappearance	is	the	physical	lack	of	a	loved	one.	The	loss	is	of	life,	while	compensation	is	the	exchange	value	accorded	to	the	damage	caused	by	the	loss.	Ophir	(2005:90)	goes	on	
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to	suggest	that	the	response	to	a	condition	of	loss	is	mediated	through	‘interest	in	what	has	disappeared’	and	‘the	impossibility	of	entering	into	an	exchange	cycle	and	restoring	the	disappeared’.	He	suggests	that	‘each	one	of	these	on	its	own	is	a	necessary	but	insufficient	condition	for	something	to	be	experienced	as	irreparable	loss’.	So,	the	extent	to	which	the	next	of	kin	experience	this	loss	depends	upon	their	interest	in	what	has	disappeared	and	the	possibility	of	it	being	replaced	through	an	exchange	economy.	There	are	two	ways	to	annul	a	loss:	first	to	let	go	of	interest	and	second	‘to	reduce	it	to	the	exchange	value	in	some	sort	of	exchange	economy’	(2005:90).	In	the	case	of	military	death	and	disability	the	former	may	not	be	possible	due	to	the	sheer	investment	of	affect	in	the	relationship	with	the	deceased.	The	latter	too	is	never	totally	possible,	for	how	can	one	calculate	and	put	into	an	exchange	system	the	value	of	a	loved	one	beyond	the	economic	earning	power	of	his	body.	Thus,	compensation	offered	for	a	loss	that	refuses	to	fully	become	damage	hangs	somewhere	in	the	middle.	The	loss	tries	to	articulate	itself	as	damage,	but	the	transformation	remains	flawed,	an	incomplete	exchange	that	cannot	annul	the	loss.	Attempts	at	annulment	are	incomplete	for,	as	Ophir	suggests,	they	represent	two	different	irreconcilable	genres:	first,	‘the	genre	of	loss	is	tragedy’	and	second,	‘the	genre	of	damage	is	the	bureaucratic	file’	(2005:138).			In	the	case	of	military	death,	this	is	a	tragedy	made	all	the	more	poignant	by	it	being	a	man-made	and	preventable	loss,	a	death	that	nonetheless	must	be	discussed	as	necessary,	honourable	and	meaningful.	No	questions	can	be	asked	or	responsibility	assigned,	not	just	because	the	benevolent	military	stands	at	the	other	end	but	also	because	of	the	affective	interiority	of	the	subject.	The	subject	is	pained	not	only	by	the	grief	of	disappearance	and	a	sense	of	irrevocable	loss	that	cannot	be	fully	converted	into	damage,	but	also	because	of	what	I	argued	in	the	last	chapter	are	‘traumatic	real	kernels’	(Žižek	2008:45).	These	are	subtle	workings	of	affect,	guilt	and	regret,	for	the	death	was	not	only	preventable,	but	also	predictable.	Service	in	the	military	was	a	choice	the	family	made	to	improve	its	economic	condition,	and	for	this	reason	financial	compensation	takes	on	a	significance	beyond	the	obvious	financial	needs	it	may	meet.	It	stands	for	what	the	son	earned	and	what	he	sacrificed	himself	for	and	must	be	claimed	as	a	right;	the	very	claim	is	an	act	of	loyalty	to	the	lost	son.		 He	was	our	blood,	our	son.	Why	should	we	let	others	[his	widow]	consume	it.	Our	son	earned	it,	those	who	raised	him,	looked	after	him,	his	mother	and	father,	it	is	their	right	to	claim	what	the	fauj	has	given.												(Salma,	Aslam’s	mother,	Palwal,	18th	January	2015)	
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This	is	a	relationship	of	symbiosis	between	the	military	and	its	subjects,	generated	in	the	almost	insufferable	moment	of	separation	from	a	loved	one.	The	very	compensation	that	produces	unease	and	reduces	the	loss	to	a	monetary	transaction	also	allows	feelings	of	loss	to	be	assuaged	to	some	extent,	for	claiming	compensation	amounts	to	making	the	sacrifice	count,	a	terrible	price	that	once	paid	must	be	claimed	and	owned	as	a	symbol	of	love.	This	system	of	exchange	is	monetary	and	materialistic,	yet	populated	by	affect;	affect,	such	as	the	grief	of	loss,	honour	and	pride,	that	can	be	expressed	through	commemoration	of	the	dead,	and	affect	that	must	remain	hidden,	populated	by	feelings	of	regret	and	guilt.			For	families,	the	inability	of	compensation	regimes	to	annul	loss	completely	represents	the	residual	unease	and	regret	associated	with	accepting	compensation	for	the	death	of	a	loved	one.	For	the	military	institution,	the	inability	of	compensation	regimes	to	assuage	loss	reflects	the	desire	to	use	the	bodies	of	the	dead	to	extract	support	and	sympathy	from	the	nation	and	construct	the	loss	as	if	it	were	not	compensation-able.	As	such	calculation	and	transaction	of	the	loss	of	life	or	faculty	remains	veiled	in	public	military	narratives,	I	suggest	that	these	compensation	economies	function	as	economies	of	loss,	with	compensation	offered	by	the	military	and	claimed	by	families	for	losses	that	elude	reparation.	
Of	Intractable	Subjects	and	Masks	that	Slip	This	section	will	present	two	subjects,	the	female	subject	and	the	disabled	soldier	both	direct	recipients	of	military	compensation	in	an	attempt	to	understand	the	complexities	of	the	lived	experiences	that	lie	behind	these	compensation	economies.	I	propose	that	the	wife	and	the	disabled	soldier	are	intractable	subjects,	figures	that	are	considered	unmanageable	or	burdensome	and	harder	to	assimilate	within	the	commemorative	regimes	of	the	Pakistani	military	despite	their	central	placement	within	compensatory	regimes.			
Bringing	in	the	Women		
											Kausar	–The	Erring	Widow	Aslam	was	adopted	at	age	5	by	his	maternal	uncle	and	aunt	who	were	childless.	His	 biological	 mother	 and	 father	 lived	 down	 the	 lane,	 only	 ten	 minutes	 away.	Kausar	married	Aslam	seven	years	before	his	death	in	Wana.	They	did	not	have	any	children	at	the	time	of	his	death.	During	the	funeral	the	biological	father	was	accorded	 the	 honour	 of	 receiving	 the	 flag,	 as	 the	 adoption	 had	 never	 been	formalized.	Kausar	received	a	full	pension	and	all	emoluments	in	her	name	after	she	reassured	the	DASB	authorities	that	she	had	no	intention	of	getting	married.	
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However,	 behind	 the	 scenes,	 in	 ‘consultation’	with	Aslam’s	 adoptive	 father,	 she	divided	all	the	one-time	emoluments	(i.e.	cash	payments)	she	received	into	three	parts,	 one	 for	 herself,	 one	 for	 the	 biological	 mother	 and	 one	 for	 the	 adoptive	father.	She	also	agreed	to	give	half	of	the	pension	she	received	in	her	name	every	month	 to	 the	biological	mother.	The	plot	of	 land	was	allotted	 jointly	 to	her	and	the	 biological	 mother,	 with	 her	 consent.	 Four	 years	 after	 her	 first	 husband’s	death,	Kausar	decided	to	marry	his	best	friend.	While	she	received	the	support	of	her	brothers	in	this	decision,	Aslam’s	family	and	the	rest	of	the	village	censured	her	for	moving	on	and	soiling	the	memory	of	her	shaheed	husband.	The	marriage	was	duly	reported	to	the	DASB	by	Aslam’s	biological	father,	and	the	full	pension	reverted	to	the	biological	mother.	Kausar	claims	that	she	returned	all	the	money	she	was	 holding	 at	 the	 time	 of	 her	 second	marriage	 to	 the	 adoptive	 father,	 but	there	was	much	acrimony	as	both	 sets	of	parents	 claimed	 that	 she	did	not	give	them	anything.	On	my	last	visit,	Kausar	claimed	she	was	being	pressured	to	agree	to	sell	the	plot	of	land.	Her	brothers	did	not	want	her	to	sell,	so	she	was	resisting	this.			
	 	
	
																		Sumaira	–	The	Wife	in	Waiting	 	Sumaira	was	married	 at	 age	16	 to	her	maternal	 aunt’s	 son,	Tahir.	He	died	 six	months	 later	 in	 the	operations	 in	Wana.	Tahir	did	not	have	 time	 to	 report	his	marriage,	and	therefore	he	was	listed	as	unmarried	in	the	army’s	records.	The	initial	 papers	 were	 in	 the	 mother’s	 (Sajjida’s)	 name,	 but	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	funeral	 this	 was	 rectified	 and	 all	 ensuing	 payments	 were	 given	 to	 Sumaira,	including	 the	 Distress	 Grant	 (which	 she	 handed	 over	 to	 Tahir’s	 brothers	immediately).	In	view	of	Sumaira’s	age	and	the	marriage	being	issueless	it	was	decided	between	the	 family	and	the	military	that	 the	pension	would	be	 jointly	allocated,	with	a	percentage	for	both	the	mother	and	the	widow.	Sumaira,	who	is	still	not	eligible	for	a	national	identity	card,	has	been	to	the	DASB	twice	for	the	paperwork	required	by	the	military.	There	was	also	some	confusion	regarding	Tahir’s	status	as	a	shaheed.	The	family	has	yet	to	receive	any	compensation	from	the	army	other	than	money	for	funeral	expenses	and	a	pension.	Upon	inquiry	at	the	DASB,	I	found	that	Tahir’s	death	was	listed	as	an	in-service	death	and	not	as	
shaheed.	 As	 they	 waited	 to	 find	 out	 the	 status	 of	 his	 death,	 the	 families	(Sumaira’s	and	her	deceased	husband’s)	were	discussing	 the	possibility	of	her	being	married	to	the	youngest	brother.	The	only	hitch	was	that	this	brother	was	already	engaged	 to	 someone.	Gossip	 in	 the	village	was	 rife	 regarding	whether	Tahir’s	 family	would	 ‘keep’	 Sumaira	 or	 let	 her	 go.	Most	were	of	 the	 view	 that	Sumaira	 should	 forgo	 her	 pension	 and	 other	 emoluments	 in	 favour	 of	 the	mother,	 as	 a	 16-year	 old	 girl	 could	not	 be	 expected	 to	 live	 the	 rest	 of	 her	 life	alone.	 Sumaira	 shifted	 her	 stance	 during	 my	 fieldwork	 from	 my	 initial	conversations	with	her	when	she	said	she	would	never	re-marry	as	she	was	the	widow	of	a	shaheed.	 In	 later	 interviews,	 she	suggested	 that	 it	would	be	best	 if	she	stayed	within	the	family	and	married	the	younger	brother.	At	the	time	I	was	leaving,	one	year	down	the	road,	with	the	family	still	undecided	about	her	fate,	she	shared	a	fair	amount	of	weariness	and	said	she	would	like	to	go	home	to	her	parents’	house,	but	that	the	brothers	of	the	deceased	would	not	let	her.	
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These	two	sketches	how	the	mechanics	of	the	compensatory	regime	play	out	in	complicated	ways	in	the	lives	of	two	Pakistani	military	widows	in	the	village	of	Palwal,	and	I	will	refer	to	them	in	my	analysis	below.			
		Photograph	7:	A	shaheed’s	widow	at	her	husband’s	grave		To	understand	the	military’s	relationship	with	its	female	subjects	and	its	obsession	with	and	disdain	for	the	feminine,	it	may	be	useful	to	pick	up	from	the	last	chapter,	which	laid	out	how	grieving	is	gendered	as	a	function	of	the	relationship	between	the	military	and	its	subjects,	particularly	women.	Women,	with	their	excessive	emotion,	are	seen	as	primitive,	irrational	and	dangerous,	to	be	managed	by	both	the	military	and	male	members	of	the	village.	It	is	this	subordinate	being	that	the	military	turns	towards	to	formalize	the	relationship	with	the	soldier’s	family	in	contractual	and	binding	ways.	Thus,	the	military	singles	out	for	bureaucratic	and	contractual	purposes	the	subject	that	causes	anxiety	and	concern,	and	money	exchanges	hands	right	from	the	beginning,	with	the	salary	of	the	deceased	soldier	and/or	the	Distress	Grant	handed	over	to	the	widow	or	mother	to	help	pay	for	funeral	arrangements.			 As	I	walked	towards	the	coffin	placed	in	the	courtyard,	I	started	to	shiver	as	if	from	cold,	and	I	felt	faint	when	I	came	near	the	dead	body,	[then]	I	fainted.	Then	the	army	man	who	had	come,	he	had	Aslam’s	three	months’	salary	with	him.	He	said	to	my	cousin,	who	was	a	subedar:	call	
his	widow.	Sign	this	page	sister,	he	kept	saying	to	me.	He	gave	me	his	(Aslam’s)	things.	I	told	him	to	give	it	to	my	brother,	he	said	no,	I	am	not	
allowed	to	do	that.	He	is	ordered	to	give	it	to	the	widow	if	he	is	married	and	to	the	mother	if	not.	Later,	I	gave	it	to	my	brother.	(Kausar,	Aslam’s	widow,	Palwal,	5th	February	2015)		
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This	marks	the	beginning	of	the	compensation	process,	visible	in	certain	local	spaces,	where	the	materialist	narrative	cannot	disappear,	and	hidden	in	other	(national)	spaces	where	the	ideological	narrative	must	remain	dominant.	The	woman	suddenly	finds	herself	centre	stage.	From	here	on	she	becomes	a	visible	political	subject	and	a	citizen	who	will	now	need	to	engage	with	the	state	and	its	institutions.	This	may	involve	getting	a	national	identity	card,	attending	the	District	Soldiers	Board	to	be	allotted	a	pension	book,	monthly	visits	to	the	local	post	office	to	collect	pension	or	becoming	a	litigant	in	court.		The	military’s	relationship	with	its	two	female	subjects,	the	widow	and	the	mother	who	are	the	recipients	of	attention,	regulation	and	emoluments,	is	not	the	same.	For	commemorative	practices,	it	is	the	mother	figure	that	is	invoked,	placed	on	the	higher	rung	to	articulate	the	narrative	of	sacrifice	and	martyrdom.	The	reasons	for	this,	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	stem	from	how	a	mother’s	love	is	depicted	and	portrayed	in	popular	culture	as	pure	and	asexual,	as	opposed	to	the	romantic	love	associated	with	the	wife.	The	mother	represents	the	archetypal	selfless	mourner,	whose	love	is	unconditional	and	unadulterated,	a	love	that	everyone	can	relate	to.	It	is	ties	of	this	kind	that	need	to	be	foregrounded	within	the	militarism	project	to	elicit	the	kind	of	nostalgia	and	emotion	that	runs	through	the	invocation	of	death	and	loss	for	the	spectator	nation.	The	wife,	on	the	other	hand,	is	an	embodiment	of	romantic	or	sexual	love,	her	capacity	for	which	continues	beyond	the	soldier’s	death,	creating	a	set	of	anxieties.	Some	of	this	anxiety	has	to	do	with	her	unsuitability	as	a	figure	in	commemorative	practices	that	demand	more	durable	and	unquestionable	bonds,	while	some	is	linked	to	contestations	that	can	arise	in	the	deceased’s	family	and	draw	attention	to	the	compensation	process,	thereby	threatening	its	invisibility.		In	cases	where	a	soldier	is	married,	the	main	beneficiary	of	benefits	provided	by	the	Government	of	Pakistan	is	the	widow,	unless	the	deceased	has	nominated	another	recipient.	GHQ	benefits	are	allocated	to	the	widow	and	children,	and	nomination	is	not	a	consideration	unless	contested.149	In	both	cases,	the	widow	is	clearly	preferred	over	and	above	the	parents	of	the	deceased,	especially	if	she	has	children.	Dispute	Committees	at	regimental	and	GHQ	levels	can	decide	distribution	in	cases	of	dispute.	This	authority	can	override	nomination	by	the	soldier,	based	on	an	assessment	of	the	situation	on	the	ground.	Considerations	that	the	DASB	and	military	officers	in	dispute	committees	use	to																																									 																					149	Much	of	the	institutional	and	procedural	information	provided	here	is	drawn	from	interviews	with	the	Personnel	and	Administration	Directorate,	the	Shuhada	Cell,		and	DASB	Chakwal,15th	January,		7th	August	and	21st	January	2015	respectively.	It	is	also	based	on	interviews	conducted	during	fieldwork	in	villages.		
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decide	the	‘suitability’	of	the	widow	to	receive	full	emoluments	are	her	age,	the	number	of	years	of	marriage,	the	number	of	children	and	the	financial	conditions	of	the	deceased’s	parents,	as	well	as	the	presence	of	other	sons	who	can	support	the	parents.	If	she	is	older,	with	children	and	especially	if	there	are	other	sons	to	look	after	the	parents	of	the	deceased,	then	the	widow	is	protected	against	claims	to	the	emoluments.	The	reasons	suggested	for	this	by	officers	interviewed	were	principles	of	pragmatism	and	fairness,	as	the	mother	has	other	sons	or	a	husband	to	look	after	her,	whereas	the	wife	loses	her	main	source	of	income.	Many	officers	recognize	the	vulnerability	of	the	wife	in	a	joint	family	system	after	the	death	of	the	husband	and	defend	the	need	to	safeguard	her	against	male	members	of	both	her	husband’s	family	and	her	own,	who	seek	to	control	her.150			In	the	case	of	17-year	old	Sumaira	sketched	above,	the	family	of	the	deceased	fears	that	she	may	marry	again	or	move	away	from	the	deceased’s	parents,	taking	the	emoluments	with	her.	They	seek	to	hold	on	to	her	either	through	remarriage	within	the	family	or,	as	in	the	case	of	Kausar,	making	claims	to	the	DASB	or	regiment	centre	if	she	does	marry	and/or	move	away.	Even	though	marriage	in	rural	settings	is	almost	always	within	the	extended	family,	these	disputes	can	be	especially	bitter.	Stories	of	widows	like	Kausar	who	married	again	or	moved	out	of	the	deceased	husband’s	home	and	parents	who	as	a	result	did	not	receive	due	share	of	military	benefits	and	facilities,	are	common	in	villages.	The	military	is	thus	faced	with	the	challenge	of	trying	to	appease	two	distinct	sets	of	next	of	kin.	The	primary	question	is	whether	the	widow	will	move	back	to	her	parents	or	stay	in	the	house	of	her	deceased	husband.	This	is	not	merely	a	question	that	lurks	in	the	minds	of	the	deceased’s	family	or	the	villagers	or	a	subject	of	idle	gossip,	but	one	that	is	asked	of	the	widow	when	she	is	taken	(for	she	does	not	possess	mobility)	to	the	local	DASB	office	at	the	time	the	property	deed	and	pension	book	is	made	out.	The	military	accommodates	these	anxieties,	and	policy	states	that	the	pension	reverts	to	the	mother	in	cases	of	re-marriage,	and	in	cases	where	the	widow	is	young	and	issueless,	making	her	chances	of	re-marriage	more	likely,	property	deeds	and	pension	are	allocated	jointly.			The	Pakistani	military	prefers	to	settle	disputes	through	its	own	internal	mechanisms:	the	DASB	and	the	dispute	committees	set	up	at	the	regimental	centres.	Disputes	have	rarely	found	their	way	to	civil	court,	but	when	this	happens	they	are	mostly	settled	in	favour	of	the	military	compensation	procedures.	The	purported	repugnance	of	the	compensation	scheme	to	Islamic	laws	of	inheritance	has	often	been	cited	as	grounds	for																																									 																					150	Brigadier	2,		Shuhada	Cell,	GHQ,	7th	August	2015.	
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filing	a	case,	but	these	concerns	have	been	addressed	by	the	military	and	other	government	departments	that	offer	compensation	by	labelling	the	emoluments	as	gifts	or	grants	by	the	employer	after	death,	and	thus	not	being	part	of	the	heritable	estate	of	the	deceased.151	This	distinction	between	heritable	and	non-heritable	property	has	been	consistently	upheld	by	various	reported	judgments	from	courts	at	all	levels,	and	the	law	has	thus	created	a	distinction	between	benefits	to	which	Islamic	laws	of	inheritance	can	apply	and	to	those	to	which	it	does	not.152	When	disputes	are	brought	to	the	notice	of	the	military	institution,	most	often	at	the	regimental	level,	the	first	step	is	the	verification	of	the	claims	made	by	both	parties,	which	is	done	locally	by	the	DASB’s	extensive	network	of	welfare	officers	(former	army	soldiers).	The	DASB	makes	a	recommendation,	based	upon	which	the	regimental	centre	makes	a	decision,	often	regarding	the	two	most	contested	emoluments,	ownership	of	land	and	pension	allocation,	which	is	then	communicated	to	the	contesting	parties.	The	DASB		may	play	more	than	just	a	verification	role	here,	and	often	acts	as	a	mediator	between	the	two	groups.	A	common	plea	from	the	dispute	committees	to	both	parties	is	to	not	tarnish	the	glory	of	shahadat	by	dragging	the	sacred	name	of	the	shaheed	through	the	courts.			 I	try	and	talk	to	them	and	remind	them	about	their	son’s	sacrifice.	I	say	this	is	your	son’s	sacrifice.	These	people	forget	that	this	is	the	money	of	a	shaheed.	I	tell	them	your	son	was	lucky	to	have	received	shahadat	and	you	people	are	just	not	sensitive	to	that,	the	shaheed	lives	forever.	I	tell	contesting	mothers	that	they	should	let	the	widow	take	the	pension	and	remind	them	do	you	think	it	would	be	acceptable	to	the	shaheed	that	his	widow	goes	about	borrowing	money	from	people	for	day	to	day	expenses.																		(Captain	1,	Secretary	DASB	Chakwal,	21st	January	2015)		This	theme	is	often	brought	up	during	mediation	in	the	military	apparatus	and	also	tacitly	runs	through	the	civilian	judicial	court	system.	Brigadier	2	shared	the	story	of	a	civil	judge	who	had	called	him	to	tell	him	that	a	shaheed’s	family	had	come	to	the	courts	regarding	a	dispute	over	compensation	money,	and	that	when	he	told	the	judge	about	the	presence	of	Dispute	Committees	right	up	to	GHQ	level,	the	judge	told	the	families	to	go	to	
																																								 																					151	1982,	Pakistan	Legal	Decisions	(PLD)	Shariat	petition	No.	6/R	of	1980,	Mirza	Muhammad	Amin	etc.	v	
Government	of	Pakistan,	Federal	Shariat	Court	(FSC)	Pg.	143-151.	152	According	to	this	ruling,	service	benefits	which	an	employee	can	claim	from	his	employer	in	his	lifetime	are	considered	part	of	his	estate	upon	his	death,	and	are	heritable.	They	are	to	be	distributed	amongst	all	his	heirs	according	to	the	respective	shares	allocated	to	them	by	Islamic	law.	Service	benefits	that	can	be	defined	as	grants	or	concessions	on	the	part	of	an	employer	are	to	be	distributed	only	to	those	members	of	his	family	stipulated	by	the	rules	and	regulations	of	the	service	(2011,	Civil	Law	Cases	[CLC]	Page:1528,	Zaheer	Abbas	v	
Pir	Asif	and	others).	
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the	GHQ:		 He	[the	judge]	told	them	that	by	dragging	the	case	through	a	civilian	court	you	insult	the	shaheed	(…)	you	see	money	is	the	root	of	all	conflict,	the	family	of	the	shaheed	wants	to	control	the	widow	as	they	want	the	money	to	stay	in	the	family.	So	they	will	try	all	tactics,	sometimes	even	get	her	married	to	a	younger	brother	and	then	mistreat	her.																					(Brigadier	2,	Shuhada	Cell,	GHQ,	7th	August	2015)	
	The	widow	becomes	an	intractable,	unpredictable	suspect	figure	in	the	compensatory	regime.	Her	motives	are	considered	suspect	and	need	to	be	questioned,	and	unlike	the	mother,	whose	devotion	to	her	son	is	unquestioned,	she	is	painted	as	a	somewhat	tragic	figure,	in	need	of	protection	but	also	unpredictable,	whose	sexuality	must	be	watched.	Her	suitability	for	the	role	of	primary	next	of	kin	and	to	receive	the	emoluments	assigned	to	her	is	conditional	and	cannot	be	taken	for	granted.	Garbed	in	talk	of	the	shaheed’s	honour,	what	is	often	at	stake	is	a	set	of	anxieties	of	the	family	(their	ability	to	stake	claim	on	the	emoluments	given)	and	of	the	military	(that	the	disputes	and	contestation	not	become	too	public).	For	the	latter,	control	over	the	management	of	disputes	ensures	that	they	are	addressed	internally	and	do	not	find	their	way	to	the	civil	courts	or	the	media,	a	motivation	in	line	with	the	need	for	invisibility	discussed	earlier.	The	affective	tenor	of	these	mediations	constantly	draws	upon	notions	of	the	sanctity	of	shahadat.	In	other	words,	these	tales	of	disputes	are	folded	in	again	and	again	by	the	military	and	its	local	institutions	in	the	district	and	by	the	families	and	the	larger	village	through	the	refrain	that	the	sanctity	of	the	shaheed	must	not	be	damaged	by	open	talk	of	money	or	family	disputes	over	money.			Based	on	this	attention	to	the	female	subject	and	her	significant	role	in	compensation	regimes	one	may	argue	(or	hope)	that	her	entry	into	the	formal	institutional	mechanisms	of	the	state	as	a	citizen	enables	more	autonomy.	The	DASB	secretary	highlighted	the	need	to	protect	the	interests	of	the	female	recipient,	and	the	DASB	authorities	will	in	principle	insist	that	the	mother	or	widow	be	physically	present	for	the	pension	books	to	be	made,	that	they	must	physically	make	a	trip	to	the	post	office	every	month	to	collect	the	pension,	and	in	case	of	transfer	or	sale	of	land	that	they	must	once	again	appear	before	the	DASB	or	the	GHQ,	depending	upon	the	nature	of	the	case.	However,	a	closer	look	at	how	these	women’s	lives	change	(or	not)	perhaps	unsurprisingly	reveals	a	different	scenario.	The	case	of	Sumaira	cited	at	the	beginning	of	this	section	is	evidence	of	that.	Much	like	the	war	widow	in	Israeli	society,	studied	by	Lea	Shamgar-Handelman	in	Israeli	
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War	Widows,	Beyond	the	Glory	of	Heroism	(1986),	the	Pakistani	military	widow	is	subject	to	stereotyping	and	gender	discrimination,	and	is	abandoned	by	the	state	if	she	decides	to	remarry.	Male	members	of	the	family	further	compound	these	problems	through	active	control	and	interference.	It	is	often	the	father	or	the	brothers	of	the	deceased,	or	male	members	of	the	widow’s	family,	who	will	actually	control	the	emoluments	and	take	decisions	regarding	their	use.			While	it	would	perhaps	be	easy	to	attribute	the	failure	of	policies	to	translate	into	meaningful	autonomy	for	women	to	the	conservative	rural	environs	where	they	unfold,	I	argue	that	this	failure	lies	in	part	with	the	logic	of	the	policy	of	itself.	In	analysing	welfare	policies	for	women,	Elieen	Boris	and	Peter	Bardaglio	suggested	in	The	Transformation	of	
State	Patriarchy	(1983:72)	that	the	‘nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries	(….)	saw	not	the	decline	of	patriarchy	but	its	transformation	from	a	familial	to	a	state	form’.	In	other	words,	modern	social	policies	protect	the	status	quo,	reflecting	dominant	male	interests	and	regenerating	patriarchal	norms,	even	as	they	may	unsettle	or	disturb	relations	between	men	and	women	within	families.	In	Regulating	the	Lives	of	Women:	
Social	Welfare	Policy	from	Colonial	Times	to	the	Present,	Mimi	Abramovitaz	argues	that	American	social	policies	have	in	fact	‘functioned	to	enforce	a	family	ethic	about	women’s	proper	roles’	(qtd.	in	Skocpol	1995:31	emphasis	in	original).	Such	policies	tend	to	reward	certain	kinds	of	women,	whose	lives	include	marriage,	motherhood	and	in	the	case	discussed	here,	fidelity	to	a	deceased	husband.	Conversely,	in	her	book	Protecting	
Soldiers	and	Mothers	(1995:34),	Theda	Skocpol	has	argued	for	an	optimistic	recognition	of	the	‘crucial	differences’	between	the	‘paternalist’	British	social	policy	of	the	early	1900’s,	which	was	based	on	male	bread-winning	ideals	and	was	devised	by	men	in	an	attempt	to	benefit	women	through	male	wage-earning	capacity,	and	‘maternalist’	early	US	labour	policies,	which	even	though	they	were	based	on	similar	ideals,	were	advocated	for	by	women	and	also	applied	directly	to	women,	such	as	pensions	awarded	directly	to	war	widows.			I	position	myself	within	earlier	feminist	scholarship,	concurring	with	its	conclusion	that	the	transformative	potential	of	modern	welfare	state	policies	is	severely	limited	because	they	are	essentially	paternalist	even	when	they	benefit	women	directly.	In	fact,	these	policies	further	embed	women	in	sets	of	gendered	relations,	which	reinforce	male	domination	and	control,	in	this	case	compliance	with	the	militarism	project.	The	singling	out	of	the	female	dependent	by	the	military	policy	is	reflective	of	the	patriarchal	state	that	enforces	a	‘family	ethic’	that	recognizes	women	as	dependents,	in	keeping	with	the	
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trope	of	the	helpless	women	who	is	taken	care	of	when	the	male	breadwinner	dies	and	whose	honour	is	at	stake	if	the	nation	is	undefended.	Furthermore,	women’s	ability	to	access	these	emoluments	depends	upon	the	benevolence	of	the	state	patriarch,	here	the	institution	of	the	military,	which	determines	her	suitability	as	a	subject.	A	set	of	conditions	that	she	must	meet	further	enmeshes	and	controls	her,	and	transgressing	those	boundaries	will	result	in	the	favours	being	taken	away,	as	with	the	reversion	of	pensions	in	cases	of	re-marriage.	The	state	then	turns	to	a	more	suitable	female	subject,	the	mother.	Moreover,	even	when	she	stays	within	these	boundaries,	the	male	patriarch	of	the	family	will	step	in	to	control	management	of	these	emoluments.	As	recounted	above,	Aslam’s	widow	Kausar	handed	over	the	money	to	her	brother	almost	immediately.	This	transfer	from	the	state	patriarch,	the	military	institution,	to	the	woman	for	a	brief	moment	and	then	back	to	the	patriarch	of	the	house	is	significant.			Thus,	it	is	no	surprise	that	these	policies	yield	limited	autonomy	to	the	female	subject,	even	when	land	deeds	and	pension	books	are	made	out	in	the	names	of	women.	The	terms	of	policy,	progressive	and	affirmative	as	it	may	be	in	principle	and	at	least	in	its	early	implementation,	are	doomed	as	much	by	the	status	and	position	of	women	in	rural	Pakistan	as	by	the	logic	of	the	policy	itself.	This	logic	hands	out	benefits	and	services	to	dependents	belonging	to	the	weaker,	primitive	sex,	who	are	pulled	into	the	project	of	militarism	in	ways	that	further	enmesh	them	in	the	institutions	of	family	and	nation-state.	The	masculine	state’s	erosion	of	the	family	patriarch	(initially	with	the	grieving	processes	and	then	through	compensation	procedures	that	name	the	female	as	primary	next	of	kin)	is	to	be	seen	not	as	an	erosion	of	patriarchy	but	its	subtle	transformation	from	familial	to	state	form.	This	transformation	does	not	weaken	the	patriarchal	structure	of	relationships	between	men	and	women,	nor	does	it	translate	into	visible	agency	for	women,	but	instead	positions	them	as	pawns	between	men,	first	between	the	military	and	the	family	and	then	between	the	male	members	of	the	family.		
	The	female	subject	receiving	emoluments	serves	the	military	in	two	ways.	First,	she	is	perhaps	the	ideal	subject	of	a	compensatory	regime	that	seeks	to	remain	masked	and	unimportant.	The	giving	of	monies	in	exchange	for	the	loss	of	death	seems	less	transactional	and	materialistic	when	the	recipient	is	the	grief	stricken	female	subject	and	supports	the	trope	of	the	vulnerable	women	(or	nation)	in	need	of	protection	and	the	narrative	of	selfless	sacrifice	that	the	military	holds	dear.	Second,	the	pulling	in	of	the	female	subject	in	more	binding	contractual	ways	also	serves	to	bring	in	a	more	intractable	subject,	one	perhaps	less	readily	swayed	by	the	notions	of	‘izzat	(prestige),	
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rutba	(status)	and	azaz	(ceremony)’	that	Nawaz’s	father	is	drawn	to,153	one	who,	as	I	documented	in	Chapter	4,	also	articulates	the	regulation	of	her	affect	at	the	time	of	soldiers’	deaths	as	intrusive.	This	difference,	expressed	below	by	Nawaz’s	sister	as	she	describes	the	divergent	responses	of	her	mother	and	father	to	the	YeS	ceremony,	is	created	by	how	the	male	and	female	subjects	are	imagined	and	brought	into	the	militarism	project	rather	than	by	any	essentialist	biological	variance.		 My	father	 is	a	political	man,	he	did	his	matric	when	very	few	people	 in	our	village	had	done	so,	he	thinks,	he	sees	things	differently,	my	mother	is	uneducated,	she	is	emotional,	she	only	feels.																																																																													(Nawaz’s	sister,	Palwal,	14th	September,	2015}		In	addition	to	my	field	work,	I	base	this	assertion	on	the	considerable	amount	of	scholarship	which	supports	the	notion	that	the	bonds	between	women	and	militarism	can	be	more	tenuous,	as	the	direct	focus	of	these	projects	has	been	men	and	notions	of	masculinity	(Ehrenreich	1997:19;	Mosse	1990;	Nagel	1998).	In	part,	the	sudden	attention	that	the	female	subject	may	get	as	she	is	drawn	into	these	projects,	the	meaning	it	accords	to	a	senseless	death	and	the	framing	of	her	being	the	rightful	claimant	of	the	emoluments	may	help	bring	her	closer	to	this	project.	However,	what	ties	her	to	militarism	in	more	inextricable	ways	are	the	myriad	social	relations	that	define	her	in	a	patriarchal	society	and	which	stand	to	benefit	from	emoluments.	The	channelling	of	compensation	through	her	ensures	that	she	is	firmly	enmeshed	in	the	militarism	project	and	remains	a	disciplined	subject.	In	other	words,	keeping	her	invested	and	complicit	becomes	the	goal	not	just	of	the	military	institution	but	also	of	the	male	members	of	the	family,	who	need	her	to	access	benefits	and	facilities.		
Fitting	the	Disabled	Body	in	In	this	section,	I	present	another	intractable	subject,	the	disabled	soldier	who,	unlike	the	
shaheed,	defies	simple	categorization	and	management.	In	Dismembering	the	Male,	Men’s	
Bodies,	Britain	and	the	Great	War	(1996),	Joanna	Bourke	details	the	fluctuations	in	public	and	policy	attention	to	the	bodies	of	the	disabled	after	WWI.	Compared	to	disabled	civilians,	constructed	as	‘passive	sufferers’,	the	war	wounded	and	disabled	were	set	up	as	‘active	sufferers’	(1996:39).	The	‘sentimentalization’	of	disablement	in	these	times	constructed	the	disabled	man	as	‘not	less	but	more	of	a	man’.	The	subject	of	attention	from	poets,	films	and	photographers,	they	were	‘England’s	broken	dolls’,	whose	absent	parts	represented	‘patriotic	power’	(1996:56-59).	Over	time,	the	special	status	accorded																																									 																					153	See	Chapter	4;	Nawaz’s	father,	10th	April	2015.	
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these	disabled	veterans	faded	and	they	started	to	be	‘identified	with	passivity	–	the	helplessness	of	children	who	needed	to	be	looked	after	for	the	rest	of	their	lives’	(1996:75).	I	trace	similar	fluctuations	in	representations	of	the	disabled	figure	in	the	context	of	the	current	war	in	Pakistan	and	suggest	that	the	Pakistani	military	has	only	just	begun	to	assimilate	this	cost	of	war,	inscribed	onto	the	living	body.	At	this	juncture,	reparation	regimes	rely	mostly	on	the	monetized	contract,	and	attempts	to	sentimentalize	the	disabled	are	unconvincing	for	a	host	of	reasons	that	I	will	elaborate	below.		The	on-going	war	in	Waziristan	has	resulted	in	the	deaths	of	over	5000	soldiers,	with	more	than	twice	that	number	maimed	or	injured.154	These	War	Wounded	Persons	(WWPs),	as	they	are	called	by	the	military,	have	three	types	of	disabilities,	largely	due	to	IED	(Improvised	Explosive	Device)	blasts:	spinal	cord	injuries,	amputations	(uni-,	bi-	and	tri-amputations)	and	traumatic	brain	injuries.	In	addition	to	the	network	of	Combined	Military	Hospitals	(CMH)	that	serve	the	injured,	the	army	has	set	up	specialized	centres	across	the	country,	specifically	in	Lahore,	Pano	Aqil,	Malir,	Mirpur	Khas,	Peshawar	and	Rawalpindi.	The	Armed	Forces	Institute	of	Rehabilitative	Medicine	(AFIRM)	in	Rawalpindi	is	the	largest	of	these	facilities.	Medical	treatment	and	rehabilitation	services	provided	at	this	centre	include	fitting	prosthetics,	vocational	training,	psychological	support	and	hostel	facilities.155	Compensation	packages	for	WWPs	were	upgraded	around	the	same	time	as	shuhada	compensation.156	The	current	policy	calculates	loss	based	on	the	degree	of	disability	and	assigns	one	of	three	categories	–	A,	B	or	C	–	to	the	soldier,	with	category	A	representing	the	highest	level	of	incapacitation.	Discharge	with	full	benefits	implies	a	loss	of	earning	power,	as	the	disabled	soldier	receives	a	percentage	of	his	salary	depending	upon	the	category	to	which	he	is	allocated.	In	2009,	the	army	announced	a	new	policy	whereby	WWPs	were	given	the	option	of	returning	to	their	units	to	be	assigned	suitable	and	secure	employment.	A	corresponding	guarded	visibility	was	accorded	these	incomplete	bodies	through	their	appearance	in	the	audience	at	the	YeS	ceremony	in	2012	and	also	on	military-sponsored	TV	programmes.	In	the	2013	and	2014	YeS	ceremonies,	short	documentaries	were	dedicated	to	WWPs,	but	they	disappeared	from	the	stage	in	2015.	When	questioned	about	this	disappearance,	the	organizers	said	that	this	was	because	of	time	limitations.157	Clearly	the	disabled	are	not	prioritized	as	highly	as	the	shaheed,	or	more	aptly	the	uncomplicated	affect	and	support	that	the																																									 																					154	Various	soldiers	and	senior	officers	of	the	Pakistan	Army	that	I	interviewed	suggested	this	ratio	between	the	dead	and	the	disabled.	155	Presentation	by	army	doctor,	AFIRM,	Rawalpindi,	17th	February	2015.	156	This	includes	disability	pensions	and	one-off	disability	compensation	from	the	government	allocation	and	allotment	of	land,	group	insurance	and	disability	allowance	from	the	GHQ	allocation..	157	Colonel	1	and	Major	1,	22nd	May	2015	and	16th	September	2015	respectively.		
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shaheed	and	his	family	can	invoke	is	prioritized	over	the	kinds	of	affect	that	may	be	invoked	when	these	disabled	bodies	are	on	display.	The	image	of	the	military	wants	to	present	is	that	of	the	steadfast	soldier,	undeterred	by	the	loss,	wanting	to	return	to	the	field	to	continue	fighting	like	a	man.	However,	the	disabled	soldier	cannot	return,	and	heroism	is	harder	to	attribute	to	the	incomplete	body.	So	it	is	not	surprising	that	not	only	is	their	inclusion	into	the	narrative	more	constrained	than	in	the	case	of	the	shaheed	and	the	other	masculine	able-bodied	ghazi,	but	it	is	also	more	ambivalent	in	that	they	are	sometimes	allowed	a	presence	and	sometimes	made	invisible.			I	did	not	go	looking	for	disabled	soldiers	in	the	villages	I	visited;	they	discovered	me	through	the	villagers	that	pointed	them	out	to	me.	‘Why	don’t	you	visit	Shakeel?’	or	‘Have	you	heard	of	Bashir,	he	just	returned,	he	doesn’t	have	any	legs?’	For	the	villagers,	the	connections	between	my	interest	in	those	who	had	died	in	the	war	and	the	lives	of	these	disabled	men	was	much	clearer.	The	fact	that	at	the	time	of	planning	my	fieldwork	I	had	not	thought	I	would	also	come	across	them	reflects	to	some	extent	my	own	internalization	of	the	grand	narrative	that	spoke	only	of	the	shaheed.			I	discuss	the	experiences	of	the	disabled	body	through	my	conversations	with	Shakeel	and	his	family.158	Shakeel	had	been	in	the	Army	for	one	year	and	22	days	when	he	was	maimed	in	an	IED	blast	in	Mahmud	Agency	in	Waziristan	in	2011.	He	remembers	that	day	clearly:		
	
Shakeel:	One	minute	I	was	standing	facing	one	direction	and	then	suddenly	there	was	dust	everywhere,	I	was	lying	far	away	facing	another	direction	(…)	I	remember	that	the	major	put	me	in	his	lap,	it	was	a	terrible	moment,	I	was	sobbing,	I	was	reading	the	kalma	(Muslim	confession	of	faith).159	I	thought	I	would	stop	breathing	(…)	I	stayed	in	the	hospital	for	nearly	two	years,	they	kept	operating	on	me.	I	did	not	tell	my	family	immediately	but	later	my	friend	told	them	and	my	mother	and	older	sister	came	to	Peshawar.			The	way	he	spoke	about	the	field	of	combat	was	in	stark	contrast	to	how	most	other	soldiers	I	had	interviewed	spoke	about	it	–	he	spoke	of	fear,	panic,	dust	and	grime	and	didn’t	mention	the	glory	and	excitement	that	others	often	alluded	to.	Shakeel’s	left	leg	is	amputated	from	the	knee	and	the	other	has	had	a	permanent	rod	inserted	in	it.	During	my	interviews	with	him	he	would	often	pull	up	his	shalwar	and	take	off	his	artificial	leg																																									 																					158	Drawn	from	four	interviews	with	Shakeel	and	his	family,	Kandwal,	2nd	October	2014	to	14th	August	2015.	159	Implies	that	he	was	thought	he	would	die.	
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and	point	to	the	other	where	there	was	an	angry	row	of	stitches	running	down	from	his	knee.	Shakeel’s	family	also	spoke	obsessively	about	the	loss;	it	figured	repeatedly	in	their	conversations	and	discussion	would	revolve	around	the	injury.	They	expressed	how	he	was	different,	not	complete	anymore.	Sometimes	the	mother	and	sister	would	refer	to	him	in	the	past	tense,	talking	of	the	way	he	was	or	what	he	could	have	been	had	he	not	been	maimed.	This	incompleteness	was	feminized,	and	the	sister	refers	to	him	below	to	him	as	someone	who	is	not	much	different	from	women:	defenceless	and	no	longer	able	to	defend	others.	
	
Sister:	What	happened	to	my	brother	is	zulm	(cruelty).	We	are	thankful	to	Allah	that	he	at	least	breathes,	when	he	comes	through	the	gate	our	heart	is	glad,	but	when	he	takes	off	his	leg,	he	is	defenceless;	if	someone	comes	into	this	house	and	takes	away	his	leg,	he	can’t	do	anything.	We	don’t	have	any	male	in	the	house,	our	father	is	sick	and	he	is	like	this.	If	he	had	been	ok,	we	would	not	have	needed	for	anything.	
	Shakeel	also	spoke	hesitantly	about	how	sometimes	he	was	teased	in	the	village	and	made	fun	of	for	not	being	physically	fit	any	more.	He	said	the	villagers	said	it	jokingly	and	was	willing	to	concede	that	maybe	they	meant	no	harm,	but	he	reiterated	that	it	hurt	him.	His	fiancée’s	family	broke	off	the	engagement	after	his	injury.	The	sense	of	having	being	changed	forever,	of	loss	that	can	never	be	resolved,	whether	in	military	or	civilian	environs,	was	intense.	The	tears	fell	freely,	he	was	able	to	express	sadness,	just	as	he	was	able	to	express	fear,	something	which	his	other	brothers	in	arms	have	difficulty	articulating.		
	
Mother:	He	still	cries	when	he	looks	at	his	leg.	Only	a	few	days	ago,	he	was	sitting	on	the	charpai	and	looking	at	his	leg	with	a	mirror.	He	kept	looking	and	looking	and	sobbing	and	sobbing.	When	I	walked	in,	I	found	him	like	that,	I	asked	him,	have	you	gone	mad?	
	Shakeel	echoes	the	shame	of	being	feminized	by	the	injury.	The	inability	to	perform,	a	fear	of	being	found	inadequate,	makes	him	unwilling	to	return	to	service	where	he	knows	he	will	be	assigned	feminized	tasks:	tasks	that	women	can	do	too,	like	cooking	or	gardening.			
Shakeel:	I	will	decide	[about	staying	or	leaving	the	army]	after	some	time.	I	want	a	[medical]	board.160	It	is	difficult	to	be	a	ghulam	(servant)	now.	Earlier	I	was	fit,	I	was	ghulam	because	I	chose	to	be	one,	now	I	am																																									 																					160	Board	here	refers	to	the	medical	board	that	can	sanction	release	from	army	service	because	of	a	medical	condition.		
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unfit,	now	I	will	choose	my	own	work	(…)	Like	earlier,	if	they	asked	me	to	do	anything,	I	could	perform,	I	could	do	it.	I	can’t	walk	now,	I	am	dependent	on	others.	How	can	I	work	for	others,	follow	orders?	Others	around	me	will	run	and	do	this.	It	will	be	difficult	to	bear	that.	(…)	Earlier,	when	I	went	into	the	army,	you	are	not	aware	[of	the	risks],	somebody	says	come	join	the	army,	nothing	will	happen.	But	now	(…)	I	have	told	them,	that	now	I	will	work	and	do	what	I	want.			His	choice	of	words,	that	he	will	no	longer	serve,	be	a	ghulam	(servant),	also	hints	at	defiance,	a	taking	back	of	control,	for	he	says	that	he	will	choose	his	own	work	from	now	on.	His	mother	regrets	his	decision	to	join	the	army.	Themes	of	regret	and	disavowal	that	the	decision	to	go	into	the	army	was	in	any	way	promoted	or	pushed	by	the	family	echoes	a	familiar	guilt	I	spoke	about	in	Chapter	4.	
	
Mother:	I	wish	he	had	never	left	for	the	army,	never	become	a	ghulam	(servant),	even	if	it	meant	him	working	as	a	labourer.	He	was	our	only	son,	our	only	support	(….)	we	only	educated	him,	we	did	not	have	money	to	educate	the	girls	(…).	He	wanted	to	go,	we	didn’t	force	him,	we	thought	we	would	live	more	comfortably,	some	money	will	come	into	our	home,	we	will	pass	our	time	well.	
	An	investigation	into	the	differences	between	the	dead	and	the	disabled	is	one	way	to	look	at	the	figure	of	the	disabled	soldier,	for	it	is	a	comparison	that	haunts	him	and	his	family	and	troubles	the	military.	Death	is	permanent,	death	is	sudden	and	the	dead	are	silent.	Death	is	also	something	that	we	must	all	face,	and	that	makes	it	all	the	more	intimate	and	familiar,	almost	comforting.	It	also	brings	with	it	finality	and	closure.	The	disabled	body	continues	to	live	after	sacrifice;	it	continues	to	breathe	even	though	the	life	it	lived	earlier	has	died.		
	
Shakeel:	He	who	is	hit	by	a	bullet,	he	becomes	a	shaheed	(but)	our	grief	stays	and	people	feel	pity	for	us.	They	[shaheed]	get	shot	and	they	finish.	When	others	see	us	they	see	with	what	difficulty	we	are	living	our	lives.	When	they	see	them	[shaheed’s	family]	they	sympathize	with	them.	Their	son	is	dead,	he	is	a	shaheed,	all	is	over,	in	our	case,	they	will	ask	us,	‘how	did	it	happen,	when	did	it	happen?’	It	becomes	alive	again.		
Sister:	We	can	see	his	face;	at	least	we	can	see	his	face,	even	if	he	is	disabled.	Those	who	are	shaheed,	their	mother	can’t	look	at	them,	their	children	can’t	look	at	them.	They	are	sad,	and	we	are	sad.		In	Shakeel’s	case	there	was	frankness,	an	immediate	ability	to	express	regret	about	earlier	decisions	and	much	less	need	to	constantly	refer	to	the	narrative	of	sacrifice	for	the	nation	or	religion.	His	family	called	the	sacrifice	of	a	limb	zulm	(something	that	is	
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unjust,	exploitative,	cruel)	in	contrast	to	the	families	of	the	shaheed,	who	in	their	initial	conversations	with	me	referred	to	the	sacrifice	of	life	as	a	nazrana	(offering)	to	the	nation.	I	posit	that	these	articulations	or	digressions	from	disciplined	subjects	that	Shakeel	and	his	family	allow	themselves	are	a	function	of	his	continuous	and	visible	loss,	which	has	yet	to	find	adequate	placement	or	closure	in	the	narrative	of	willing	sacrifice	that	the	military	so	effectively	crafts	around	the	figure	of	the	shaheed.	The	shaheed	is	far	more	visible	in	nationalist	discourse,	and	the	nation	constantly	hears	of	lives	sacrificed	for	the	nation,	but	rarely	of	the	countless	and	larger	number	of	men	who	are	disabled	for	life.	While	the	bodies	of	dead	men	serve	as	‘symbolic	capital’	(Verdery	1999:33),	the	mangled	bodies	of	the	disabled	are	not	glorious	enough	to	be	depicted	by	the	military.	Heroism	and	willing	sacrifice	is	easier	to	paint	on	the	dead	body	of	the	soldier	than	on	maimed	incomplete	bodies.	I	argue	that	the	inability	to	fully	absorb	the	incomplete	body	into	military	narratives,	with	WWPs	appearing	in	some	YeS	programmes	but	being	less	visible	in	others,	hints	at	a	psychic	anxiety	that	lurks	in	the	narrative	crafted	around	the	disabled,	anxiety	about	the	imperfect	body	that	can	no	longer	be	representative	of	hardness,	bravery	and	masculinity.	In	the	military	institution,	the	body	is	revered;	an	aspiration	of	perfection	haunts	the	soldier	from	the	moment	he	enters	the	institution,	undergoing	a	series	of	exacting	physical	and	medical	examinations	and	measurements.	His	body	is	literally	paraded	to	show	strength	and	discipline.	So	how	this	body	is	to	be	portrayed	now	that	it	is	imperfect,	the	very	antithesis	of	all	the	military	stands	for,	poses	a	problem.	This	mutilation	cannot	be	shrouded	and	nailed	up	in	a	coffin;	this	body	will	be	viewed	by	all	and	sundry,	an	object	of	pity,	feminized	as	it	can	no	longer	defend	itself.			As	Ophir	(2005:90)	suggests,	the	ability	of	loss	to	be	annulled	depends	upon	either	letting	go	interest	or	reducing	the	loss	to	some	sort	of	exchange	economy.	Much	like	the	loss	of	life	discussed	earlier,	this	loss	tries	to	articulate	itself	as	damage,	but	the	transformation	remains	even	more	incomplete,	for	unlike	families	of	the	dead,	WWPs	lack	recourse	to	a	system	of	commemoration	that	helps	them	make	meaning	of	the	loss.	Constant	comparisons	to	the	shaheed’s	greater	sacrifice,	and	by	default	to	the	disabled’s	inferior	sacrifice,	render	efforts	at	reparation	ineffectual.	Because	of	its	acute	sense	of	continuous	loss,	this	lived	experience	of	sacrifice	seems	to	them	more	painful	than	death.	Shakeel’s	family	has	been	unable	to	situate	themselves	within	this	discourse.	They	hint	at	equivalence	–	‘they	are	sad,	we	are	sad’	–	but	shy	away	from	it,	for	‘at	least’	the	loved	one	can	be	‘seen’.	Part	of	the	reason	that	the	bonds	between	these	families	and	the	military	are	not	as	intense	is	also	because	the	relationship	in	the	case	of	the	shaheed	is	directly	between	the	family	and	the	institution,	and	the	family	becomes	directly	dependent	upon	
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and	exposed	to	the	rhetoric	of	the	military.	Disabled	soldiers	serve	as	intermediaries	for	their	families,	who	are	not	invited	to	commemorative	events	other	than	as	carers	of	the	disabled,	and	they	are	missing	from	the	military	narratives	that	highlight	the	shaheed’s	family.	For	these	reasons,	in	the	case	of	the	disabled	the	transition	from	zulm	(cruelty)	to	the	nazrana	(offering)	remains	unconvincing.	The	two	irreconcilable	genres	suggested	by	Ophir,	loss	(tragedy)	and	damage	(bureaucratic	file),	remain	even	more	irreconcilable	in	this	case.			It	is	therefore	solely	the	compensation	regime,	or	the	genre	of	the	bureaucratic	file,	that	supports	families	in	handling	this	loss.	The	military	recognizes	this,	and	ensures	that	the	incentives	offered	are	sufficiently	generous	that	they	cannot	be	refused.	On	my	last	visit,	Shakeel	informed	me	that	he	had	realized	that	it	was	better	for	him	to	complete	at	least	15	years	of	service,	as	that	allowed	him	to	retire	with	full	benefits.	He	will	receive	full	medical	support	even	if	he	decides	to	opt	out	of	service,	but	he	also	recognizes	that	his	chances	of	receiving	better	care	are	higher	if	he	stays	in	service.	He	said	he	had	been	thinking	emotionally	earlier	and	he	was	thinking	more	sensibly	now.	He	had	also	become	engaged	to	a	young	woman	and	said	he	needed	to	be	practical	and	clear-headed.	As	the	AFIRM	psychologist	told	me,	depression	is	common	and	patients	can	initially	be	non-compliant,	but	the	policy	of	assured	service	and	benefits	helps	to	alleviate	their	principal	concerns	around	livelihood.161	The	binding	of	the	disabled	subject	to	the	military	is	thus	made	possible	largely	because	of	the	compensation	regime.	Loss	continues	to	haunt	this	subject	and	perhaps	makes	him	more	intractable	than	others.	He	must	be	zealously	guarded	and	kept	close	to	the	military,	something	which	the	military	recognizes.		
	All	interviews	that	you	see	on	TV	are	first	approved	by	the	ISPR	to	see	if	they	are	appropriate,	and	in	fact	an	officer	accompanies	these	people	when	they	visit	the	hospital.	They	then	submit	the	video	or	article	before	they	are	allowed	to	screen	or	publish.						(Deputy	Commandant,	AFIRM,	17th	February	2017)		The	military	would	rather	retain	him	than	let	him	go,	even	if	this	means	a	greater	burden	on	its	resources.	As	suggested	by	Brigadier	2,	‘in	case	he	wishes	to	retire,	we	first	try	and	persuade	him	not	to.	We	show	him	the	benefits	of	continuing	service.	If	he	is	adamant	then	we	will	let	him	go.	More	than	60%	will	continue’.	This	proximity	is	desired	because,	as	Brigadier	2	suggests,	the	disabled	soldier	is	a	‘zinda	lash	(a	living	corpse).	It	is	a	very	
																																								 																					161	AFIRM	psychologist,	17th	February	2015.	
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precarious	situation,	for	he	suffers	the	most,	as	everything	changes	for	him’.162	He	is	a	subject	that	occupies	the	spaces	of	the	dead	and	the	living,	a	man	and	yet	as	helpless	as	the	dreaded	feminine,	from	whom	distance	has	been	so	carefully	created.	The	‘precariousness’	mentioned	here	is	not	just	the	life-changing	experience	of	disability,	but	also	his	positioning	within	the	narrative	of	sacrifice.	He	is	a	liminal	figure	who	refuses	categorization,	and	in	that	refusal	threatens	to	destabilize	the	carefully	crafted	narrative	of	sacrifice.	A	narrative	that	holds	this	liminal	figure	in	place	is	yet	to	be	crafted,	although	the	dangerous	and	non-final	nature	of	the	affect	of	the	disabled	and	his	family	can	apparently	be	disciplined	through	monetized	regimes	of	compensation.	
Conclusion	This	chapter	has	interrogated	the	compensation	regimes	rolled	out	by	the	Pakistani	military	in	cases	of	death	and	disability	and	has	suggested	that	these	regimes	operate	as	‘economies	of	loss’:	compensation	offered	for	losses	that	for	disparate	reasons	elude	reparation	for	the	military	institution	and	its	subjects.			By	exploring	the	desire	for	the	invisibility	of	material	compensation	on	the	part	of	the	military	and	its	subjects,	this	chapter	has	drawn	attention	to	the	anxieties	and	unease	associated	with	these	regimes.	It	has	argued	that	reluctance	to	bring	this	aspect	of	the	relationship	to	the	foreground	is	reflective	of	the	military’s	desire	to	construct	death	and	loss	as	willing	sacrifice.	The	military’s	desire	to	play	up	the	sacrifice	and	play	down	material	compensation	is	an	attempt	to	extract	maximum	leverage	from	the	nation	as	well	as	to	garner	support	for	its	image	as	a	selfless	defender	of	the	nation.	For	the	families	of	the	deceased,	because	death	was	predictable	as	a	possible	outcome	in	a	gamble	for	a	better	life,	loss,	damage	and	the	possibility	of	compensation	play	out	in	even	more	complicated	ways.	The	military	draws	upon	ideologies	of	nation	and	religion,	including	tropes	of	honour	and	sacrifice,	as	well	as	materialistic	drivers,	to	cement	its	relationship	with	the	families	of	the	deceased,	emphasizing	different	aspects	of	the	relationship	at	different	times.	For	the	families,	the	relationship	at	this	juncture	is	driven	by	a	need	to	make	meaning	and	quiet	the	unease	that	emanates	from	entering	into	a	transaction	involving	the	death	of	a	loved	one.	Counter	intuitively,	they	do	this	by	fighting	for	the	very	compensation	that	makes	them	uncomfortable,	for	this	allows	them	to	claim	what	their	son	earned,	and	by	doing	so	make	the	loss	worthwhile.	The	substance	of	the	relationship	between	the	subjects	and	the	military	institution	is	constructed	from	the	interaction	between	the	two,	an	interaction	that	masks	the	logic	of	compensation	for																																									 																					162	Brigadier	2,	Shuhada	Cell,	7th	August	2015.	
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military	death	from	each	other,	from	the	nation	and	perhaps	in	the	case	of	the	families,	from	themselves.			This	chapter	has	also	investigated	how	the	mechanics	of	compensation	regimes	imbricate	the	female	subject	(specifically	the	widow)	and	the	disabled	soldier,	both	of	whom	are	deemed	intractable	for	different	reasons,	into	the	militarism	project.			The	wife	represents	romantic	or	sexual	love,	a	capacity	that	does	not	end	with	the	death	of	the	husband	and	hence	makes	her	a	less	appropriate	subject	than	the	mother,	whose	bonds	of	love	are	considered	more	durable.	This	creates	a	set	of	anxieties	for	the	military,	as	in	addition	to	being	less	suitable	for	depiction	in	commemorative	practices,	the	wife	also	threatens	to	draw	attention	to	the	material	aspects	of	this	transaction	in	cases	when	re-marriage	leads	to	dispute	over	the	distribution	of	compensation.	The	deceased’s	family	also	stands	to	lose	if	the	wife	remarries	outside	the	family	or	decides	to	move	out.	The	chapter	has	argued	that,	as	the	recipient	of	emoluments	handed	out	by	the	military	at	the	time	of	death,	the	female	subject	becomes	further	enmeshed	in	the	social	relationships	that	define	her	in	a	patriarchal	society.	It	is	rare	that	she	has	control	over	what	she	has	been	given,	and	she	often	becomes	a	pawn	between	the	male	members	on	either	side	of	the	family.			In	conditions	where	those	who	have	sacrificed	do	not	die,	but	continue	to	live,	reflect	and	speak,	reparation	is	even	more	challenging.	The	military	has	yet	to	place	the	disabled	securely	within	the	narrative	of	sacrifice,	which	it	crafts	much	more	effectively	in	case	of	the	shaheed.	Its	attempts	to	sentimentalize	the	disabled	remain	unconvincing	for	a	host	of	reasons,	some	to	do	with	the	continuous	nature	of	loss	and	some	to	do	with	the	challenges	of	categorizing	this	incomplete	body	as	part	of	the	image	of	the	able-bodied	warrior.	At	this	juncture,	its	efforts	at	reparation	rely	mostly	on	using	monetized	contracts	to	rein	in	this	intractable	subject.			 	
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Chapter 6: Battles Won and Lost - Service, Shahadat and the Enemy 
Revisited The	qanoon	[law]	of	the	shaheed	is	that	one	group	is	defying	religion	and	the	other	is	standing	firm	on	the	side	of	the	right	and	there	is	clash	between	them	and	there	is	a	declaration	of	war.	[Only]	then	he	is	
shaheed.	These	shaheed	are	at	the	orders	of	America,	America	wants	to	rule	the	world	and	wants	to	take	over	with	its	men,	there	is	no	right	or	wrong	in	this.										 	(Cleric	2,	Palwal,	2nd	February	2015)				Since	9/11,	the	Pakistani	military	has	grappled	with	a	new	system,	fighting	a	war	inside	Pakistan’s	borders	against	an	enemy	that	is	not	yet	othered	but	bears	an	uncomfortable	familiarity	in	terms	of	religion.	In	the	above	excerpt	from	an	interview	with	a	cleric	in	Palwal,	the	shaheed	being	questioned	are	the	soldiers	of	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces	dying	in	the	GWOT.	This	chapter	investigates	how	changing	narratives	about	the	enemy	influence	the	meaning	assigned	to	dying	for	the	state	in	local	spaces	such	as	rural	Chakwal.			The	chapter	presents	the	ambivalence	and	discomfort	that	emerge	due	to	the	current	war,	in	spaces	long	considered	the	military’s	heartland.	This	discomfort	strains	at	the	relationship	between	the	military	and	its	subjects	and	produces	certain	kinds	of	anxieties	that	are	smoothed	over	by	both	protagonists,	lest	the	cleavages	become	more	obvious.163	On	the	surface,	it	seems	that	it	is	business	as	usual.	Whatever	the	doubts	created	by	these	ambivalences,	they	are	resolved	and	soothed,	for	we	do	not	see	mass	disaffection	among	troops	in	these	districts,	hence	some	may	posit	that	they	are	not	worthy	of	analysis.	I	argue	that	examining	these	doubts	and	the	dynamics	of	their	resolution	provides	a	useful	window	to	understand	the	relationship	between	the	military	institution	and	its	subjects.	Studying	this	relationship	through	the	prism	of	this	war	strips	away	the	rhetoric	of	Islam	that	too	often	shrouds	it.	This	is	helpful,	for	it	lays	bare	the	materialist	and	affective	inducements	that	secure	service	and	sacrifice	in	the	Pakistani	military.	The	chapter	will	argue	that	the	‘battle	of	narratives’	(a	term	used	by	Colonel	1),	that	seeks	to	(re)claim	the	right	to	shahadat,	is	won	by	the	military	not	through	the	discourses	of	nation	and	religion,	but	on	totally	different	terrain,	populated	by	materialist	and	affective	drivers.	164				
																																								 																					163	The	military’s	anxieties	were	foregrounded	in	Chapter	1.	164	Colonel	1,	ISPR,	22nd	May	2015.	This	refers	to	the	perceived	need	to	battle	the	assertion	of	the	religious	right	(Jammat-i-Islami	and	some	Deobandi	groups)	that	the	military	dead	are	not	shaheed.	
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This	chapter	first	articulates	how	I	locate	religion	within	the	idea	of	the	state	of	Pakistan.	In	this	section	I	present	a	broad-stroke	trajectory	of	the	events	that	have	led	the	Pakistani	military	into	this	current	war,	starting	from	the	genesis	of	the	state	and	its	legitimation	through	religion	and	the	nexus	between	sectarianism,	jihadism	and	Pakistan’s	rulers	(both	military	and	civilian).	These	entanglements	are	discussed	as	an	essential	context,	wherein	ambivalent	subjects	of	the	Pakistani	military	(soldiers	and	families)	are	formed.	The	chapter	then	draws	upon	my	ethnography	of	Palwal	village	and	interviews	with	retired	and	serving	military	soldiers,	local	politicians	and	ordinary	men	and	women	from	Palwal	and	adjoining	villages	to	document	responses	to	the	new	Muslim	enemy.	The	last	section	investigates	contestations	around	dead	soldiers	from	these	areas,	looking	at	how	they	are	expressed	and	resolved	and	the	imperatives	that	make	resolution	possible.	
Locating	Religion	in	the	Pakistani	State	and	Military	The	use	of	religion	as	a	tool	of	legitimation	has	a	long	and	complicated	history	in	Pakistan,	and	its	roots	lie	in	the	genesis	of	the	Pakistani	state	itself.	Christopher	Jaffrelot	describes	Pakistani	nationalism	as	one	‘where	the	ideological	construction	of	the	national	project	precedes	the	formation	(in	sociological	terms)	of	the	nation’	(Jaffrelot	2015:189).	Like	many	scholars	before	him,	he	suggests	that	this	nationalism	has	relied	heavily	on	the	instrumentalization	of	Islam,	allowing	an	elite	Muslim	minority	to	convince	Muslim	majority	provinces	to	participate	in	the	division	of	what	was	then	British	India.	A	nation	that,	as	Salman	Rushdie	suggested,	was	not	‘sufficiently	imagined’	and	was	born	as	a	result	of	what	Younus	Samad	calls	‘a	brief	moment	of	political	unity’	(Rushdie	1983:87;	Samad	1995:90).	In	his	examination	of	the	political	idea	that	lies	at	the	root	of	Pakistan,	Faisal	Devji	argues	that	Muslim	nationalists	nullified	history,	geography	and	even	demography	to	lay	the	foundation	of	their	political	mobilization,	focusing	instead	on	an	‘empty’	idea	of	religion.	Religion	here	was	not	an			 old	fashioned	theological	entity,	but	an	abstract	idea	and	modern	idea,	(…)	whose	sense	of	brotherhood	provides	a	people	with	the	foundations	of	its	nationality.	For	Muslim	nationalism,	in	other	words,	religion	was	conceived	of	not	as	a	supplement	to	geography	but	as	its	alternative	(Devji,	2013:47)	.		This	was	religion	‘in	the	peculiarly	secular	sense’	(Devji,	2013:139),	as	‘Jinnah	had	attempted	to	turn	Islam	into	an	ethno-territorial	ideology	that	could	be	exploited	to	political	ends’	(Jaffrelot	2015:459).	Whatever	Jinnah	may	have	imagined	for	the	Pakistani	state,	scholars	have	argued	that	this	very	ambiguity,	and	the	indeterminate	nature	of	how	
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Islam	was	conceived	for	the	purpose	of	legitimizing	the	struggle	for	Pakistan,	has	led	to	it	being	exploited	by	both	political	and	military	leaders	alike;	a	usage	that	has	also	played	out	through	alliances	with	and	appeasement	of	the	religious	right.	Starting	from	the	constitutional	debates	between	the	relatively	secular	Muslim	League,	which	viewed	Islam	as	an	identity	marker,	and	religious	scholars,	who	embodied	a	more	Islamist	vision,	Pakistan’s	history	is	chequered	with	the	state’s	dangerous	obsession	with	the	‘empty’	idea	of	religion.		Stemming	partly	from	the	ambiguity	mentioned	above,	the	state	of	Pakistan	‘invented’	(Gellner	1964)	a	Pakistani	selfhood	based	on	purging	the	other:	the	Hindu	or	the	Hindu	Indian	state	(Racine	2002;	Saigol	2013).	Religion	was	underlined	in	this	identity	as	the	primary	basis	of	difference.	This	was	a	simpler	version	of	Islam,	an	internally	undifferentiated	category	that	emerged	in	sharp	relief	only	when	posited	against	the	enemy,	Hindu	India.	Pakistani	nationhood,	perceived	as	under	threat	from	both	neighbouring	India	and	the	internal	challenges	posed	by	nationalist	movements	and	ethno-linguistic	conflicts	after	partition,	continued	the	process	of	deepening	its	religious	character	through	two	routes.	First,	the	culture	and	identity	of	a	culturally	diverse	geographical	area	was	forcefully	homogenized	around	a	single	–	Muslim	–	identity,	while	the	second	inter-related	trajectory	involved	strengthening	the	predominantly	Punjabi	military	over	and	above	other	state	institutions	(Rizvi	2003;	Jaffrelot	2015:123-124)			Against	this	backdrop,	religious	extremism	in	Pakistan	can	be	traced	to	the	coming	together	of	two	elements	in	the	late	1970s,	around	the	time	of	the	General	Zia-ul	Haq’s	1977	takeover.	The	first	was	religious	sectarianism,	involving	antagonism	between	Shia	and	Deobandi	Sunni	sects,	which	intensified	largely	as	result	of	a	mix	of	domestic	and	regional	factors.	These	factors	included	Gen.	Zia’s	1979	Islamization	policy,	largely	Sunni	in	flavour,	and	the	dynamics	set	in	motion	by	the	Iranian	revolution,	with	Saudi	and	Iranian	funding	trickling	in	to	enhance	Sunni	and	Shia	influence	in	the	region	respectively	(Nasr	2002;	Abou	Zahab	2002;	Ahmed	2013).	It	might	be	useful	to	clarify	here	that	three	of	the	four	dominant	sects	Pakistan	(Barelvi,	Deobandi	and	Ahle-Hadith)	are	part	of	the	Sunni	branch	of	Islam.	Within	this,	the	Barelvi	sect	has	the	deepest	roots	in	Punjab,	outnumbering	the	other	two	groups.	The	fourth	sect	is	the	Ahle-	Tashi	Shia	minority.	What	is	referred	to	as	the	Shia-Sunni	conflict	is	a	misnomer,	especially	in	Punjab,	and	can	better	be	described	as	antagonism	between	Shias	and	Deobandi	Sunnis,	who	are	supported	by	Ahle-Hadith	in	their	anti-Shia	stance.	At	one	point,	the	Sipah	Sahaba	Pakistan,	a	Deobandi	political	organization,	renamed	itself	Ahle-Sunnat	wal	Jamaat	
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(ASWJ).	This	blurring	of	identities	among	Sunni	sects	is	important	to	highlight,	for	reasons	I	will	take	up	in	the	following	sections.			The	second	element	that	played	a	pivotal	role	in	rising	extremism	in	the	country	is	the	heavy	investment	in	jihadism,	a	state	project	to	shore	up	support	for	the	jihad	in	Afghanistan	in	the	1970s	and	1980s,	and	later	in	Kashmir	during	the	1980s	and	1990s.	This	was	firmly	rooted	in	the	Pakistani	establishment’s	obsession	with	India,	starting	with	the	strongly	felt	inferiority	and	vulnerability	that	Pakistan	inherited	at	partition	in	1947,	reinforced	in	1971	when	Bangladesh	became	independent.	The	route	taken	by	the	establishment	to	ease	this	sense	of	inadequacy	is	the	legacy	that	haunts	Pakistan	to	this	day.	This	included	the	arming	of	jihadist	movements	to	fight	in	Afghanistan	in	order	to	acquire	strategic	depth	(Cheema	2003:3)	and	then	in	Kashmir	in	order	to	bleed	India	(Rashid	2012),	as	well	as	allowing	its	own	soil	in	the	Federally	Administered	Tribal	Areas,	its	Northern	Province,	KP	and	parts	of	Punjab	to	be	used	to	nurture	the	radical	ideologies	that	supported	these	groups	(Gul	2010;	Rashid	2012;	Jaffrelot	2015).	The	roots	of	this	can	be	traced	back	to	before	the	Soviet	invasion	of	Afghanistan.	Zulfiqar	Ali	Bhutto,	a	civilian	ruler,	played	the	religion	card	both	internally,	when	he	pandered	to	religious	parties	and	used	a	1974	constitutional	amendment	to	declare	Ahmedis	to	be	non-Muslims,	and	externally,	when	he	offered	his	support	to	Islamist	groups	fighting	to	overthrow	the	pro-USSR	regime	in	Kabul	(Gul	2010).	After	the	Soviet	invasion,	under	the	martial	regime	of	General	Zia,	the	Inter	Services	Intelligence	(ISI)	invested	in	the	Afghan	Mujahideen	with	active	support	from	both	the	US	and	Saudi	Arabia.	The	ISI	relied	partly	on	Jammat-i-Islami	(JI),	a	religious	political	party,	to	carry	out	its	strategy,	which	involved	mobilizing	young	men	for	jihad	in	Afghanistan	(Roy	1995;	Jaffrelot	2015).	Once	Afghanistan	had	been	won	over,	the	Pakistani	jihadist	movements	turned	their	attention	to	Indian	Kashmir,	with	continued	support	and	aid	from	the	ISI	and	the	military	(Rashid	2012).	It	is	relevant	to	mention	here	that	JI	claims	the	first	shaheed	in	Afghanistan.	Posted	at	the	gate	of	its	headquarters	in	Mansoora	(Lahore,	Punjab)	is	a	list	of	hundreds	of	Afghan	and	Kashmiri	shaheeds	(qtd.	in	Jaffrelot	2015:502).	This	is	instructive	to	the	discussion	in	Chapter	1	about	the	challenge	from	these	same	groups	to	the	Pakistani	military	regarding	its	right	to	claim	martyrdom	for	its	soldiers	and	the	discussion	in	this	chapter	about	how	dying	for	the	state	is	understood	in	local	spaces	where	the	military-mosque	nexus	is	challenged.		
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These	two	elements,	sectarianism	and	jihadism,	have	a	natural	affinity	for	each	other,	although,	as	mentioned	above,	their	trajectories	in	Pakistan	have	been	different.	Both	elements	converge	and	must	be	viewed	collectively	if	we	are	to	understand	how	the	political	use	of	religion	by	the	state	and	its	proxies,	and	now	anti	state	elements,	plays	out	in	entangled	ways	in	local	spaces.				While	the	Pakistani	military	has	been	a	primary	driver	in	the	steady	Islamization	of	the	state	and	its	population,	it	has	not	itself	been	insulated	from	these	influences.	Since	partition,	it	has	relied	heavily	on	the	construction	of	a	more	ideological	and	religiously	motivated	imagining	of	the	soldier	(Rizvi	2003,	Saigol	2013).	This	was	a	shift,	as	the	rhetoric	employed	by	the	British	Indian	Army,	which	depended	on	the	same	regions	for	recruitment,	revolved	around	the	myth	of	the	martial	race	and	loyalty	to	the	Raj	(Caplan	2010;	Mazumder	2011;	Singh	2014).	The	Pakistani	military	uses	religion	to	construct	its	image	as	the	defender	of	faith,	not	just	national	boundaries	(Ishtiaq	2013;	Fair	2014;	Jaffrelot	2015).	As	a	result,	in	the	four	wars	with	India,	the	martyr	for	the	nation	and	the	
shaheed	for	religion	have	been	imagined	side	by	side	with	little	or	no	contestation.	It	may	be	useful	to	highlight	that	this	is	not	the	first	time	that	the	Pakistani	military	has	taken	on	a	Muslim	enemy.	The	1971	break-up	of	Pakistan	and	the	killing	of	Bengali	Muslims	did	not	pose	challenges	similar	to	those	faced	by	the	soldier	in	the	GWOT.	For	those	in	West	Pakistan,	the	1971	war	was	constructed	as	‘The	Betrayal	of	East	Pakistan’	(Niazi	1998),	and	killing	was	made	possible	by	othering	the	Bengali	and	playing	on	his	constructed	affinity	with	Hindu	India.	The	army	labelled	the	Mukti	Bahini,	the	Bangladeshi	guerrilla	movement,	as	kafir	(non-believers)	(Cohen,	2004).	Operations	in	Baluchistan,	especially	in	the	so-called	fourth	war	of	1973-1977,	which	resulted	in	the	loss	of	over	5,300	Baluch	Muslim	lives,	did	not	pose	much	contention	either,	as	the	enemy	were	constructed	as	Baluch	nationalists	(Urmila	Phadnis	qtd.	in	Jaffrelot	2015:139;	Titus	1996).	In	both	these	instances,	ethnicity	trumped	religious	identity	and	did	not	pose	a	threat	to	the	construction	of	the	soldier	as	a	fighter	for	Islam	and	the	military	institution	as	a	defender	of	faith.		Since	9/11,	pressure	from	the	United	States	has	forced	Pakistan	to	take	on	the	very	Islamic	militants	that	it	had	nurtured	and	groomed	for	proxy	wars	in	Afghanistan	and	Kashmir.	This	turnabout	in	military	state	policy	has	taken	place	in	fits	and	starts,	as	evidenced	by	the	initially	half-hearted	troop	deployment	and	operations	in	Waziristan,	as	well	as	a	number	of	failed	peace	agreements.	It	has	been	suggested	that	this	ambivalence	towards	sections	of	the	Taliban	that	promise	strategic	depth	in	Afghanistan	or	Islamists	
			 205	
that	restrict	their	operation	to	India	continues	in	current	military	policy	(Fair	2014).	This	thesis	does	not	attempt	to	add	insight	to	this	particular	line	of	inquiry,	but	instead	mentions	this	backdrop	as	a	context	to	help	understand	that	the	subjects	produced	in	these	ambivalent	frames	are	bound	to	be	ambivalent	as	well.	In	other	words,	ambivalence	among	those	who	participate	in	the	militarism	project	(soldiers,	families	and	districts)	has	a	social,	political	and	historical	basis.	I	first	turn	briefly	to	the	immediate	historical	backdrop	of	the	province	of	Punjab	to	contextualize	its	complicated	history	of	mobilization	in	the	name	of	religion.	
Punjab	and	Shifting	Enemies	Within	and	Without	Since	the	1980s,	the	influence	of	various	competing	Muslim	religious	alignments	and	sects	has	grown	steadily	in	Punjab.	These	have	now	become	integrated	into	the	socio-political	system,	allowing	them	significant	outreach	in	society	through	religious	and	political	parties,	madrassas	and	welfare	organizations	(Jaffrelot	2015;	Siddiqa	2013).	Although	there	are	less	Deobandis	than	Barelvis	in	Pakistan	as	a	whole,	as	of	2012	there	are	approximately	9,500	Deobandi	madrasas	registered	across	Pakistan,	compared	to	6,500	associated	with	other	Muslim	sects	(Bano	2012:70-71).	41.4	%	of	the	total	number	of	seminaries	in	Punjab	are	Deobandi,	while	the	Deobandi	population	stands	at	22.45	%	of	the	total	(Ramzan	2015).165	Parts	of	Punjab	are	Shia-dominated,	specifically	by	Shia	landlords.	Sectarianism	has	firm	roots	within	the	province	and	religio-political	Shia	and	Sunni	identities	have	resulted	in	sectarian	violence	from	time	to	time.	Sectarian	tensions	are	rarely	restricted	to	religious	grounds,	and	have	often	folded	into	other	conflicts,	for	instance	over	land	or	electoral	rivalries	(Waseem	2001,	Abou	Zahab	2002,	Nelson	2016).	Punjab,	especially	the	south,	has	been	a	prime	recruitment	and	training	ground	for	jihad	in	Afghanistan	and	Kashmir	(Siddiqa	2013).	The	spectre	of	the	Punjabi	Taliban	has	been	repeatedly	pointed	out	by	analysts	as	a	formidable	force	that	potently	represents	the	merging	of	sectarian	and	jihadist	forces,	made	all	the	more	toxic	by	their	past	and,	many	argue	current	patronage	by	the	establishment,	including	state	bureaucracy,	military	intelligence	agencies,	political	parties	and	trading	communities	(Siddiqa	2013;	Jaffrelot	2015;	Nelson	2016).		
While	the	rising	Deobandi	presence	and	the	inter-related	jihadist	project	has	largely	been	concentrated	in	southern	Punjab,	there	are	also	distinct	pockets	in	northern	Punjab,	where	Chakwal	is	located	(Siddiqa	2013;	Nelson	2016).	Shiites	are	an	influential	minority	in	Chakwal	district,	but	its	rural	areas	are	largely	Barelvi-dominated.	Here,	Deobandi																																									 																					165	Between	1988	and	2000,	the	number	of	dini	seminaries	in	Punjab	grew	from	1320	to	3153,	a	higher	growth	rate	than	in	the	province	of	KP,	usually	associated	with	extremism	(Fair	2008).	
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numbers	have	increased	at	a	rapid	pace,	and	certain	areas,	such	as	the	administrative	subdivision	of	Talagang,	are	more	open	to	this	influence.166	Both	Deobandi	and	Ahle-Hadith	religious	and	militant	organizations	operate	in	these	areas,	with	support	from	the	business-trading	community,	religious	leaders	and	the	state	machinery	(Siddiqa	2013:13).	In	Chakwal,	this	steady	indoctrination	is	apparent	in	the	Shiite/Sunni	cleavages	that	have	appeared	as	a	result	of	Deobandi	influence.	In	2009,	a	suicide	attacker	blew	himself	up	inside	a	bargah	(a	Shiite	place	of	worship)	in	Chakwal	city.167	Maulana	Akram	Awan	(a	former	army	soldier)	of	Tanzeem-ul-Ikhwan	(The	Brotherhood	Organization)	of	Chakwal	threatened	General	Pervez	Musharraf	with	a	million-man-march	to	Islamabad	to	demand	the	implementation	of	Sharia	law	in	the	country	in	2000.	(Phillipon	2016:160).	In	a	more	recent	incident,	in	2016	an	Ahmedi	place	of	worship	was	attacked	by	a	mob	in	Dulmial	Village	in	Chakwal.168		Increasing	radicalism	in	Chakwal,	a	traditionally	martial	district,	poses	the	question	of	how	soldiers	who	come	from	this	area	may	be	affected	by	these	local	dynamics,	which	until	Pakistan’s	participation	in	the	war	on	terror	posed	few	dilemmas	for	the	military	or	for	the	local	population.	The	slow	but	definite	turnabout	in	policies	that	has	come	with	the	increased	deployment	of	troops	and	the	intensification	of	operations	in	Waziristan	makes	visible	in	both	dramatic	and	(more	often)	undramatic	ways	the	unravelling	of	the	alliance	between	religion	and	the	military	as	a	result	of	the	inclusion	of	a	new(er)	enemy	within	its	scope:	radical	Sunni	Deobandi	groups	that	have	turned	against	the	state.	In	the	next	section,	I	build	a	case	that	this	unravelling	has	implications	for	the	Pakistani	military’s	ability	to	demand	unquestioned	loyalty	from	this	(martial)	district.	
The	Enemy	as	One	of	Our	Own	I	now	turn	to	the	intimate	space	of	the	villages	of	Chakwal	district	in	order	to	understand	how	the	new(er)	enemy	is	viewed	there.	I	start	this	interrogation	with	the	caveat	that	much	of	my	fieldwork	took	place	in	five	villages	in	the	Chakwal	Tehsil	of	Chakwal	District,	all	of	which	are	Barelvi-dominated.	While	there	is	some	Deobandi	influence	there,	it	is	not	significant	in	terms	of	population	figures.	Results	may	indeed	be	different	among	Shia	populations,	in	urban	parts	of	Chakwal	where	Sunni-Shia	cleavages	go	deeper,	or	in	areas	where	there	is	more	organized	Deobandi	influence,	such	as	Talagang	Tehsil.	While	the	conclusions	I	draw	must	be	analysed	in	this	context,	I	believe	that	as																																									 																					166	Interviews	with	district	officials	and	local	politicians.	167	Staff	Reporter	(2009,	April	9).	Bloodbath	in	Chakwal	leaves	26	dead,	40	injured.	Dawn.	Retrieved	from	http://www.dawn.com/news/455393		168	Dhakku,	N.	(2016,	December	14).	Fear	stalks	Chakwal	after	attack	on	Ahmadi	place	of	worship.	Dawn.	Retrieved	from	http://www.dawn.com/news/1302240		
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many	areas	of	rural	Chakwal	present	a	similar	picture,	the	following	examination	is	significant	for	understanding	how	the	war	and	the	enemy	is	viewed	in	areas	that	are	not	considered	contentious	because	of	their	long	association	with	the	military	and	their	relatively	small	Deobandi	population.	In	other	words,	if	contestations	of	the	military’s	current	war	exist	despite	these	factors,	they	are	perhaps	all	the	more	significant.			The	following	excerpt	from	an	interview	with	a	college	professor	in	Chakwal	sets	out	some	of	this	debate	around	the	war.	It	refers	to	an	attack	by	Tehreek	Taliban	Pakistan	(TTP)	on	an	army	public	school	in	Peshawar	in	December	2014.			There	are	different	reactions	to	this	school	incident	that	has	just	happened.	Some	people	believe	that	what	happened	should	not	have	happened,	others	believe	that	this	is	bad	but	that	what	happened	in	the	Lal	Masjid	is	also	bad,	and	[then]	there	are	those	who	say	that	what	has	happened	is	what	should	have	happened.	These	three	perspectives	are	like	stairs;	as	you	go	up	you	move	towards	extremism,	the	third	stair	is	the	most	extremist.	(…)	This	extremist	thinking	is	in	some	Deobandi	groups:	they	think	the	fauj	is	murtid	(apostate),	those	who	accept	Islam	first	and	then	reject	it	later.			 	 	 	 												(Professor	Shamil,	Chakwal	city,	5th	January	2015)	
	The	above	excerpt	sums	up	the	various	views	about	the	war	and	the	new	enemy	in	Chakwal.	There	is	clearly	no	single	interpretation	of	how	the	local	space	regards	this	war	and	this	enemy.	What	is	interesting	is	that	these	perspectives	are	presented	not	as	distinct	categories	but	as	a	continuum,	which	permits	a	slippery	range	of	positions	that	suggest	not,	duplicity	but	allow	for	ambivalence	to	be	expressed.		An	array	of	mosques	and	competing	religious	ideologies	dot	the	landscape	of	rural	Punjab.	These	mosques	represent	different	schools	of	Islam,	with	the	most	clear-cut	division	being	between	Shiite	(Ahle-Tashi)	and	Sunni	(Ahle-Sunnat)	mosques,	which	differ	architecturally	as	well	as	in	their	adornments.	In	Palwal,	the	two	dominant	sub-sects	are	Barelvi	and	Deobandi,	with	the	former	in	the	majority.	There	are	a	total	of	four	mosques	in	the	village,	of	which	two	are	exclusively	Barelvi.	The	largest	and	most	well	attended	mosque	is	located	right	next	to	a	large	darbar	(shrine),	where	steady	streams	of	people	from	inside	and	outside	the	village	pay	homage.	The	villagers	claim	that	this	is	a	Barelvi	mosque,	but	it	is	attended	by	both	Barelvis	and	Deobandis	and	has	a	Deobandi	cleric.			
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Adherence	to	sub-sects	within	Sunni	Islam	was	often	not	expressed	outright,	but	emerged	only	upon	direct	questioning.	Questions	about	sects	would	be	taken	to	mean	the	Shiite	and	Sunni	divide.	The	other	was	the	Ahle-Tashi	(Shia)	or	the	Marzai	(Ahmedi),	and	to	some	extent	the	Ahle-Hadith.	There	was	a	tendency	to	regard	Barelvis	and	Deobandis	as	being	the	same,	resting	within	the	folds	of	the	Ahle-Sunnat	label,	and	my	interlocutors	generally	did	not	bring	up	Barelvi	or	Deobandi	identities.	When	they	did,	it	was	often	in	a	pejorative	sense,	as	disapproval	of	increasing	sectarianism	in	Islam	and	an	almost	ostrich-like	desire	to	pretend	they	did	not	exist	(Nelson	2009).	As	the	conversation	continued,	however,	differentiations	between	the	groups	would	be	pointed	out	by	Barelvis,	who	slightly	disapproved	of	the	Deobandis’	perceived	lack	of	reverence	for	Prophet	Muhammad	and	sufi	shrines,	and	often	alluded	to	Deobandi	ideology	as	being	more	antagonistic	towards	Shias.	Deobandis	tended	to	gloss	over	these	differentiations	as	weaknesses	of	the	Barelvi	groups,	who	they	felt	were	in	need	of	reform.	They	insisted	that	these	were	minor	differences.	The	Deobandis	I	interviewed	perceived	themselves	as	more	orthodox,	disapproving	of	shrines	and	grave	ornamentation	and	stressing	tableegh	(propagation	of	faith)	and	jihad.	As	mentioned	above,	the	largest	mosque	in	Palwal	is	attended	by	both	Deobandis	and	Barelvis,	and	the	cleric	selected	by	the	largely	Barelvi	mosque	committee	is	a	Deobandi	from	Attock,	a	neighbouring	district.	Kandwal,	the	village	next	to	Palwal,	which	is	also	Barelvi-dominated,	has	a	large	well-attended	madrasah,	run	by	a	Deobandi	group,	to	which	the	local	Barelvi	population	send	their	children.	This	mixing	between	these	two	sub-sects	seemed	to	pose	little	contestation	for	the	villagers.	In	keeping	with	the	above-mentioned	more	pronounced	differentiation	from	Ahle-Tashi		this	would	be	unthinkable	in	the	case	of	an	Ahle-Tashi	madrasah	or	mosque.			
Cleric:	 There	 is	 no	 mosque	 that	 is	 Barelvi	 and	 no	 mosque	 that	 is	Deobandi.	 Deobandi	 and	 Barelvi	 are	 not	 real	 sects,	 these	 are	 just	 the	names	of	cities.	Our	imam	is	the	same,	Hanafi.	This	is	not	a	clash	of	fiqh	(Islamic	Jurisprudence)	(…)	Shiites	are	different,	their	imam	is	different.		
Me:	Do	they	stand	in	agreement	on	their	stance	towards	Ahle-Tashi?		
Cleric:	 I	 can	 show	 you	 a	 book	 for	 Barelvi,	 they	 have	 used	 very	 harsh	language	against	Shias	too.	Maybe	they	don’t	follow	it.	When	you	take		a	stand	against	something	 then	you	have	 to	be	willing	 to	die	 for	 it	 too,	and	Deobandis	have	[done	that].	
														(Deobandi	village	cleric	1,	Palwal,	4th	May	2015)	
		The	conversation	above	with	the	Deobandi	cleric	of	the	largest	mosque	in	a	Barelvi-dominated	village	highlights	a	subtle	distinction	between	how	the	groups	regard	the	
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variance	between	their	two	sub-sects.	Barelvis	tolerate	Deobandi	influence,	allowing	them	space	within	their	own	spaces.	They	view	them	as	somewhat	problematic	in	their	more	extreme	views,	but	nonetheless	regard	them	as	their	own.	On	the	other	hand,	Deobandis	are	more	organized	in	leadership	positions	and	are	able	to	thrive	through	their	ability	to	highlight	similarities	between	the	two	sub-sects	and	at	the	same	time	differences	with	the	Ahle-Tasih	(Shia).	Addressing	the	question	of	religious	education	in	Pakistan,	Mathew	J.	Nelson	(2009:603)	proposes	that	there	is	a	deliberate	effort	to	emphasize	‘doctrinal	uniformity’	as	opposed	to	religious	differentiation	when	it	comes	to	sectarian	difference	among	Muslims.	In	the	context	of	the	Shia-Sunni	divide,	Nelson	suggests	that	because	Sunnis	are	in	majority,	their	ascendancy	is	considered	justifiable	(at	least	among	Sunni	populations)	and	supports	the	belief	that	there	is	only	one	true	Islam	and	difference	is	to	be	abhorred.	I	argue	that	in	the	intra-Sunni	context,	this	desire	not	to	see	or	acknowledge	differences	is	strategic	and	plays	out	in	favour	of	the	more	organized	(minority)	Deobandi	Sunni	groups,	who	through	this	assimilation	into	the	Sunni	sect	are	rendered	less	visible.	I	highlight	this	politics	of	assimilation	as	important,	for	it	influences	the	(in)ability	to	see	the	enemy	as	an	internally	differentiated	category	within	the	Sunni	faith.	The	enemy	is	seen	as	one	of	us,	with	his	religious	affiliation	only	marginally	different,	unlike	the	Ahle-Tashi,	who	has	been	more	effectively	othered.				Below,	I	highlight	three	themes	that	stood	out	in	my	discussion	with	villagers	about	Pakistan’s	participation	in	the	war.	First,	the	consensus,	or	at	least	something	that	was	articulated	openly	by	most,	including	Deobandi,	was	that	rebellion	against	an	Islamic	state	was	not	permissible	under	Islam	and	that	army	action	in	Waziristan	was	justified.	On	the	surface,	the	Pakistan	card	was	stronger	here,	yet	it	is	important	to	point	out	that	this	was	only	possible	within	the	framework	of	religion	and	not	on	nationalist	grounds	alone.	In	other	words,	the	Pakistani	state	was	worth	defending	only	when	Islam	was	attached	it.	Another	justification	suggested	for	putting	Pakistan	first	was	that	in	order	for	Muslims	to	thrive,	the	Pakistani	state	must	be	viable,	hence	the	anti-state	rhetoric	of	the	Taliban	was	short-sighted	and	counter-productive.	In	both	cases,	the	nationalist	argument	only	held	when	it	was	coupled	with	religious	identity.	Second,	this	support	for	the	military	was	couched	in	a	language	of	unease,	and	the	war	was	often	subjected	to	muted	and	sometimes	open	questioning.	Villagers	criticized	the	Pakistani	state	for	aligning	with	the	US	and	taking	on	a	war	that	was	not	its	own.	This	criticism	emerged	most	clearly	when	the	2007	Lal	Masjid	operation	was	discussed.	This	war	was	seen	as	a	distraction	from	Pakistan’s	real	enemies:	those	on	the	eastern	border	or	those	who	were	weakening	Muslim	unity.	I	suggest	that	only	muted	critique	was	
			 210	
voiced	because	many	of	my	interviews	were	conducted	after	the	2014	Peshawar	army	school	attack.	This	was	followed	by	widespread	state	and	public	condemnation	of	the	TTP	and	the	formulation	of	the	National	Action	Plan	in	2015	by	the	Government	of	Pakistan.	The	latter	included	strict	action	against	extremism	and	sectarianism,	including	militancy	in	Punjab.169As	such	I	can	only	assume	that	any	sympathy	for	the	enemy	I	was	allowed	to	witness	was	a	watered	down	version	of	sympathies	that	may	actually	exist.			Third,	there	were	two	common	types	of	narrative	about	the	enemy.	First	was	a	complete	rejection	of	the	enemy	as	Muslim.	This	narrative	projected	them	as	foreign	militants,	funded	by	Israel	or	India	or	the	US	and	did	not	see	them	as	Deobandi	or	aligned	with	any	particular	sect	in	Islam	but	as	mercenaries.	This	did	away	with	any	angst	that	may	have	been	provoked	by	the	Pakistani	military’s	killing	of	Muslims	and	also	provided	a	justification	for	supporting	the	war	effort,	as	well	as	mirroring	the	rhetoric	used	by	the	military	to	conflate	this	enemy	with	India.170	I	hold	that	in	light	of	the	contestation	that	exists	around	the	figure	of	the	shaheed,	which	I	will	detail	below,	it	is	the	second	narrative	that	holds	most	sway	in	these	local	spaces.	This	narrative	saw	the	enemy	as	Muslim	but	misguided,	as	being	from	within	and	ideologically	not	at	fault	but	with	a	problematic	methodology.	Here,	the	enemy	was	categorized	as	gumrah	bhai	(brothers	led	astray)	or	sons	whose	intentions	were	not	at	fault	but	who	had	an	erroneous	modus	
operandi.	There	was	a	suggestion	that	this	brother	and/or	enemy	had	been	mishandled	by	the	state	or	the	military	because	of	Pakistan’s	alignment	with	the	West.	Although	this	narrative	categorized	the	enemy	as	brothers	led	astray,	it	nonetheless	did	not	challenge	the	war	effort	outright.	There	was	a	tendency	to	treat	the	Muslim	enemy	as	an	undifferentiated	category	in	terms	of	religious	sect.	Discomfort	at	talking	about	the	enemy’s	alignment	with	a	particular	Sunni	sect	was	an	echo	of	the	earlier	desire	not	to	acknowledge	sub	sects	of	the	Sunni	faith	and	was	a	feature	of	my	conversations	with	both	Barelvis	and	Deobandis.	In	their	conversations	with	me,	most	villagers	were	hesitant	to	assign	a	particular	sectarian	leaning	to	the	enemy,	although	a	few	were	bolder,	suggesting	upfront	that	it	was	sections	of	the	Deobandi	school	of	thought	that	were	leading	the	war	effort	on	the	other	side.	In	discussions	of	the	enemy,	his	Pashtun,	and	more	specifically	tribal,	identity	would	sometimes	be	brought	up	instead.171	Othering	came	more	easily	in	this	context,	and	there	was	often	a	reference	to	the	Taliban	as	members	of	qabyli	(tribal)	areas,	in	reference	to	the	Federally	Administered	Tribal	Areas																																									 																					169	National	Action	Plan	(NAP).	National	Counter	Terrorism	Authority	(NACTA).	Retrieved	from	http://nacta.gov.pk/NAPPoints20.htm		170	See	the	section	on	the	‘Elusive	Enemy’	in	Chapter	1.	171	It	is	likely	that	this	would	be	different	in	KP	districts,	which	identify	more	closely	with	Pashtun	identity.	
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(FATA),	and	they	would	then	be	caricatured	as	uneducated	and	barbaric.	These	accounts	were	often	tinged	with	grudging	admiration	for	their	fierce	ability	as	fighters.	It	might	be	useful	to	mention	here	that	as	early	as	1948,	the	Pakistani	state	mobilized	militias	from	FATA	to	fight	in	Kashmir,	and	the	subsequent	use	of	these	areas	in	the	Afghan	jihad	was	discussed	briefly	in	Chapter	1.	Humeira	Iqtidar	(2016)	suggests	that	the	residents	of	FATA	are	‘enmeshed	in	a	complex	web	of	colonial	and	post-colonial	legal	and	political	regimes	that	separates	them	definitively	from	the	rest	of	Pakistan.’172	As	such,	the	unease	that	haunted	these	conversations	about	war	hung	around	the	Muslim	identity	of	the	enemy,	and	the	qabyli	(tribal)	identity	helped	to	ease	this	ambivalence.	The	othering	of	the	enemy	based	on	the	tribal	and	perhaps	even	Pashtun	identity	of	these	areas	came	easily	in	the	heartland	of	Punjab,	reminiscent	of	the	otherings	of	other	ethnicities	(Bengali	and	Baluchi)	mentioned	earlier.				It	is	clear	from	these	discussions	that	these	local	landscapes	are	not	adapted	or	prepared	for	the	new	enemy	system.	Sectarian	and	jihadist	ideology	has	been	allowed	to	fester	and	the	state	has	turned	a	blind	eye,	or	worse	has	provided	active	patronage,	and	there	is	limited	local	buy-in	to	the	state’s	narrative.	The	enemy	remains	a	category	that	is	undifferentiated	from	other	Sunni	Muslims	(Barelvi	and	Ahle-Hadith),	largely	due	to	the	manner	in	which	Deobandi	groups	(both	welfare	organizations	and	seminaries)	propagate	assimilation	versus	differentiation	between	Sunni	sects	in	these	rural	spaces.		
Assimilating	the	‘New’	Shaheed:	Whispers	in	the	Night	I	turn	now	to	the	contestations	that	are	expressed	in	these	villages	around	the	figure	of	the	shaheed	soldier	who	has	fought	and	sacrificed	in	this	war.	Dying	in	uniform,	and	the	honour	associated	with	it,	has	a	long	history	in	the	village	of	Palwal,	located	in	the	heart	of	the	so	called	martial	belt.	Some	still	have	memories	of	great-uncles	and	grandfathers	who	fought	in	Japan	in	World	War	II	and	did	not	return,	tinged	with	melancholy	about	never	finding	out	what	happened	to	them	or	where	exactly	they	died.	There	was	a	clear	acknowledgement	that	some	of	this	recruitment	happened	under	conditions	of	duress,	running	side	by	side	with	the	intertwined	themes	of	the	sheer	economic	desperation	that	drove	many	into	service	and	the	pakki	mahana	amadani	(secure	monthly	income)	that	it	secured.	Some	referred	to	these	dead	as	shaheed,	others	simply	as	those	who	did	not	return	or	who	were	killed	in	WWII.	In	either	case	they	were	respected	and	their	stories	were	told	with	pride.	Many	drew	a	clear	distinction	between	the	pre-	and	post-partition	army.	The	British	Indian	Army	was	a	ghair	mazhab	(non-Muslim)	force,	while	the																																									 																					172	Iqitidar,	H.	(2016,	February).	Pakistan’s	Apartheid	Regime.	Tanqeed.	Issue	10.	Retrieved	from	http://www.tanqeed.org/2016/02/pakistans-apartheid-regime/		
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Pakistani	military	was	a	Muslim	force	that	had	fought	to	save	Islam	from	the	Hindu	enemy.	It	is	important	to	emphasize	that	the	earlier	British	Indian	Army	and	participation	within	it	was	respected,	its	dead	were	honoured	and	the	reference	to	it	being	a	non-religious	force	was	not	pejorative.	Very	few	used	the	honorific	shaheed	in	this	context.	Post-partition	military	service	continued	to	be	referred	to	as	an	economic	necessity,	a	pakki	naukri,	however,	what	changed	was	the	reverential	status	accorded	to	the	dead.	From	here	onwards,	martyrdom	for	the	state	and	religion	merged	and	the	dead	were	always	referred	to	as	shaheed.	After	partition,	dying	in	military	service	was	synonymous	with	dying	for	Islam,	and	on	the	surface	this	practice	of	revering	the	military	martyr	continued	irrespective	of	whether	these	men	died	on	the	border	with	Hindu	India	or	in	the	recent	war	fighting	against	Muslims.	The	dead	soldier	was	a	martyr	of	the	Islamic	nation-state,	a	shaheed,	to	be	accorded	the	highest	place	in	heaven.	In	the	Barelvi-dominated	village	of	Palwal,	he	became	something	of	a	saint,	with	his	ornately	decorated	grave	painted	with	verses	from	the	Quran	and	fitted	with	shelves	carrying	
siparas	(chapters	of	the	Quran).	His	grave	also	featured	state	symbols,	like	the	flag	atop	his	grave	and	the	name	of	his	unit	and	the	operation	in	which	he	died	carved	onto	his	tombstone.	To	the	occasional	visitor,	the	ideas	of	state	and	religion	would	seem	to	sit	comfortably	alongside	each	other.		In	Palwal	village,	I	encountered	three	types	of	references	to	shaheed	apart	from	the	military-owned	shahadat.	The	first	two	were	typical	of	what	one	would	find	in	a	rural	Barelvi	dominated	village.	One	was	a	common	reference	to	Karbala,	in	which	Hussain	is	mentioned	as	the	preeminent	embodiment	of	shahadat	in	Islam	in	both	the	vernacular	and	in	the	sermons	of	clerics.	The	other	was	to	a	pre-partition	Muslim	man	of	the	area	who	had	killed	a	blasphemer	and	had	then	been	executed	by	the	British,	thereby	attaining	shahadat.173		The	third	reference	was	to	shahadat	in	war.	I	will	unpack	this	third	reference	further,	as	it	is	indicative	of	the	tensions	and	ambivalence	mentioned	above.	In	a	sermon	given	by	the	local	cleric	on	the	occasion	of	the	death	anniversary	of	a	soldier	who	had	died	in	Waziristan,	Pakistan	was	not	mentioned.174	The	absence	of	the	state	from	the	commemoration	of	the	death	of	a	solider	of	the	Pakistani	military	is	an	interesting	paradox,	which	brings	out	the	complexities	of	how	the	death	of	a	soldier	fighting	a	different	enemy	and	in	a	different	war	was	received	in	these	local	spaces.	In	his	one	and	a	half	hour	sermon,	the	cleric	spoke	about	the	concept	of	shahadat	in	Islam,	wars	in	the	time	of	the	Prophet	and	tales	of	the	bravery	of	Muslim	soldiers	and	their	leaders.																																									 																					173	A	number	of	older	villagers	referred	to	this	incident.	174	Sermon	by	village	cleric	1,	in	Palwal,	10th	December	2014.	
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He	described	how	the	shaheed	feels	no	pain	at	the	time	of	death	and	talked	about	the	
shaheed’s	reception	in	heaven.	Pakistan	was	not	mentioned,	even	though	the	entire	graveyard	next	to	the	mosque	was	decorated	with	Pakistani	flags.	A	possible	explanation	for	this	omission	could	be	his	own	ambivalence	to	the	current	war	as	a	Deobandi	maulvi,	a	passive	antagonism	whereby	he	honoured	the	village’s	dead	without	condoning	the	military’s	current	war.	Another	explanation	given	to	me	by	villagers	was	that	the	cleric	wanted	to	avoid	controversy,	just	in	case	someone	did	not	agree	that	these	men	are	
shaheed.	In	other	words,	he	was	playing	it	safe.			If	the	second	explanation	holds	true,	three	things	stand	out,	the	first	being	that	unease	about	these	shahadats	is	an	open	secret.	People	may	speak	of	it	amongst	themselves	in	small	groups,	but	it	will	not	be	openly	addressed,	either	with	the	military	when	it	comes	to	the	village	for	the	funeral	or	in	large	gatherings.	Secondly,	the	way	to	deal	with	this	unease	is	to	steer	clear	of	the	state	and	discuss	only	the	religious	narrative,	because	that	is	considered	indisputable.	However,	the	reverse	may	not	be	true.	In	other	words,	the	idea	of	shahadat	can	be	discussed	without	any	reference	to	the	state,	but	the	same	cannot	be	said	of	the	state,	which	needs	to	draw	on	religion	to	legitimize	itself.	The	YeS	events	organized	by	the	military	rely	heavily	on	religious	inflections	(see	Chapter	1).	The	village	funeral,	which	is	choreographed	by	the	military,	draws	in	religion	constantly	to	position	this	sacrifice	for	the	nation	within	the	folds	of	faith	(see	Chapter	4).	It	may	be	useful	to	repeat	here	what	was	suggested	in	an	earlier	section,	that	the	nationalist	argument	for	supporting	the	military	operation	against	fellow	Muslims	holds	only	when	it	is	coupled	with	religious	identity.	In	other	words,	the	state	is	worthy	of	being	defended	only	because	it	is	Islamic.	One	may	suggest	that	the	reason	the	religious	narrative	is	foregrounded	at	the	cost	of	the	state	is	because	I	am	after	all	discussing	a	religious	sermon	by	the	local	cleric.	However,	the	very	idea	that	a	private	commemoration	by	the	father	of	a	dead	soldier	is	considered	incomplete	unless	it	is	followed	by	a	religious	sermon	by	the	local	mosque	is	an	important	indicator	that	Islam	must	be	drawn	in,	and	that	when	it	becomes	risky	to	use	the	religion-state	dyad,	it	is	the	state	that	can	be	discarded.			
Thirdly,	and	most	importantly	for	my	project	because	of	the	practical	and	affective	imperatives	involved,	the	village	dead	are	honoured	and	owned,	no	matter	what	the	nature	of	contestations	may	be.	The	village	honoured	its	dead	in	the	past	when	they	fought	for	a	ghair	mazhab	(non-Muslim)	army,	and	they	will	continue,	at	least	for	now,	to	honour	their	dead	even	when	the	bonds	between	state	and	religion	may	be	questioned.	
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This	ability	to	smooth	over	destabilizations	or	the	loosening	of	bonds	adds	another	layer	of	complexity	to	the	relationship	between	the	military	army	and	its	subjects,	and	will	be	addressed	below.		The	discomfort	and	anxiety	around	the	war	which	was	mentioned	earlier	filtered	into	conversations	about	those	who	had	died	fighting	this	war.	This	discomfort	was	not	articulated	outright,	but	was	quantified	as	a	difference	from	earlier	shaheed.	Villagers	referred	to	those	who	fought	and	died	in	wars	on	the	Indian	border	or	on	the	Siachen	Glacier	as	‘asal	(authentic)	shaheed’,	implying,	although	never	saying	outright,	that	soldiers	returning	from	Swat	and	Waziristan	were	not	(as)	authentic.		 Mazoor	was	asal	(authentic)	shaheed,	he	was	at	the	border	[with	India].	Those	who	are	shaheed	now,	they	are	Muslims	fighting	with	Muslims.	The	real	enemy	is	at	the	Lahore	and	Sialkot	border.	Hindu	and	Kafir	(non-believers)	[are	the	real	enemy].									(Havildar	Sohail,	Palwal,	14th	November	2014)			What	is	insightful	in	the	text	above	is	that	the	dead	in	this	war	continue	to	be	referred	to	as	shaheed,	but	are	differentiated	from	those	who	die	fighting	against	Hindu	India.	The	excerpt	below	is	from	an	interview	with	a	villager	who	compares	a	soldier	from	Palwal	who	died	in	the	1999	Kargil	War	with	four	younger	men	who	have	died	more	recently	in	the	current	war:			 There	was	a	lot	of	feeling	generated	in	the	Kargil	War,	there	was	a	lot	of	patriotism,	and	they	[people	in	the	village]	were	annoyed	when	there	was	a	compromise,	and	the	reason	was	that	a	dead	body	from	Kargil	had	come	into	our	village	(...)	There	is	more	open	talk	[now].	During	those	times	patriotism	was	stronger	(...).	There	is	talk	that	it	is	the	army’s	doing	that	our	children	are	dying.	And	then	it	was	raised	at	the	national	level	whether	these	are	shaheed	or	not	(…)	The	clash	with	India	is	clear,	it	arouses	strong	sentiments,	it’s	like	the	cricket	match	between	India	and	Pakistan,	but	this	is	different.	When	the	operation	started	inside	the	country,	people	have	a	different	perspective	on	that.	They	say	that	these	Taliban,	they	are	like	our	sons,	they	are	also	taking	the	name	of	Islam.	Are	they	[army	soldiers]	shaheed	or	are	they	[Taliban]	shaheed?		 	 	 	(Ali,	Palwal	village	local,	18th	December	2014)	
	In	the	above	excerpt	it	is	clear	is	that	there	is	a	difference	between	support	for	a	war	with	India	and	for	a	war	with	fellow	Muslims.	Earlier	the	village	rallied	round	the	state,	and	there	was	even	annoyance	when	Pakistan	pulled	its	troops	back	from	Kargil.	In	the	
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earlier	instance,	the	death	of	a	soldier	from	the	village	actually	intensified	the	desire	to	battle,	for	it	became	a	matter	of	honour	and	of	making	the	sacrifice	count.	It	is	instructive	to	note	here	that	the	speaker	still	hints	at	a	layering	of	narratives	in	saying	that	there	is	more	‘open	talk’	now,	implying	that	people	would	express	doubt	even	in	the	narrative	of	glory	and	honour	in	the	war	against	India.	However,	in	this	current	war	these	doubts	are	aired	more	openly:	that	the	enemy	is	not	Hindu	or	linked	to	India	and	that	that	the	enemy	is	like	‘our	son’,	he	is	a	Muslim,	fighting	in	the	name	of	Islam.			Those	currently	serving	in	the	army	and	those	who	had	lost	a	loved	one	rarely	brought	up	this	differentiation	between	shaheeds,	yet	their	critique	of	the	war	and	army	policy	was	along	the	same	lines.	Their	challenge	was	more	personal	and	raw,	and	came	from	deep	grief	and	anger	at	being	used	as	cannon	fodder	in	a	war	that	they	did	not	own.	For	Nawaz’s	mother	Yasmin,	it	was	all	the	more	raw	after	the	TTP’s	attack	on	the	army	school	in	Peshawar:		
Yasmin:	If	we	had	not	stung	them	[Taliban]	they	would	not	have	done	this	to	us.	Musharraf	(former	COAS)	is	a	dog,	he	brought	this	on	Pakistan	and	he	should	be	kept	in	jail	and	never	let	out.		
Sister:	My	brother	died	fighting	these	people.	
Yasmin:	(cutting	her	short)	Would	Musharraf	have	got	into	this	war	if	his	son	was	in	the	army?	He	should	have	sent	his	son.	How	many	sons	have	become	
shaheed	because	of	his	decisions?			(Nawaz’s	sister	and	mother	[Yasmin],	Palwal,	25th	January	2015)			These	were	affective	tones	that	ran	counter	to	and	challenged	military	narratives,	ruptures	in	the	relationship	between	the	military	and	the	families	of	the	dead	similar	to	those	mentioned	in	Chapter	4’s	discussion	of	practices	and	rituals	of	grieving	that	go	awry.			It	is	clear	from	the	ambivalence	seen	above	that	the	‘battle	of	narratives’,	which	Colonel	1	of	the	ISPR	suggested	had	been	won	by	the	military,	is	still	up	for	grabs	in	the	very	constituency	the	military	considers	its	heartland:	a	village	in	a	martial	district	of	Punjab	province	with	four	dead	soldiers	from	this	war	buried	in	its	graveyard.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	what	is	also	obvious	in	these	spaces	is	continued	loyalty	to	the	military.	Yasmin	and	her	husband	display	the	flag	of	Pakistan	on	their	son	Nawaz’s	grave,	and	in	addition	to	his	name	and	date	of	birth,	his	tombstone	carries	the	name	of	his	regiment	and	the	operation	he	died	in.	Whatever	ambivalence	exists	in	them	about	the	current	war,	they	continue	to	attend	the	YeS	ceremony,	and	they	show	no	sign	of	tangible	
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disaffection.	Also,	an	overwhelming	number	of	young	men	turned	up	for	recruitment	in	the	summer	of	2015:	4000	young	boys	aged	17	and	above	from	Chakwal	district	who	were	willing	to	risk	death	for	pakki	naukri	and	die	against	an	enemy	they	do	not	consider	their	own.175	To	explain	these	seemingly	contradictory	moves,	both	towards	and	away	from	the	military,	I	now	move	on	to	a	description	of	how	these	contestations	about	the	current	war	are	resolved.	
Reconciliations,	Resolution	and	Hierarchies		Saleem,	a	young	man	who	is	currently	unemployed,	explains	the	nature	and	resolution	of	these	tensions	below:		
Saleem:	A	small	percentage	of	people	will	talk,	but	most	will	not	discuss	the	death.	Why	did	he	die,	was	it	right	or	wrong?	In	those	last	rites,	they	feel	joy	in	their	hearts,	they	are	respecting	him	by	doing	this.	Other	deaths	are	not	like	this.	When	someone	dies	it	is	a	regular	feeling,	but	when	a	fauji	dies	he	is	a	helpless	man,	he	may	not	be	correct	in	terms	of	religion	but	he	has	died	wearing	a	uniform	we	respect	so	much	that	we	don’t	look	at	his	character	and	what	he	was	like,	we	just	look	at	how	he	died.		
Me:	So	what	does	the	small	percentage	say?	
Saleem:	This	problem	happens	when	you	use	the	word	shaheed.	I	think	people	who	understand	don’t	talk	about	this	and	understand	why	he	is	called	a	shaheed,	because	those	who	are	in	the	fauj	use	this	term,	although	the	real	meaning	(of	shahadat)	is	that	it	is	used	for	a	person	who	dies	in	the	way	of	Allah	(…).	The	word	shaheed	is	used	because	he	was	an	army	man,	and	we	say	it	to	give	him	respect.	I	too	think	like	this.	Some	who	are	shaheed	like	this	are	not	very	strong	religiously,	yet	we	call	them	shaheed.	Those	who	serve	the	country	and	die,	their	religion	is	their	country.	He	thinks	the	land	is	his	mother.	This	is	his	intention,	and	he	is	watan	ka	shaheed	(martyr	for	the	nation-state).	Mazhab	ka	shaheed	(martyr	for	religion)	is	a	different	category.	Those	who	cannot	understand	this	are	more	extremist.	They	will	say,	he	died	fighting	in	his	own	country,	he	is	not	shaheed,	he	died	while	killing	other	Muslims	(…).	Until	after	the	burial	nobody	talks.	But	then	in	private	gatherings	people	will	say	this.	How	can	we	call	him	a	shaheed,	he	died	like	this.	But	he	is	a	
shaheed,	only	his	level	is	different,	for	there	are	different	levels.	These	are	two	different	things,	why	should	we	debate	them.	We	call	him	
shaheed	because	when	he	died	he	was	wearing	Pakistan	Army	uniform	on	his	body.		
Me:	How	do	different	sects	see	this?	
Saleem:	Deobandi	will	say	this	more	but	not	all	(…).	Shia	and	Barelvi	will	not	get	into	this	discussion.	Deobandi	will,	and	that	is	because	they																																									 																					175	Fieldnotes,	Chakwal,	21st	May	2015.	
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prioritize	religion	in	everything.	If	for	me	my	country	comes	second	to	my	religion	then	naturally	I	will	think	like	this.		(Saleem,	adjoining	village	local,	20th	April	2015)		Saleem	had	obviously	thought	this	through,	and	the	reconciliation	he	proposed	was	something	that	also	echoed	in	my	conversations	with	other	villagers.	He	proposed	a	hierarchy	of	the	shaheed	that	resonates	with	the	pre-partition	understanding	of	those	who	died	for	the	British	Indian	Army.	This	reconciliation	came	from	the	subjects	themselves,	troubled	by	the	competing	narratives	around	shahadat	coming	from	the	military	and	local	discourses.	In	the	village,	the	resolution	was	the	emergence	of	a	hierarchy	of	the	shaheed	that	unsettled	the	link	between	nation	and	religion	in	ways	that	allowed	co-existence.	This	reconciliation	is	perhaps	made	possible	by	the	fear	that	these	whispers	could	strain	the	relationship	between	the	district	and	the	benevolent	army,	but	also	by	the	strong	affective	bonds	with	the	dead,	who	are	easy	to	identify	with,	as	at	some	point	in	their	lives	most	young	men	in	the	district	will	have	tried	to	join	the	military	or	will	have	been	expected	to.	This	sense	of	affinity	is	made	possible	by	the	shared	socio-economic	realities	of	the	district	and	the	desire	for	pakki	naukri.	These	pragmatic	concerns	and	affinities	allow	a	new	(for	the	post	partition	era)	category	to	emerge,	the	
watan	ka	shaheed	(martyr	for	the	nation-state),	which	differentiates	itself	from	the	
mazhab	ka	shaheed	(martyr	for	religion).			The	cleric	cited	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	vehement	in	his	criticism	of	the	war,	has	a	son	serving	in	the	army.	He	was	unhappy	with	what	he	perceives	to	be	an	exaggerated	reverential	status	of	the	shaheed	of	the	village,	who	he	claimed	had	died	fighting	
America’s	war.	In	response	to	my	question	about	whether	it	was	difficult	for	him	to	accept	his	son	being	a	soldier	in	the	Pakistan	Army	fighting	in	what	he	called	America’s	
war,	he	said:		 It	is	the	rules	and	regulations	of	the	government	[the	military]	for	the	one	who	is	serving.	God	has	written	down	his	fate.	He	can	die	at	home	or	he	can	die	there,	this	is	the	natural	cycle.	It	is	not	true	that	he	will	only	go	to	heaven	if	he	is	a	shaheed.	You	can	go	to	heaven	for	other	reasons	too.	God	has	written	down	how	we	all	will	die,	so	it	is	futile	to	argue	about	this.	 															(Cleric	2,	Palwal,	2nd	February	2015)			
	In	his	opinion,	the	above	conversation	was	‘futile’,	and	it	was	clear	that	he	would	rather	not	discuss	this.	For	him,	as	for	the	interlocutor	above,	the	‘helpless’	soldier	is	simply	following	orders,	and	as	such	is	absolved	of	blame,	while	death	in	service	is	not	shahadat	
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in	the	name	of	Islam.	He	sought	to	honour	the	soldier	who	dies	and	loosely	alluded	to	the	fact	that	he	can	still	be	respected	and	find	his	way	into	heaven	through	his	other	deeds,	suggesting	other	kinds	of	shahadat	that	are	not	shahadat	for	mazhab	(religion).		In	the	village	space	there	was	an	assertion	of	a	new	(or	a	reversion	to	an	earlier)	category	of	shaheed,	one	who	dies	because	he	fights	for	his	country,	not	necessarily	his	religion.	To	enable	this	shift,	the	village	pulled	in	an	imagining	of	the	soldier	that	already	existed	in	the	vernacular.	This	was	an	imagining	at	odds	with	the	more	public	image	of	the	soldier	as	the	brave	and	fearless	defender	of	the	nation-state,	constructing	him	instead	as	a	simpleton,	a	yes	man	who	undergoes	harsh	army	discipline	and	training.	Two	moves	allowed	this,	the	first	being	the	claim	that	he	was	but	a	bacha	(child)	or	a	larka	(boy)	as	opposed	to	being	a	man:			 These	bache	[the	three	who	died	within	one	year]	were	brave	boys.	Once	they	were	 recruited	 they	never	 looked	back.	They	were	brave,	 but	 the	one	who	died	before	in	the	Kargil	War,	he	was	very	brave.	(…)	He	was	a	real	man.	 					(Havildar	Sohail,	Palwal,	14th	November	2014)		
	The	second	move	was	an	assertion	that	army	discipline	does	not	allow	dissent	and	that	the	soldier	is	majboor	(helpless):		 Many	of	our	(Deobandi)	elders	are	in	the	army.	Everyone	knows	that	the	army	system	is	such	that	one	can’t	say	I	don’t	agree	and	I	will	not	go	[to	the	front].	Nobody	discusses	this,	in	other	words	he	is	the	most	majboor	person.	He	has	to	do	his	service,	and	whatever	he	does,	he	does	because	he	is	ordered.	So	nobody	discusses	it	if	a	fauji	is	Deobandi	and	he	is	deployed	in	Wana.	When	he	comes	back	he	will	not	be	asked	‘what	were	you	doing	there?’	Because	everyone	knows	he	is	not	fighting	there	of	his	own	will.																																																									(Saleem,	adjoining	village	local,	20th	April	2015)		
	This	shaheed	was	less	authentic	than	the	asal	shaheed,	for	he	was	a	bacha	and	majboor;	he	did	not	fight	the	(original)	enemy,	but	instead	fought	the	gumrah	bhai	(brothers	who	have	been	led	astray).	He	was	thus	absolved	of	any	blame;	he	deserved	pity	but	also	reverence	and	respect.	In	the	village	imagination,	the	shaheed	was	no	longer	constructed	as	the	fearless,	determined	or	willing	soldier	but	as	one	who	is	helpless,	infantilized	and	unable	to	desert	or	reject	this	war.	These	tropes	of	infantilizing	the	soldier	and	of	helplessness	ran	through	the	narratives	of	soldiers	and	the	families	of	the	dead,	an	imagining	of	the	soldier	that	already	existed	in	villages	even	outside	the	context	of	the	
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current	war,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	and	was	actively	pulled	in	to	settle	doubts	and	unease	as	they	talked	about	the	deaths	of	those	who	died	in	this	war.		It	may	be	pertinent	to	mention	here	that	the	two	attempts	at	reconciliation	mentioned	above,	which	permit	resolution	of	the	doubt	and	unease	that	assail	these	local	spaces	–	the	separation	of	religion	and	state	and	the	less	masculine	imagining	of	the	soldier	–	are	not	the	reconciliations	that	the	state	narrative	proposes.	The	former	reconciliation	directly	contradicts	the	state’s	efforts,	which	forbid	the	cleavage	between	religion	and	state	from	appearing	and	assert	the	religion-state	dyad,	as	in	the	YeS	programme.	The	state	does	not	look	for	a	co-existence	that	the	village	has	come	to	accept,	but	desires	to	revert	to	earlier	unquestioned	bonds.	The	second	reconciliation,	in	which	the	soldier	is	seen	as	majboor	and	the	dead	as	bache	or	larka,	caught	up	in	a	war	that	is	not	his	own,	is	also	a	far	cry	from	the	masculine	and	determined	solider	that	YeS	ceremonies	project.	Thus,	the	reconciliations	that	emerge	in	these	local	spaces	are	often	hushed	or	muted,	for	they	are	at	odds	with	military	narratives	and	speak	to	the	dissonances	that	exist	in	these	seemingly	complicit	relationships.			Against	the	backdrop	of	the	current	war	in	which	the	military	is	engaged,	religion	no	longer	exists	as	a	simple	attachment	to	the	state	or	the	military,	but	instead	becomes	a	site	of	contestation.	Islam	becomes	a	more	complicated	terrain;	the	subject	is	faced	by	two	opposing	Islamic	spaces	here:	the	Islamic	state	of	Pakistan	and	Islamic	militants.	For	the	subject,	the	dilemma	becomes	how	can	Islam	fight	itself?	This	should	cause	significant	contestation,	yet	we	see	two	opposing	moves	in	the	spaces	that	provide	the	army’s	fodder.	Ambivalence,	doubt	and	unease	predictably	occur,	yet	we	also	see	continued	loyalty,	readiness	to	serve	and	honour	accorded	to	the	shaheed.	So,	how	are	these	mutually	exclusive	moves	possible,	such	that	doubt	or	unease	is	not	associated	with	disaffection	or	desertion?	When	I	put	this	apparent	contradiction	to	my	interlocutors,	they	responded	with	bemusement,	a	look	that	seemed	to	say	what	an	odd	question	to	ask.	As	one	villager	put	it,	‘This	is	a	fauji-dominated	area,	their	livelihoods	are	attached	to	the	army,	they	will	not	turn	against	the	military	and	they	will	continue	to	serve.’176	To	understand	this	contradiction	we	perhaps	need	to	question	our	own	propensity	to	see	these	moves	as	contradictory	in	the	first	place.	This	propensity	comes	from	a	view	that	places	Islam	and	the	nation	as	central	drivers	in	the	readiness	to	serve	and	sacrifice,	a	view	that	the	state	and	military	propaganda	apparatus	takes	pains	to	project.	As	a	result,	we	see	these	moves	in	a	one-dimensional	space,	where	the	state	and	the	now	splintered	domain	of	religion	demand	or	pull	at	subjects	in	opposing	directions.	One	way	to																																									 																					176	Chaudary	Zafar,	Palwal,	30th	April	2015.	
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understand	this	co-existence	is	to	see	that	these	moves	happen	on	two	separate	terrains,	or	‘battlefields’	to	revert	to	the	earlier	analogy	used	by	the	ISPR	officer.	The	military	may	suggest	that	it	is	fighting	a	‘battle	of	narratives’	on	religio-nationalist	grounds,	reclaiming	the	right	to	martyrdom	for	religion,	and	assert	that	the	loyalty	which	subjects	display	during	funeral	rites,	their	presence	in	YeS	ceremonies	and	the	endless	lines	for	recruitment	are	signs	that	this	battle	has	been	won.	Yet,	in	the	hilly	tracts	of	Punjab,	where	rain	is	unpredictable	and	other	livelihoods	are	insecure,	military	service	and	sacrifice,	whether	under	the	British	or	in	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Pakistan,	has	never	been	about	religion	or	nation	alone,	but	also	about	mundane	materialism	and	affective	drivers.	Islam	and	nationalism,	and	more	aptly	Islamic	nationalism	in	the	case	of	Pakistan	–	a	state	it	is	hard	to	imagine	without	Islam	–	is	a	rhetoric	offered	by	the	military.	It	is	embraced	by	the	subjects	of	power	in	an	almost	psychological	way,	as	a	bid	to	displace	the	reality	of	materialism	that	makes	this	readiness	to	serve	possible.	It	also	serves	as	a	way	to	offset	some	of	the	intense	grief	that	accompanies	the	death	of	a	loved	one,	a	way	to	make	meaning	and	dispel	the	discomfort	and	guilt	that	accompanies	a	death	that	is	coupled	with	the	exchange	of	material	compensation.	Hence,	despite	these	deep	contestations	in	the	current	setting,	we	see	very	little	disaffection,	and	recruitment	continues.		
Conclusion		The	chapter	has	documented	unease	in	local	spaces	in	Chakwal	as	troop	deployment	and	military	operations	in	northwest	Pakistan	became	more	intense,	and	more	importantly	as	coffins	start	to	roll	into	villages.	National	contestations,	including	fatwas	(religious	injunctions)	against	the	Pakistani	military	and	the	Lal	Masjid	incident	in	2007,	have	filtered	into	local	narratives	and	resonate	with	local	understandings,	despite	overt	loyalty	to	the	state	being	expressed	and	notions	of	honour	being	strongly	articulated	in	a	district	that	has	long	been	considered	martial.	Beyond	the	initial	phase	of	the	war,	these	contestations	have	had	limited	impact	on	the	district’s	actual	willingness	to	contribute	recruits	and	work	inside	the	state-military	framework.	I	have	argued,	however,	that	this	should	not	shield	from	view	the	local	frameworks	in	which	soldiers	and	their	families	reside	or	imply	that	they	are	completely	benign.	Both	the	local	and	military	sides	of	the	evolution	of	soldiers	and	their	families	need	to	be	acknowledged,	even	if	the	end	result	is	yet	to	pose	any	significant	sustained	challenge	to	the	military.			
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The	Pakistani	state	and	military	are	haunted	by	a	desire	to	use	religion	as	a	political	tool	to	legitimize	their	current	policies	and	the	original	idea	of	the	state.177	The	parameters	of	the	debate	continue	to	be	on	religious	grounds,	with	the	state	asserting	its	right	to	retain	the	status	of	martyrdom	for	the	country	as	a	religious	exercise.	Within	local	spaces,	this	assertion	is	contested.	The	obsession	with	the	ever	changing	and	narrowing	definitions	of	the	Pakistani	Muslim	and	the	forces	of	sectarianism	and	jihadism	that	have	mushroomed	in	these	environs	have	confounded	the	evolution	of	national	identities	that	may	rally	to	the	call	of	nation	alone.	Within	the	village,	the	resolution	of	these	contestations	is	the	emergence	of	a	hierarchy	of	the	shaheed	that	unsettles	the	link	between	the	nation-state	and	religion,	and	there	is	an	assertion	of	a	different	(or	reversion	to	an	earlier)	category	of	shaheed:	one	who	died	because	he	fought	for	his	country,	not	necessarily	his	religion.	The	splintering	between	the	nation-state	and	religion	poses	a	dilemma,	for	it	threatens	the	use	of	religion	as	a	crutch,	which	has	served	the	subjects	well	in	the	past.	Islam	is	now	a	more	complicated	terrain,	and	the	subject	must	traverse	this	terrain	in	ways	that	allow	Islam	to	exist	in	the	spaces	of	both	the	state	and	militants.	The	resolution	is	to	separate	mazhab	(religion)	from	the	watan	(nation-state),	a	resolution	that	if	we	look	closely	is	a	slippage	from	the	earlier	exalted	position	of	the	shaheed	for	religion.	Here,	those	who	subscribe	to	this	view	–	a	hierarchy	of	the	
shaheed	that	regards	the	shaheed	who	fights	non-Muslims	as	more	authentic	than	the	
shaheed	who	dies	fighting	the	Muslim	enemy	–	are	clearly	acknowledging	a	slippage,	much	like	the	ladder	of	attitudes	towards	extremism	that	was	pointed	out	earlier	by	my	interlocutor.	As	such,	the	move	in	these	local	spaces	to	separate	martyrdom	for	the	state	from	martyrdom	for	religion	threatens	the	state-religion	ideology	that	the	military	still	considers	to	be	the	core	of	the	image	of	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces.			This	chapter	claims	that	the	battle	of	narratives	on	ideological	grounds,	especially	one	that	draws	on	religion	as	its	primary	affective	repertoire,	is	far	from	being	won.	Doubts	and	questions	are	abundant,	resulting	in	a	hushed	ambivalence.	What	is	interesting,	however,	is	that	it	remains	hushed,	and	I	have	argued	that	this	silence	is	not	just	due	to	the	obvious	coercive	mechanisms	of	the	military	crushing	dissent,	or	to	the	huge	propaganda	apparatus	available	to	the	military,	such	as	YeS	ceremonies,	but	that	it	is	due	to	bonds	of	another	nature	altogether.	These	bonds	are	held	in	place	by	symbiotic	relationships	that	when	threatened	generate	a	powerful	set	of	anxieties,	and	a	battle	that																																									 																					177	Religion	comes	up	repeatedly	in	YeS	scripts,	and	more	often	than	not,	predictably,	the	state	is	mentioned	within	the	folds	of	faith;	the	state	is	Islamic	and	the	nation	has	a	religion.	This	was	echoed	in	Chapter	3,	where	the	military’s	response	to	the	challenges	posed	by	the	new	war	was	to	insist	on	the	state’s	right	to	claim	shahadaat	in	the	religious	sense	and	designate	the	enemy	as	non-	Muslim.  	
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is	lost	on	ideological	grounds	is	won	on	another	other	terrain.	In	local	spaces,	this	resolution	is	on	affective	and	material	grounds,	terrain	bolstered	by	the	district’s	history,	which	keeps	the	emerging	reconciliation	very	much	in	favour	of	the	military,	even	if	the	military’s	narrative	of	the	war	and	the	enemy	may	be	rejected.			 	
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Conclusion At	its	heart,	this	thesis	has	been	an	examination	of	the	affective	relationships	that	are	crafted	within	militarism.	Foremost,	it	is	an	interrogation	of	the	relationship	between	the	Pakistan	Armed	Forces	and	its	immediate	subjects,	soldiers	and	their	families.	A	second	relationship,	between	the	military	and	the	qaum,	is	studied	not	directly,	but	as	a	function	of	the	first	relationship,	with	the	bodies	and	families	of	dead	soldiers	serving	as	conduits	for	communication	with	the	nation.			The	voluntary	nature	of	enlistment	in	the	non-conscription	military	of	Pakistan,	where	war	or	the	threat	of	war	is	never	far	away,	has	often	been	explained	as	a	function	of	economic	desperation.	In	the	rain-fed	hilly	tracts	of	Punjab,	where	opportunities	to	make	a	living	are	scarce,	historical	proclivity	has	also	been	cited	as	reason.	This	thesis	has	attempted	to	complicate	this	explanation	by	positioning	affect	as	a	technology	of	rule	employed	by	the	military.	This	involves	putting	in	place	a	set	of	gendered	governing	practices	that	are	pivotal	in	sustaining	collusive	partnerships	between	those	who	stand	to	suffer	significant	losses	(soldiers	and	their	families)	and	those	who	stand	to	gain	(the	military	institution).	This	thesis	has	traced	this	relationship	and	followed	it	through	various	spaces	and	critical	moments,	beginning	in	Chapter	1	with	a	grand	spectacle	of	mourning	and	power:	a	commemorative	ceremony	held	by	the	Pakistani	military.	Chapters	2	to	5	responded	to	the	master	narrative	put	out	at	these	ceremonies	and	examined	the	subjectivities	of	the	protagonists	of	the	militarism	project,	as	well	as	the	institutions	and	topographical	spaces	in	which	they	reside.	Chapter	6	studied	this	relationship	through	the	lens	of	a	war	that	strips	away	the	rhetoric	of	religion	and	lays	bare	more	clearly	the	inducements	that	secure	service	and	sacrifice	in	the	military.		
Manufacturing	the	Affective	Subject	In	this	thesis,	affect	and	its	control,	production	and	stubborn	afterlife	emerges	as	a	consistent	theme	running	through	the	relationship	between	the	military	and	its	subjects.	A	wide	range	of	military	practices	have	been	examined	that	work	and	rework	both	affect	that	is	considered	productive	for	military	interests	and	affect	considered	counter-productive.	Affective	regulation	and	the	formation	of	affective	attachment	are	visible	in	the	disciplinary	techniques	employed	in	military	training	institutes,	which	seek	the	transformation	of	the	peasant-subject	into	the	soldier-subject.	This	includes	the	suppression	and	severing	of	bonds	with	family	and	all	things	familiar	at	the	time	of	recruitment	into	the	army.	The	military	demands	the	acceptance	of	violence	on	one’s	body	and	secures	this	acceptance	not	through	materialist	incentives	alone	but	also	
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through	affective	realms,	desiring	the	reimagining	of	familial	attachments	through	the	concerns	of	the	state.	This	reimagining	allows	the	emergence	of	a	response	of	love,	loyalty	and	attachment	to	the	benevolent	benefactor,	who	has	the	right	to	ask	you	to	die	or	kill	in	its	name.	In	cases	of	deaths	of	soldiers,	this	affective	regulation	extends	to	the	family,	and	militarism	also	demands	that	the	subject	accept	violence	to	the	body	of	its	loved	ones.	Mourning	rituals	for	the	dead	are	meticulously	disciplined	by	the	military	in	local	spaces,	re-drawing	the	lines	between	appropriate	and	inappropriate	grief	by	crafting	spectacular	funeral	ceremonies	replete	with	military,	national	and	religious	meaning-making	and	compensation	regimes	that	are	set	in	motion	from	the	moment	the	body	arrives	in	the	village.	During	commemorative	ceremonies,	the	grief	of	the	families	of	the	dead	becomes	material	for	military	scrutiny	and	crafting.	Here,	families	are	expected	to	draw	on	their	reservoir	of	grief	to	produce	deeply	moving	performances	for	the	qaum.	Affective	management	that	seeks	to	enhance	certain	kinds	of	affect	and	downplay	others	is	evident	in	the	careful	preparation	of	families	for	their	on-stage	testimonies,	including	skilful	use	of	the	camera	and	strict	control	of	what	is	allowed	on	stage	and	what	is	edited	out.	Collective,	predictable	and	productive	mourning	is	made	possible	in	these	affective	spaces,	both	local	and	national,	where	the	military	and	the	family	perform	for	the	nation	and	the	dead	body	in	a	coffin	is	transformed	into	the	revered	transcendental	figure	of	the	
shaheed,	turning	meaningless	and	avoidable	death	into	meaningful	sacrifice.			The	productive	ability	of	power,	in	this	case	the	ability	of	the	military	to	produce	certain	kinds	of	affect	and	response	in	its	subjects,	is	evident	in	these	appropriations.	In	the	context	of	grief,	subjects	perform	for	the	military	and	reify	national	scripts	of	sacrifice,	whether	in	commemorative	ceremonies,	military	funerals	or	memorialization	sites	and	practices	in	local	rural	environs.	While	these	representations	of	the	military	can	be	read	along	the	lines	of	Foucauldian	analysis	as	reiterations	of	power	in	which	the	subject	is	imbricated	(Foucault	1991;	Butler	1997),	I	have	claimed	that	they	are	not	just	reflective	of	the	productive	capacity	of	power	and	its	unchallenged	hold	over	its	subjects,	but	are	also	a	function	of	affective	residues	and	effluxes	that	remain	in	the	interiority	of	the	subject	and	in	the	physical	spaces	where	they	reside.	This	thesis	has	documented	examples	of	such	residues	that	resist	being	folded	into	the	militaristic	scripts	of	sacrifice	for	the	nation	and	hence	lie	outside	them.	An	example	of	this	is	how	grief	that	has	been	disciplined	by	the	military	spills	out	again	and	again	in	both	public	and	private	narratives,	and	refuses	easy	closure.	Realizations	of	what	if		(their	sons	had	not	been	sent	on	military	service	or	had	left	military	service)	on	part	of	the	parents,	that	induce	emotions	like	guilt	and	regret;	accounts	of	the	soldiers	in	training	as	they	knowingly	
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became	automatons	and	experience	feelings	of	numbness	and	dissociation;	the	uneasiness	of	parents	locked	in	compensation	regimes;	and	nostalgic	families	blinded	by	the	glare	of	the	national	spotlight	in	commemorative	ceremonies	are	some	other	evidences	of	my	claim	that	the	afterlife	of	affect	that	has	been	regulated,	haunts	people	and	spaces.	This	afterlife	of	affect	binds	the	subject	more	closely	to	the	militarism	project,	and	in	order	to	understand	this	contradiction,	this	thesis	has	turned	to	the	role	ideologies	of	religion	and	nation	play	(or	not	play)	in	militarist	subjectivities.				
Enter	the	Nationalist	and	Religious	Subject?	I	have	suggested	in	this	thesis	that	the	apparent	complicity	of	the	subject	is	not	only	a	matter	of	the	appropriations	and	manipulations	invoked	by	the	national	script	(which	in	the	case	of	Pakistan	is	also	religious).	Instead,	I	have	argued	that	a	set	of	materialistic	and	affective	imperatives	sustains	the	relationship	between	the	military	institution	and	its	subjects.	In	Chapter	2,	I	presented	the	evolution	of	the	military	as	a	modern	kinship	group	that	rewards	its	subjects	through	pay,	pensions,	benefits	and	land	grants	(Lieven	2011).	While	the	Islamic	nation-state	and	memories	and	myths	of	a	martial	past	and	tradition	were	voiced	as	reasons	for	people	going	into	military	service,	this	articulation	was	nearly	always	secondary	to	the	more	emphatically	stated	reason,	pakki	naukri.	I	have	suggested	that	on	this	local	terrain,	nationalistic	narratives	of	service	and	sacrifice	act	as	bargaining	chips	which	permit	continued	membership	in	the	military	kinship	group	and	allow	claims	to	be	made	from	it.	The	soldier-subject’s	attachment	to	all	things	military,	nurtured	by	the	military	institution,	and	the	regulation	of	grief	at	the	time	of	soldier’s	death	are	ways	in	which	the	military	uses	the	control	and	production	of	affect	to	bind	its	subjects	even	closer	to	it.	I	have	argued	that	the	compliance	of	the	deceased	soldier’s	family	and	their	willing	alignment	with	the	military	represent	attempts	to	make	sense	of	this	death	and	ease	the	terrible	burden	of	loss,	rather	than	being	due	to	some	essentialist,	ephemeral	and	transcendental	love	for	the	Islamic	nation-state.	This	is	also	evidenced	in	the	military’s	ability	to	largely	override	the	ideological	challenges	entailed	by	the	shift	away	from	the	traditional	Hindu	enemy	to	the	new(er)	Muslim	threat,	as	documented	in	Chapter	6.	In	these	local	spaces,	the	desire	to	serve	in	the	military	is	unabated,	despite	deep	ambivalence	and	sometimes	outright	rejection	of	the	new	enemy	and	war.	I	have	explained	this	contradiction	by	positioning	Islam	and	nationalism	as	rhetoric	offered	by	the	military	and	embraced	by	the	subjects	of	its	power	in	an	almost	psychological	way	to	displace	and	offset	both	the	reality	of	the	materialism	that	makes	this	readiness	to	serve	and	risk	death	possible	as	well	as	the	grief	caused	by	the	death.	The	institution	and	its	subjects	draw	in	nationalistic	(including	religious)	ideology	almost	cynically	in	order	to	
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discipline	and	re-purpose	livelihoods,	death	and	disability.	This	re-purposing	is	made	possible	by	the	collusion	of	the	subject	with	the	power	that	forms	it,	allowing	the	corporality	of	the	mutilated	body	to	be	reconstructed	into	a	revered,	objectified,	flag-draped	coffin	or	by	shrouding,	veiling	and	hiding	from	view	the	reasons	people	volunteer	for	the	military.	Where	in	the	first	re-purposing,	ideology	serves	as	a	way	to	deal	with	grief	and	disciplines	pain,	in	the	second,	ideology	masks	the	material	benefits	of	militarism	for	the	soldier,	his	family	and	the	institution.			Moreover,	my	thesis	has	argued	that	the	subject	is	conscious	of	his	or	her	appropriation	and	manipulation	by	hegemonic	power.	As	voiced	by	the	families	of	the	dead,	the	script	of	sacrifice	and	service	for	the	nation-state	is	a	rhetorical	crutch	from	which	they	feel	compelled	to	read.	The	phrase	karna	parta	hai,	kehna	parta	hai	(You	have	to	do	this,	you	
have	to	say	this)	clearly	signifies	an	awareness	of	the	mask,	which	they	are	compelled	to	wear.	I	have	complicated	this	compulsion	through	Slavjok	Žižek’s	(2008:45)	scholarship	on	ideology	as	‘fantasy-construction’.	In	the	case	of	military	service	and	death,	nationalist	and	religious	ideology	operates	to	build	a	social	reality	in	which	death	is	meaningful,	which	in	turn	provides	some	escape	from	the	‘traumatic	real	kernel’	of	families’	own	implication	in	the	death.	Families	are	driven	by	a	need	to	lessen	their	intense	guilt	and	regret	at	partaking	in	and	losing	a	gamble	taken	in	order	to	improve	their	economic	condition.	This	realization	brings	its	own	set	of	affective	residues	that	trouble	them	and	linger,	and	are	assuaged	not	through	subversion	or	challenge	but	rather	through	further	compliance.	The	material	compensation	offered	by	the	military	produces	guilt	and	unease,	for	it	implies	the	reduction	of	grievous	pain	to	a	crude	monetary	transaction,	but	it	also	works	to	assuage	this	loss	to	some	extent.	Claiming	this	compensation	amounts	to	making	the	sacrifice	count.	This	is	a	relationship	of	collusion	with	the	military,	spawned	in	the	unbearable	moment	of	separation	from	a	loved	one.	Affect-laden	moments	of	separation	in	which	there	is	tension	and	an	ability	to	decipher	disciplinary	frameworks	become	the	very	sites	that	permit	a	reconsolidation	of	power.		My	contribution	in	this	thesis	has	been	to	provide	two	further	elaborations	of	this	notion	of	ideology	as	‘fantasy’,	an	escape	from	the	unacceptable	reality,	not	that	the	nation-army	used	the	soldier	as	cannon	fodder	but	that	they	(family)	themselves	are	implicated	in	that	fact.	Both	these	elaborations	implicate	affect:	it	is	affect,	both	produced	and	disciplined	by	the	military,	that	makes	these	fantasies	come	alive;	and	it	is	also	affect	–	its	afterlife	and	residues	–	that	makes	these	fantasies	forever	vulnerable,	never	still	and	therefore	in	need	of	constant	validation.		
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I	thus	argue	that	power	and	ideology	work	to	make	us	subjects	in	flawed,	incomplete	ways,	and	that	spaces	for	disaffection	and	ambivalence	are	part	of	these	relationships	between	the	military	and	its	subjects.	In	this	context,	the	affective	selves	produced	in	nationalist	and	religious	discourses	react,	respond	and	bond	with	the	discourse	in	more	complicated	ways	than	simply	duping	through	ideology	or	buying	off	materially.	These	symbiotic	relationships	are	fuelled	by	deeply	felt	affect	that	leads	families	to	cling	to	and	be	soothed	by	these	narratives	of	sacrifice	for	and	service	to	the	Islamic	nation-state.	The	scripts	of	nation	and	religion	that	are	offered	then	become	a	language	that	allows	them	to	stand	either	on	the	national	stage	or	in	the	local	space,	available	cultural	constructions	of	sacrifice	and	honour	that	can	make	an	intolerable	loss	breathable.		
Gendering	the	Subject		This	thesis	has	paid	attention	to	four	specific	sites	where	the	female	subject	of	militarism	become	a	preoccupation	for	the	masculine	military,	and	has	used	these	sites	to	understand	how	the	military	engages	with	the	female	subject.	Through	depictions	of	the	exalted	mother	of	the	shaheed	(Chapter	1),	the	desire	for	distance	from	the	feminine	as	a	rite	of	passage	for	the	soldier	subject	(Chapter	3),	the	military’s	preoccupation	with	the	ways	men	and	women	grieve	(Chapter	4)	and	the	military’s	engagement	and	discomfort	with	the	widow	figure	and	the	incomplete	feminized	body	of	the	disabled	soldier	(Chapter	5),	this	thesis	has	nuanced	the	relationship	between	the	military	and	its	female	subjects,	the	mothers	and	widows	of	dead	soldiers.		The	military	finds	women’s	affect	problematic	and	in	need	of	regulation,	yet	at	the	same	time	it	is	also	craved	by	the	militaristic	project.	The	subjectivities	of	soldiers	at	the	training	centre	emerge	from	a	conscious	and	deliberate	effort	to	create	distance	from	the	contaminating	effect	of	the	civilian	and	feminine.	Here,	boys	become	men,	or	soldiers,	by	giving	up	stubborn	bonds	of	attachment	and	mastering	fear,	both	of	which	are	associated	with	the	feminine.	The	female	subject’s	grief	also	becomes	a	point	of	concern	for	both	the	military	and	the	men	of	the	village	at	the	time	of	the	soldier’s	death.	This	is	dealt	with	by	the	military	institution	by	subordinating	women	and	their	emotions	beneath	the	faculties	of	reason,	a	denigrated	status	where	her	affect	is	considered	unreasonable	and	in	need	of	restraint	(Ahmed	2004).	The	military	calls	upon	men	to	manage	the	grief	of	the	women	in	their	family	and	grieve	differently	from	them.	This	differentiation	allows	the	men	in	the	family	to	regain	their	sense	of	masculinity,	which	is	momentarily	threatened	by	their	own	overwhelming	grief	and	the	military’s	takeover	of	death	and	its	rites.	These	examples	construct	the	feminine	and	the	female	subject	as	polluting,	troublesome	and	in	
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need	of	restraint,	even	though	they	are	important	in	producing	differentiations	between	men	and	women.			I	also	present	how	the	affect	of	the	female	subject	is	actively	appropriated	and	in	some	cases	exalted.	Military	compensation	favours	female	dependents,	the	mother	or	wife	of	the	dead	solider.	Here,	the	female	dependent	perhaps	represents	the	ideal	subject	for	a	compensatory	regime	that	wishes	to	be	masked.	The	exchange	of	money	in	return	for	the	sacrifice	of	life	is	deemed	less	transactional	and	materialistic	when	the	recipient	is	the	female	subject,	for	this	supports	the	trope	of	the	vulnerable	woman	(the	nation)	in	need	of	protection	from	the	masculine	soldier	(the	military).	The	military	institution	also	deems	the	female	subject’s	ability	to	express	grief	and	invoke	it	in	others,	which	was	previously	considered	problematic,	vital	for	the	spectacles	of	mourning	that	it	orchestrates.	In	commemorative	events,	this	excessive	primitive	affect	of	women	is	the	very	substance	of	what	is	re-worked	and	appropriated	to	fuel	these	performances	for	the	
qaum.		The	militarized	self	(the	soldier)	and	the	military	are	gendered	not	just	in	an	instrumental	way,	to	fight	wars	or	defend	the	nation,	but	because	it	cannot	be	imagined	without	bringing	in	the	feminine:	‘The	female	is	the	ground	from	which	the	male	imagines,	produces	or	transforms	himself’	(Chopra,	Osella	&	Osella	2004:23).	Without	this	engagement	with	the	feminine,	the	militarized	self	(the	soldier)	and	the	masculine	military	are	capable	neither	of	delineating	their	own	boundaries	nor	of	capitalizing	on	affective	manipulation.	I	thus	argue	that	the	masculine	military	institution,	nurtured	on	the	idea	of	separation	and	difference	from	the	feminine,	contains	both	a	discomfort	with	the	female	subject	and	yet	a	constant	need	to	engage	with	it.	
The	Growing	Shadow	of	the	Shuhada	Monument	In	September	2016,	as	I	write	the	concluding	section	of	my	thesis,	three	years	on	from	when	I	began	it,	General	Raheel	Sharif,	one	of	the	most	popular	of	the	generals	who	have	headed	the	military	establishment	since	Pakistan’s	inception,	has	just	delivered	what	can	be	dubbed	a	‘State	of	the	Union’	address	at	the	YeD	commemoration	ceremony.178	The	fact	that	in	a	democracy	this	address	can	be	made	by	the	Chief	of	Army	Staff,	broadcast	live	across	the	nation	and	quoted	the	next	day	in	the	press,	electronic	media	and	newspapers	alike,	and	that	the	subject	matter	of	this	address	covers	issues	of	governance,	the	criminal	justice	system,	economic	development,	foreign	policy,	terrorism																																									 																					178	Sattar,	B.	(2016,	September	10).	State	of	the	Union.	The	News.	Retrieved	from	https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/149153-State-of-the-union	
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and	corruption,	without	as	much	as	a	raised	eyebrow,	powerfully	demonstrates	how	the	military	establishment	positions	itself	in	the	polity	of	Pakistan.			The	military’s	ability	to	create	this	space	(YeD	&	YeS)	to	communicate	directly	with	the	nation	or	interfere	in	state	affairs	may	come	as	no	surprise	in	the	context	of	Pakistan,	but	what	is	perhaps	significant	to	note	here	is	the	nature	of	the	platform	it	uses	to	assert	its	power:	the	stage	that	pays	homage	to	its	dead.	An	examination	of	the	YeS/YeD	stage,	with	which	this	thesis	began	as	a	site	for	investigating	the	hows	of	military	appeal	and	its	dominance	in	Pakistan,	brings	into	sharp	focus	the	centrality	of	carefully	crafted	narratives	of	grief	and	mourning	in	the	messaging	the	military	puts	out	for	the	nation.			In	2007,	General	Raheel	Sharif’s	predecessor,	General	Ashfaq	Pervez	Kayani,	inherited	an	army	that	desperately	needed	to	rehabilitate	its	image	in	the	wake	of	General	Pervez	Musharraf’s	long	and	contentious	military	takeover.	The	threat	of	terrorism,	directly	associated	with	the	GWOT,	was	also	increasing,	and	the	military	was	coming	under	attack	from	both	Islamic	militants	and	Islamic	political	parties.	General	Kayani’s	primary	focus	during	his	tenure	was	to	acknowledge	the	military	rank	and	file,	and	according	to	some	analysts	there	was	an	unprecedented	focus	on	the	welfare	of	soldiers.179	General	Kayani	also	declared	Youm-	e-	Shuhada,	upgraded	compensation	packages	and	administrative	procedures	and	improved	the	GHQ’s	mechanisms	for	handling	shuhada	and	WWPs.	While	General	Sharif	continued	these	policies	when	he	took	over	in	2013,	he	is	believed	to	have	had	a	stronger	external	focus,	with	his	period	featuring	more	interference	in	civilian	affairs.	However,	I	contend	that	the	line	drawn	between	General	Kayani’s	focus	on	internal	military	matters	and	General	Raheel	Sharif’s	more	outward	and	popular	public	persona	is	illusory.	The	inward	focus	and	image	building	around	the	shaheed	and	sacrifice	that	intensified	during	General	Kiyani’s	time	acted	as	a	powerful	enabler,	legitimizing	the	military	and	helping	it	re-build	its	reputation	and	image.	At	this	particular	juncture	in	Pakistan’s	history,	with	the	army	at	war,	power	ostensibly	rests	in	civilian	hands,	but	rising	casualties	and	the	commemorative	stage	at	its	disposal	give	the	military	more	ammunition	and	leverage	to	retain	their	hold	over	civilian	affairs	of	the	state.	It	is	this	vast	arsenal	at	the	disposal	of	the	military	establishment,	allowing	it	to	produce	and	discipline	affect	through	the	tropes	of	martyrdom,	service	and	sacrifice,	that	it	zealously	and	relentlessly	deploys	in	its	relationship	with	the	nation.	Much	like	the	
																																								 																					179	Gul,	I.	(2016,	September	16).	Armed	but	not	dangerous.	The	Friday	Times.		Retrieved	from		http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/armed-but-not-dangerous		
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soldier	trained	at	the	regimental	centre	on	tropes	of	honour,	love	and	family,	the	nation	is	also	disciplined	and	made	docile	through	affect,	grief	and	love.		To	understand	how	affect	operates	as	a	mediator	in	the	militarism	project,	this	thesis	has	traced	the	different	treatment	meted	out	to	the	civilian	dead	and	the	dead	in	uniform.	In	the	case	of	civilians	who	die	as	a	result	of	an	act	of	terror,	commemoration	serves	to	honour	the	dead	and	thus	hide	the	ineptitude	of	the	state,	or	worse,	its	complicity.	The	logic	behind	most	material	compensation	regimes	offered	by	the	state	is	to	address	losses	incurred	by	its	citizens	for	which	the	state	takes	responsibility.	In	cases	of	military	death,	commemoration	and	compensation	regimes	are	driven	by	different	imperatives.	Commemoration	of	military	deaths	acts	not	just	to	deflect	criticism	of	the	state	or	military	institutions,	or	to	distract	from	their	culpability,	but	serves	the	far	more	strategic	goal	of	creating	an	image	of	the	dead	as	selfless	and	willing	martyrs	for	the	nation-state.	While	a	systematic	military	compensation	regime	exists,	in	contrast	to	the	compensation	regime	for	civilian	dead,	which	is	visible	and	bitterly	contested,	it	remains	masked	in	military	commemorative	spaces.	This	is	made	possible	by	a	number	of	watchful	institutional	mechanisms	that	filter	out	this	aspect	on	the	national	stage	and	address	grievances	in	local	spaces.	I	suggest	that	this	masking	is	desired	because	calculating	and	transacting	a	loss	essentially	entails	that	its	price	has	been	paid	and	the	transaction	completed.	The	military	instead	seeks	a	position	where	it	must	be	able	to	continually	extract	compensation	from	the	nation,	in	the	form	of	support	and	loyalty,	for	the	sacrifices	that	it	has	made	that	cannot	be	compensated.	Simply	put,	in	cases	of	civilian	death,	the	purpose	is	to	assuage	or	lessen	the	grief	and	affect	around	death,	and	compensation	regimes	are	a	visible	means	of	doing	so.	With	military	deaths,	there	is	a	deliberate	attempt	to	produce	and	appropriate	grief	and	affect,	which	is	more	potent	if	compensatory	regimes	remain	masked.	
Commemorating	the	dead	and	compensating	for	their	deaths	involves	two	sets	of	relationships,	the	first	of	which	is	between	the	military	and	its	direct	subjects	and	involves	cultivating	a	relationship	moulded	by	material	compensation	and	accompanied	by	rituals	of	meaning-making	and	commemoration	in	local	spaces	and	on	the	national	stage.	The	deliberate	masking	of	the	former	allows	a	second	set	of	relationships	to	develop	between	the	military	and	the	nation,	for	which	the	transaction	of	compensation	is	extractive,	i.e.	aimed	at	extracting	legitimacy	and	unquestioned	support	for	the	military	institution	and	its	policies.	
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Mediating	Militarism	through	Affect	While	my	analysis	has	been	concerned	with	the	centrality	of	affect	as	a	technology	of	rule	in	militarism	in	the	context	of	Pakistan,	this	thesis	also	responds	to	broader	theoretical	concerns	about	the	working	of	the	hegemonic	power	relations	that	nurture	militarism,	and	their	limits.	The	focus	of	this	thesis	has	been	on	the	military	institution.	However,	what	has	been	examined	is	the	affective	relationships	crafted	within	militarism,	and	hence	I	suggest	that	these	claims	also	extend	to	states	where	military	or	militaristic	goals	may	be	subsumed	under	the	state.	The	call	to	militarism,	which	in	the	context	of	state	armies	is	closely	associated	with	nationalism,	can	be	a	project	of	the	state	as	much	as	of	the	military	per	se.			To	decipher	the	insidious	appeal	of	militarism	it	is	perhaps	vital	to	understand	the	experiences	and	motivations	of	its	foot	soldiers,	those	who	die	and	those	who	let	their	loved	ones	die	for	projects	or	ideologies	by	which	they	may	not	be	duped.	This	opens	up	more	intimate	and	perhaps	more	obscure	avenues	to	study	the	mechanisms	through	which	the	militarism	project	works	and	which	sometimes	place	it	beyond	meaningful	scrutiny	and	question.	There	are	two	inter-related	reasons	why	a	focus	on	the	affective	domain	represents	a	much-needed	window	for	understanding	how	militaristic	narratives	of	sacrifice	and	service	to	the	nation-state	have	valence	with	populations.	First	and	foremost,	it	allows	us	to	recognize	that	affect	is	the	substance	that	makes	these	fantasies	or	beliefs	in	militaristic	narratives	possible.	By	attending	to	this	substance,	we	are	able	to	see	the	disjuncture	between	the	hegemonic	project	and	its	reception	at	the	local	level,	cracks	that	are	also	allowed	expression	through	affect.	The	focus	on	affect	permits	us	to	record	the	incomplete	and	fractured	processes	through	which	modern	militarism	claims	its	subjects.	It	also	allows	us	to	understand	how	this	disjuncture	functions	as	a	further	reconsolidation	of	hegemonic	power	where	anxieties	and	guilt	tightly	bound	together	with	economic	imperatives	underlie	the	apparent	complicity	between	the	powerful	and	the	powerless.	Second	it	enables	an	understanding	of	how	the	affect	associated	with	military	death	and	grief	can	act	as	a	formidable	deterrent	to	any	challenge	to	or	questioning	of	the	militarism	project.	This	ability	to	stifle	dissent,	whether	among	the	direct	subjects	of	militarism	or	within	the	larger	group	that	I	refer	to	in	this	thesis	as	the	nation,	needs	more	scrutiny.		In	2007,	around	the	time	of	the	Iraq	War,	the	British	government	rolled	out	a	campaign	with	the	backing	of	The	Sun	which	aimed	at	bringing	public	attention	to	the	working	conditions	of	military	employees	and	through	that	it	‘remind[ed]	the	nation	of	the	debt	of	honour	it	owed	to	the	soldiers	who	fought	on	its	behalf’	(Ware	2012:267).	The	campaign	also	intended	to	sever	the	connection	between	
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the	army	and	the	unpopular	war	in	Iraq	by	‘separat[ing]	the	men	from	the	mission’.	(Ingham	and	Dandeker	2010	qtd.	in	Ware	2012:267).	The	ability	of	affect	to	stifle	challenge	has	been	documented	in	studies	of	anti-war	activism	that	have	shown	how	criticism	is	weakened	by	a	desire	to	show	respect	for	the	families	of	the	deceased	and	the	sentiments	of	soldiers	(Wasinksi	2008).		Even	where	state	policies	or	actions	that	have	led	to	combat	have	been	challenged,	or	when	movements	are	fuelled	by	a	realization	of	the	unjustness	or	meaninglessness	of	war,	limits	are	placed	on	this	critique	by	an	‘emotional	pull’	that	demands	that	protestors	‘support	the	troops’,	if	not	the	war,	and	there	remains	a	concurrent	reverence	of	the	troops,	who	can	be	pitied	for	being	misled	while	remaining	heroic	in	the	act	of	sacrifice	(Managhan	2011:43).			In	the	context	of	the	US	perpetration	of	the	Iraq	war,	Christophe	Wassinki	suggests	that		 [t]he	most	important	part	of	the	contestation	of	the	war	expresses	itself	as	a	sort	of	pity	policy,	taking	an	attitude	focused	on	the	suffering	of	the	deceased	presented	only	as	victims.	In	this	situation,	death	is	not	presented	as	the	result	of	an	unjust	system	but,	mainly,	as	something	to	be	regretted	because	of	the	suffering	borne	(2008:125).	Does	this	lead	us	down	a	blind	alley,	where	challenge	to	the	sacredness	of	martyrdom	for	the	nation-state	becomes	sealed	inside	the	affect	attached	to	the	grief	and	suffering	of	death?	I	contend	that	this	would	perhaps	be	too	hasty	a	conclusion.	Below	I	address	the	barriers	and	potential	for	challenge	in	each	set	of	subjects	separately.		This	thesis	has	outlined	the	many	times	that,	despite	overt	compliance	with	affective	regulation,	the	affect	of	soldiers	and	families	escapes	discipline	and	expresses	itself	through	emotion	that	frees	it	up	to	challenge	regimes	of	power.	Affect,	deemed	so	appropriate	for	consolidating	hegemony’s	hold	over	its	subjects,	becomes	the	very	medium	that	allows	subjects	to	express	discontent.	While	these	may	be	deeply	ambivalent	acts	of	protest	that	allow	subversion	to	exist	in	the	military	side	by	side	with	complicity	(Gutmann	and	Lutz	2010)	and	also	possibly	function	as	‘safety	valves’	(Abu	Lughod	1990:47),	they	do	reveal	an	interesting	trajectory	in	how	subjects	escape	subjection	at	various	points	in	time.	I	contend	that	understanding	these	‘diagnostics	of	power’	is	important	(Abu	Lughod	1990:47).	I	do	not	suggest	that	this	trajectory	leads	to	resistance	and	subversion	of	militarism,	in	fact	my	thesis	has	consistently	recorded	otherwise,	but	I	posit	that	laying	bare	these	mechanisms	and	recording	these	dissonances	is	not	just	an	important	theoretical	exercise	for	understanding	power	and	how	it	works,	but	also	a	political	one,	as	I	will	explain	below.	
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In	the	case	of	the	second	set	of	subjects,	the	nation,	modern	militarism	operates	through	a	blurring	and	mixing	of	spaces,	so	that	the	lines	between	the	civilian	and	the	military	are	redrawn	or	constantly	shift	(Lutz	and	Bartlett	1995;	Lalarukh	1997;	Baber	2000;	Altinay	2004;	Lutz	2006;	Saigol	2013).	I	have	shown	how	events	that	commemorate	war	martyrs	represent	a	civilianization	of	military	spaces,	an	opposite	move	to	that	which	is	normally	studied	in	militarism,	the	militarization	of	civilian	spaces.	This	move	is	in	fact	an	incorporation	of	the	civilian	within	military	spaces,	with	civilian	subjects	participating	in	the	reproduction	of	military	power.	This	mixing	of	the	civilian	with	the	military	creates	a	powerful	illusion	of	participation,	compliance	and	support.	The	illusion	created	is	that	of	families	willingly	suffering	this	violence	against	their	loved	ones.	I	call	this	an	illusion	of	
authenticity,	because	while	it	draws	on	experienced	affect	and	pain,	and	thus	represents	genuineness,	it	is	carefully	crafted	and	presented.	This	illusion	of	authenticity,	representing	an	alliance	between	the	victims	of	war	and	its	perpetrators,	is	not	questioned,	because	to	challenge	these	‘spectacles	of	power’180	is	to	refute	or	dishonour	both	the	nation-state,	personified	by	state	policy,	and	the	genuine	affect	of	the	families	on	display.	The	state	(the	military)	creates	a	false	equivalence	between	the	affect	produced	in	response	to	the	death	of	its	soldiers	and	itself	as	an	institution.	Just	as	authentic	grief	and	loss	cannot	be	questioned,	the	state	(military)	cannot	be	questioned.	This	false	equivalence	acts	as	an	arsenal	at	the	state’s	(the	military’s)	disposal	to	be	used	to	discipline	and	control	public	opinion	in	its	favour.			If	we	are	to	understand	militarism’s	ability	to	establish	preparation	for	war	as	normal	and	necessary	(Mann	1987)	and	demand	sacrifice	from	its	subjects,	it	is	important	to	make	visible	the	mechanisms	through	which	it	makes	this	appeal.	This	appeal	is	meshed	together	deliberately	with	the	bodies	of	the	dead	and	the	affect	associated	with	them.	Any	attempt	to	study	this	appeal	must	record	the	centrality	of	affect	(especially	around	death)	to	militarism	and	how	it	is	deployed	to	mask	the	illusory	nature	of	this	appeal.	There	are	three	sequential	ways	in	which	this	opens	up	the	possibility	of	a	more	potent	and	political	challenge	to	militarism:	first,	by	understanding	that	the	subjects’	complicity	in	militarism	does	not	reflect	a	willingness	to	sacrifice	based	on	some	transcendental	notion	of	sacrifice	for	the	nation-state;	second,	by	challenging	the	false	equivalence	highlighted	earlier	which	suggests	that	questioning	war	or	the	hegemony	of	the	military	state	is	the	same	as	disrespecting	the	affect	produced	in	response	to	the	death	of	its	soldiers;	and	third,	and	perhaps	most	challenging,	by	deconstructing	narratives	of																																									 																					180	Khaled	Fahmy	(1997:8)	uses	this	term	to	describe	images	that	represent	the	power	of	the	state.	I	invoke	it	to	describe	commemorative	ceremonies	organized	by	the	state	that	are	crafted	as	deeply	touching	and	poignant	events	that	leave	the	viewer	with	a	sense	of	awe	at	the	state’s	ability	to	summon	such	sacrifice.	
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heroism,	pity	for	suffering	and	meaningful	death	in	war	and	acknowledging	that	war	can	never	be	glorious	and	participation	in	it	is	always	dishonourable,	so	that	‘the	dead	soldiers	who	had	participated	in	that	enterprise	should	not	be	considered	as	heroes,	should	not	be	mourned	for	long	by	the	community,	and	should	not	be	taken	as	social	examples’	(Wasinksi	2008:125).		As	long	as	war	is	glorious	and	the	dead	are	heroes,	even	if	they	are	to	be	pitied	as	bache	or	majboor	(as	I	documented	in	Chapter	6),	and	as	long	as	service	in	the	military	is	not	called	out	for	what	it	is	essentially	is,	a	viable	source	of	pakki	
naukri	for	the	more	economically	disadvantaged	(as	I	documented	in	chapters	2,	3,	4	and	5),	the	state’s	(military’s)	ability	to	weave	service	and	sacrifice	as	noble	and	draw	in	its	foot	soldiers	will	be	sustained.	This	thesis	has	shown	that	the	very	subjects	whose	affect	is	constructed	as	sacred,	a	sacredness	that	in	turn	is	used	to	stifle	questioning	and	debate,	acknowledge	at	least	some	of	these	threads.	The	political	potential	of	this	look	at	militarism	which	adequately	deconstructs	the	moments	of	disjuncture	between	the	hegemonic	project	and	its	reception	by	its	immediate	subjects	lies	in	its	ability	to	trouble	the	apparent	untroubled	association	between	the	military	and	these	families.	By	doing	so	it	reduces	to	some	extent	the	military’s	ability	to	use	affect	as	a	technology	of	rule	with	both	its	immediate	subjects	and	members	of	the	general	public.		Michel	Foucault	(1998:86)	reminds	us	that	‘[Power’s]	success	is	proportional	to	its	ability	to	hide	its	own	mechanisms’.	My	intention	in	scrutinizing	these	technologies	of	rule	was	to	contribute	to	opening	a	debate	that	can	resist	interrogation	because	of	the	reverence	and	respect	accorded	to	the	feelings	of	the	families	of	the	deceased	and	the	tightly-knit	tropes	of	martyrdom	and	sacrifice	purportedly	undertaken	through	ideologies	of	nation	and	religion.	These	ideologies	of	nation	and	religion	are	but	an	afterthought,	and	it	is	in	part	through	the	construction	of	subjectivities	through	affect	that	militarism	maintains	its	tenacious	hold	over	the	nation-state	and	its	politics.	If	studies	of	militarism	can	document	subjects	in	their	lived	complexities,	both	complicit	in	and	disengaged	from	these	projects,	if	the	affect	of	militarist	subjectivities	can	be	recorded	as	both	manufactured	and	authentic,	then	perhaps	scholarship	on	militarism,	as	well	as	anti-war	critique,	can	begin	to	challenge	the	foundations	of	the	carefully	manufactured	truth	that	men,	women	and	sacrifice	for	the	nation-state	go	hand	in	hand.	
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